In re Edwards ( 2022 )


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    DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 19-BG-659
    IN RE CLARISSA THOMAS EDWARDS, RESPONDENT.
    A Suspended Member of the Bar
    of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
    (Bar 
    Registration No. 434607
    )
    On Report and Recommendation
    of the Board on Professional Responsibility
    (15-BD-030; 13-DDN-D261 and 13-DDN-D463)
    (Submitted May 10, 2022                                 Decided July 28, 2022)
    Clarissa T. Edwards, pro se.
    Hamilton P. Fox, III, Disciplinary Counsel, Myles V. Lynk, Senior Assistant
    Disciplinary Counsel, and Becky Neal, Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for
    petitioner.
    Before MCLEESE, DEAHL, and HOWARD, Associate Judges.
    PER CURIAM: The Board on Professional Responsibility determined that
    respondent Clarissa T. Edwards commingled client funds, failed to maintain
    adequate records of client funds, and made a reckless misrepresentation on a court
    form. The Board recommended that Ms. Edwards be suspended for two years, with
    a fitness requirement as a condition of reinstatement. Ms. Edwards contests the
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    Board’s finding of reckless misrepresentation. Ms. Edwards also argues that the
    appropriate sanction is a public censure. Disciplinary Counsel argues that Ms.
    Edwards’s misconduct warrants a three-year suspension with a fitness requirement.
    We uphold the Board’s determination of recklessness and adopt the Board’s
    recommended sanction of a two-year suspension with a fitness requirement.
    I.
    The Board based its recommendation on the following factual conclusions. In
    2009, Ms. Edwards was censured by this court for, among other things, commingling
    funds and failing to keep complete records of client funds. In re Thomas-Edwards,
    
    967 A.2d 178
    , 179 (D.C. 2009) (per curiam). Following the censure, Ms. Edwards
    took several courses about managing law-firm finances and worked with the Practice
    Management Advisory Service of the District of Columbia Bar. Beginning in 2011,
    however, Ms. Edwards again began to commingle client funds with her personal
    funds. She also failed to maintain adequate records of client funds from 2011
    through 2015. Her records were so deficient that it was not possible for Disciplinary
    Counsel to determine whether Ms. Edwards had misappropriated any funds. The
    Board concluded that this conduct violated D.C. R. Prof. Conduct l.15(a), which
    3
    prohibits commingling, and D.C. Bar R. XI, § 19(f) (repealed as duplicative of Rule
    1.15(a), effective March 1, 2016), which required the keeping of complete records
    about client funds.
    Also, Ms. Edwards twice failed to disclose her 2009 censure to a court. On a
    pro hac vice application filed in the Eastern District of Virginia, she stated that she
    had “not been reprimanded in any court nor [had] there been any action in any court
    pertaining to [her] conduct or fitness as a member of the bar.” Shortly afterwards,
    on a form filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
    (D.D.C.), Ms. Edwards was asked to identify “[a]ll occasions, if any, on which you
    have been held in contempt of Court, convicted of a crime, censured, suspended,
    disciplined or disbarred by any Court since your last renewal date,” to which she
    replied “none.” When opposing counsel in the Virginia matter later raised the error
    on her pro hac vice form, Ms. Edwards corrected the Virginia form, but she never
    corrected the D.D.C. form.
    The Board concluded that Ms. Edwards’s false statement on the D.D.C. form
    violated D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c), which prohibits “conduct involving
    dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” The Board concluded that there
    was not clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Edwards was intentionally dishonest
    4
    on the D.D.C. form. The Board essentially credited Ms. Edwards’s testimony that
    the original false statement was the result of her rushing through the form. The
    Board further explained that although opposing counsel had notified Ms. Edwards
    that her statement on the Virginia pro hac vice application was false, Ms. Edwards
    had never been notified that her statement on the D.D.C. renewal application was
    false, and Ms. Edwards thus lacked actual knowledge of the D.D.C. statement’s
    falsity.   In the Board’s view, Ms. Edwards’s claim that the mistake was not
    intentional was supported by the extensive testimony that Ms. Edwards’s work as an
    attorney was frequently rushed and that Ms. Edwards lacked attention to detail.
    On the other hand, the Board concluded that Ms. Edwards’s false statement
    on the D.D.C. form was reckless. The Board gave two principal reasons for that
    conclusion: (1) given her prior discipline, Ms. Edwards should have been more
    careful in filling out the D.D.C. form; and (2) once she was alerted to the falsity on
    the Virginia form, Ms. Edwards ought to have confirmed the accuracy of her recently
    filed D.D.C. form.
    5
    II.
    As noted, Ms. Edwards challenges the Board’s determination that her failure
    to correct the D.D.C. form was reckless, arguing that instead she was merely
    careless. We review de novo the Board’s determination that Ms. Edwards acted
    recklessly. E.g., In re Dailey, 
    230 A.3d 902
    , 909 (D.C. 2020). We agree with the
    Board’s reasoning and its conclusion. The question on the D.D.C. form was very
    clear, and it is difficult to see how Ms. Edwards could have answered it as she did
    unless she ignored the text of the question. Once she was advised that she had given
    a false answer to a similar question on the Virginia form, Ms. Edwards certainly
    could have been expected to realize her mistake on the D.D.C. form. See generally,
    e.g., In re Schuman, 
    251 A.3d 1044
    , 1054 n.8 (D.C. 2021) (“Dishonesty can be
    proven by sufficient proof of recklessness—i.e., proof that [the attorney] consciously
    disregarded the risk created by [the attorney’s] actions.”) (internal quotation marks
    omitted).
    III.
    This court adopts the sanction recommended by the Board “unless to do so
    would foster a tendency towards inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct
    6
    or would otherwise be unwarranted.” D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(h)(1). “The Board’s
    recommended sanction thus comes to the court with a strong presumption in favor
    of its imposition. Generally speaking, if the Board’s recommended sanction falls
    within a wide range of acceptable outcomes, it will be adopted and imposed.” In re
    Cleaver-Bascombe, 
    892 A.2d 396
    , 402 (D.C. 2006) (citation and internal quotation
    marks omitted).    “Ultimately, the system of attorney discipline, including the
    imposition of sanctions, is the responsibility and duty of this court.” In re Austin,
    
