Headspeth v. United States ( 2022 )

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 19-CF-482
JUSTIN HEADSPETH, APPELLANT
v.
UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.
Appeal from the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia
(CF1-1887-16)
(Hon. Todd E. Edelman, Trial Judge)
(Submitted June 3, 2021 Decided December 8, 2022)
Nancy Allen was on the brief for appellant.
Channing Phillips, Acting United States Attorney (at the time of
submission), and Elizabeth Trosman, John P. Mannarino, Laura R. Bach, Ellen
D’Angelo, and Anne Y. Park, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief
for appellee.
Before BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge, BECKWITH & EASTERLY,
Associate Judges.
BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge: Appellant Justin Headspeth was indicted
on seventeen assault and gun possession charges related to his shooting of Otis
Grandson and Eugenia Young in the Parkchester community in the southeast
2
quadrant of Washington, D.C. Following a trial, the jury found appellant guilty of
thirteen of those counts. Specifically, the jury found appellant guilty of one count
of assault with the intent to kill while armed (“AWIKWA”), one count of aggravated
assault while armed (“AAWA”), one count of assault with significant bodily injury
while armed (“ASBIWA”), and three related counts of possession of a firearm
during the commission of a crime of violence or a dangerous offense (“PFCV”) as
to Otis Grandson. The jury also convicted appellant of the same as it relates to
Eugenia Young, as well as one additional count of unlawful possession of a firearm
(“UPF”). Appellant challenges his conviction of AAWA against Mr. Grandson,
claiming there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction, and also challenges
the trial court’s denial of his motion for a mistrial based on alleged jury misconduct.
Appellant also argues for merger of certain convictions. We affirm, and remand on
the merger issue, which the government concedes.
I. Factual and Procedural History
Appellant (also known as Goobs 1) and Mr. Grandson have known each other
for several years, previously as neighbors in the Parkchester community, which is
1
“Goobs” is a nickname for appellant among his acquaintances. Appellant’s
identity is not disputed.
3
adjacent to the 1500 block of Eaton Road in Southeast Washington, D.C., the
location of the shooting. Mr. Grandson moved away from Parkchester in 2007, but
visits the community periodically. 2
On January 25, 2016, Mr. Grandson, accompanied by Eugenia Young, was
driving through Parkchester when he saw appellant. The two men locked eyes,
which prompted Mr. Grandson to tell Ms. Young that if appellant had a gun, he
believed appellant would try to kill him. As Mr. Grandson turned onto Eaton Road,
his vehicle became lodged in the snow. Mr. Grandson remained in the driver’s seat
while Ms. Young exited the vehicle to try to remove snow from around the tires.
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Grandson saw appellant approaching on foot.
Appellant then shot Ms. Young four times in the abdomen, causing her to collapse
in the snow. Mr. Grandson opened his door in an attempt to exit the vehicle, and
appellant shot him twice through the open door — once in the back of the head and
once in the left hand. Both Mr. Grandson and Ms. Young were transported to
2
Although the details of their acquaintance are not the subject of appeal, the
trial court recognized their acquaintanceship as an underlying factor in this case. Mr.
Grandson maintains that appellant killed his older brother in 2007. For this reason,
at sentencing, the trial court recognized that appellant was motivated to shoot Mr.
Grandson.
4
emergency rooms and survived with immediate injuries and long-term health
complications, all directly attributable to the gunshot wounds inflicted by appellant.
Mr. Grandson, in particular, testified to his physical pain and several injuries,
including the protracted impairment of the function of blood vessels as well as nerves
in his head, neck, back, left hand, and the left side of his body generally. Many of
his injuries required immediate and ongoing medical treatment, including a follow-
up appointment to remove the bullet from his scalp and follow-up neurology
appointments to monitor the healing of his vertebrae because of the concerns of
potential damage to his spinal cord.
A jury trial commenced on February 5, 2019. Approximately seven days after
the trial began, the government notified the trial court that it discovered a photograph
on a social media website, Instagram, of appellant sitting in the courtroom. The
photograph was posted by Instagram user account “fatyee_lm3ent.” The photograph
was posted with the caption “Free goobs_ He innocent!!” 3 To minimize the risk of
3
The formatting of the Instagram comment is preserved from the original.
