IN RE DANA JOHNSON ( 2016 )

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 15-BG-1218 7/28/16
IN RE DANA JOHNSON, PETITIONER.
On Report and Recommendation of the
Board on Professional Responsibility
(BDN-39-15)
(Argued April 14, 2016 Decided July 28, 2016)
Dana W. Johnson, pro se.
Julia L. Porter, Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, with whom Wallace
E. Shipp, Jr., Disciplinary Counsel, and Jennifer P. Lyman, Senior Assistant
Disciplinary Counsel, were on the brief, for the Office of Disciplinary Counsel.
Before BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY and MCLEESE, Associate Judges, and REID,
Senior Judge.
PER CURIAM: Pro se petitioner Dana W. Johnson was disbarred in 2002, In
re Johnson (Johnson I), 810 A.2d 917 (D.C. 2002) (per curiam), and this court
denied his first petition for reinstatement in 2014, In re Johnson (Johnson II), 103
A.3d 194 (D.C. 2014). Mr. Johnson brought this second petition for reinstatement
before the Board on Professional Responsibility (―the Board‖) after multiple failed
attempts to file a compliant affidavit with the Board pursuant to D.C. Bar R. XI,
2
§ 14 (g).1 Mr. Johnson asserted that his last two affidavits filed in March 2015 and
August 2015 were ―collectively compliant‖ and requested that his affidavits
receive nunc pro tunc treatment dating back to May 2001 when he filed his first
affidavit, which would allow his requisite five year period of disbarment2 to run
from that date. The Board found that the last two affidavits were still not
compliant, refused to entertain any further affidavits submitted for the purpose of
receiving nunc pro tunc treatment, and submitted its recommendation to this court
to dismiss Mr. Johnson‘s second petition for reinstatement. We adopt the
recommendation of the Board.
1
D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 14 (g) states in pertinent part:
Within ten days after the effective date of an order of
disbarment or suspension, the disbarred or suspended
attorney shall file with the Court and the Board an
affidavit:
(1) Demonstrating with particularity, and with
supporting proof, that the attorney has fully complied
with the provisions of the order and with this rule;
(2) Listing all other state and federal jurisdictions and
administrative agencies to which the attorney is admitted
to practice; and
(3) Certifying that a copy of the affidavit has been
served on Disciplinary Counsel.
2
D.C. Bar R. XI, § 16 (c) states that ―a disbarred attorney shall not be
eligible for reinstatement until five years shall have elapsed following the
attorney‘s compliance with section 14.‖
3
I. Factual Background
This is Mr. Johnson‘s second petition for reinstatement. In brief, the
Maryland Court of Appeals disbarred Mr. Johnson in April 2001,3 and this court
imposed reciprocal discipline and disbarred him in the District of Columbia in
November 2002.4 Johnson I, supra, 810 A.2d at 917. Over the course of
approximately fifteen years, Mr. Johnson made eight attempts to comply with D.C.
Bar R. XI, § 14 (g), which requires an attorney, within ten days after the date of
disbarment, to file an affidavit that, inter alia, demonstrates that he has fully
complied with the ―core requirements‖5 of D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14 (a)-(d).
Specifically relevant to this case, the core requirement found in 14 (a) mandates
3
Mr. Johnson was disbarred for operating a law office in Maryland without
a Maryland license, falsely claiming to represent two clients who did not retain
him, subsequently forging those clients‘ signatures to a bankruptcy petition, and
filing it without their knowledge, all in violation of the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct 1.7 (b), 3.3 (a)(1), 5.5 (a), 7.1, 7.5 (a) and (b), and 8.4 (a),
(c), and (d). See Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Johnson, 770 A.2d 130,
150 (Md. 2001).
4
The underlying facts are discussed in greater detail in Attorney Grievance
Comm’n of Md., supra note 3, 770 A.2d at 134-37, and Johnson II, supra, 103
A.3d at 195-97.
5
See In re Weekes, 990 A.2d 470, 474 (D.C. 2010).
4
that an attorney who is disbarred notify all clients in any pending matters of his
disbarment and advise such clients to seek legal advice elsewhere. In addition to
verifying compliance with the ―core requirements‖ of 14 (a) through (d), a
disbarred attorney must list in the 14 (g) affidavit all other state and federal
jurisdictions to which the attorney is admitted to practice. See D.C. Bar R. XI,
§ 14 (g)(2).
