United States v. Kyle ( 2022 )

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 20-CO-330
UNITED STATES, APPELLANT,
v.
MONTERO KYLE, APPELLEE.
Appeal from the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia
(CF2-5408-18)
(Hon. Judith Smith, Trial Judge)
(Argued December 9, 2021 Decided February 10, 2022)
Daniel J. Lenerz, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Michael R.
Sherwin and Channing D. Phillips, Acting United States Attorneys at the time the
briefs were filed, and Elizabeth Trosman, John P. Mannarino, and Dennis Clark,
Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the briefs, for appellant.
Shilpa S. Satoskar, Public Defender Service, with whom Samia Fam and
Jaclyn S. Frankfurt, Public Defender Service, were on the brief, for appellee.
Before BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge, MCLEESE, Associate Judge, and
FISHER, Senior Judge.
MCLEESE, Associate Judge: The United States appeals from the trial court’s order
suppressing evidence. We reverse.
2
I.
The following evidence was introduced at a hearing on appellant Montero
Kyle’s motion to suppress evidence. At around 11 p.m. one night, uniformed
Metropolitan Police Department officers saw a group of people in the street and on
the sidewalk. Loud music was playing, and people in the group appeared to be
drinking. Officers got out of the car, and one of them noticed Mr. Kyle, who was
walking away from the group. Mr. Kyle was holding a bottle and had a backpack in
his hand. One of the officers said “hey boss, come here,” and Mr. Kyle then ran.
The officer chased Mr. Kyle into an alley, where Mr. Kyle fell. As Mr. Kyle got up,
he threw the backpack over a ten-foot-tall, solid fence separating the alley from a
backyard. Mr. Kyle ran again, leaving the alley, running onto another street, and
entering the backyard of a house on that street, where the officer apprehended him.
Another officer retrieved the backpack, which contained a gun, Mr. Kyle’s expired
D.C. identification, his current Virginia driver’s license, his vehicle registration and
title, Virginia and D.C. license plates, and a set of keys, among other items.
Mr. Kyle moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the backpack,
arguing that the seizure and search of the backpack were unlawful under the Fourth
3
Amendment. The United States argued in response that the seizure and search of
the backpack did not violate Mr. Kyle’s Fourth Amendment rights, because Mr. Kyle
had abandoned the backpack. The trial court granted the motion to suppress,
concluding that Mr. Kyle had not abandoned the backpack. The trial court gave
several reasons for its conclusion: (1) the backpack contained personal items that
would have been expensive, difficult, or impossible to replace; (2) the closed
backpack was not an obviously incriminating item such as an exposed gun or drugs;
(3) Mr. Kyle threw the backpack onto private property rather than in a public place;
and (4) after Mr. Kyle threw the backpack over a high fence, the backpack was not
immediately or readily accessible to the police. The trial court acknowledged the
United States’s argument that Mr. Kyle had thrown the backpack into the yard of a
stranger, but reasoned that the officers would not have known that when they
retrieved the backpack.
The trial court also ruled in the alternative that, even if Mr. Kyle had
abandoned the backpack, the evidence recovered from the backpack should be
suppressed because the police lacked both a warrant and adequate grounds to seize
and search the backpack.
4
II.
When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we “view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” Bennett v. United
States, 26 A.3d 745, 751 (D.C. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). We draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling. Milline v.
United States, 856 A.2d 616, 618 (D.C. 2004).
The seizure and search of the backpack could violate Mr. Kyle’s rights under
the Fourth Amendment only if Mr. Kyle “manifested a subjective expectation of
privacy in [the backpack] that society accepts as objectively reasonable.” California
v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988). In other words, Mr. Kyle can prevail only if
both (1) he retained a subjective expectation of privacy in the backpack; and (2) that
expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable.