Additionally, it is not readily apparent from inspection of the trial record whether
the user account captioned their post with the text at issue or immediately
commented on their post with the text. This distinction, to the extent it may exist, is
not relevant.
5
similar photographs being taken during the trial, the government requested that all
cell phones be checked at the door. The trial court granted this request.
On February 12, 2019, after the close of evidence, appellant, through counsel,
informed the trial court that other persons had commented on the Instagram post.
One of these posters was Instagram user account “pr3miumsupply,” which,
according to the account’s description, is associated with a company called Premium
Supply. The trial court identified the following comments on the post as troubling:
Small [world] my auntie on jury duty for that[. 4]
...
I ain’t been d[o]wn there since last week ask her how it’s
looking[. 5]
...
make sure she say not guilty n Iont even no bra but free
em[. 6]
...
She said it’s not looking too good, but she wit[h] him[. 7]
4
Comment by Premium Supply.
5
Comment by “fatyee_Im3ent,” responding to Premium Supply.
6
Comment by “bmcurt,” responding to Premium Supply.
7
Comment by Premium Supply, responding to “fatyee_Im3ent.”
6
The trial court discussed with both parties the potential of extra-judicial contact with
a jury member, and ordered the government to investigate the matter. 8 The trial
court then excused the jury for two days to allow the government to investigate the
situation surrounding the social media posts.
The next day, the government advised the trial court that two individuals,
whose names were not disclosed to the trial court and are not included in the record,
were identified as the Instagram account holders for Premium Supply. Both knew
appellant personally. The government advised that one of the individuals had been
in court to watch the trial. Both individuals indicated to the government that they
did not create the original Instagram comment authored by Premium Supply, and
provided information of four other individuals allegedly with administrative access
to Premium Supply’s social media account. The government advised the trial court
8
As an additional measure, the trial court, under seal, individually inquired of
the five female jurors whether they (1) had spoken to anyone about the case; (2) had
any nieces or nephews with whom they had spoken about the case; (3) were familiar
with or knew anyone who managed or worked for a company called Premium
Supply; and (4) had Instagram accounts. All five jurors responded that they had not
spoken with anyone about the case and, although some had Instagram accounts, they
were not familiar with Premium Supply or its Instagram handle “pr3miumsupply.”
With the parties’ apparent consent, the court reviewed publicly accessible
information regarding the accounts the jurors were following on Instagram.
7
that it would continue investigating potential connections between any juror and the
individuals with administrative access to the Premium Supply Instagram account.
Appellant then moved for a mistrial due to alleged jury misconduct for extra-
judicial communications. The trial court, however, withheld ruling on appellant’s
motion at that time to allow the government to continue its investigation into the
matter.
The following day, the government advised the trial court that its investigation
did not produce evidence that any of the individuals associated with the Premium
Supply account had contact with any member of the jury. The trial court, at that
point, stated he was not inclined to grant appellant’s motion due to a lack of any
evidence supporting misconduct. The trial court then conducted a voir dire of each
juror individually, inquiring whether they recognized a company called Premium
Supply or any of the names associated with the “pr3miumsupply” account, and
whether they had spoken to anyone about the case. All fourteen jurors responded
that they had no such knowledge and had not spoken to anyone about the case.
Appellant renewed his motion for a mistrial, arguing his right to an impartial
jury had been impinged, and the government’s investigation had neither confirmed
8
nor disproved any connection or contact between a member of the jury and the
individuals associated with Premium Supply. When asked if there was anything the
defense would request the government do further, defense counsel responded, “I
cannot think of what I would ask them specifically to do. . . . So, Your Honor, I
really can’t.” The trial court then denied appellant’s motion for a mistrial,
concluding there was no instance of jury tampering. The trial court found nothing
more than an unverifiable, anonymous claim that a juror had disclosed something
about the case to a third party, and had revealed a bias in favor of acquitting
appellant. It also found that appellant acknowledged that the government had
exhausted its investigative measures while delaying the trial for forty-eight hours.9
Following closing arguments, the jury returned a verdict convicting appellant
on thirteen of the seventeen counts. The jury found appellant guilty of one count of
AWIKWA, one count of AAWA, one count of ASBIWA, and three related counts
of PFCV as to Mr. Grandson. The jury also convicted appellant of the same as it
relates to Ms. Young, as well as one additional count of UPF. Following sentencing,
this timely appeal followed.
