E.C. v. RCM of Washington, Inc. , 92 A.3d 305 ( 2014 )

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 12-AA-1441
E.C.,* PETITIONER,
v.
RCM OF WASHINGTON, INC., RESPONDENT.
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
District of Columbia Office of Administrative Hearings
(2012-DOES-00933)
(Argued September 27, 2013 Decided June 5, 2014)
Jennifer Mezey, Legal Aid Society of the District of Columbia, with whom
Drake Hagner and John C. Keeney, Jr., were on the brief, for petitioner.
Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project
(―DV LEAP‖), and George Washington University Law School, with whom
Matthew A. Eisenstein, Christa D. Forman, and Adele M.K. Gilpin, Arnold &
Porter, LLP, were on the brief, for amici curiae.
Eugene A. Adams, Chief Deputy Attorney General for the District of
Columbia, with whom Ariel B. Levinson-Waldman, Senior Counsel to the Attorney
General for the District of Columbia, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, Loren L.
Alikhan, Deputy Solicitor General, and Richard S. Love, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, filed an amicus curiae brief for petitioner.
*
Pursuant to petitioner‘s request, this court will use her initials, ―E.C.,‖ to
refer to petitioner and those of her ex-boyfriend, ―M.L.‖, when referencing him, in
order to help protect their privacy.
2
Before BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY and EASTERLY, Associate Judges, and KING,
Senior Judge.
BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Associate Judge: In this appeal, we are presented
with an issue of first impression: whether a victim of domestic violence, who is
separated from her employment on account of alleged misconduct, is nonetheless
eligible for unemployment compensation benefits when the alleged misconduct
underlying the victim‘s separation from employment is ―due to domestic violence.‖
In this case, petitioner E.C. seeks review of the decision by an administrative law
judge (―ALJ‖) of the District of Columbia Office of Administrative Hearings
(―OAH‖) partially denying her claim for unemployment benefits on the basis that
she was terminated for simple misconduct.
On review, E.C., joined by amici curiae and the District of Columbia Office
of the Attorney General (―the District‖),1 contends that the ALJ erred in his
determination that she is disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation
1
We invited the District to provide us with supplemental briefing on
October 7, 2013, which it answered on November 27, 2013. Following the
District‘s supplemental briefing to this court, E.C. informed this court by way of
letter, received on December 11, 2013, that she adopts the District‘s positions on
two issues. In determining whether a claimant‘s separation from employment was
―due to domestic violence,‖ she asks us to consider: (1) applying a ―substantial or
significant cause of job loss,‖ standard, which we read as synonymous with amici‘s
―substantial factor‖ standard, see infra, and (2) taking into account the ―entire
mosaic‖ of domestic violence.
3
benefits on account of engaging in ―simple misconduct,‖2 by admitting her former
boyfriend, who had a history of abusing her, onto the premises of her employer‘s
residential facilities on three occasions, because she is entitled to benefits under
D.C. Code § 51-131 (2010 Supp.), enacted to allow victims of domestic violence to
receive unemployment compensation benefits in circumstances where they can
show they have separated from their employment ―due to domestic violence.‖
E.C., amici, and the District urge us to interpret the language ―due to domestic
violence‖ broadly, to mean that any claimant who shows that domestic violence
played a ―substantial factor‖ in the claimant‘s separation from employment is
eligible for unemployment compensation benefits, even if the claimant might
otherwise be disqualified from receiving benefits, for reasons including
misconduct, as alleged here.3
2
D.C. Code § 51-110 (b)(2) (2001); 7 DCMR §§ 312.5 and 312.6.
3
Amici curiae consisted of the following organizations and individuals: The
Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project (who presented at
oral argument); Ayuda; Bread for the City; Catherine F. Klein, Professor of Law
and Director of Columbus Community Legal Services, Columbus School of Law,
Catholic University; D.C. Volunteer Lawyers Project; District of Columbia
Coalition Against Domestic Violence; Legal Aid Society – Employment Law
Center; Legal Momentum; and Lisa Vollendorf Martin, Professor of Law and Co-
Director, Families and the Law Clinic, Columbus School of Law, Catholic
University.
4
In the alternative, E.C. challenges the ALJ‘s simple misconduct finding on
the basis that the ALJ failed to engage in ―the reasoned analysis‖ required for
misconduct cases when he did not consider material facts and issues tending to
negate any misconduct on E.C.‘s part, citing Hamilton v. Hojeij Branded Food,
Inc., 41 A.3d 464, 477 (D.C. 2012). Specifically, E.C. alleges that the ALJ failed
to ―meaningfully analyze‖ the ―underlying reasons‖ for her actions, namely, the
domestic violence context that affected E.C. and her conduct toward her employer.
See Larry v. National Rehabilitation Hospital, 973 A.2d 180, 183–84 (D.C. 2009).
With regard to the domestic violence statute, we conclude that, based on the
statute‘s legislative history, remedial purpose to combat domestic violence and its
impact on victims in the unemployment compensation context, as well as public
policies underlying similar remedial legislation, the statute intends to allow for
broad coverage of claimants whose separation from employment is ―due to
domestic violence.‖ However, we emphasize that in order for a claimant to qualify
for benefits under this provision of the statute, the claimant first must establish a
causal nexus between the domestic violence and the claimant‘s separation from
employment. To establish that a claimant‘s separation from employment was ―due
to domestic violence‖ under D.C. Code § 51-131, a claimant must show that: (1)
the claimant suffered domestic violence that qualifies as an ―intrafamily offense‖
5
under the Intrafamily Offenses Act4 (―IFOA‖), along with qualifying supporting
documentation, and (2) domestic violence played a ―substantial factor‖ in the
claimant‘s separation from employment.
In this case, we hold that E.C. established a clear causal nexus between the
conduct that led to her termination from employment and the domestic violence
that she suffered, thereby showing that domestic violence played a ―substantial
factor‖ in her separation from employment. Because E.C. established that her
separation from employment was ―due to domestic violence,‖ under our
interpretation of the statute‘s language, E.C. is eligible for unemployment
compensation benefits. Accordingly, we reverse the ALJ‘s ruling partially
disqualifying E.C. from benefits. Because we determine that E.C. clearly
established that the instances of misconduct leading to her termination from
employment were ―due to domestic violence,‖ we need not draw any conclusions
on her alternate claim.
4
D.C. Code § 16-1001 (8) (2009 Supp.).