Mr. Kyle emphasizes our statement that “the ultimate determination of
abandonment in the Fourth Amendment sense hinges on the outcome of a factual
inquiry into intent.” Spriggs v. United States, 618 A.2d 701, 703 (D.C. 1992)
(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Boswell,
5
347 A.2d 270, 274 (D.C. 1975) (“Abandonment is primarily a question of
intent . . . .”). It is true that the subjective intent of the defendant is an important part
of the relevant inquiry. Our cases, including Spriggs and Boswell, make clear,
however, that the defendant’s intent is only half of the inquiry. For a defendant to
prevail on a motion to suppress, the defendant’s subjective expectation of privacy
must also be objectively reasonable. E.g., Spriggs, 618 A.2d at 703 n.3 (question is
whether defendant voluntarily “relinquished his interest in the property in question
so that he could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to
it at the time of the search”) (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted);
Boswell, 347 A.2d at 274 (same); see also, e.g., Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 39 (seizure
and search is basis for relief under Fourth Amendment only if defendant “manifested
a subjective expectation of privacy . . . that society accepts as objectively
reasonable”) (emphasis added).
In the present case, we assume without deciding that Mr. Kyle retained a
subjective expectation of privacy in the backpack. We hold that throwing the
backpack over a fence into someone else’s backyard while fleeing from the police
precluded Mr. Kyle from retaining an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy
in the backpack. We note that Mr. Kyle does not dispute that his action in throwing
the backpack over the fence was voluntary for purposes of this case.
6
The issue presented in cases such as this is often discussed using the term
“abandonment.” E.g., Dozier v. United States, 220 A.3d 933, 947 n.20 (D.C. 2019).
That term also refers to a property-law concept, however, and its use in the Fourth
Amendment context has the potential to create confusion. “The issue is not
abandonment in the strict property-right sense . . . .” Boswell, 347 A.2d at 274. “It
is possible for a person to retain a property interest in an item . . . while at the same
time relinquishing any reasonable expectation of privacy for purposes of obtaining
suppression.” Holt v. United States, 675 A.2d 474, 479 n.3 (D.C. 1996); see also,
e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 (1984) (holding that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in open fields; “The existence of a property right
is but one element in determining whether expectations of privacy are legitimate.
The premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and
seize has been discredited.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v.
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91 (1980) (“This Court has repeatedly repudiated the notion
that arcane distinctions developed in property and tort law ought to control our
Fourth Amendment inquiry.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore
focus our inquiry on whether Mr. Kyle retained an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in the backpack at the time the police seized and searched the
backpack.
7
Our cases are not entirely clear as to our standard of review. Compare, e.g.,
Spriggs, 618 A.2d at 703 (“Because the ultimate determination of abandonment in
the Fourth Amendment sense hinges on the outcome of a factual inquiry into intent,
a finding of abandonment is reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.”) (brackets
and internal quotation marks omitted), with, e.g., Brown v. United States, 97 A.3d
92, 95-97 (D.C. 2014) (in context of abandonment claim, court states that whether
defendant has reasonable expectation of privacy is issue of law that court reviews de
novo). Because the standard of review does not affect the outcome of this appeal,
we assume without deciding that we review the trial court’s ruling for clear error.
On a related topic, Mr. Kyle argues that abandonment must be shown by clear,
unequivocal, and decisive evidence. Boswell, 347 A.2d at 275. The United States
has not disputed that argument. We therefore also assume without deciding that the
United States bore a heightened burden of proof in this case. But see, e.g., Nix v.
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 n.5 (1984) (“[T]he controlling burden of proof at
suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a
preponderance of the evidence.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); State v.
Rynhart, 125 P.3d 938, 943 (Utah 2005) (applying preponderance-of-evidence
standard to issue of Fourth Amendment abandonment, explaining that “the
distinction between the concept of abandonment in property law and in the context
8
of the Fourth Amendment supports application of the burden of proof generally
applicable to motions to suppress”).
III.
We hold that Mr. Kyle clearly lacked an objectively reasonable expectation
of privacy in his backpack at the time the backpack was seized and searched. While
fleeing from the police, and in the sight of the pursuing officer, Mr. Kyle threw the
backpack over a fence into a backyard that was not his own. There was no evidence
that he had any other connection to the backyard, which happened to be next to the
spot in the alley where he fell down while fleeing. After he threw the backpack, Mr.
Kyle got up and ran some distance before ultimately being apprehended by police.
We conclude that those circumstances are clearly, unequivocally, and decisively
inconsistent with an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the backpack.
When an item is voluntarily “discarded in a public area in anticipation of a
police investigation, the fourth amendment does not set limits on [the item’s]
recovery by the police . . . .” Boswell, 347 A.2d at 274, 275 n.10 (quoting Smith v.
