State of Libya v. Strabag Se ( 2021 )


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  •                               UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    STATE OF LIBYA,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                                   No. 1:20-cv-02600 (DLF)
    STRABAG SE,
    Respondent.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
    This case arises out of an arbitration between Libya and Strabag SE (Strabag) over a
    series of construction contracts that were disrupted by the 2011 Libyan revolution. Before the
    Court is Libya’s Petition to Vacate the Arbitration Award, Dkt. 1, and Strabag’s Cross-Motion to
    Confirm the Arbitration Award, Dkt. 12. For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny
    Libya’s petition and grant in part Strabag’s cross-motion.
    I.     BACKGROUND
    Respondent Strabag is a publicly listed, international construction firm that is
    incorporated in Austria. Resp’t’s Opp’n to Libya’s Pet. to Vacate at 4, Dkt. 11. Following the
    relaxation of international sanctions on Libya in 2003, Strabag, through its wholly owned
    German subsidiary, Strabag International Ltd. (Strabag International), was awarded contracts to
    construct two major road projects in Libya. Arbitration ¶¶ 4–5, Dkt. 1-3; Resp’t’s Opp’n at 6. In
    2006, Libya started “requiring that foreign firms engaged in construction carry on business in
    conjunction with a Libyan partner.” Arbitration ¶ 6.
    In July 2007, to comply with this new requirement, Strabag International entered into a
    joint venture with the Libyan Investment and Development Company (LIDCO). Id. They called
    the venture Al Hani General Construction Company (Al Hani). Id. ¶ 7. Strabag indirectly owns
    sixty percent of Al Hani via its one hundred percent ownership of Strabag International. Id. ¶ 7.
    Strabag International’s existing contracts in Libya were assigned to Al Hani which then
    “subsequently entered into several additional” construction contracts with Libya. Id. ¶ 59.
    Strabag contends that it “committed significant resources” to its “investment” in Al Hani and the
    Libyan contracts in the form of “acquiring property, building large facilities, . . . importing large
    quantities of heavy equipment[,]” and “extend[ing] Al Hani a significant line of credit to ensure
    the subsidiary had sufficient working capital when it was suffering from serious cash flow
    problems.” Resp’t’s Opp’n at 6.
    Each of the two contracts entitled Al Hani to an advance payment (one for fifteen percent
    of the contract’s value, the other for twenty percent) from the Libyan government entity
    responsible for the contract. Arbitration ¶ 65. These advance payments were to be repaid
    through discounts in the amounts owed to Al Hani for the work completed. Id. The contracts
    further required that Al Hani secure irrevocable bank guarantees “to be released only after
    completion of all work under the Contracts and the expiry of the remedial period under the
    guarantee period.” Id.
    In February 2011, armed conflict broke out in Libya between the Libyan government and
    rebel forces. Id. ¶ 75. As the conflict spread across Libya, Al Hani halted construction and
    began moving its employees and equipment to safer locations. Id. ¶ 76. Al Hani suffered
    significant losses from both the government’s own forces and the “breakdown of law and order.”
    Id. ¶ 77. Al Hani’s vehicles were taken at a checkpoint, one of their construction camps was
    overrun, looted, and partially burned by a mob, and a number of their sites were “occupied for
    2
    varying lengths of time by organized military units loyal to the regime.” Id. ¶¶ 77–79. Much of
    Al Hani’s equipment was either stolen or destroyed in the conflict. Id.
    After the conflict, Strabag and Al Hani asked the government about “securing payment
    for unpaid work done prior to the Revolution; compensation for wartime damage; and resuming
    work on major uncompleted contracts.” Id. ¶ 86. But they could not agree, so they commenced
    arbitration in June 2015. Resp’t’s Opp’n at 8.
    While the contracts themselves provided that “disputes are to be resolved in Libyan
    courts,” Strabag brought this dispute to arbitration under the Austria–Libya Bilateral Investment
    Treaty (the Treaty). Arbitration ¶ 1. Article 11 of the Treaty “permits a qualifying investor to
    submit a dispute to arbitration.” Pet. ¶ 11. Consistent with the Treaty, Strabag submitted the
    dispute to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Id. The
    ICSID has the authority “to administer certain categories of proceedings between States and
    nationals of other States that fall outside the scope of the ICSID Convention.” ICSID Additional
    Facility Rules, Pet. Ex. 3, at 5, Dkt. 1-5.
