William MacOn v. TDCJ-ID ( 2012 )


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  •                                  IN THE
    TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-10-00150-CV
    WILLIAM MACON,
    Appellant
    v.
    TDCJ-ID, ET AL,
    Appellees
    From the 278th District Court
    Walker County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 24,659
    DISSENTING OPINION
    The problem presented in this appeal is a recurring problem in inmate litigation
    against State employees and the State: After suit is brought, some defendants are
    served and some are not; a dismissal of some defendants is granted—maybe even of all
    the defendants that have been served; and then an appeal. The question we must first
    decide is whether we have jurisdiction of the appeal.
    JURISDICTION AS AN INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL?
    The Court relies on Fuller to hold that as an interlocutory appeal, we have no
    jurisdiction to review the trial court’s order/judgment of dismissal. See Fuller v. Moya,
    No. 10-09-00294-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 9596 (Tex. App.—Waco Dec. 16, 2009, no
    pet.) (mem. op.). This is based upon the Court’s determination, in reliance on Fuller,
    that the judgment is not final. Even if the judgment is not final, we nevertheless have
    jurisdiction of this proceeding as an interlocutory appeal expressly authorized by
    statute. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (West Supp. 2011). The served
    defendants filed a plea to the jurisdiction requesting a dismissal of the case pursuant to
    section 101.106(f) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 
    Id. § 101.106(f)
    (West
    2011). An interlocutory appeal is permitted from an order which either grants or denies
    a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit. 
    Id. § 51.014(a)(8)
    (West Supp. 2011).
    To give the phrase "grants or denies" its full effect, section 51.014(a)(8) must allow an
    appeal to be filed by both a non-governmental plaintiff challenging the grant of a plea
    to the jurisdiction and a governmental defendant challenging the denial of one. Tex.
    A&M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 
    233 S.W.3d 835
    , 843 (Tex. 2007). Further, State officials or
    employees may file a plea to the jurisdiction and may appeal its denial pursuant to
    Section 51.014(a)(8). See 
    id. at 844-845.
    Because Macon is appealing from the trial
    court’s order granting the defendants’ plea to the jurisdiction brought by a
    governmental unit, Macon is permitted, by statute, to appeal that interlocutory order.
    Macon v. TDCJ                                                                       Page 2
    JURISDICTION AS AN APPEAL OF A FINAL JUDGMENT?
    We would also have jurisdiction of this appeal if it is an appeal of a final
    judgment. On this issue, I agree with the Court that the text of the order is not always
    determinative of the legal analysis of finality. Further, I agree that what happens after
    the order of dismissal, specifically the conduct of the parties and the trial court, is
    important to the analysis but also is not necessarily determinative. For example in one
    of our cases, Fuller, mentioned above and relied upon by the Court, the defendants that
    had been served before the dismissal order was rendered answered and the
    plaintiff/inmate continued to have other defendants served and continued to prosecute
    his case in the trial court against the other defendants. The order of dismissal in that
    proceeding did not have any indication of finality as to the other defendants or the
    intent to address the entire relief requested in the proceeding. The dismissal order
    simply dismissed the suit as against the two defendants that had been served and had
    filed a motion to dismiss. In what could be characterized as an abundance of caution,
    the inmate, Fuller, also filed an appeal which we dismissed because we determined we
    had no jurisdiction of the interlocutory appeal because we determined that based on the
    wording of the order of dismissal and the subsequent activity of the parties and the trial
    court, the trial court did not intend the dismissal order of only some of the defendants
    to be a final judgment in the trial court proceeding. 
    Id. at *2-3.
    Macon v. TDCJ                                                                       Page 3
    This proceeding, however, is different. Like Fuller, in this proceeding all the
    defendants that had been served were dismissed. Unlike Fuller, the trial court’s order
    contains language that indicates finality; a version of the traditional Mother-Hubbard
    clause. And also unlike Fuller, Macon’s subsequent conduct indicates that he believes
    the judgment is final and he does not intend to take any further action in the trial court
    until the appeal is resolved. Specifically, the only defendant not served is a named
    building owned by TDCJ, and Macon contends that the clerk erred in not properly
    effecting service.
    Macon has thus indicated by his conduct and his complaint on appeal that he is
    going to take no further action in the trial court to serve the remaining defendant. If
    this appeal is dismissed, the matter will sit on the trial court’s docket with nothing for
    the trial court to rule upon or decide. Presumably, it will sit there until one of the
    parties takes some additional action, although what that action may be is not clear, or
    until it is dismissed for want of prosecution.
    It is clear that the parties believe that the trial court intended a final judgment.
    The judgment is labeled “ORDER OF DISMISSAL AND FINAL JUDGMENT” and ends
    with the order that: “The court denies all relief not expressly granted in this judgment.”
    Therefore, the judgment disposes of every defendant that was served and all the relief
    requested. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 
    39 S.W.3d 191
    , 195 (Tex. 2001). Macon’s issue
    Macon v. TDCJ                                                                        Page 4
    on appeal is whether the clerk erred in some manner in connection with failing to
    effectuate service on the remaining named defendant.1
    Based on the facts in this proceeding I would hold that the trial court intended a
    final judgment and that the judgment is final for purposes of appeal and proceed to
    address the legal merits of Macon’s issue on appeal since the briefs on the merits have
    already been filed.
    CONCLUSION
    Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the determination that we have no
    jurisdiction of this appeal.
    TOM GRAY
    Chief Justice
    Dissenting Opinion issued and filed May 23, 2012
    1 Macon apparently contends in the alternative in his brief that the remaining defendant was actually
    served.
    Macon v. TDCJ                                                                                 Page 5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-10-00150-CV

Filed Date: 5/23/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/16/2015