United States, 292 A.2d 150, 151 n.4 (D.C. 1972)). In Spriggs, for example, officers
9
approached Ms. Spriggs, who placed an opaque key case filled with valuable drugs
on the curb of a public sidewalk and walked four to seven feet away from the key
case. 618 A.2d at 702-03. This court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that Ms.
Spriggs had abandoned the key case for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at
703.
In several respects, the circumstances of this case are more inconsistent with
an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy than the circumstances of Spriggs
were. Ms. Spriggs placed her item down, whereas Mr. Kyle threw his; Ms. Spriggs
walked away from her item, whereas Mr. Kyle ran away from his; and Ms. Spriggs
traveled only a few feet from her item, whereas Mr. Kyle traveled quite a bit farther
from his. Mr. Kyle, however, points to another difference between this case and
Spriggs: Ms. Spriggs left her item in plain view in a public place, whereas Mr. Kyle
left his on private property behind a fence that hid the item from general public view.
We agree with Mr. Kyle that this difference is relevant. We disagree, however, that
it suffices to support the trial court’s ruling in the circumstances of this case.
It appears to be undisputed that Mr. Kyle threw his backpack into another
person’s backyard. The parties do dispute whether that person was proven to be a
10
stranger to Mr. Kyle. The United States argues that the trial court found as a matter
of fact that Mr. Kyle threw the backpack into the backyard of a stranger. Mr. Kyle
argues that the trial court made no such finding and that the record would not have
supported such a finding. We need not resolve that dispute. For current purposes,
it suffices that Mr. Kyle threw his backpack into another person’s backyard and that
there was no evidence that Mr. Kyle had any connection to the homeowner. Mr.
Kyle should reasonably have expected that the homeowner might notice the
backpack and open it to determine whose it was or whether it contained dangerous
or illegal items. Mr. Kyle also should reasonably have expected that the homeowner
might ask the police to come and investigate an unexplained backpack in the
homeowner’s backyard. Moreover, Mr. Kyle placed the backpack in a location that
might well have been legally inaccessible to him, because -- unless he obtained
consent from the homeowner -- he would have had no legal right to enter onto
another’s property to retrieve the backpack. See, e.g., State v. Burt, 918 N.W.2d 501(Table), 2018 WL 1629233, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. 2018) (“[R]etrieving personal
property intentionally left on another person’s property is not a legitimate purpose
or defense to trespassing.”); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 198(1) (Am. L. Inst.
1965) (although party may in some circumstances enter onto property of another to
recover party’s chattel, that is not true if chattel is on property with party’s consent);
75 Am. Jur. 2d Trespass § 84 (Nov. 2021 update) (same).
11
We do not mean to suggest that these circumstances by themselves are fatal
to Mr. Kyle’s claim. Rather, our holding is that Mr. Kyle clearly lacked an
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the backpack given these
circumstances and the other circumstances of the case, including that Mr. Kyle threw
the backpack while fleeing from the police and while in view of the police, and that
Mr. Kyle then ran off, substantially distancing himself from the backpack.
Numerous courts have concluded that defendants lacked an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy in circumstances comparable to those of this case.
See, e.g., United States v. Juszczyk, 844 F.3d 1213, 1213-15 & n.3 (10th Cir. 2017)
(Mr. Juszczyk lacked objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in backpack
containing identifying documents and contraband, where Mr. Juszczyk, who was in
yard of acquaintance’s home working on motorcycle, threw backpack onto roof
when police arrived at home; in absence of specific consent from homeowner, Mr.
Juszczyk would have committed trespass if he had tried to retrieve backpack from
roof); United States v. Nowak, 825 F.3d 946, 947-49 (8th Cir. 2016) (per curiam)
(Mr. Nowak lacked objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in backpack
containing handgun, where Mr. Nowak asked friend for ride, police officers stopped
car for traffic violation, and Mr. Nowak fled from car despite being told to remain,
leaving backpack behind; “In this case, there is simply no evidence that [Mr.] Nowak
12
gave any indication—verbal or otherwise—that he intended for [the driver] (or
anyone else) to take care or possession of the backpack in his absence such that his
personal belongings would remain private. Nor do the circumstances lend
themselves to such a conclusion.”); Commonwealth v. Carnes, 967 N.E.2d 148, 150-
53 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (Mr. Carnes lacked objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy in backpack containing weapon, where Mr. Carnes fled scene of murder, put
backpack in bushes between shed and fence in best friend’s backyard, and then left
area; Mr. Carnes concealed backpack in backyard he neither owned nor controlled,
throwing backpack into bushes was not “normal precaution[] to maintain his
privacy,” and there was “no evidence that [Mr. Carnes] left the item to the care or
responsibility of another”); State v. Kolia, 169 P.3d 981, 983-84, 985-90 (Haw. Ct.