9
Additionally, the trial court recognized that the government, having
thoroughly investigated the issue, would be most motivated to have such a juror
removed because the potential jury misconduct, if realized, would benefit appellant.
See supra Instagram comments (“make sure she say not guilty”).
9
II. Discussion
Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion
for a mistrial, and that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for
aggravated assault while armed as to Mr. Grandson. We disagree and affirm the
defendant’s convictions. Appellant also argues that some of his convictions merge.
We agree and remand to the trial court on that issue.
A. Denial of Motion for Mistrial
Appellant raises two related arguments in challenging the trial court’s denial
of his motion for a mistrial: (1) that the trial court’s inquiry of the jurors was
inadequate; and (2) that the government failed to meet its burden of demonstrating
there was no jury tampering. We address these arguments in turn.
“[A] mistrial is a severe remedy, one to be taken only in circumstances
manifesting a necessity therefor[e],” and given to the broad discretion of the trial
court. Bost v. United States, 178 A.3d 1156, 1191 (D.C. 2018) (cleaned up).
Relatedly, “the determination of juror bias or prejudice,” the premise of the motion
10
for mistrial, “lies particularly within the discretion of the trial court.” Bellamy v.
United States, 810 A.2d 401, 408 (D.C. 2002) (cleaned up). “The remedy for
allegations of juror partiality,” including juror tampering, “is a hearing in which the
defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.” Young v. United States, 694
A.2d 891, 894 (D.C. 1997) (citation omitted). Such a determination is “reversible
only for a clear abuse of discretion, and the findings of fact underlying that
determination are entitled to great deference.” Bellamy, 810 A.2d at 408 (cleaned
up). The trial court also has “considerable discretion in conducting an investigation
into alleged juror misconduct.” Id.; Young, 694 A.2d at 896 (declining to remand
for appellant to further explore the potential of juror tampering where the trial court
had already held a hearing).
Appellant, claiming there was evidence of jury tampering, argues that an
unidentified member of the jury improperly communicated with a third party, which
deprived him of a fair trial with an impartial jury. He argues that, irrespective of the
fact that any potential bias would be in his favor, the following comments from an
Instagram post are evidence of a juror’s bias: “Free goobs[.] He innocent!!”; “Small
[world] my auntie on jury duty for that”; “I ain’t been d[o]wn there since last week
ask her how it’s looking”; “She said it’s not looking too good, but she wit[h] him”;
and “make sure she say not guilty [and] [I don’t] even no bra but free em.”
11
The trial court took great care to investigate this potential instance of jury
tampering and juror bias by voir diring each of the five female jurors and authorizing
the government to conduct its own two-day investigation into the matter. The voir
dire of the five female jurors did not reveal any improper juror communication or
bias toward or against appellant. Even further, the trial court’s voir dire of every
member of the jury on the matter did not reveal any improper juror communication
or bias toward or against appellant. Likewise, the government, having investigated
individuals associated with the social media posts, advised the trial court that there
was no evidence that the individuals had contact with any member of the jury.
At the conclusion of the government’s investigation, the trial court determined
that the claim of alleged misconduct by an anonymous juror was unverifiable and
without any evidence to support it. Notably, appellant was unable to identify any
additional steps for the government to take in its investigation during the timeframe
allotted by the trial court and appellant did not pursue the issue further. Appellant
also never requested that the government expand the scope of the investigation or
that the trial court expand the scope of its voir dire of the jury. Accordingly, we
conclude the trial court took appropriate, definitive steps to determine whether there
was jury tampering or bias by authorizing a two-day investigation and polling each
12
juror. The trial court correctly exercised its discretion to determine the credibility
of the witnesses during voir dire and concluded that if there was any evidence of
bias, it was anonymous and unverified.