In November 2014, this court dismissed Mr. Johnson‘s first petition for
reinstatement because his first five 14 (g) affidavits were noncompliant for failing
to demonstrate that he fully satisfied the 14 (a) core requirement to notify clients of
his disbarment. See Johnson II, supra, 103 A.3d at 199. Specifically, he did not
provide proof that he gave notice to an individual whom he represented in a 2001
arbitration proceeding, claiming that he did not have records of the representation
and could not recall the individual‘s name from memory. Id. at 195-97. On
January 29, 2015, Mr. Johnson filed a second petition for reinstatement with the
Board, along with a sixth 14 (g) affidavit. The sixth affidavit failed to correct the
deficiencies of the previous five affidavits. Mr. Johnson then filed a seventh 14 (g)
affidavit on March 4, 2015, in which he claimed that he was still unable to recall
the individual‘s name from the 2001 arbitration. But, he asserted that the
5
individual was aware of his disbarment and still opted to have Mr. Johnson
represent him in the arbitration in a non-legal capacity.
On August 5, 2015, the Board issued an order dismissing Mr. Johnson‘s
second petition. The Board concluded that Mr. Johnson satisfied the notice
requirement in 14 (a) ―to the extent he [was] able to do so‖ because he was unable
to name the individual from the 2001 arbitration, and that was ―unlikely to
change.‖ To demonstrate full compliance with 14 (g), however, the Board required
Mr. Johnson to correct a false statement in his March 2015 affidavit. Specifically,
in response to 14 (g)(2), which requires a disbarred attorney to list ―all other state
and federal jurisdictions to which [he] is admitted to practice,‖ Mr. Johnson
included the following statement:
At the time of entry of the order of suspension, the
complete list of the state and federal jurisdictions and
administrative agencies to which I was admitted to is:
1) the U.S. District Courts for the District of Columbia
and the Eastern District of Virginia. I am still admitted
to those jurisdictions. 2) I was admitted to the bar of the
Commonwealth of Virginia but my license to practice
there was revoked in approximately 2002 and is still
revoked.
This statement was false. Mr. Johnson was not admitted to practice in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia because he was disbarred
by that federal court in August 2002. Mr. Johnson argued to the Board that he
6
never received the order of disbarment because he was forced to foreclose his home
and had no fixed address following his disbarment. However, Mr. Johnson should
have known, pursuant to the Local Civil Rules of the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia, that he would be automatically suspended and
ordinarily disbarred by that federal court upon being disbarred by this court in 2002.
See D.D.C. Local Rule 83.16 (c)(1), (4).
The assertion that he was admitted to practice in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia was also false. Mr. Johnson‘s license to
practice in the Commonwealth of Virginia was revoked on June 18, 2001, which
likewise made him ineligible to practice in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia. See E.D. Va. Local Civil Rule 83.1 (A). Mr. Johnson
was still listed on the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia‘s membership list at the time he filed his March 2015 affidavit only
because he failed to report the revocation of his Virginia license to that federal
district court. Indeed, on March 30, 2015, the Clerk‘s Office in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia removed Mr. Johnson from its
membership list upon learning of his revoked Virginia license from the District of
Columbia‘s Disciplinary Counsel. The Board stated that, should Mr. Johnson
7
correct the false statement about his bar membership or explain why that statement
was true, his affidavit would receive nunc pro tunc treatment to March 4, 2015.
On August 18, 2015, Mr. Johnson filed a supplemental affidavit claiming
that the statements about his bar memberships in his March 2015 affidavit were
true ―to the best of his knowledge and belief.‖ He did not address the August 2002
order of disbarment from the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia in the affidavit, nor did he respond to the fact that the June 2001
revocation of his license in the Commonwealth of Virginia made him ineligible to
practice in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
Instead, he continued to assert that he had membership in both federal district
courts, which he claimed he confirmed ―by telephoning and receiving a verbal
confirmation from [each] respective clerk‘s office earlier [that] year, prior to filing
his March 4, 2015, [a]ffidavit.‖
On October 29, 2015, the Board issued a supplement to its August 5, 2015,
order refusing to accept Mr. Johnson‘s August 18, 2015, supplemental affidavit
because, even if he ―relied in good faith on the ‗verbal confirmation‘ of his bar
memberships by the [respective] federal court clerks[‘] [offices] when he prepared
his March [2015] affidavit,‖ he should have corrected the false statement in his
8
August 2015 affidavit, after Disciplinary Counsel ―supplied evidence that [he] was
either disbarred or ineligible to practice before those courts.‖ Finding that no
further opportunity to correct was in order, the Board stated that Mr. Johnson was
―not entitled to have the time of his disbarment run, nunc pro tunc, to the date of
his March 4, 2015 affidavit‖ and refused ―to entertain further attempts by [Mr.