App. 2007) (Mr. Kolia lacked objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in fanny
pack containing drugs, where Mr. Kolia threw fanny pack on roof of laundry-room
building while fleeing from police and there was no evidence of Mr. Kolia’s
connection to location; “[T]he laundry room roof was on private property at a place
which was inaccessible except to those who had both the means (such as a ladder)
and the right to gain access to the roof. Thus, [Mr.] Kolia himself would have been
unable to retrieve the fanny pack without both the permission of the property owners
and the proper means to retrieve it.”) (citing numerous cases); United States v.
Taylor, 462 F.3d 1023, 1025-26 (8th Cir. 2006) (Mr. Taylor abandoned black bag
13
containing cocaine, where Mr. Taylor fled from police officers and threw bag into
nearby backyard, and officers found bag with assistance of drug-sniffing dog);
United States v. Figueroa, 187 F.3d 623 (Table), 1998 WL 1085825, at *1-2, *4-5
(1st Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (Mr. Figueroa had no objectively reasonable expectation
of privacy in box containing handgun and drugs, where police went to execute search
warrant at Mr. Figueroa’s apartment, Mr. Figueroa fled to another apartment in
building and left box in that apartment; “We are mindful that . . . the contraband here
was discarded in a private residence rather than in a public place. That distinction,
however, makes no difference under these circumstances. [Mr.] Figueroa simply
stashed the box in the nearest available place in hopes that it would not be discovered
by the officers who were in pursuit of him.”).
We acknowledge a complication in our reliance upon our decision in Spriggs
and the out-of-jurisdiction decisions just cited. In Spriggs, we affirmed a ruling of
the trial court as not clearly erroneous. 618 A.2d at 703. The out-of-jurisdiction
decisions just cited all affirmed trial-court rulings and/or conducted de novo review
of trial-court rulings as to whether a defendant had an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy. E.g., Juszczyk, 844 F.3d at 1213-15 (affirming under de novo
review). As we have explained, supra at 6, we take as a given for purposes of this
case that we are required to affirm the trial court’s ruling unless that ruling was
14
clearly erroneous. Appellate decisions affirming trial-court rulings under deferential
or de novo review do not necessarily establish that a contrary trial-court ruling
should properly be reversed when the appellate court is instead required to review
the trial court’s ruling under a deferential standard of review, such as the clear-error
standard. Cf., e.g., Workman v. United States, 255 A.3d 971, 978 (D.C. 2021)
(“Appellate decisions upholding a given exercise of discretion do not necessarily
establish that a different exercise of discretion would be impermissible.”).
Nevertheless, for the reasons that we have stated and that are stated in the decisions
we have cited, we conclude that Mr. Kyle clearly lacked an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in the backpack at the time the backpack was seized and
searched.
In reaching that conclusion, we note that we are not aware of any decision
holding that a defendant retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in
circumstances comparable to those of the present case. Mr. Kyle seeks support from
five decisions that he contends are comparable, but we are not persuaded.
First, in Boswell, Mr. Boswell, who was not aware that he was being watched
by an off-duty police detective, left a television covered by a blanket in a hallway in
15
his brother-in-law’s apartment building and then went next door to a laundromat to
make a telephone call. 347 A.2d at 272-73. This court held that Mr. Boswell had
not abandoned the television. Id. at 274-75. Boswell differs from the present case
in numerous respects, including that Mr. Boswell was not fleeing from the police,
Mr. Boswell did not leave the vicinity of the television, there was evidence that Mr.
Boswell had a connection to the place where he left the television, and Mr. Boswell
did not throw the television into an area where Mr. Boswell might have been unable
to lawfully retrieve it. Boswell specifically distinguished situations involving
“objects . . . thrown away or discarded in anticipation of a police arrest or
interrogation.” Id. at 275 n.10. Although we need not explore this issue further, we
also note that this court has previously questioned the outcome of Boswell in light
of subsequent Supreme Court decisions. Godfrey v. United States, 408 A.2d 1244,
1246-47 & nn.1-2 (D.C. 1979), amended, 414 A.2d 214 (D.C. 1980).