Appellant argues that the trial court was required to grant a motion for a
mistrial unless the government satisfied an affirmative burden to demonstrate that
there was no evidence of jury tampering. That contention is in error; whether the
trial court should grant a motion for a mistrial based on juror misconduct operates
on a burden shifting framework. As articulated in Al-Mahdi v. United States,
“[w]here . . . the impartiality of a juror has been plausibly
called into question, it is the responsibility of the trial
judge to hold a hearing to determine whether the allegation
of bias has merit.” Medrano-Quiroz v. United States, 705
A.2d 642, 649 (D.C. 1997). The judge must conduct “a
thorough inquiry . . . into whether the defendant suffered
actual prejudice.” Hill v. United States, 622 A.2d 680, 684
(D.C. 1993) (emphasis in the original); see also Smith v.
Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215, 71 L. Ed. 2d 78, 102 S. Ct.
940 (1982) (“The remedy for allegations of juror partiality
is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to
prove actual bias.”). “Where, following a hearing, the
defendant has established a substantial likelihood of actual
prejudice from the unauthorized contact, . . . ‘all
reasonable doubts [about the juror’s ability to render an
impartial verdict must] be resolved in favor of the
accused.’” Hill, 622 A.2d at 684 (quoting United States v.
Williams, 262 U.S. App. D.C. 112, 128, 822 F.2d 1174,
1190 (1987)); accord, Medrano-[Quiroz], 705 A.2d at
650. Thus, upon a prima facie showing of juror bias or
partiality, “it is the government's burden to demonstrate
that the juror's contact with extraneous information was
13
harmless or non-prejudicial.” Hill, 622 A.2d at 684. To
go forward with the trial, the evidence of record must
justify a high degree of confidence that the likelihood of
juror partiality has been rebutted. “If the government does
not meet its burden, then the court is obliged to declare a
mistrial,” Parker v. United States, 757 A.2d 1280, 1287
(D.C. 2000), or, if possible, to grant other adequate relief
(such as excusing the affected juror).
867 A.2d 1011, 1018-19 (D.C. 2005). Applying that framework here, we are
satisfied that the trial court properly denied appellant’s motion for a mistrial because
appellant failed to carry his burden, after the court’s thorough investigation, to
establish a substantial likelihood of actual prejudice from unauthorized contact.
The trial court conducted a sufficiently thorough investigation into whether
the defendant suffered actual prejudice due to extra-judicial communications. As
detailed above, the court extensively questioned the jurors who were most likely to
have engaged in extra-judicial communications as well as the entire jury to ensure
there were no impermissible extra-judicial communications. Additionally, the court
enlisted the government in aid of its investigation and the government was unable to
determine that any individual with access to the Premium Supply account had
impermissible extra-judicial communications with a juror. The fact that appellant
was unable to identify any additional steps for the court, or the government, to take
14
in investigating this claim of juror misconduct supports our conclusion that the
investigation was appropriately thorough.
Appellant then possessed the initial burden of persuasion to “establish[] a
substantial likelihood of actual prejudice from the unauthorized contact.” 10 Id. at
1018. Appellant failed to carry this burden. After a thorough investigation, there
was no evidence that the alleged extra-judicial communication actually took place
or that there was otherwise any veracity to the Instagram comments at issue.
Appellant does not contend otherwise, and instead he rests on the erroneous assertion
the government bore the initial burden. Moreover, even if an extra-judicial
communication did take place, the record lacks any evidence that a juror’s
decisionmaking was influenced, and thus, that the defendant was actually
prejudiced. Without this evidence, we cannot conclude that appellant satisfied his
burden. As a result of this conclusion, we do not need to consider whether the
10
In Al-Mahdi and the cases cited therein, we discuss the defendant as having
the initial burden of persuasion of proving actual prejudice. This framing was based
on the fact that, in each case, the defendant argued that they were prejudiced by
alleged juror misconduct. See, e.g., Al-Mahdi, 867 A.2d at 1017; Medrano-Quiroz
v. United States, 705 A.2d 642, 659-50 (D.C. 1997); Hill v. United States, 622 A.2d
680, 683-84 (D.C. 1993). In instances where the government is the movant,
however, it appears to us that the initial burden of persuasion should fall on the
government as the party asserting actual prejudice. See Hallman v. United States,
410 A.2d 215, 217 (D.C. 1979) (“The burden of showing prejudice to support a
motion for mistrial is upon the movant.”).