6
I. Factual Background
The uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that E.C. was in an abusive
relationship with her ex-boyfriend, M.L., for over eleven months, during which
time she tried to end the relationship no less than four separate times. While E.C.
was involved with M.L., she began working for RCM, an organization that
provides housing for persons with mental and physical disabilities (―residents‖).
To ensure the safety of the residents under RCM‘s care, it required all employees
to observe a company policy prohibiting those not employed or authorized by
RCM from accessing its residential facilities. RCM apprised all new hires,
including E.C., of the policy at new hire orientation and company training, as well
as in the personnel handbook provided to each employee.
Over the course of E.C.‘s relationship with M.L., he exhibited controlling
behavior that interfered with her work and became extreme and violent whenever
E.C. attempted to end the relationship. For example, in separate instances, M.L.
grabbed E.C. around her neck, vandalized her apartment building, kicked in her car
window, slashed her tire, and stalked her at work. In another incident, M.L.
repeatedly called E.C., came to her workplace, and tapped on the glass patio door
of her workplace while he watched her ignore his calls. According to E.C., it was
7
M.L.‘s abusive and controlling tactics, specifically his repeated attempts to invade
her work space and stalk her at work, which led E.C. to permit him to set foot on
RCM property on three separate occasions, in violation of RCM‘s policy
prohibiting access to unauthorized persons, ultimately leading to her termination.
For example, during E.C.‘s employment, M.L. showed up at her workplace
multiple times despite her instructing him that he was not allowed on RCM‘s
premises. According to E.C., M.L. appeared uninvited so often at her workplace
that she could not ―even give a number‖ for the times he appeared. In one such
instance, E.C. felt compelled to speak with M.L. on a public street by the RCM
facility because ―it‘s safer for [her] to allow him to say what he needs to say so that
[she] [could] remain safe.‖ E.C. eventually ended the relationship with M.L. in
March 2012, which led to M.L.‘s final threat to get E.C. fired. Specifically, M.L.
said: ―[Y]ou think that you‘re going to hold your job? You‘re unfit to work here
and I‘m going to make sure that I call your employ[er].‖
To protect herself against M.L., E.C. filed two temporary protection orders
(―TPO‖) in August 2011 and March 2012, respectively, in the Domestic Violence
Unit of D.C. Superior Court, both of which were granted and ordered M.L. to stay
away from E.C.‘s work and home, among other places. The court, however,
8
rejected E.C.‘s September 2011 request for a civil protection order (―CPO‖), which
resulted in the lapse of her August 2011 TPO, because, according to the court, the
parties seemed to agree on their desire to stay away from each other, given that
M.L. had similarly filed a TPO against E.C.5 E.C. later filed a second CPO against
M.L. in March 2012 that the court granted. In that CPO, E.C. described numerous
incidents, including how M.L. repeatedly came to RCM‘s residential facility at 110
Michigan Ave., Northeast, and how during one argument, he grabbed E.C.‘s purse
and then grabbed her neck.
With regard to her alleged misconduct, E.C. admitted that she voluntarily
allowed M.L. onto RCM property on three occasions. During the first incident,
M.L. allegedly followed her to RCM‘s residential facility on Alabama Avenue
5
Under D.C. Code § 16-1003 (a) (2007 Supp.), ―[a] petitioner . . . may file
a petition for civil protection . . . against a respondent who has allegedly committed
or threatened to commit one or more criminal offenses against the petitioner.‖
While the petition for a CPO is pending, the court may issue a TPO for a period of
up to fourteen days if it ―finds that the safety or welfare of the petitioner . . . is
immediately endangered by the respondent.‖ D.C. Code § 16-1004 (b)(1)-(2)
(2009 Supp.).
After conducting a hearing on the petition for a CPO, the court may issue a
CPO if it ―finds that there is good cause to believe the respondent has committed or
threatened to commit a criminal offense against the petitioner.‖ D.C. Code
§ 16-1005 (c) (2009 Supp.). The CPO may require the respondent to ―refrain from
committing or threatening to commit criminal offenses against the petitioner‖ and
―stay away from or have no contact with the petitioner and any other protected . . .
locations[,]‖ among other preventive measures. § 16-1005 (c)(1)–(2).
9
from her September 1, 2011 hearing at Superior Court, where she had attempted to
file a petition for a CPO against him. Rather than risk M.L. ―mak[ing] a scene at
[her] workplace,‖ and even though she warned M.L. that he should not be at her
workplace, E.C. nevertheless allowed M.L. onto the property for twenty minutes
while she prepared a meal for an RCM resident because ―the last thing [she]
needed was to lose her job.‖
On the second occasion, in November 2011, E.C. had asked M.L. to pick her
up at work because she was not driving at that time, but when he arrived, she had
not yet finished her work. While E.C. completed her duties for the day, her co-
worker, Carolyn Harris, gave M.L. access onto the property, access to which E.C.
appeared to acquiesce, or at least not explicitly deny. M.L. remained on the
property for roughly two minutes, and did not interact with any of the RCM
facility‘s residents. During the third incident, in December 2011, E.C. had
requested that M.L. bring her breakfast to work because she had to ―come into
work unexpectedly and could not stop . . . to get breakfast [that] particular
morning.‖ E.C. admitted that she allowed M.L. to enter the property as far as the
outer door of the apartment, where E.C. was caring for a resident, because she
could not leave the residents alone. An RCM resident who had met M.L. at a
10
holiday party then invited him into the apartment. M.L. remained on the property
―no longer than ten minutes.‖
RCM eventually terminated E.C. on the basis that she had violated company
policy by admitting non-authorized persons onto company property in those three
instances. Subsequently, E.C. filed for unemployment insurance benefits under
D.C. Code § 51-109 (2001). The District of Columbia Department of Employment
Services denied E.C.‘s application for benefits on May 29, 2012, because RCM
had terminated E.C. for violation of an employer rule, constituting employee
misconduct. E.C. appealed that denial of benefits to the OAH.
On July 10, 2012, ALJ James Harmon presided over a hearing on E.C.‘s
eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits. Specifically, the ALJ
determined the issues before him to be: (1) whether E.C. ―engaged in any type of
work-related misconduct that would warrant the denial of her receiving [these]
benefits‖ and (2) whether D.C. Code § 51-131 applied to E.C.‘s case on account of
any domestic violence.