    The Arbitration took place over two weeks in Paris in July 2018. Arbitration ¶ 46. The
    parties and the ICSID Tribunal (the Tribunal) determined that the “legal seat” of the Arbitration
    would be Washington, D.C., as allowed by the Additional Facility Rules of the ICSID, and thus
    both parties agreed that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) would govern the Arbitration. The
    Tribunal concluded that Libya had breached its obligations under the Treaty and awarded
    Strabag €74,937,003.60 (plus interest) in damages. Resp’t’s Opp’n at 12; Arbitration ¶ 979.
    Libya now petitions this Court to vacate the award of the Tribunal on the grounds that it
    violates § 10(a)(4) of the FAA. Pet. ¶ 58. Libya claims that the award is not sufficiently final
    and that the Tribunal exceeded its powers. Id. Alternatively, Libya claims that the award should
    3
    be modified to avoid double recovery for Strabag. Id. ¶ 63. Strabag seeks to confirm the award.
    Resp’t’s Opp’n at 1. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the parties’ claims under 9 U.S.C.
    § 10(a).
    II.    LEGAL STANDARDS
    “[T]he burden facing petitioners who seek judicial vacatur of arbitration awards is
    exceedingly high.” FBR Cap. Mkts. & Co. v. Hans, 
    985 F. Supp. 2d 33
    , 36 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing
    Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 
    559 U.S. 662
    , 671 (2010)). “[J]udicial review of
    arbitral awards is extremely limited,” and courts “do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal
    error by an arbitrator as [they would] in reviewing decisions of lower courts.” Kurke v. Oscar
    Gruss & Son, Inc., 
    454 F.3d 350
    , 354 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Teamsters Loc. Union No. 61 v.
    United Parcel Serv., Inc., 
    272 F.3d 600
    , 604 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). “It is only when [an] arbitrator
    strays from interpretation and application of the agreement and effectively ‘dispense[s] his own
    brand of industrial justice’ that his decision may be unenforceable.” Stolt-Nielsen, 
    559 U.S. at 671
     (quoting Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 
    532 U.S. 504
    , 509 (2001) (per
    curiam)). “The courts are not authorized to reconsider the merits of an award even though the
    parties may allege that the award rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of the contract.”
    United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 
    484 U.S. 29
    , 36 (1987). This highly deferential
    standard “maintain[s] arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway,” and
    prevents allowing arbitration to become “merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-
    consuming judicial review process.” Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 
    569 U.S. 564
    , 568–69
    (2013) (quoting Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 
    552 U.S. 576
    , 588 (2008)).
    Under the FAA, a party to an arbitration can, within one year of the award, apply to a
    federal court in the district where the award was made, see 9 U.S.C. § 10(a), for “an order
    4
    confirming the award,” id. § 9. “[T]he court must grant such an order unless the award is
    vacated, modified, or corrected . . . .” Id. As the Supreme Court has explained, this is a clear
    mandate that is not “malleable” and leaves no discretion to the district court. Hall St. Assocs.,
    
    552 U.S. at 587
    . The party seeking to vacate or modify the award bears the burden of proof. See
    Republic of Argentina v. AWG Grp. Ltd., 
    211 F. Supp. 3d 335
    , 344 (D.D.C. 2016), aff’d,
    
    894 F.3d 327
     (D.C. Cir. 2018). A court may vacate the award “where the arbitrators exceeded
    their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
    subject matter was not made.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). A court also may modify an award “[w]here
    there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material mistake in the
    description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award.” Id. § 11(a). A party that
    “seeks to set aside an award in the country where it was issued” may seek a pre-judgment bond
    when “the other party seeks to enforce the award elsewhere.” United Nations Comm’n on Int’l
    Trade L., Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New
    York Convention”), art. VI, Introduction ¶ 1 (2016).
