Dorothy Manning v. Don Meadows, Sheriff ( 2018 )


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  •                             STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    Dorothy Manning,
    Melinda Bailey and                                                                 FILED
    Taylor Bailey, by her next friend                                              October 12, 2018
    and guardian/natural mother, Melinda Bailey,                                    EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
    Plaintiffs Below, Petitioners                                                   SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    OF WEST VIRGINIA
    vs.) No. 17-0798 (Mercer County 14-C-406)
    Don Meadows, individually and in his
    Capacity as the Sheriff of Mercer County, and
    The Mercer County Commission,
    Defendants Below, Respondents
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Petitioners Dorothy Manning, Melinda Bailey, and Taylor Bailey, by her next friend and
    guardian/natural mother, Melinda Bailey, by counsel Anthony M. Salvatore, appeal the Circuit
    Court of Mercer County’s August 18, 2017, order granting respondents’ motion for summary
    judgment. Respondents Don Meadows, individually and in his capacity as the Sheriff of Mercer
    County, and the Mercer County Commission, by counsel James C. Stebbins and Spencer D.
    Elliott, filed a response. On appeal, petitioners argue that the circuit court erred in granting
    respondents’ motion for summary judgment.
    This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal
    arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided
    by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record
    presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these
    reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21
    of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    On March 18, 2014, petitioners attended a magistrate court hearing at the Mercer County
    Courthouse. The hearing involved a dispute between petitioner Taylor Bailey and another high
    school student. Petitioners alleged that following the hearing, Sheriff Meadows became irate,
    screaming and yelling at them in a violent and threatening manner. Sheriff Meadows admitted
    that he issued a verbal warning to petitioners, but denied screaming or yelling in a threatening
    manner. Following the incident, petitioners filed a complaint against respondents alleging
    intentional infliction of emotional distress. In regard to damages, petitioners claimed that they
    suffered from severe emotional distress and anxiety as a result of the incident with Sheriff
    Meadows.
    1
    Thereafter, respondents filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the
    West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondents argued that Sheriff Meadows’s alleged
    conduct did not rise to the level required to prove the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
    distress. Respondents requested that the circuit court grant summary judgment if the circuit court
    found no genuine issues of material fact. Petitioners filed a response in opposition arguing that
    there were genuine issues for trial and that the actions of Sheriff Meadows caused them to suffer
    severe emotional distress and anxiety.
    During the August 16, 2017, hearing on respondents’ motion for summary judgment, the
    circuit court found that petitioners did not meet the elements of intentional infliction of
    emotional distress necessary to recover damages. In its order granting summary judgment, the
    circuit court explained that
    [f]irst, as a matter of law, the conduct reported by [petitioners] was not so extreme
    and outrageous that it would go beyond all possible bounds of decency. This is an
    absolute requirement for the first element of the tort of [intentional infliction of
    emotional distress] to be met. This [c]ourt, as gatekeeper for frivolous claims, has
    a duty to dismiss an action when as a matter of law the conduct complained of is
    not outrageous; rather, it was only an incident where someone was inconsiderate
    and unkind. As the West Virginia Supreme Court has explained, society is
    expected to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language and it is certainly
    not this [c]ourt’s duty to intervene every time someone’s feelings are hurt.
    The circuit court further noted in its order that petitioners had not been diagnosed with post-
    traumatic stress disorder, nor had they incurred any medical expenses as a result of the incident
    with Sheriff Meadows. In their complaint, petitioners did not allege any physical threats by
    Sheriff Meadows or any physical injury. While Taylor Bailey stated that she experienced one
    episode of sleep paralysis, nightmares, a fear of being pulled over by a police officer, and high
    blood pressure, she was on high blood pressure medication prior to the incident and failed to
    seek any medical treatment as a result of this incident. Additionally, Melinda Bailey complained
    of high blood pressure, sleep-loss, nightmares, and diagnosed herself with post-traumatic stress
    disorder. However, she admitted that she was previously prescribed Xanax and Lexapro before
    the incident occurred, and also admitted that she did not go to a psychologist or psychiatrist
    following the incident. Lastly, Dorothy Manning claimed to have post-traumatic stress disorder
    and complained of nightmares, hair loss, diabetes, and high blood pressure, but admitted to
    taking three Xanaxes a day prior to the incident and further admitted that none of her medication
    changed following the incident with Sheriff Meadows.
    The circuit court also noted that in petitioners’ response to the motion for summary
    judgment, “there was merely a bare recitation of the facts with the depositions included. There
    was no argument or evidence presented that would lead this [c]ourt to believe this claim should
    not be dismissed.” Ultimately, the circuit court found that there were no material factual issues in
    dispute which could lead a reasonable jury to find respondents liable. Accordingly, respondents’
    motion for summary judgment was granted and the case was dismissed. It is from the circuit
    court’s August 18, 2017, order granting summary judgment that petitioners appeal.
    2
    Our standards of review for cases concerning summary judgment are well settled. “A
    circuit court’s entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.” Syl. Pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192
    W.Va. 189, 
    451 S.E.2d 755
    (1994). In conducting our de novo review, we apply the same
    standard for granting summary judgment that is applied by the circuit court. Under that standard,
    “‘[a] motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is
    clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the
    facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law.’ Syllabus Point 3, Aetna
    Casualty & Surety Co. v. Federal Insurance Co. of New York, 148 W.Va. 160,
    