At the hearing, RCM presented evidence from three witnesses: Stacey
Whitted, Human Resources Manager for RCM; Keesa Robinson, Support
11
Coordinator for RCM; and Paulette Robinson, Incident Management Coordinator
for RCM. Ms. Whitted and Ms. Keesa Robinson both attested that M.L. was not
an employee of RCM, and Ms. Robinson further testified that, as E.C.‘s supervisor,
she had not authorized M.L. to be on the property. Ms. Paulette Robinson testified
that she personally advised E.C. of the policy on prohibited access by unauthorized
persons to RCM facilities, for which, she confirmed, E.C. was terminated.6
Notably, Ms. Robinson testified that prior to terminating E.C., RCM learned of her
domestic violence issues with M.L. E.C. revealed to her employer that she had ―a
past violent history‖ with M.L., including ―quite a few bad altercations.‖ Ms.
Robinson also testified that E.C. described multiple incidents where M.L. either
appeared at RCM‘s residential facilities, or followed E.C. in the community while
she served RCM residents.
At the hearing, E.C. testified about M.L.‘s history of abusive behavior,
including incidents intended to show M.L.‘s interference with and effect on her
6
RCM additionally presented documentary evidence showing that E.C.
signed and acknowledged receipt of the policy manual, including a section that
provides that an employee may be terminated for allowing unauthorized
individuals onto company property.
Separately, Ms. Whitted conceded during her testimony that M.L.‘s actions
prompted RCM‘s investigation of E.C., rather than any independent concerns
about E.C.‘s job performance.
12
employment at RCM. To further support her claim of domestic violence, E.C.
called a Licensed Independent Clinical Social Worker (―LICSW‖), Heather
Powers,7 to testify as an expert witness on domestic violence. Ms. Powers testified
that, in her opinion, E.C. had experienced domestic violence during her
relationship with M.L., namely, through ―[his] coercion and threats[,] . . .
intimidation, . . . destroying [her] property, [inflicting] emotional abuse . . . [and]
isolation, controlling what [E.C.] [did] . . . and using economic abuse, . . . [as well
as] preventing [E.C.] from getting and/or keeping a job‖; Ms. Powers also
described M.L.‘s stalking of E.C. through repeated unwanted contact.
Ms. Powers noted that M.L.‘s actions made E.C. afraid and willing to
comply with some of his requests in order to reduce the possibility of abuse,
because M.L. carried out his threats against her, including ultimately depriving
E.C. of her employment. Specifically, E.C.‘s actions at RCM, including her
allowing M.L. onto company property, were consistent with common patterns of
abusive relationships involving domestic violence because by ―doing things that
were in compliance with [M.L.‘s] desires . . . to have [E.C.] solely dependent upon
7
Ms. Powers has more than seven years of experience as a LICSW in the
field of domestic violence. She has conducted more than 250 assessments with
victims of domestic violence and provided individual and group therapy to over
100 survivors of domestic violence.
13
him . . . she would keep herself safe, she would be more likely to keep any
incidents that could involve others who were near her when these incidents
happened . . . under control.‖
In a final order, the ALJ made a number of findings of fact based on the
evidence presented. On the issue of misconduct, the ALJ found that RCM had a
policy ―which provides that an employee may be discharged for ‗allowing
unauthorized person(s) in RCM‘s facilities or riding in [a] company vehicle,‘‖
which E.C. knew of and acknowledged when she received her personnel handbook
on May 16, 2011. The ALJ also found that E.C. admitted M.L., either directly or
indirectly, onto RCM property on three occasions in September, November, and
December 2011. Lastly, the ALJ found that RCM ultimately terminated E.C. and
sent her a letter on April 23, 2012, stating the reason for her termination as ―failure
to follow protocol regarding unauthorized staff in work locations.‖
With regard to her relationship with M.L., the ALJ determined that E.C.
engaged in a ―turbulent relationship‖ with him, during which a number of abusive
events took place. However, the ALJ also found that E.C. took certain
precautionary measures, such as seeking TPOs and CPOs against M.L. From these
factual findings, the ALJ drew a series of legal conclusions. Specifically, the ALJ
14
determined that RCM failed to show that E.C. had committed gross or simple
misconduct under D.C. Code § 51-110 (b) because RCM based its claim of
misconduct on E.C.‘s violation of an employer rule, and failed to meet its burden
in proving ―that it consistently enforce[d] its policy, as required by 7 DCMR
§ 312.7 (c).‖ Nonetheless, the ALJ independently determined that E.C.‘s behavior
constituted simple misconduct because E.C. allowed M.L. onto RCM‘s residential
facilities on three occasions, and that these instances constituted ―a willful and
deliberate violation of [RCM‘s] interests.‖ The ALJ decided that E.C. breached
her duties and obligations to RCM because in each of the three instances, E.C.
―directly or indirectly permitted [M.L.] to enter the worksite, she did so willingly
and voluntarily, as there were no threats or coercive behavior from M.L. on those
occasions.‖
The ALJ also acknowledged that the evidence demonstrated that E.C. was a
victim of domestic violence, but found that the evidence in the record ―[did] not
show that, during those specific times [when E.C. allowed M.L. onto the property]
that her actions were so adversely and severely affected by her being a victim of
domestic violence, that she lacked the required intent to commit an act or acts that
constituted misconduct under the [D.C. Unemployment Compensation] Act.‖
Consequently, the ALJ disagreed with E.C.‘s contention that she lost her
15
employment ―due to domestic violence,‖ and did not make an explicit ruling under
D.C. Code § 51-131. This petition for review followed.
II. Discussion
E.C. argues that the ALJ committed legal error because he erroneously failed
to find that E.C. lost her employment ―due to domestic violence,‖ and further
failed to explicitly apply D.C. Code § 51-131, the domestic violence statute, to
determine whether E.C. qualified for unemployment compensation benefits under
the statute. Specifically, E.C. claims that the ALJ improperly required her to
demonstrate a strict causal nexus between her termination from employment and
the alleged domestic violence, effectively placing the burden on E.C. ―to show that
her exposure to domestic violence negated a finding of misconduct,‖ thus making
the ―special protection for domestic violence victims superfluous‖ under the
statute. She contends that had the ALJ applied § 51-131, based on its language,
purpose, and legislative history, he would have determined that she qualified for
benefits under the statute because E.C. proved that domestic violence played a
―substantial factor‖ in her separation from employment, even if it was not the ―sole
cause.‖
16
In assessing E.C.‘s claim of eligibility under D.C. Code § 51-131, we first
discuss the legal framework used to interpret statutory questions. We then
determine how to define and prove ―domestic violence‖ and interpret the ―due to
domestic violence‖ requirement under the statute. Lastly, we must decide whether,
on this record, E.C. is entitled to the statute‘s protection and unemployment
compensation benefits under our interpretation of the statute.