Second, in Shreeves v. United States, (D.C. 1978), Mr. Shreeves robbed and
killed a person in the District of Columbia. Id. at 776. The next day, Mr. Shreeves
killed another person in Maryland and shot a police officer who had stopped Mr.
Shreeves’s car to investigate. Id. at 776-77. The day after that, police were informed
that Mr. Shreeves’s car had been parked for seven hours on private land behind a
farmers’ market. Id. at 777. This court held that Mr. Shreeves had not abandoned
16
the car, concluding instead that Mr. Shreeves had intended to “secrete” the car, in
which he had left “a substantial number of his personal belongings.” Id. at 784-85
(internal quotation marks omitted). Our opinion in Shreeves did not explicitly
explain why Mr. Shreeves had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in
the car, instead focusing on whether Mr. Shreeves subjectively intended to give up
his interest in the car. Id. On the issue of objective reasonableness, Shreeves is
similar to this case in one significant respect: Mr. Shreeves left his car on private
property. Id. at 777. This court did not address the significance of that fact, however,
and the surrounding details are not described. Id. at 777, 784-85. For example, it is
unclear whether the private property in Shreeves served as a parking lot for the
farmers’ market. Id. It thus is unclear whether Mr. Shreeves would have been a
trespasser had he retrieved his car. In any event, Shreeves differs from the present
case in several important respects: Mr. Shreeves apparently parked his car, which is
the normal way that people leave cars, whereas Mr. Kyle threw his backpack into
someone else’s backyard; and there was no evidence that Mr. Shreeves fled from his
car in the sight of police officers, whereas Mr. Kyle did flee from his backpack in
the sight of the police.
Third, in Biles v. United States, 101 A.3d 1012 (D.C. 2014), Mr. Biles was
selling DVDs at a flea market. Id. at 1015. He kept the DVDs about eight feet away
17
from where he was standing, in a box hidden under a backpack, next to a door into
the flea market. Id. This court held that Mr. Biles had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his belongings. Id. at 1024-25. The court explained that Mr. Biles had
not “discarded” his belongings, but instead had kept them “protected from view and
in his line of sight.” Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). This case
differs from Biles in both of those respects, as well as because Mr. Biles did not flee
from police and there was no indication that Mr. Biles would have invaded someone
else’s property rights by retrieving the DVDs.
The two out-of-jurisdiction decisions that Mr. Kyle emphasizes are
distinguishable for similar reasons. In Young v. State, 72 P.3d 1250 (Alaska Ct. App.
2003), the court held that Mr. Young did not abandon tissue-paper bundles
containing crack cocaine by crouching down to slide them under the locked door of
a motel closet and then standing up. Id. at 1250-54. In so holding, the court
explained that Mr. Young had not thrown the bundles away and did not walk away
from the bundles after hiding them. Id. at 1254. Similarly, in People v. Kelly, 568
N.Y.S.2d 804 (App. Div. 1991), the court held that Mr. Kelly did not abandon a
brown paper bag by putting the bag behind a metal flap in the lobby of an apartment
building and then walking a short distance out to the building’s stoop. Id. at 805.
Young and Kelly differ from this case in several important respects. In neither Young
18
nor Kelly did the defendant throw the item at issue; in neither case did the defendant
then run a substantial distance away from a thrown item; and in neither case was it
clear that the defendant would have been unable to lawfully retrieve the thrown item
without obtaining a property owner’s consent.
We also are not persuaded by the additional points made by the trial court and
by Mr. Kyle. First, the trial court noted that the police officers would have been
unaware at the time of the incident that Mr. Kyle had thrown his backpack into the
yard of a stranger. As the parties agree, however, the objective reasonableness of
Mr. Kyle’s expectation of privacy must be determined based on all of the
circumstances, not only those circumstances known by the police at the time of the
search or seizure at issue. See, e.g., Boswell, 347 A.2d at 274 (all relevant
circumstances should be considered); United States v. Paradis, 351 F.3d 21, 32 (1st
Cir. 2003) (“When abandonment is argued to show lack of a Fourth Amendment
interest, a court inquires into all facts, including those not known to the police at the
time of their search. After all, the question is not what the police knew but whether
the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the seized object.”) (citation
omitted).