Johnson] to supplement his [14 (g)] affidavit in order to obtain nunc pro tunc
treatment of his period of disbarment.‖ Mr. Johnson filed exceptions to the
Board‘s August 5, 2015, and October 29, 2015, orders in this court, arguing that
his affidavits were collectively compliant and requesting nunc pro tunc treatment
back to May 18, 2001, the date of his first affidavit.
II. Analysis
We review bar disciplinary recommendations from the Board, such as
whether to permit nunc pro tunc treatment of an attorney‘s period of disbarment,
with great deference and will adopt a recommendation ―unless [it] is unwarranted
or inconsistent with sanctions for comparable conduct.‖ In re Hallal, 944 A.2d
1085, 1087 (D.C. 2008) (awarding nunc pro tunc treatment to an attorney‘s date of
disbarment despite filing a late 14 (g) affidavit). This court accepts ―findings of
fact made by the Board unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence of
9
record.‖ D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9 (h)(1). However, we review de novo legal
conclusions, such as whether a 14 (g) affidavit is compliant. See Johnson II,
supra, 103 A.3d at 197. ―[A]lthough we place great weight on the
recommendations of the Board . . . , this court has the ultimate authority to decide
whether to grant a petition for reinstatement.‖ In re Sabo, 49 A.3d 1219, 1224
(D.C. 2012) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
An attorney who has been disbarred in this jurisdiction ―shall not resume the
practice of law until reinstated by order of [this] Court‖ and ―may not apply for
reinstatement until the expiration of at least five years from the effective date of
the disbarment.‖ D.C. Bar R. XI, § 16 (a). To be eligible for reinstatement, a
disbarred attorney must, among other things, submit a compliant 14 (g) affidavit
within 10 days of the date of disbarment, demonstrating that he has fully complied
with the ―core requirements‖ of 14 (a) through (d). In the event a lawyer fails to
file a compliant 14 (g) affidavit, ―he is generally not eligible for reinstatement until
[the five year period of disbarment] has elapsed following his compliance with‖
14 (g). In re Gardner, 650 A.2d 693, 697 (D.C. 1994); see also D.C. Bar R. XI,
§ 16 (c).
In certain ―exceptional circumstances,‖ however, this court has allowed for
―full, though technically imperfect compliance with the [14 (g)] affidavit
10
requirement.‖ In re Weekes, supra note 5, 990 A.2d at 474 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). For example, in In re Gardner, the respondent did not
file a 14 (g) affidavit but ―promptly provided the Board with written notice,‖ which
contained ―key elements relative to the [14 (g)] affidavit . . . .‖ 650 A.2d at 697.
In In re Susman, the respondent‘s initial 14 (g) affidavit was non-compliant, but he
was not notified of its deficiency until nearly three years after its submission, and,
upon notice, he promptly corrected the deficiencies. 876 A.2d 637, 638 (D.C.
2005). Under those circumstances, this court awarded nunc pro tunc treatment,
allowing the petitioner‘s five year disbarment period to run from the date of the
originally filed deficient affidavit. Id.However, no such exceptional circumstances exist here. We conclude that
Mr. Johnson‘s March 2015 and August 2015 affidavits were noncompliant. We
therefore adopt the Board‘s recommendation to deny Mr. Johnson‘s petition for
reinstatement and to decline to award his affidavits nunc pro tunc treatment to the
date of any previously filed affidavits.