A. Standard of Review and Statutory Construction
In reviewing an OAH decision, we determine whether: ―(1) OAH made
findings of fact on each materially contested issue of fact, (2) substantial evidence
supports each finding, and (3) OAH‘s conclusions flow rationally from its findings
of fact.‖ Rodriguez v. Filene’s Basement Inc., 905 A.2d 177, 180 (D.C. 2006)
(citations omitted). However, ―the construction of a statute raises a question of law
which this court reviews de novo.‖ Burton v. Office of Emp. Appeals, 30 A.3d 789,
791 (D.C. 2011) (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted). ―[W]e
are presumed to have the greater expertise when the agency‘s decision rests on a
question of law, and . . . therefore remain ‗the final authority on issues of statutory
construction.‘‖ Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs.,
683 A.2d 470, 472 (D.C. 1996) (citations omitted).
17
In interpreting a statute as a matter of first impression, the ―judicial task is to
discern, and give effect to the legislature‘s intent.‖ Burton, supra, 30 A.3d at 792
(citation omitted). ―When statutory language is unambiguous, we are required to
give effect to its plain meaning.‖ Hamilton, supra, 41 A.3d at 474 (citation
omitted). ―The primary and general rule of statutory construction is that the intent
of the lawmaker is to be found in the language that he has used.‖ Peoples Drug
Stores v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 753 (D.C. 1983) (en banc) (citation
omitted). We acknowledge, however, that sometimes the literal language of the
statute is not enough, and that the statute must be read ―in . . . light of the statute
taken as a whole‖ and ―against the backdrop of its policies and objectives.‖
Burton, supra, 30 A.3d at 792 (citation omitted).
The District of Columbia‘s unemployment compensation statute creates a
presumptive right to unemployment compensation benefits. See D.C. Code
§ 51-109; Hamilton, supra, 41 A.3d at 473. However, an employee is ineligible to
receive benefits if the employee is discharged for ―gross‖ or ―other than gross‖
misconduct — commonly referred to as ―simple‖ misconduct. D.C. Code
§ 51-110 (b); see also Badawi v. Hawk One Sec., Inc., 21 A.3d 607, 613–14 (D.C.
2011) (noting that ―[i]n every unemployment compensation case, the employer
bears the burden of proving that the employee engaged in misconduct‖ (citations
18
omitted)). Although the ―gross‖ and ―simple‖ misconduct provisions operate to
disqualify certain claimants from benefits, D.C. Code § 51-131 (a) provides an
exception: ―Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, no otherwise
eligible individual shall be denied [unemployment compensation] benefits for any
week because the individual was separated from employment by discharge or
voluntary or involuntary resignation due to domestic violence against the
individual . . . .‖ (emphasis added). Domestic violence is defined under the statute
as an ―‗intrafamily offense,‘‖ see D.C. Code § 51-131 (b), as further defined under
the IFOA, see D.C. Code § 16-1001 (8). To be eligible ―to receive [unemployment
compensation] benefits for separation from employment due to domestic
violence,‖ a claimant must ―submit[] . . . support [for] the claim of domestic
violence[,]‖ which a claimant can establish through various means, including:
(1) A police report or record;
(2) A governmental agency or court record, such as a
court order, a Petition for a Civil Protection Order, or a
record or report from Child Services; or
(3) A written statement, which affirms that the claimant
has sought assistance for domestic violence from the
signatory, from a:
(i) Shelter official;
(ii) Social worker;
(iii) Counselor;
(iv) Therapist;
(v) Attorney;
(vi) Medical doctor; or
(vii) Cleric.
D.C. Code § 51-132 (2004 Supp.).
19
Because D.C. Code § 51-131 presents an additional pathway under which a
claimant may qualify for unemployment compensation benefits, our task is to
determine how the statute applies to an individual claimant, particularly in relation
to the broader unemployment compensation benefits statutory framework. In so
doing, we are mindful of reading the statute through the lens previously discussed
for statutory interpretation case questions. Consequently, we conclude that four
issues merit our consideration in interpreting and applying § 51-131, and its
requirement that a claimant — here, E.C. — show that her separation from
employment was ―due to domestic violence‖: (1) what significance we should
attribute to the statute‘s ―notwithstanding‖ language, (2) how to define and prove
―domestic violence‖ as an ―intrafamily offense,‖ (3) what causation standard
should apply to our determination of whether an individual is separated from her
employment ―due to domestic violence,‖ and (4) whether E.C. is eligible for
benefits under § 51-131. In order to answer these questions, we are required to
consider the IFOA and our case law defining domestic violence under the IFOA.
And, given the public policy considerations inherent to the statute, we must also
consider the domestic violence statute‘s legislative history and purpose, as well as
the broader unemployment compensation statutory framework under which it falls.
20
B. Interpretation of the statute’s “notwithstanding” clause
E.C. asserts that the ―notwithstanding‖ language of D.C. Code § 51-131
indicates that the legislature intended this provision ―to override conflicting
provisions of any other section.‖ E.C. cites to Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group,
508 U.S. 10, 18 (1993), for support. We agree with this interpretation.
We had occasion to address a ―notwithstanding‖ clause in Burton v. Office of
Employee Appeals, supra, where appellants challenged the trial court‘s decision
that they could be demoted without cause under the Metropolitan Police Personnel
Amendment Act (―MPPA‖). 30 A.3d at 790. In affirming the trial court‘s
decision, we interpreted a provision of the MPPA intended to confer authority on
the mayor or his delegee to return assistant chiefs of police and inspectors to the
rank of captain, ―notwithstanding‖ any other law or regulation, to mean that the
provision ―at a minimum[] . . . supersede[d] any conflicting regulations that were
in place at the time the statute was enacted.‖ Id. at 795. In rejecting appellant‘s
argument that such an interpretation would eviscerate strong protections granted
under the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act to Career Service employees, which
the MPPA amended, we concluded that a ―notwithstanding‖ clause clearly
21
indicates the legislature‘s intent to override any other conflicting provision. Id. at
796 (referencing Cisneros, supra, 508 U.S. at 18, in its rationale).
Applying those principles to the domestic violence statute, the plain
language of D.C. Code § 51-131 unambiguously overrides any conflicting
provision within the same subchapter, which covers eligibility for, and
disqualification from, unemployment compensation benefits. Therefore, § 51-131
is intended to supersede § 51-110 (b)‘s disqualification of a claimant‘s
unemployment compensation benefits for engaging in misconduct when that
claimant is a victim of domestic violence, and shows that his or her separation
from employment was ―due to domestic violence‖ under §§ 51-131 and 51-132.
