In re: Mikel D. Jones , 97 A.3d 590 ( 2014 )

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 12-BG-1914
IN RE MIKEL D. JONES, RESPONDENT.
A Member of the Bar of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals
(Bar Registration No. 456094)
On Report and Recommendation
of the Board on Professional Responsibility
(BDN 439-11)
(Submitted September 24, 2013 Decided August 21, 2014)
Before FISHER, Associate Judge, and PRYOR and KING, Senior Judges.
PER CURIAM: Mikel D. Jones was convicted in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania of one count of conspiracy to
commit mail and wire fraud; fourteen counts of aiding and abetting mail fraud;
fourteen counts of aiding and abetting wire fraud; and one count of aiding and
abetting money laundering. United States v. Jones, CRIM.A. 11-261, 2012 WL
383668 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2012), aff’d, 544 F. App’x 87 (3d Cir. 2013). On July 9,
2012, the Pennsylvania court sentenced Jones to forty-two months of incarceration
2
on each count, to be served concurrently, followed by three years of supervised
release, and ordered him to make restitution of $457,743.75.1
Jones did not report his criminal convictions to this court or the Board of
Professional Responsibility (“the Board”) as required by D.C. Bar R. XI, § 10 (a).
Bar Counsel learned of Jones’s convictions through news reports. On November
30, 2012, Bar Counsel filed with this court a certified copy of the judgment of
conviction. On December 17, 2012, this court suspended Jones pursuant to D.C.
Bar R. XI, § 10 (c) and referred the matter to the Board. In January 2013, Bar
Counsel determined that Jones’s convictions were based on offenses involving
moral turpitude per se within the meaning of D.C. Code § 11-2503 (a) (2012 Repl.)
and accordingly recommended disbarment. Jones did not respond to Bar
Counsel’s statement on moral turpitude. Jones failed to file the affidavit required
by D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14 (g) following entry of this court’s order of suspension.
1
On October 31, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision. United States v. Jones, 544 F. App’x 87
(3d Cir. 2013). We note that Mikel D. Jones has not petitioned for certiorari nor
rehearing.
3
The Board has concluded that respondent’s convictions involve moral
turpitude per se and recommends disbarment pursuant to § 11-2503 (a). Jones did
not oppose the Board’s recommendation.
Mail fraud is a crime of moral turpitude per se, In re Bryant, 46 A.3d 402,
402 (D.C. 2012) (quoting In re Evans, 793 A.2d 468, 469 (D.C. 2002) and citing In
re Leffler, 940 A.2d 105, 106 (D.C. 2007)). Therefore, D.C. Code § 11-2503 (a)
mandates that this court disbar Jones. See In re Schainker, 871 A.2d 1206, 1206
(D.C. 2005). Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Mikel D. Jones is disbarred from the practice of law in the
District of Columbia. We direct Jones’s attention to the requirements of D.C. Bar
R. XI, § 14 (g) and their effect on his eligibility for reinstatement. See D.C. Bar R.
XI, § 16 (c).
So ordered.