15
government would have satisfied its burden of proving that any extra-judicial
communication was harmless or non-prejudicial. Accordingly, we conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial.
B. Sufficient Evidence for AAWA
Appellant also argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a
conviction for AAWA, where appellant shot Mr. Grandson in the back of the head
at close range. As a threshold matter, the government contends that appellant failed
to raise this argument at trial by moving for a judgment of acquittal. 11 Yet assuming
appellant did preserve his claim, we nonetheless conclude that the government’s
evidence was sufficient to support Mr. Grandson’s conviction of AAWA. Foster v.
United States, 218 A.3d 1142, 1144 (D.C. 2019) (“We review challenges to the
sufficiency of the evidence de novo, considering all the evidence in the light most
11
Without delving into the law of preservation, we note that the factual record
is far from clear. Although in his brief to this court, Mr. Headspeth agrees with the
government that his trial counsel did not make an MJOA motion “at anytime,”
neither Mr. Headspeth nor the government acknowledges that (1) defense counsel
indicated an interest in making such a motion on February 12, 2019, prompting the
court to respond “we’ll do that,” and (2) the docket entry for that day reflects that
“[t]he court has denied the MJOA in this case.”
16
favorable to the verdict and according deference to the factfinder to weigh the
evidence, determine credibility, and draw justifiable inferences of fact.”).
“A person commits the offense of aggravated assault if [u]nder circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to human life, that person intentionally or
knowingly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of serious bodily injury to
another person, and thereby causes serious bodily injury.” D.C. Code
§ 22-404.01(a)(2). This court has consistently defined “serious bodily injury” as
“encompass[ing] ‘bodily injury that involves a substantial risk of death,
unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or
protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental
faculty.’” White v. United States, 207 A.3d 580, 588 (D.C. 2019) (quoting Nixon v.
United States, 730 A.2d 145, 149 (D.C. 1999)). We have “often noted the high
threshold of injury envisioned by the legislature in authorizing a maximum prison
sentence for . . . assaults that . . . result in life-threatening or disabling injuries,
including stab wounds, intense burns, and broken bones.” Id. (internal quotations
and citations omitted). “The victims [of such assaults] typically required urgent and
continuing medical treatment, [] surgery[], carried visible and long-lasting (if not
permanent) scars, and suffered other consequential damage, such as significant
impairment of their faculties.” Id. (quoting Swinton v. United States, 902 A.2d 772,
17
775 (D.C. 2006)). However, “the fact that an individual suffered from knife or
gunshot wounds does not make that injury a per se ‘serious bodily injury.’” Bolanos
v. United States, 938 A.2d 672, 678 (D.C. 2007) (quoting Zeledon v. United States,
770 A.2d 972, 977 (D.C. 2001)). The determination of whether injuries constitute
“serious bodily injury” is fact-intensive and must be supported by evidence in the
record. See Nixon, 730 A.2d at 151 (“[D]ue to the absence of testimony from [the
victims], or from health professionals who treated them, or medical records detailing
the nature and extent of their injuries, the government failed to [prove] beyond a
reasonable doubt that [the victims] suffered serious bodily injury . . . .”).
The record here reveals extensive testimony by Mr. Grandson’s treating
physician, the chief of trauma surgery at the hospital, Dr. Babak Sarani, regarding
the seriousness of Mr. Grandson’s injuries, his medical records, and the medical
treatment he received. 12 Dr. Sarani testified that “the blood vessel that travels right
through the vertebrae as it goes up toward the brain” was severed from the gunshot.