To allow § 51-110 (b) to otherwise disqualify a claimant because of his or her
misconduct, when that claimant loses his or her employment ―due to domestic
violence,‖ would ―work an obvious injustice‖ to the statute because it would fail to
consider § 51-131‘s place in the overall unemployment compensation framework
as a superseding provision. See Burton, 30 A.3d at 792 (providing that correctly
interpreting a statute requires a contextual approach that leads to a ―sensible
construction‖ of the law in its entirety).
22
C. Domestic violence as an “intrafamily offense”
As previously stated, D.C. Code § 51-131 (b) defines ―domestic violence‖ as
an ―intrafamily offense,‖ pursuant to the IFOA, D.C. Code § 16-1001 (8). Under
D.C. Code § 16-1001 (8), ―intrafamily offense‖ is defined as any ―interpersonal,
intimate partner, or intrafamily violence.‖ ―Interpersonal violence‖ is
correspondingly defined as ―an act punishable as a criminal offense that is
committed or threatened to be committed by an offender upon a person,‖ including
one who is involved ―in a romantic, dating, or sexual relationship with the
offender.‖ D.C. Code § 16-1001 (6) (2009 Supp.). Similarly, ―intrafamily
violence‖ refers to ―an act punishable as a criminal offense that is committed or
threatened to be committed by an offender upon a person to whom the offender is
related by . . . domestic partnership.‖ D.C. Code § 16-1001 (9) (2001). In
determining whether an abuser‘s actions constitute ―domestic violence,‖ for
purposes of D.C. Code § 51-131, E.C., amici, and the District suggest that this
court read ―domestic violence‖ broadly to include all the abusive actions taken by
the abuser against a claimant throughout their relationship, that may constitute
―intrafamily offenses,‖ not just the specific actions directly leading to the
claimant‘s termination. To support this broad definition of ―domestic violence,‖
the parties urge us to consider our jurisprudence on the IFOA, where we have
23
liberally construed ―domestic violence‖ in order to further the Act‘s remedial
purpose. See Cruz-Foster v. Foster, 597 A.2d 927, 929 (D.C. 1991). We find that
framework appropriate.
First, we must determine whether any of the incidents leading to a claimant‘s
separation from employment constitute ―interpersonal‖ or ―intrafamily violence,‖
as well as what proof the claimant must show of this violence. D.C. Code
§ 16-1001 (6), (9). For example, in Richardson v. Easterling, 878 A.2d 1212 (D.C.
2005), we concluded that under the IFOA, an individual does not necessarily have
to provide proof of a criminal act involving abuse or violence in order to establish
an ―intrafamily offense,‖ because doing so placed an unintended limitation on the
IFOA, which ran contrary to its ―paramount consideration‖ as a remedial piece of
legislation.8 Id. at 1216-17 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, we determined that, contrary to the trial court‘s ruling, a pattern of
harassing behavior by petitioner‘s boyfriend that was committed ―with the intent to
cause emotional distress to [petitioner] by willfully, maliciously and repeatedly
harassing [him],‖ was a sufficient, though not necessary, means of proving the
8
We defined an ―intrafamily offense‖ as ―an act punishable as a criminal
offense committed by an offender upon a person‖ with whom the claimant showed
some type of relationship — in this case, the sharing of a ―mutual residence‖ and
involvement in a ―romantic relationship.‖ Richardson, supra, 878 A.2d at 1216
(citation omitted).
24
―intrafamily offense‖ of stalking. Id. at 1217; see also D.C. Code
§ 22-3133 (2009 Supp.).9 We specifically recognized that stalking qualified as
―emotional violence,‖ one of the types of ―domestic violence‖ which the IFOA was
intended to protect against. Richardson, supra, 878 A.2d at 1217 n.6 (citation
omitted) (noting that ―the statutory language [of the IFOA] exclude[d] any notion
that physical violence, or the threat thereof, was the only harm that the Act was
designed to address‖). Thus, like in Richardson, any pattern of conduct designed
to cause emotional distress is sufficient, though not necessary, to constitute an
―intrafamily offense‖ for purposes of D.C. Code § 51-131, so long as the claimant
establishes the pattern of conduct through one of the means of supporting
documentation under D.C. Code § 51-132, see supra Part II.A.
Although we have answered how to frame the substantive question of
whether the claimant‘s proof conclusively establishes an ―intrafamily offense,‖ in
making that determination, we must additionally consider what timeframe is
9
To establish a pattern of harassing behavior to prove the offense of
stalking, we note that a claimant may show the requisite ―course of conduct‖
through one or more episodes of ―harassing‖ behavior engaged in by the
perpetrator. See Shewarega v. Yegzaw, 947 A.2d 47, 53 (D.C. 2008) (―[A]s a
prophylactic measure imposed in the wake of an intrafamily offense, the CPO need
not await the materialization of a full-fledged criminal pattern; rather, we think it
must be read as proscribing even a single act of harassment, if that act otherwise
satisfies the statutory definition of the offense.‖).
25
relevant in so doing. In this regard, we find it appropriate to take into account the
public policy considerations behind the IFOA, which ―was designed to protect
victims of family abuse from acts and threats of violence,‖ and to further consider
that ―the paramount consideration concerning th[e] legislation is that it is
remedial.‖ See Cruz-Foster, supra, 597 A.2d at 929 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
In Cruz-Foster, we assessed whether the trial court erred in denying a
request to extend petitioner‘s CPO for ―good cause,‖ and ultimately remanded to
the trial court because it had not considered the ―entire mosaic‖ of petitioner‘s
history of abuse, which we recognized ―as critical to the determination‖ of whether
petitioner met her burden in showing ―good cause.‖ Id. at 930–32 & n.3 (citing In
re S.K., 564 A.2d 1382, 1389 (D.C. 1989) (per curiam) (establishing that in child
abuse and neglect cases, the judge must be familiar with the ―entire mosaic‖ in
order to best protect the child, the ultimate purpose of such a civil proceeding)); cf.
State v. Krol, 344 A.2d 289, 302 & n.12 (1975) (establishing that ―past conduct is
important evidence as to [a defendant‘s] probable future conduct‖ when assessing a
defendant‘s ―dangerousness‖ for purposes of whether to commit the defendant
acquitted by reason of insanity)). We specifically determined that the trial court
improperly limited its consideration of whether petitioner met her evidentiary
26
burden to ―an assessment of credibility with respect to the episodes‖ of abuse by
petitioner‘s perpetrator, Foster, after his release from prison, rather than
considering the entire history of abuse, spanning the time shortly after petitioner‘s
marriage to Foster, Foster‘s criminal history of contempt for violation of a CPO,
and the final abuse after Foster‘s imprisonment. Cruz-Foster, supra, 597 A.2d at
930-32. Accordingly, we remanded for additional factual findings. Id. at 932.