    858 A.2d 969
    , 975 (D.C. 2004).
    We conclude that the Board’s recommended sanction is reasonable and
    appropriate. In prior disciplinary cases involving commingling and dishonesty, we
    have imposed a wide range of sanctions, depending on the surrounding
    circumstances. See, e.g., In re Marks, 
    252 A.3d 887
    , 888-89 (D.C. 2021) (per
    curiam) (suspending respondent for one year without fitness requirement, where
    respondent commingled and negligently misappropriated client funds and made two
    intentionally dishonest statements); In re Ekekwe-Kauffman, 
    210 A.3d 775
    , 781-82,
    786-88, 793-97, 800 (D.C. 2019) (per curiam) (suspending respondent for three
    years with fitness requirement, where respondent commingled client funds over
    course of several years; failed to provide competent, zealous representation; failed
    to keep her client informed about course of her case; charged unreasonable fee;
    7
    refused to return unearned fee; and intentionally submitted falsified document to
    court); In re Johnson, 
    158 A.3d 913
    , 915-16, 919-20 (D.C. 2017) (suspending
    respondent for ninety days, with sixty days suspended in favor of one year of
    probation with conditions, where respondent commingled funds, failed to act
    competently and diligently, and engaged in dishonest conduct).
    In recommending a two-year suspension with a fitness requirement, the Board
    explained that (1) the misconduct was serious, involving extended commingling and
    severe and pervasive lack of recordkeeping; (2) Ms. Edwards did not appreciate the
    seriousness of her misconduct, and instead seemed to try to make excuses for it; (3)
    Ms. Edwards’s dishonesty was reckless rather than intentional; (4) although Ms.
    Edwards suggested that she suffered from mitigating medical conditions, she failed
    to provide medical evidence to support that suggestion and failed to show that her
    condition caused her misconduct; and (5) Ms. Edwards’s prior censure for strikingly
    similar misconduct was a significant aggravating factor. We view the Board’s
    explanation to be supported by the record and very persuasive.
    Disciplinary Counsel argues that the court should instead impose a three-year
    suspension with a fitness requirement. We decline to impose that sanction, which is
    the second-harshest sanction available, short only of disbarment. In re Mensah, 262
    
    8 A.3d 1100
    , 1102 (D.C. 2021) (per curiam); D.C. Bar R. XI, § 3(a)(2) (authorizing
    suspension for not more than three years). Cases imposing that sanction have
    typically involved more serious misconduct than is present in this case. See, e.g., In
    re Marks, 252 A.3d at 888-89; In re Daniel, 
    11 A.3d 291
    , 294-97, 299 (D.C. 2011)
    (suspending respondent for three years with fitness requirement, where respondent
    commingled client funds, used his IOLTA and client escrow accounts to conceal
    funds from IRS, and repeatedly made false statements to IRS).
    We are likewise unconvinced by Ms. Edwards’s argument that she should be
    censured rather than suspended. Ms. Edwards’s previous censure did not deter her
    from again commingling funds and failing to keep complete records. We conclude
    that another censure would not serve the goals of the disciplinary process. See In re
    Martin, 
    67 A.3d 1032
    , 1053 (D.C. 2013) (“The discipline we impose should serve
    not only to maintain the integrity of the profession and to protect the public and the
    courts, but also to deter other attorneys from engaging in similar misconduct.”)
    (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, we previously concluded that a
    censure was not appropriate where commingling was accompanied by acts of
    dishonesty. See 
    id. at 1053-54
     (explaining that although a censure might be an
    appropriate sanction for a single act of comingling, respondent’s “dishonesty . . .
    9
    warrant[s] imposition of a more severe sanction,” and suspending respondent for
    eighteen months with fitness requirement).
    In sum, we agree with the Board that a two-year suspension with a fitness
    requirement is appropriate and would not “foster a tendency towards inconsistent
    dispositions for comparable conduct or . . . otherwise be unwarranted.” D.C. Bar R.
    XI, § 9(h)(1).
    Respondent Clarissa T. Edwards is hereby suspended for two years from the
    practice of law in the District of Columbia, with reinstatement conditioned on proof
    of fitness to practice law. Disciplinary Counsel has notified the court that Ms.
    Edwards has failed to file the affidavit required by D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(g). Ms.
    Edwards has not responded to that notice. Ms. Edwards’s period of suspension will
    not begin until Ms. Edwards files an affidavit that fully complies with the
    requirements of D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(g). See, e.g., In re Robinson, 
    275 A.3d 890
    (D.C. 2022) (per curiam).
    So ordered.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-BG-659

Filed Date: 7/28/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/28/2022