A. Noncompliance of March 2015 and August 2015 Affidavits
11
Mr. Johnson argues that his March 2015 and August 2015 affidavits were
―collectively compliant‖ with 14 (g). He asserts that he explained in his August
2015 affidavit that the statement regarding his bar membership was true because he
confirmed via telephone that he was admitted to practice in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia and United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia at the time he filed the March 2015 affidavit. Yet, the
statement regarding his bar memberships was false because the order of disbarment
from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia indicates that
Mr. Johnson has not been admitted to practice in that jurisdiction since August
2002. Moreover, notwithstanding the alleged verbal confirmation from the Clerk‘s
Office in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Mr. Johnson
should have known that, upon being disbarred by this court in 2002, he would ―be
automatically suspended from practice in‖ the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, and subsequently, the federal court would impose ―identical
discipline‖ if it deemed it appropriate. See D.D.C. Local Rule 83.16 (c)(1), (4).
Further, Mr. Johnson was not eligible to practice in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia at the time he filed his March 2015
affidavit. ―Any person who is an [a]ctive [m]ember of the Virginia State Bar in
good standing is eligible to practice before [the United States District Court for the
12
Eastern District of Virginia] upon admission.‖ See E.D. Va. Local Civil Rule 83.1
(A).6 Mr. Johnson was no longer a member of the Virginia State Bar ―in good
standing‖ because his Virginia license was revoked on June 18, 2001. The Federal
Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement required Mr. Johnson to ―promptly inform the
Clerk of [the] Court‖ for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia ―upon being subjected to public discipline . . . by a [c]ourt of any state
. . . ,‖ and required the Eastern District of Virginia to subsequently ―impose the
identical discipline.‖7 See E.D. Va. Local Civil Rule, App. B; FRDE II.A, II.D.
Mr. Johnson failed to report his revoked Virginia license. As a result, the Eastern
District of Virginia was unaware of his Virginia disbarment until the District of
Columbia‘s Disciplinary Counsel notified them on March 30, 2015.
Although Mr. Johnson‘s name was still on the membership list of attorneys
licensed to practice in the Eastern District of Virginia at the time he filed his March
2015 affidavit, placement on a membership list does not itself determine an
6
At the time of Mr. Johnson‘s disbarment, the rules stated that ―[a]ny
person who is a member of the bar in good standing in the Supreme Court of
Virginia is eligible to practice before this Court upon admission.‖ See E.D. Va.
Local Civil Rule 83.1 (A) (2001).
7
Reciprocal discipline will be imposed barring any evidence that such an
outcome would be inappropriate. See E.D. Va. Local Civil Rule, App. B; FRDE
II.A, II.D.
13
attorney‘s eligibility to practice law in a jurisdiction. In contrast, the rules for the
Eastern District of Virginia indicate that eligibility to practice depends on an
attorney‘s status as a ―member of the Virginia State Bar in good standing,‖ and Mr.
Johnson was no longer ―in good standing‖ once his Virginia license was revoked.
Mr. Johnson cannot use his failure to comply with the reporting requirement as a
basis for claiming continued bar membership in his March 2015 affidavit,
particularly since he was required to notify the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia of his revoked license prior to March 4, 2015.
Accordingly, we conclude that Mr. Johnson‘s last two affidavits are noncompliant
because the statement in his March 2015 affidavit that he was ―still admitted to
those jurisdictions‖ was false, and he did not correct the statement in his August
2015 affidavit, as requested.
Mr. Johnson makes an additional argument that the Board never filed a
Notice of Non-Compliance during his second petition for reinstatement, which
precluded him from seeking a hearing before the Board to determine the validity of
Disciplinary Counsel‘s objections to his affidavit. However, a disbarred attorney
―is not relieved of the obligation to comply fully with [14 (g)] by [Disciplinary]
Counsel‘s failure to file‖ a Notice of Non-Compliance, In re Bowser, 771 A.2d
1002, 1003 (D.C. 2001), and ―an evidentiary hearing is not required when the
14
attorney has simply not provided the information required by [] 14 (g),‖ Johnson
II, supra, 103 A.3d at 199.