In coming to this determination, we noted the remedial character of the
IFOA, which required asking ―whether the ‗balance of harms‘ favor[ed] the grant
of [petitioner‘s] application,‖ and the D.C. Council‘s intended ―preference for a
generous construction of the remedial provisions of the Act.‖ Id. at 930–31. We
find that the same remedial concerns that arose in Cruz-Foster similarly arise here,
because, if we were to read too narrow a timeframe into the domestic violence
statute for purposes of establishing proof of an ―intrafamily offense,‖ then
claimants who establish proof of an ―intrafamily offense[s]‖ suffered during the
entirety of the relationship, but not during the isolated instances leading to their
separation from employment would be disqualified from receiving benefits. This
result would be anomalous to the underlying considerations of the IFOA — ―to
protect victims of family abuse from acts and threats of violence‖ and further its
―remedial purpose‖ by ―liberally construing‖ its provisions. Id. at 929 (citation
27
and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, applying the foregoing
considerations, we conclude that, in determining whether a claimant‘s proof shows
evidence of an ―intrafamily offense(s),‖ a reviewing court must consider the
―entire mosaic‖ of the claimaint‘s history of abuse, not just the incidents directly
leading to her separation from employment.
D. The causation standard for interpreting “due to domestic violence”
Having determined that we should liberally construe whether there is
―domestic violence,‖ sufficient to constitute an ―intrafamily offense,‖ by
considering the ―entire mosaic‖ of domestic violence, we turn to what causation
standard should apply in deciding whether an individual is separated from her
employment ―due to domestic violence.‖ E.C., amici, and the District urge us to
broadly interpret the ―due to domestic violence‖ language, so that a claimant need
only show that the ―domestic violence‖ played a ―substantial factor‖ in a
claimant‘s separation from employment, rather than requiring that the ―domestic
violence‖ be the ―sole cause‖ of this separation. We agree with their interpretation.
The causation standard required to support a finding that a consequence is
―due to‖ a specific action is not easily or clearly defined. The Sixth Circuit defined
28
the degree of necessary causation for ―due to‖ to mean that a miner seeking to
prove his eligibility for black lung benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act is
only required ―to show that his total disability was due ‗at least in part‘ to his
pneumoconiosis . . . [because] this more lenient interpretation is more consistent
with the remedial purpose‖ of the legislation. Peabody Coal Co. v. Smith, 127
F.3d 504, 506 (6th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).10 At the other end of the
spectrum, the D.C. Circuit observed that in assessing how much of a proposed U.S.
Post Office rate adjustment must be ―due to‖ exigent circumstances, ―due to‖ can
also be read to require a strict causal nexus where a result is ―due only to,‖ as
opposed to ―due in part to,‖ a particular cause. See U.S. Postal Serv. v. Postal
Regulatory Comm’n, 395 U.S. App. D.C. 122, 126, 640 F.3d 1263, 1267–68
(2011) (noting that the plain meaning of ―due to‖ means ―because of,‖ ―by cause
of,‖ or ―as a result of,‖ and remanding for the Commission to decide the separate
issue of the necessary degree of causality required to warrant a rate adjustment for
exigent circumstances when there is no similar plain meaning regarding ―the
closeness of the causal connection‖). As such, ―due to‖ is devoid of any clear
meaning under D.C. Code § 51-131.
10
In a prior case interpreting the Black Lung Benefits Act, the Sixth Circuit
noted that ―[th]e causal nexus of ‗due to‘ has been given a broad variety of
meanings in the law ranging from sole and proximate cause at one end of the
spectrum to contributing cause at the other.‖ Adams v. Dir., OWCP, 886 F.2d 818,
821 (6th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).
29
Given the ambiguity of the plain meaning of ―due to,‖ our task is to ―give
effect to the legislative intent‖ of a statute whose language we have determined to
be unclear; thus, D.C. Code § 51-131 must be read ―in . . . light of the statute taken
as a whole‖ and ―against the backdrop of its policies and objectives.‖ See Burton,
supra, 30 A.3d at 792 (citations omitted). The District of Columbia Council‘s
Committee Report makes clear that the statute is intended to:
provide unemployment compensation to individuals who
leave work because of domestic violence. Domestic
violence victims are often stalked by their batterers at
work, miss work due to injuries inflicted on them, and
need time to obtain legal relief to keep themselves and
their children safe. A lost job and income makes it even
more difficult to leave the violent relationship. This bill
will minimize how money factors into the decision to
leave an abusive situation.
D.C. Council, Comm. on Public Servs., Comm. Report on Bill No. 15-436, 1 (Jan.
28, 2004) [hereinafter Comm. Rep.]. The testimony of Councilmember and Public
Service Committee Chairman David A. Catania, who introduced the law,
specifically recognized the pervasive and insidious nature of domestic violence and
emphasized how the proposed legislation would address the interplay of domestic
violence and a victim‘s separation from employment by providing a domestic
violence victim with a sustainable economic future:
Studies have shown that 96% of employed domestic
violence victims experience problems at work related to
the abuse and that 30% lose their jobs due to domestic
violence. The violence experienced at home clearly
30
impacts their ability to maintain and obtain employment.
. . . Importantly, if a battered individual, especially a
woman, loses her income, she is more likely to be forced
to remain with[,] or return to the batterer because she is
unable to support herself and her family. . . .
[U]nemployment compensation is vastly greater [than
TANF benefits11], which affords a battered woman a far
better opportunity to achieve economic security after
leaving an abusive relationship.
Hearing on Bill 15-436, The Unemployment Compensation and Domestic
Violence Amendment Act of 2003, Before the Pub. Servs. Comm., 2003 Leg.,
Council Period 15 (Nov. 10, 2003) at 2:51–3:56 (statement of Councilmember
David Catania, Chairman) [hereinafter ―Hearing‖].
In drafting the statute, the Committee also heard testimony from various
domestic violence experts,12 many of whom indicated that the legislation was
critical for those whose jobs had been affected by domestic violence because the
11
Under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program,
needy families receive benefits intended to assist them in achieving self-
sufficiency through state funding. About TANF, Admin. for Children & Families,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/programs/tanf/about (last visited Dec. 10,
2013).