He described how Mr. Grandson’s blood vessel was “torn straight in half . . . [and]
spasm[ed] down as a defense mechanism” to stop him from bleeding to death. This
12
We note that although Mr. Grandson’s medical records from George
Washington University Hospital were introduced at trial, they were not included in
the record on appeal.
18
vital blood vessel previously supplied the brain with blood, but is now permanently
damaged due to appellant’s assault. Regarding the medical treatment prescribed by
Dr. Sarani, during his initial hospital stay, Mr. Grandson received a full-body CAT
scan, a cerebral angiogram, 13 and a neck brace.
The government contends there is ample evidence to affirm appellant’s
conviction for aggravated assault while armed due to the fact that Mr. Grandson
faced a “substantial risk of death.” Bolanos, 938 A.2d at 677. Here, Dr. Sarani’s
testimony provides important insight into the risk Mr. Grandson faced. This
testimony unequivocally reflects that Mr. Grandson faced a substantial risk of death
from the damage to his blood vessels, which could have caused him to bleed to death.
This risk of imminent death is precisely the “high threshold of injury” contemplated
as constituting a serious bodily injury. White, 207 A.3d at 588.
Appellant’s contentions that these unrealized future concerns do not support
a finding of serious bodily injury because they “did not manifest themselves” is
inconsistent with our case law. We have consistently held that the relevant inquiry
13
A cerebral angiogram is a test in which “a catheter was inserted . . . into the
blood vessel in his leg and . . . passed up through the heart into the blood vessels that
go into the brain to then image those vessels very carefully to give . . . a very specific
portrayal of the type of injury he had sustained.”
19
is into whether the victim was at substantial risk of death, not whether the risk
actually manifested or was mitigated by the receiving of timely medical treatment.
See Freeman v. United States, 912 A.2d 1213, 1222 (D.C. 2006) (holding that a
victim still faced a substantial risk of hemorrhaging to death if a lodged bullet moved
and damaged the aorta even though the victim was never in critical condition nor did
the victim receive emergency surgery because the victim was stabilized on the
scene). Dr. Sarani’s expert testimony is unequivocal that Mr. Grandson faced a
substantial risk of death. Accordingly, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to
support appellant’s conviction for AAWA against Mr. Grandson on the ground that
he incurred “serious bodily injuries” due to the substantial risk of death his injuries
posed. Because there is at least one ground sufficient to affirm appellant’s
conviction, we do not reach whether there was also sufficient evidence that Mr.
Grandson incurred a serious bodily injury due to either extreme physical pain or a
protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental
faculty. See Nixon, 730 A.2d at 149.
C. Merger of Convictions
Appellant also argues that some of his convictions merge. We agree and
remand for the trial court to resolve the merger issues.
20
Appellant argues that his ASBIWA convictions (both as to Mr. Grandson and
Ms. Young) should merge into his AAWA convictions, and that his six PFCV
convictions should merge into one count for each victim. The government concedes
to appellant’s various merger arguments. See Medley v. United States, 104 A.3d
115, 132 (D.C. 2014) (noting that assault with significant bodily injury merges as a
lesser-included offense of aggravated assault); Matthews v. United States, 892 A.2d
1100, 1106 (D.C. 2006) (“The general rule when the convictions for the predicate
crimes [against separate victims] do not merge is that the associated PFCV
convictions do not merge either.”); Campos-Alvarez v. United States, 16 A.3d 954,
962 (D.C. 2011) (“[T]he government agree[s] that the PFCV convictions based on
AWIKWA and AAWA [as to the same victim] merge . . . .”). Therefore, we remand
the case to the trial court with instructions to merge appellant’s convictions for
AAWA and ASBIWA as to Mr. Grandson and merge the three PFCV convictions
into a single conviction for PFCV. The trial court should also merge appellant’s
conviction for AAWA and ASBIWA as to Ms. Young and merge the three PFCV
convictions into a single conviction for PFCV.
21
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we affirm appellant’s conviction for aggravated assault while
armed, and remand the case to address the convictions that merge.
So ordered.