19
Second, the trial court noted that Mr. Kyle’s backpack contained personal
items that would have been expensive, difficult, or impossible to replace. That fact
is most directly relevant to whether Mr. Kyle intended, if possible, to eventually
retrieve the backpack, which in turn is relevant to whether Mr. Kyle retained a
subjective expectation of privacy in the backpack. We have no occasion to address
that issue, however, in light of our conclusion that in any event Mr. Kyle clearly
lacked an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the backpack. We assume
for purposes of our decision that the value of the items inside the backpack has at
least some relevance to the objective reasonableness of Mr. Kyle’s expectation of
privacy. Nevertheless, we do not view the value of the items in the backpack as
sufficient to support an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the
backpack in the circumstances of this case. See, e.g., Spriggs, 618 A.2d at 702-03(holding that Ms. Spriggs abandoned key case containing over $400 worth of heroin
and cocaine).
Third, the trial court noted that the closed backpack was not an obviously
incriminating item such as an exposed gun or drugs. That fact is relevant to the
objective-reasonableness inquiry, but we do not view it as sufficient in the
circumstances of this case. The key case in Spriggs also was not obviously
20
incriminating until it was opened. 618 A.2d at 702. The same is true of the various
containers at issue in the out-of-jurisdiction cases cited supra at pp. 10-12.
Fourth, the trial court noted that Mr. Kyle threw the backpack over a high
fence, making the backpack not immediately or readily accessible to the police. That
fact also is relevant but does not suffice in the circumstances of this case. Most
importantly, Mr. Kyle threw the bag onto a location -- someone else’s backyard --
that was readily accessible to the homeowner and that was at least as inaccessible to
him as it was to the police. See, e.g., Juszczyk, 844 F.3d at 1213-15 & n.3 (no
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in object thrown on another’s roof);
Kolia, 169 P.3d at 985-90 (same); Carnes, 967 N.E.2d at 150-53 (same as to object
thrown into another’s backyard); Taylor, 462 F.3d at 1025-26 (same).
Fifth, Mr. Kyle argues that the trial court implicitly found that he intended to
hide the backpack. The United States disputes that the trial court made any such
finding. We need not resolve that dispute, although we do note that throwing the
backpack over a fence while in the sight of a chasing police officer does not seem to
be a very effective way of hiding the backpack. Even assuming that Mr. Kyle
intended to hide the backpack, we conclude that he clearly lacked an objectively
21
reasonable expectation of privacy in the backpack given the manner and
circumstances in which he did so. See, e.g., Carnes, 967 N.E.2d at 150-53 (no
reasonable expectation of privacy in backpack Mr. Carnes attempted to hide in
bushes in best friend’s yard); Taylor, 462 F.3d at 1025-26 (same as to bag Mr. Taylor
attempted to hide in yard).
Finally, Mr. Kyle argues that a number of the out-of-jurisdiction decisions
discussed above are inconsistent with the law of this jurisdiction, because in this
jurisdiction abandonment “hinges on the outcome of a factual inquiry into intent.”
Spriggs, 618 A.2d at 703 (internal quotation marks omitted). As we have previously
explained, however, the defendant’s intent is only half of the inquiry, and a
defendant’s subjective expectation of privacy must also be objectively reasonable.
E.g., Spriggs, 618 A.2d at 703 n.3; Boswell, 347 A.2d at 274. The out-of-jurisdiction
decisions discussed above, which deny relief on the ground that a defendant lacked
an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, are thus entirely consistent with
the law of this jurisdiction.
22
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Mr. Kyle clearly lacked an
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his backpack after throwing the
backpack into a yard that was not his own, while being chased by police officers.
The trial court ruled in the alternative that, even if Mr. Kyle had abandoned the
backpack, the evidence recovered from the backpack should be suppressed because
the police lacked both a warrant and adequate grounds to seize and search the
backpack. We agree with the parties, however, that a party who lacks an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy in an item is not entitled to suppression of
evidence obtained as a result of the seizure and search of the item. See, e.g., Brown,
97 A.3d at 97 (determination that Mr. Brown lacked reasonable expectation of
privacy “forecloses [Mr. Brown’s] motion to suppress”).
In sum, we reverse the order of the Superior Court granting Mr. Kyle’s motion
to suppress, and we remand the case for further proceedings.
So ordered.