12
Expert witnesses included members of the American Bar Association‘s
Commission on Domestic Violence, Women Empowered Against Violence, Inc.
(―WEAVE‖), the D.C. Coalition on Domestic Violence, My Sister‘s Place, D.C.
Employment Justice Center‘s Program on Women‘s Employment Rights, and the
D.C. Department of Employment Services.
31
legislation would provide victims with ―much needed economic stability‖ when
they might not otherwise be eligible for unemployment insurance benefits. Comm.
Rep. at 3–6. To that end, the statute‘s liberal reporting requirements were intended
to allow claimants the greatest possible chance to establish the requisite causal
nexus needed to show eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits. 13 See
D.C. Code § 51-132.
Further, looking to the legislative history, the D.C. Council‘s Committee on
Public Services considered the actions taken by twenty-four other legislatures that
passed similar legislation intended to ―enabl[e] [domestic violence] victims to be
eligible for unemployment insurance benefits if they separate from their jobs,‖
Comm. Rep. 2, but specifically rejected limiting language enacted by certain
jurisdictions, such as ―directly due to domestic violence.‖ Compare Ind. Code
Ann. § 22-4-15-1 (c)(8) (West 2005) (―directly caused by domestic . . . violence‖),
with Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code § 1256 (West 2013) (leaving employment was
necessary ―to protect from‖ domestic violence), and Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch.
151a § 25 (e) (West 2013) (―due to circumstances resulting from domestic
13
And, as Councilmember Catania further noted, employers would not be
burdened by the cost of providing domestic violence victims unemployment
benefits: ―It does not cost the employer anything. These are dollars that come
from interest earned from the unemployment insurance fund.‖ Hearing at 5:10-
5:18.
32
violence‖). By declining to modify ―due to‖ with limiting language, e.g., ―directly
due to,‖ the Council signaled that it intended the term ―due to‖ to be broadly
applied.
And, notably, the D.C. Council envisioned extending broad coverage under
the statute because in 2010, it amended § 51-131 to extend benefits to individuals
whose separation from work was due to domestic violence against ―the individual
or any member of the individual’s immediate family[.]‖ See D.C. Law 18-192,
§ 2 (d), 57 D.C. Reg. 22 (May 28, 2010) (emphasis added). Accordingly, in our
view, the Council‘s efforts to grant claimants the broadest possible coverage under
the statute, and our consideration of other similar remedial legislation, counsels us
against applying an onerous burden to the requisite showing that a claimant‘s
separation from employment was ―due to domestic violence.‖ See Wash. Times v.
District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 724 A.2d 1212, 1216–17 (D.C. 1999)
(provisions of ―remedial humanitarian legislation of vast import . . . must be
liberally and broadly construed‖) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Although we have had no occasion to apply a broad causation standard to a
remedial statute of vast import, we have used a ―substantial factor‖ test in
determining whether a plaintiff has proved legal cause in negligence and products
33
liability cases. See Weakley v. Burnham Corp., 871 A.2d 1167, 1173 (D.C. 2005)
(adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431 (1965) test for legal cause in
deciding whether to reverse summary judgment motion in products liability case);
Majeska v. District of Columbia, 812 A.2d 948, 951 (D.C. 2002) (determining that
a missing stop sign was the ―cause-in-fact‖ of the accident injuring the plaintiff
based on § 431‘s ―substantial factor‖ test); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 431 (1965) (establishing that an ―actor‘s negligent conduct is the legal cause of
harm to another if . . . [the conduct] is a substantial factor in bringing about the
harm‖ (emphasis added)). Black’s Law Dictionary defines the ―substantial-factor
test‖ as synonymous with a ―substantial-cause test.‖ Black’s Law Dictionary 1566
(9th ed. 2009). Specifically, a plaintiff in a negligence case shows that ―causation
exists when the defendant‘s conduct is an important or significant contributor to
the plaintiff‘s injuries.‖ Id. (emphasis added). Applied in the domestic violence
context, we must determine whether the ―substantial factor‖ test appropriately
measures the causal nexus a claimant must show under the statute in order to
qualify for benefits.
We find the ―substantial factor‖ test fitting here because it recognizes that,
although many causes may lead to a particular result, the true measure of whether a
cause sufficiently establishes a nexus to the result is whether the cause significantly
34
brought about the end, not whether it is solely responsible for it. Given the type of
behaviors often exhibited by victims of domestic violence, which, though intended
to placate the perpetrators may simultaneously undermine certain employer codes
of conduct, it is fitting that in this context, we adopt a test intended to require a
claimant to show only that the ―domestic violence‖ substantially led to her
separation from employment.
To summarize, because D.C. Code § 51-131 is a remedial statute, it should
be ―liberally construed to accomplish its purpose and extend its coverage.‖ Hickey
v. Bomers, 28 A.3d 1119, 1126 n.10 (D.C. 2011) (citation omitted). Accordingly,
the appropriate causation standard for establishing a claimant‘s separation from
employment was ―due to domestic violence,‖ under § 51-131, is whether a
claimant proves that the ―domestic violence‖ played a ―substantial factor‖ in her
separation from employment, or, in the event of misconduct underlying a
claimant‘s separation from employment, that ―domestic violence‖ played a
―substantial factor‖ in the incidents of misconduct leading to her separation from
employment.14 We note that whether a claimant meets the ―substantial factor‖ test
14
We note that the statute encompasses instances where a claimant
voluntarily resigns or is terminated from his or her employment for reasons other
than misconduct, as well as cases, like E.C.‘s, where the claimant is terminated
from his or her employment on account of misconduct. See supra Part II.A.
35
is a legal determination to be made based on the evidence in the record proffered
by the claimant of the ―domestic violence‖ and its effect on the claimant‘s
separation from employment.