    III.   ANALYSIS
    Libya alleges three claims in support of its petition to vacate or modify the arbitration
    award: (1) that the award is not sufficiently final because it failed to fully address the set-off
    payments owed to Libya, see Libya’s Mem. in Supp. of Pet. to Vacate at 5, Dkt. 1-1; (2) that the
    Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to arbitrate the matter, id. at 28; and (3) that the Tribunal
    impermissibly based its decision on “good order and fundamental fairness” instead of the
    relevant provisions of the applicable treaty or contracts, id. at 30. All of Libya’s claims lack
    merit, particularly given the high degree of deference accorded to arbitration awards, see Stolt-
    Nielsen, 
    559 U.S. at 671
    ; Oxford Health, 569 U.S. at 568. Accordingly, the Court will deny
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    Libya’s petition to vacate or modify the award and grant Strabag’s cross-motion to affirm the
    award.
    A.     The Arbitration Award Was Final
    “[I]t is a cardinal principle of arbitration that awards are reviewable and enforceable only
    if they are ‘final’—that is, if they purport to resolve all aspects of the dispute being arbitrated.”
    Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL–CIO, Local 3090 v. Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth., 
    777 F.2d 751
    , 755
    (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). The finality of an arbitration award “does not
    require that the arbitration award resolve every outstanding issue that might arise in later
    litigation between the parties.” Pasha v. Janseshki, 597 F. App’x 25, 26 (2d Cir. 2015)
    (quoting ConnTech Dev. Co. v. Univ. of Conn. Educ. Props., Inc., 
    102 F.3d 677
    , 686 (2d Cir.
    1996) (arbitration was final despite defendant’s “speculation that subsequent litigation will be
    required to ascertain respective project costs” because arbitrators considered parties’ arguments
    about project costs when calculating the arbitration award amount)). Rather, an arbitration
    award is final when it is “intended by the arbitrator to be his complete determination of every
    issue submitted to him.” Am. Postal Workers Union v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
    422 F. Supp. 2d 240
    ,
    246 (D.D.C. 2006) (quoting McKinney Restoration Co. v. Ill. Dist. Council No. 1, 
    392 F.3d 867
    ,
    871 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also Gas Aggregation Servs., Inc. v. Howard Avista Energy, LLC,
    
    319 F.3d 1060
    , 1069 (8th Cir. 2003) (arbitration was not final when panel declined to decide an
    issue presented and left it for litigation).
    Here, Libya argues that the arbitration award is not final because the Tribunal did not
    fully consider Libya’s “set-off” claim. See Libya’s Mem. at 2. To the contrary, the Tribunal
    thoroughly considered and rejected Libya’s claim that any award to Strabag should be “set off”
    or reduced based on the pre-payments Libya made to Al Hani for work that Al Hani never
    6
    completed. The Tribunal first found “that it ha[d] jurisdiction to address [Libya’s] set-off
    claim.” Arbitration ¶ 897. It then went on to reject Libya’s set-off claim with sixteen pages of
    thorough analysis. See 
    id. ¶¶ 875
    –921. In doing so, the Tribunal addressed every argument
    offered by Libya, including unjust enrichment, 
    id. ¶¶ 899
    –900, misuse of the advance payments,
    
    id. ¶¶ 901
    –02, bank guarantees, see 
    id. ¶¶ 903
    –09, 918–21, the “wrapping up” of the contracts’
    requirements, 
    id. ¶¶ 910
    –16, and restitution, 
    id. ¶ 917
    .
    Libya points to a single sentence in the 335-page decision to support its baseless claim
    that the Tribunal “deliberately refused to adjudicate the set-off,” Libya Mem. 2: “In the view of
    the majority, this is a matter that must be addressed by the Parties, if it is to be addressed, outside
    the context of this arbitration,” Pet. ¶ 58 (quoting Arbitration ¶ 921). But, as the Tribunal
    explained, it had no legal basis for awarding Libya a set-off because it did not have jurisdiction
    to address the outstanding guarantees, the very existence of which was disputed. 
    Id. ¶¶ 918
    –20
    (“If Respondent’s claimed set-off were to be applied, those guarantees would remain. Claimant
    would be left exposed to the risk of what would in essence be double recovery by Respondent.”);
    see also 
    id. ¶ 919
     (“A bank that extends an ‘unconditional’ and ‘irrevocable’ letter of guarantee
    has no duty, and perhaps no right, to pay some lesser amount on the basis of an arbitration ruling
    to which it is not party.”). The Tribunal further found that Strabag and Al Hani used the advance
    payments consistent with the contracts, and thus, there was no double recovery in the award.