    133 S.E.2d 770
    (1963).” Syllabus Point 1, Andrick v. Town of Buckhannon, 187
    W.Va. 706, 
    421 S.E.2d 247
    (1992).
    Painter, 192 W.Va. at 
    190, 451 S.E.2d at 756
    , Syl. Pt. 2. In other words,
    [s]ummary judgment is appropriate where the record taken as a whole
    could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, such as
    where the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an
    essential element of the case that it has the burden to prove.
    Id. at 
    190, 451 S.E.2d at 756
    , Syl. Pt. 4. We have held that “[t]he circuit court’s function at the
    summary judgment stage is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but
    is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 
    190, 451 S.E.2d at 756
    , Syl. Pt.
    3.
    On appeal, petitioners argue that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in
    favor of respondents. Petitioners acknowledge that, pursuant to Rule 56(e) of the West Virginia
    Rules of Civil Procedure, the party responding to a motion for summary judgment “must set
    forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”  However, the circuit court
    noted that in their response to the motion for summary judgment, petitioners failed to provide an
    “argument or evidence . . . that would lead th[e] [c]ourt to believe this claim should not be
    dismissed.” Further, while petitioners argue on appeal that “depositions made the record replete
    with evidence from which a jury could have concluded in [petitioners’] favor,” petitioners fail to
    cite to this evidence or explain to what evidence they are referring. Moreover, the record is
    devoid of any issues of material fact raised by petitioners that would need to be brought to trial.
    Therefore, the circuit court determined that there were no material issues for trial, and we agree.
    Next, petitioners argue that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in
    regard to their claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress because a jury may have
    “concluded in [petitioners’] favor.” However, as discussed above, the circuit court correctly
    concluded that there were no issues for trial. Nevertheless, we have held that
    [i]n order for a plaintiff to prevail on a claim for intentional or reckless
    infliction of emotional distress, four elements must be established. It must be
    shown: (1) that the defendant’s conduct was atrocious, intolerable, and so extreme
    and outrageous as to exceed the bounds of decency; (2) that the defendant acted
    with the intent to inflict emotional distress, or acted recklessly when it was certain
    3
    or substantially certain emotional distress would result from his conduct; (3) that
    the actions of the defendant caused the plaintiff to suffer emotional distress; and,
    (4) that the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was so severe that no
    reasonable person could be expected to endure it.
    Syl. Pt. 3, Travis v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 202 W.Va. 369, 
    504 S.E.2d 419
    (1998). Further, we have
    also held that
    [i]n evaluating a defendant’s conduct in an intentional or reckless
    infliction of emotional distress claim, the role of the trial court is to first
    determine whether the defendant’s conduct may reasonably be regarded as so
    extreme and outrageous as to constitute the intentional or reckless infliction of
    emotional distress. Whether conduct may reasonably be considered outrageous is
    a legal question, and whether conduct is in fact outrageous is a question for jury
    determination.
    
    Id. at 371,
    504 S.E.2d at 421, Syl. Pt. 4. Whether Sheriff Meadows’s conduct may reasonably be
    considered outrageous was a question of law for the circuit court to decide. Petitioners failed to
    provide sufficient evidence to show that Sheriff Meadows’s conduct was extreme and
    outrageous. While it is undisputed that words were exchanged between Sheriff Meadows and
    petitioners, we have held that
    [l]iability [for intentional infliction of emotional distress] has been found only
    where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree,
    as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious,
    and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in
    which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would
    arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, “Outrageous!”
    
    Id. at 375,
    504 S.E.2d at 425. We have also held that “plaintiffs must necessarily be expected and
    required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to occasional acts that are
    definitely inconsiderate and unkind. There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every case
    where some one’s feelings are hurt.” Tanner v. Rite Aid of W.Va., Inc., 194 W.Va. 643, 651, 
    461 S.E.2d 149
    , 157 (1995) (citations omitted). Based upon the evidence in the record regarding
    Sheriff Meadows’s conduct, it is clear that his actions may not reasonably be considered to be
    outrageous.
    Petitioners were also required to prove that they suffered severe and unendurable
    emotional distress as a result of Sheriff Meadows’s conduct. Travis, 202 W.Va. at 
    371, 504 S.E.2d at 421
    , Syl. Pt. 4. While petitioners complained of severe emotional distress, anxiety, high
    blood pressure, and other issues as a result of the incident, petitioners admitted that they did not
    seek any medical attention following the exchange with Sheriff Meadows. Furthermore,
    evidence indicated that petitioners were prescribed medications for issues such as anxiety and
    high blood pressure prior to the incident and that their medications did not change after the
    incident. Petitioners presented no evidence below or on appeal to demonstrate that they were
    entitled to relief for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, we find no
    error in the circuit court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of respondents.
    4
    For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its
    August 18, 2017, order is hereby affirmed.
    Affirmed.
    ISSUED: October 12, 2018
    CONCURRED IN BY:
    Chief Justice Margaret L. Workman
    Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
    Justice Paul T. Farrell sitting by temporary assignment
    Justice Tim Armstead
    Justice Evan H. Jenkins
    Justice Allen H. Loughry II, suspended and therefore not participating
    5