E. E.C.’s eligibility for benefits under D.C. Code § 51-131
Applying the foregoing considerations here, we must determine whether:
(1) E.C. suffered ―domestic violence‖ that qualifies as an ―intrafamily offense‖
under the IFOA and the reporting requirements of D.C. Code
§ 51-132, and (2) M.L.‘s ―domestic violence‖ against E.C. — assuming it so
qualifies — played a ―substantial factor‖ in her termination from employment such
that her separation from employment was ―due to domestic violence.‖
With regard to the first question, here, E.C. proved that she suffered
―domestic violence‖ in two ways. First, she showed that at least on one of the
three occasions leading to her termination from RCM, M.L. stalked her by
following her from Superior Court to RCM‘s residential facility on Alabama
Avenue, which qualifies as ―interpersonal‖ or ―intrafamily violence‖ sufficient to
establish an ―intrafamily offense,‖ because when M.L. followed E.C. to her work,
he did so with the ―intent to cause [her] emotional distress.‖ D.C. Code § 22-3133;
36
Shewarega, supra note 9, 947 A.2d at 53; Richardson, supra, 878 A.2d at 1217;
see also D.C. Code §§ 16-1006, -1008, -1009. Second, giving due consideration to
the ―entire mosaic‖ of abuse committed by M.L. against E.C., E.C. sufficiently
showed how M.L.‘s actions as a whole constituted ―domestic violence‖ and an
―intrafamily offense‖ under D.C. Code §§ 51-131 and 16-1008 because his actions
against E.C. constituted the kind of emotional violence similar to that suffered by
petitioner in Richardson, against which the IFOA intends to protect. 878 A.2d at
1217 & n.6. Consequently, we agree with E.C. that, here, the ALJ failed to
meaningfully weigh the entire history of abuse perpetrated by M.L. against her in
determining that E.C. did not show her separation from employment was ―due to
domestic violence.‖
The ALJ did not consider how E.C.‘s undisputed testimony, the testimony of
her social worker, Ms. Powers, and documentary evidence, including various
CPOs and TPOs that satisfy the reporting requirements of § 51-132, showed a
pattern of abuse perpetrated by M.L. against E.C., during the entire course of their
eleven month relationship. See Cruz-Foster, supra, 597 A.2d at 930–32. E.C.
specifically testified that M.L. committed physical acts of violence and vandalism
against her, as well as harassed and stalked her on multiple occasions, all of which
establish ―intrafamily offenses.‖ See D.C. Code § 16-1008; Richardson, supra, 878
37
A.2d at 1217. Nonetheless, the ALJ limited his final determination that E.C. did
not lose her employment on account of domestic violence to M.L.‘s actions against
E.C. during the three incidents where E.C. permitted M.L. onto RCM property
because, according to the ALJ, the evidence ―[did] not show that . . . [E.C.‘s]
actions were so adversely and severely affected by her being a victim of domestic
violence[.]‖
Instead, the ALJ focused his analysis too narrowly on E.C.‘s actions during
the three episodes of misconduct leading to her termination and failed to
meaningfully weigh the ―entire mosaic‖ of E.C.‘s relationship with M.L. to better
assess how that mosaic of domestic violence affected her conduct at work and
resulting termination. Only after making such an assessment could the ALJ
properly go on to determine the ultimate question of whether E.C. qualified for
benefits under the domestic violence statute. Accordingly, the ALJ erred by not
considering all of the evidence proffered by E.C. of the history of domestic
violence when he determined that her separation from employment was not ―due to
domestic violence.‖
On the second question of whether E.C.‘s termination was ―due to domestic
violence,‖ we note at the outset that, in this case, we must consider whether the
38
domestic violence played a ―substantial factor‖ in E.C.‘s three instances of
misconduct because the record clearly demonstrates that her employer terminated
E.C. on account of what it determined to be misconduct, see supra Part I. Thus,
E.C.‘s termination and ―separation from employment‖ stemmed from the
misconduct.
Here, the record shows that domestic violence played a ―substantial factor‖
in each incident of misconduct leading to E.C.‘s termination from employment
because each incident is linked to the entire history of E.C.‘s relationship with
M.L., which shows a continuing pattern of harassment, stalking, and threatening
behavior at her place of work that ultimately led M.L. to inform her employer of
the three incidents of misconduct, resulting in E.C.‘s termination. Moreover, as the
testimony of her expert, Ms. Powers, a licensed social worker, demonstrates, the
incidents of misconduct illustrate a pattern of abuse whereby E.C. acted in ways
―that were in compliance with [M.L.‘s] desires . . . to have [E.C.] dependent upon
him . . . [so that] she [c]ould keep herself safe‖ and reduce any future abuse. See
supra Parts I & II.C. Significantly, Ms. Powers‘ testimony went unrefuted by
E.C.‘s employer, even though it had ample opportunity to proffer its own domestic
violence expert. And, E.C. herself specifically testified that she allowed M.L. onto
the company property because ―the last thing [she] needed was to lose her job.‖ Id.
39
We hold that E.C.‘s evidence at the hearing of ―domestic violence‖ and its
effects on her employment shows that ―domestic violence‖ played a ―substantial
factor‖ in the incidents of misconduct that led to her termination from employment,
such that her separation from employment was ―due to domestic violence‖
pursuant to D.C. Code § 51-131.15 Accordingly, the ALJ committed reversible
error in determining that E.C. failed to show that her termination from employment
was ―due to domestic violence,‖ and further erred by not applying
§ 51-131 in order to conclude that, here, E.C. qualified for unemployment
compensation benefits under the statute.16
E.C.‘s case is a prime example of a victim of domestic violence whose
experiences with domestic violence impacted her ―ability to maintain . . .
15
We note that, even though our holding in this case applies to a claimant
terminated from employment, the same analysis would apply when determining
whether a claimant who has voluntarily resigned from employment has established
the requisite causal nexus proving that the claimant‘s separation from employment
was ―due to domestic violence‖ because both instances are contemplated under the
statute. See supra Part II.D & n. 15.
16
Here, we choose to reverse as a matter of law because the record
sufficiently supports a finding of eligibility under § 51-131, and the ALJ‘s order
neither discredits E.C.‘s evidence, nor do we find any reason to doubt the veracity
of E.C.‘s testimony, or the conclusions of her expert, particularly when these stand
uncontradicted. Cf. Hamilton, supra, 41 A.3d at 480–82 (reversing the ALJ‘s
finding of misconduct where the ALJ failed to consider undisputed material
testimony and E.C.‘s evidence tending to negate any misconduct, and made no
indication otherwise discrediting E.C.‘s credibility).
40
employment.‖ Hearing at 2:51–3:56. Rather than stay with the perpetrator, E.C.
chose to end the relationship and continue ―to [try to] achieve economic security
after leaving an abusive relationship.‖ See id. E.C.‘s case squarely fits within the
purpose of the statute — to provide unemployment compensation to an individual
who is ―separated from employment by discharge . . . due to domestic violence
against the individual.‖ D.C. Code § 51-131 (a) (emphasis added).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the ALJ is reversed, and the case
is remanded with instructions to grant E.C.‘s application for unemployment
compensation benefits under D.C. Code § 51-131.
So ordered.