    Other courts confronted with similar extra-arbitral claims have likewise found that the existence
    of such claims does not defeat the finality of an arbitration. See, e.g., Ranger Offshore Mexico,
    S. de R.L. de C.V. v. Grupo Tradeco, S.A. de C.V., No. 4:15-cv-635, 
    2018 WL 780707
    , at *4
    (S.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2018), appeal dismissed, No. 18-20513, 
    2018 WL 7138080
     (5th Cir. Dec. 26,
    2018) (arbitration was final even though the panel did not resolve the issue of promissory notes
    7
    owed to one party as they were governed by Mexican law, outside the jurisdiction of the panel,
    and the panel “did not tie the outcome of arbitration award to the enforcement” of the notes).1
    Because the Tribunal clearly addressed the issues before it, including the arguments
    relating to Libya’s set-off claim, its award was sufficiently final as required by § 10(a)(4) of the
    FAA.2
    B.     The Tribunal Did Not Exceed Its Powers
    Libya next argues that the Tribunal exceeded its power in two respects. First, it alleges
    that the Tribunal “exceeded its powers in exercising jurisdiction over the parties’ dispute.”
    Libya’s Mem. at 28. Alternatively, Libya alleges that the Tribunal’s majority exceeded its
    powers “in refusing to resolve the single largest issue in the arbitration—whether the set-off for
    the approximately €98 million in unearned advance payments that Strabag received under the
    [c]ontracts” resulted in a double recovery for Strabag. Id. at 28–30. Both claims fail.
    1.      Jurisdiction
    The Tribunal properly found that it had the authority to determine its own jurisdiction.
    Arbitration ¶ 1. Because the arbitration was brought under the Treaty, the ICSID Additional
    Facility Rules applied. Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Great Socialist
    People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austria-
    Libya, art. XI, § 2(c)(ii), June 18, 2002, Dkt. 1-6. Thus, “the Tribunal ha[d] the power to rule on
    1
    Given that the Tribunal spent sixteen pages thoroughly considering and rejecting the
    petitioner’s arguments, see Arbitration ¶¶ 875–921, it is unethical for petitioner to assert that the
    Tribunal “deliberately refused to adjudicate the set-off,” Libya’s Mem. at 2.
    2
    Libya’s arguments that the award should be modified, see Libya’s Mem. at 33–39, fail for the
    same reason—the Tribunal considered and rejected them with reasoned analysis, see Arbitration
    ¶¶ 899–921.
    8
    its own competence.” ICSID Rules, art. 45; see also Gold Rsrv. Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of
    Venezuela, 
    146 F. Supp. 3d 112
    , 122 (D.D.C. 2015).
    Far from “ignor[ing] the plain language” of the Treaty, Republic of Argentina v. AWG
    Grp. Ltd., 
    211 F. Supp. 3d 335
    , 344 (D.D.C. 2016), aff’d, 
    894 F.3d 327
     (D.C. Cir. 2018)
    (quoting United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL–CIO v. Misco, Inc., 
    484 U.S. 29
    , 38 (1987)), in
    deciding unanimously that it had jurisdiction over the dispute, the Tribunal fully construed and
    applied the relevant sections of the Treaty, considered the arguments of both parties, and
    consulted international law. Arbitration ¶¶ 97–210. The Tribunal found that the arbitration was
    brought under the Treaty because Strabag qualified as an “investor,” 
    id. ¶ 119
    ; the contribution
    Strabag made to Al Hani was an “investment,” 
    id. ¶ 110
    ; Al Hani “operated under the clear
    control of Strabag;” and “[t]here was no separation between Strabag and Al Hani,” 
    id. ¶ 134
    . It
    then considered and dismissed Libya’s arguments that Strabag, as the parent company, could not
    bring the arbitration because neither it nor the state of Libya were parties to the contract. 
    Id. ¶¶ 167
    –88. And it examined the terms of the contract between Al Hani and the Libyan
    Government, including those that specified Libyan courts as the proper venue for dispute
    resolution, before determining that Strabag was entitled to pursue his claims before the Tribunal,
    consistent with principles of international law. 
