Com. v. Connor, A. ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
v. :
:
:
ANTONIO CONNOR :
: No. 1015 EDA 2017
Appellant :
Appeal from the Order Entered February 8, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0010553-2014
BEFORE: OTT, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and RANSOM*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED MAY 31, 2018
Antonio Connor appeals from the trial court’s February 8, 2017 order
denying his motion to dismiss his felony and misdemeanor charges pursuant
to the compulsory joinder principles of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110.1 We affirm.
The facts and procedural history, as gleaned from the trial court’s
opinion and the certified record, are as follows. The Commonwealth alleges
that on July 29, 2014, at approximately 9:35 p.m., Connor entered a home
on North Carlisle Street in Philadelphia and shot Jaffrea Corley in the chest.
Corley survived after enduring multiple surgeries.
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1Our jurisdiction is secure. The order below is appealable as a collateral order,
and the trial court certified that Connor’s motion was not frivolous. See
Commonwealth v. Diggs, 172 A.3d 661, 663 (Pa.Super. 2017).
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A short time later, two Philadelphia Police Officers saw Connor driving
westbound on the 1500 block of West Diamond Street. Unaware of the
shooting, the officers attempted to stop Connor’s car for driving without its
headlights activated. Connor refused to pull over, disregarded stop signs and
traffic lights, and ultimately crashed into a wall. The officers apprehended
Connor and issued him citations for four summary traffic offenses.2 Connor
was also charged with numerous felony and misdemeanor offenses:
aggravated assault, firearms not to be carried without a license, fleeing or
attempting to elude police officer, carrying a firearm on public streets in
Philadelphia, possessing instruments of crime (“PIC”), simple assault, and
recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”).3
The summary traffic charges were tried in the Philadelphia Municipal
Court Traffic Division. On September 30, 2014, that court found Connor guilty
of all four offenses.
The felony and misdemeanor charges proceeded separately in the Court
of Common Pleas. Connor filed a motion to dismiss these charges on January
3, 2017. Citing the compulsory joinder rule of 18 Pa.C.S.A § 110, he argued
that his prior conviction for the summary offenses barred a subsequent
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2 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323 (stop signs and yield signs); 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3736
(reckless driving); 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3112 (traffic-control signals); and 75
Pa.C.S.A. § 4302 (periods for requiring lighted lamps).
3 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a), 6106(a)(1); 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733(a); and 18
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6108, 907, 2701(a), and 2705, respectively.
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prosecution of the felony and misdemeanor charges. The trial court held a
hearing on January 24, 2017, and denied the motion. This appeal followed.
Connor raises a single issue for review:
Did the trial court err in denying [Connor’s] motion to
dismiss this prosecution pursuant to 18 [Pa.C.S.A. §] 110
where the Commonwealth failed to join in one prosecution
all offenses arising from the same criminal episode and
occurring within the same judicial district, and where
[Connor] was charged and found guilty of several summary
traffic offenses prior to the commencement of trial on the
related felony and misdemeanor charges forming the basis
for the instant prosecution[?]
Connor’s Br. at 4.
Connor challenges the trial court’s application of 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 110(1)(ii). “[O]ur standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is
plenary.” Commonwealth v. Fithian, 961 A.2d 66, 71 n.4 (Pa. 2008).
Section 110 provides (subject to conditions not relevant here) that a
prior conviction or acquittal bars a subsequent prosecution for “any offense
based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode”:
Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different
provision of the statutes than a former prosecution or is
based on different facts, it is barred by such former
prosecution under the following circumstances:
The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a
conviction as defined in section 109 of this title
(relating to when prosecution barred by former
prosecution for the same offense) and the subsequent
prosecution is for:
***
(ii) any offense based on the same conduct or arising
from the same criminal episode, if such offense was
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known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the
time of the commencement of the first trial and
occurred within the same judicial district as the former
prosecution unless the court ordered a separate trial
of the charge of such offense; . . .
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110(1)(ii).
Thus, under Section 110(1)(ii), a prior conviction or acquittal precludes
a subsequent prosecution if four requirements are present:
(1) the former prosecution must have resulted in an
acquittal or conviction;
(2) the current prosecution is based upon the same criminal
conduct or arose from the same criminal episode as the
former prosecution;
(3) the prosecutor was aware of the instant charges before
the commencement of the trial on the former charges;
and
(4) the current offense occurred within the same judicial
district as the former prosecution.
Fithian, 961 A.2d at 72.
To determine whether charges arise from the same criminal episode,
courts must examine both the “‘temporal” and “logical” relationship among
the charges. Commonwealth v. Reid, 77 A.3d 579, 582 (Pa. 2013) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Hude, 458 A.2d 177, 181 (Pa. 1983)). A “logical
relationship” exists if there is a “substantial duplication” of either factual or
legal issues. Id. In conducting this analysis, a court should not limit itself to
merely comparing the offenses charged. Rather, the court “should also
consider whether . . . there is ‘commonality’ of legal issues within the two
prosecutions.” Id. at 585-86.
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In a recent case, we concluded that jurisdictional limitations applicable
in Philadelphia County permit summary traffic charges to be tried separately
from felony and misdemeanor charges. See Commonwealth v. Perfetto,
169 A.3d 1114 (Pa.Super. 2017) (en banc), appeal granted, No. 455 EAL
2017, 2018 WL 1074482 (Pa. Feb. 27, 2018). There, we held that Section 110
does not bar a subsequent prosecution for misdemeanor or felony charges,
where a previous prosecution for summary traffic offenses took place in the
Philadelphia Municipal Court Traffic Division. We explained that jurisdiction is
an implicit consideration in any compulsory joinder analysis, and the
Philadelphia Municipal Court Traffic Division has exclusive jurisdiction over
traffic offenses. Id. at 1121. We thus concluded that dismissal of the
subsequent prosecution of felony and misdemeanor charges was not proper.
Id. at 1124-25.
Here, the trial court concluded that the subsequent trial for the felony
and misdemeanor charges was not barred, because the two groups of charges
– those relating to the shooting and those relating to Connor’s driving –
stemmed from unrelated facts and did not share legal issues. The court
explained:
Although the shooting and traffic violations occurred within
a short period of time, they were based on completely
different sets of facts. At the time Officer Stevenson saw
[Connor] driving without his headlights, running stop signs,
and disregarding red traffic signals, he had no knowledge
whatsoever that [Connor] was fleeing from the scene of a
shooting. Likewise, the victim and witness to the shooting
have no knowledge of [Connor’s] driving infractions after he
fled the scene. Because there is no duplication of factual or
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legal issues, joint prosecution of the offenses was not
required.
Trial Court Opinion, filed 9/12/17, at 3.
We agree with the trial court’s reasoning, and conclude that that Section
110(1)(ii) did not preclude a subsequent trial for the felony and misdemeanor
charges. Although the incidents at issue share a close temporal relationship,
the legal issues and evidence in question are almost entirely divergent. Under
Perfetto, Connor’s convictions for the traffic violations pose no bar to a
separate trial on the felony and misdemeanor charges. We accordingly affirm
the trial court’s denial of Connor’s motion to dismiss.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/31/18
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