B. Nunc Pro Tunc Treatment of Mr. Johnson’s Future 14 (g) Affidavit
A disbarred attorney will typically not be reinstated to practice in this
jurisdiction until five years have passed from the date that the attorney submits a
compliant 14 (g) affidavit. See In re Gardner, supra, 650 A.2d at 697; see also
D.C. Bar R. XI, § 16 (c). In certain ―exceptional circumstances,‖ however, where
an attorney files a deficient 14 (g) affidavit but promptly corrects any errors, we
will allow the five year period of disbarment to run nunc pro tunc from the filing
date of a previous deficient affidavit. See In re Weekes, supra note 5, 990 A.2d at
474. Mr. Johnson requested that his March 2015 and August 2015 affidavits
receive nunc pro tunc treatment dating back to May 18, 2001, when he filed his
first 14 (g) affidavit. The Board considered granting nunc pro tunc treatment to
March 4, 2015, the date of his seventh affidavit, but after Mr. Johnson submitted
an eighth noncompliant affidavit, the Board declined to ―entertain [any] further
attempts by [Mr. Johnson] to supplement his [14 (g)] affidavit in order to obtain
nunc pro tunc treatment of his period of disbarment.‖
15
In determining whether to award nunc pro tunc treatment to a disbarred
attorney‘s 14 (g) affidavit, this court must balance the public policy of D.C. Bar R.
XI, § 14 to protect the public interest with the interest of fairness to the petitioner.
In In re Weekes, we adopted the following three ―Susman factors‖ set forth by the
Board as a guide in determining whether nunc pro tunc treatment is appropriate:
1. Did the omission or defect go to one of the core
requirements listed in D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14 (a) through
(d)? If so, was there actual compliance with these
requirements which was simply not adequately reported
in the affidavit?
2. Does respondent‘s conduct, both in the underlying
violation and in the disciplinary proceeding, suggest that
an opportunity to correct is in order?
3. Does fairness to the respondent suggest that an
opportunity to correct is in order? If so, would nunc pro
tunc treatment adequately protect the public interest?
990 A.2d at 474 (discussing the three factors that the Board in In re Susman, supra,876 A.2d at 637 considered when recommending nunc pro tunc treatment).
Under the first Susman factor, this court must consider whether the defect in
the previous 14 (g) affidavits relate to the ―core requirements‖ listed in D.C. Bar R.
XI, § 14 (a)-(d). Id. The 14 (a) through (d) ―core requirements‖ mandate that a
disbarred attorney notify all clients and adverse parties of his disbarment and
deliver property to clients. A 14 (g) affidavit must ―[d]emonstrat[e] with
16
particularity, and with supporting proof, that the attorney has fully complied with‖
14 (a) through (d). Here, the record reflects that Mr. Johnson never submitted a
14 (g) affidavit demonstrating that he complied with the 14 (a) core requirement to
notify clients. Instead, the Board excused him from that requirement after he failed
over a period of fifteen years to name the individual he represented in a 2001
arbitration proceeding or to sufficiently explain the nature of the representation.
After six attempts to obtain a compliant affidavit on this issue, the Board
acquiesced to the reality that due to the passage of time, compliance was
impractical. As a result, we do not know, even now, whether ―there [was] actual
compliance with [14 (a)] which was simply not adequately reported in the
affidavit.‖ Id. Therefore, this factor weighs against Mr. Johnson.
Regarding the second Susman factor, we must examine whether Mr.
Johnson‘s ―conduct, both in the underlying violation and in the disciplinary
proceeding, suggest that an opportunity to correct is in order.‖ Id. In the
underlying violation that led to his disbarment, Mr. Johnson engaged in conduct
that was dishonest, fraudulent, and deceitful. He falsely claimed to represent
clients while entering into a bankruptcy settlement on their behalf and forged their
signatures on official documents. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md., supra,
770 A.2d at 134-37. Further, he showed disregard for the disciplinary process
17
during his first petition for reinstatement when he submitted four noncompliant
14 (g) affidavits by ―refus[ing] to clarify the circumstances surrounding his
arbitration client‖ and subsequently refusing to follow steps that the Board laid out
for him to correct this error. See Johnson II, 103 A.3d at 198; id. at 196 (noting
that Mr. Johnson refused the Board‘s specific requests that he explain the nature of
his client relationship or explain what steps he took to obtain the client‘s
information). During his second petition for reinstatement, Mr. Johnson failed to
correct the false statement made in his March 2015 affidavit pertaining to his bar
memberships in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. We conclude
that an opportunity to correct is not in order given Mr. Johnson‘s repeated refusal
to provide requested information. Cf. In re Weekes, supra note 5, 990 A.2d at 474(noting that the Board in In re Susman weighed this factor in favor of Mr. Susman
because he was ―honest and non-evasive during his disciplinary proceedings‖).