    Id. ¶¶ 189
    –207. In short, “[t]he evidence
    show[ed]” that “[Strabag] could not pursue its contract-related claims in Libyan courts in safety
    or with any reasonable expectation of a considered and expeditious outcome.” 
    Id. ¶ 208
    . Even if
    this Court were to conclude that the Tribunal committed serious error, which it does not, this
    Court would lack the power to overturn the Tribunal’s award because the Tribunal “constru[ed]
    or appl[ied] the contract and act[ed] within the scope of [its] authority.” Republic of Argentina,
    9
    211 F. Supp. 3d at 344 (quoting United Paperworkers Int’l Union, 
    484 U.S. at 38
    ). The Tribunal
    did not clearly exceed its authority in exercising jurisdiction over this dispute.
    2.      “Good order and fundamental fairness”
    As discussed above, see supra section III.A., the Tribunal did not refuse to resolve
    Libya’s request for a set-off, see Arbitration ¶ 921. Nor did it deny Libya’s proposed set-off
    based on “good order and fundamental fairness,” as Libya claims. Pet’r’s Reply at 11, Dkt. 14.
    The majority mentioned “fairness” as a consideration because the Tribunal had no jurisdiction
    over the Libyan banks that held the guarantees. But it denied Libya’s set-off request because it
    found (among numerous other reasons) that Al Hani had used all the advance payments for uses
    that the contracts permitted. See Arbitration ¶ 900 (“[T]he advance payments . . . were utilized
    by Al Hani to carry forward the several construction projects in the face of delayed or non-
    payment” by the Libyan government). The Tribunal did not view its award as permitting a
    double recovery for Strabag.
    Libya again misconstrues the record when it asserts that the dissenting arbitrator
    criticized the majority for rejecting Libya’s request for a set-off on fundamental fairness grounds.
    See Libya’s Mem. at 20–21. To be sure, the dissent disagreed with the majority’s conclusion on
    the set-off claim. And he noted that the majority’s decision to treat Strabag’s award and Libya’s
    payment and bank guarantees separately was, in his view, “not conducive to ‘good order and
    fundamental fairness,’ to which the majority—and indeed the entire Tribunal—aspired.”
    Arbitration Dissent ¶ 44, at 12 (emphasis added). But it is improper to interpret this single
    sentence as criticizing the majority for deciding the set-off issue based on its own sense of the
    fairness.
    10
    Because the Tribunal did not deny the set-off based on a sense of good order and
    fundamental fairness, but rather as a result of its reasoned interpretation of the relevant contracts,
    the treaty, and international law, the Tribunal did not exceed its authority.
    C.      Requested Relief
    None of Libya’s arguments in support of its set-off or other claims support vacatur,
    modification, or correction of the Tribunal’s award. Thus, the Court will deny Libya’s petition
    and grant Strabag’s cross-motion to confirm the award. See, e.g., Equitas Disability Advocs.,
    LLC v. Daley, Debofsky & Bryant, P.C., 
    177 F. Supp. 3d 197
    , 219 (D.D.C. 2016). Because
    neither party alleges that other litigation relating to this litigation is pending in any other court,
    the Court will also deny Strabag’s request for a pre-judgment bond under Article VI of the New
    York Convention. See Crytstallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
    
    244 F. Supp. 3d 100
    , 108 n.11 (D.D.C. 2017) (denying a pre-judgment bond request as moot).
    IV.       CONCLUSION
    For the reasons stated, it is
    ORDERED that Libya’s Petition to Vacate the Arbitration Award is DENIED. It is
    further
    ORDERED that Strabag SE’s Cross-Motion to Confirm the Arbitration Award is
    GRANTED IN PART as to the confirmation of the arbitration award and DENIED IN PART
    as to the request that Libya post a bond during the pendency of this litigation.
    The respondent is directed to file a proposed judgment amount with all pre-judgment
    interest calculations performed as required under the Arbitration Award as of October 15, 2021.
    Respondent shall file this on the docket on or before October 15, 2021, along with a proposed
    11
    judgment order, a sworn declaration by the respondent’s counsel who performs the calculations,
    and an exhibit with the spreadsheet documenting the calculations.
    SO ORDERED.
    ________________________
    DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH
    United States District Judge
    September 30, 2021
    12