The third Susman factor is the most critical to our analysis in this case —
whether ―fairness to the respondent suggest[s] that an opportunity to correct is in
order‖ and ―[i]f so, would nunc pro tunc treatment adequately protect the public
interest.‖ Id. at 474. Mr. Johnson has had a total of eight opportunities to file a
compliant affidavit and has failed to do so. He did not comply with the requests
18
from Disciplinary Counsel and the Board to correct his affidavit, but he claims that
his personal circumstances and the resistance he encountered from Disciplinary
Counsel made it difficult for him to comply. He asserts that he never received the
order of disbarment from the United States District Court of the District of
Columbia. He further asserts that he was not aware of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia‘s requirement to report his disbarment in
other jurisdictions. Finally, Mr. Johnson argues that whether he correctly reported
the status of each of his bar memberships is not germane to the purpose of 14 (g)
because it is merely a technical requirement of the rule. He questions Disciplinary
Counsel‘s insistence on his filing a new affidavit, which, he argues, would
essentially state what Disciplinary Counsel already knows — that he was not
licensed to practice before the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
He argues, in essence, that their insistence on compliance with this technical
requirement elevates form over substance, see In re Hook, 912 A.2d 554, 555 &
n.9 (D.C. 2006) (describing failure to list bar membership as a technical
deficiency), and, at oral argument, described their actions as a ―pedantic‖
enforcement of the 14 (g)(2) requirement.
19
However, contrary to Mr. Johnson‘s contentions, the requirement to list
one‘s bar membership in a 14 (g) affidavit following disbarment in this jurisdiction
is not merely ―pedantic.‖ Indeed, it is germane to the purpose of 14 (g) because it
―safeguards against the possibility that an attorney who has been disciplined in one
jurisdiction may escape the notice of another and practice without reciprocal
sanction.‖ In re Weekes, supra note 5, 990 A.2d at 473. While there is no
evidence that Mr. Johnson continued to practice in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia or the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia after 2001, he did escape the notice of the Eastern District of
Virginia and claimed membership in that bar without reciprocal sanction from that
federal court from June 2001 until March 2015 when the District of Columbia‘s
Disciplinary Counsel — not Mr. Johnson — finally reported his revoked license.
Even considering the life events that befell Mr. Johnson following his disbarment,
his claimed lack of knowledge of the reporting rule does not excuse his failure to
comply with this requirement.
A disbarred attorney who is seeking reinstatement to the practice of law — a
profession heavily dependent on self-motivated adherence to ethical rules — has
the obligation to show compliance with the rules governing the District of
Columbia bar and the disciplinary rules in other jurisdictions. Failure to comply
20
with such disciplinary rules in this case led to Mr. Johnson submitting a sworn
affidavit that contained a false statement.
Additionally, as the Board noted, despite Mr. Johnson‘s assertions that he
was licensed to practice in both the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
once Disciplinary Counsel presented him with evidence to the contrary, he still
failed to take the necessary steps to correct his March 2015 affidavit and to report
his revoked license to the Eastern District of Virginia. Contrary to Mr. Johnson‘s
contentions, his last affidavit cannot be categorized as ―full, though technically
imperfect compliance‖ for the purposes of receiving nunc pro tunc treatment. Cf.
In re Gardner, 650 A.2d at 697–98; In re Susman, supra, 876 A.2d at 638. We
therefore conclude that, in the event Mr. Johnson files a compliant affidavit in the
future, he is not entitled to receive nunc pro tunc treatment dating back to any of
his previously filed 14 (g) affidavits.
Consequently, Mr. Johnson will be subject to the required five-year period
of disbarment following the date of submission of the compliant affidavit before he
will be eligible for reinstatement pursuant to D.C. Bar R. XI, § 16 (c). To be in full
compliance, Mr. Johnson must submit a new affidavit that addresses all of the
21
requirements in 14 (g)(1)-(3). Specifically, his affidavit must correct the false
statement in his prior affidavit regarding his license and eligibility to practice law
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia as of June
18, 2001, and the United States District Court for the District of Columbia as of
August 7, 2002.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Mr. Johnson‘s March and August 2015 affidavits fail to
comply with D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14 (g). Mr. Johnson is not eligible for
reinstatement, and his second petition is dismissed.