Phillips v. Commission on Character & Fitness ( 2021 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
SOLON PHILLIPS,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 20-1982 (CKK)
MONTANA COMMISSION ON CHARACTER
& FITNESS, et al,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(April 30, 2021)
In May 2019, Mr. Solon Phillips (“Plaintiff”) was denied admission to the State Bar of
Montana. In response, Plaintiff filed this pro se civil action against the Montana Supreme Court’s
Commission on Character and Fitness (the “Commission”) and Ms. Annie Goodwin, the
Commission’s Chair (“Ms. Goodwin”) (collectively, “Defendants”) for alleged acts of
discrimination arising from Plaintiff’s denied bar application.
Plaintiff filed his complaint on July 21, 2020, and after Defendants did not respond or
otherwise plead, the Clerk of the Court entered default against Defendants. See Entry of Default,
ECF No. 7, at 1. Now pending before the Court are Defendants’ [11] Motion to Set Aside Default
and [12] Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b), as well as Plaintiff’s miscellaneous [15] Motion to
Condition Setting Aside Default. Upon consideration of the briefing, the relevant authorities, and
the record as a whole, 1 the Court finds good cause to set aside the Clerk’s entry of default and
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The Court’s consideration has focused on the following briefing and material submitted by the parties:
• Compl., ECF No. 1;
• Defs.’ Brief in Supp. of Mot. to Set Aside Default Under Rule 55 (“Defs.’ Default Mot.”), ECF
No. 11-1;
• Defs.’ Brief in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b) (“Defs.’ Mot.”), ECF No. 12-1;
• Pl.’s Mot. to Condition Setting Aside Default (“Pl.’s Mot. to Condition”), ECF No. 15,
• Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 17;
• Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. to Condition & Reply in Supp. of Defs.’ Default Mot., ECF No. 18;
• Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 20; and,
• Pl.’s Sur-Reply to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 22.
In an exercise of its discretion, the Court finds that holding oral argument in this action would not be of
assistance in rendering a decision. See LCvR 7(f).
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further concludes that it lacks personal jurisdiction over both Defendants. Accordingly, the Court
will GRANT Defendants’ [11] [12] Motions, setting aside the Clerk’s entry of default and
dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint. In turn, the Court will DENY Plaintiff’s miscellaneous [15]
Motion to Condition Setting Aside Default.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Solon Phillips is an attorney who graduated law school in 2008. See Compl. ¶ 21. He
is currently admitted to practice law in the District of Columbia, Alabama, and Washington. See
id. ¶¶ 15–17. In 2018, Plaintiff passed the Uniform Bar Examination and decided to apply for
admission to the State Bar of Montana. See id. ¶¶ 22–23. Plaintiff submitted his application to
the Montana Bar using his Maryland address and driver’s license. See O’Connor Aff., ECF No.
18-5, ¶ 10. Upon review, the Montana Bar identified “several issues” with Plaintiff’s application,
Lynch Aff., ECF No. 11-4, ¶ 11, and, consequently, requested that Plaintiff provide a list of all
jurisdictions in which he had previously applied for admission to the bar, Compl. ¶ 24. In
November 2018, Plaintiff provided the Montana Bar with updated information regarding his
admission to the bars of other jurisdictions. See id. ¶ 26. The Montana Bar ultimately referred
Plaintiff’s application to the Commission “for a character and fitness investigation.” Lynch Aff.,
ECF No. 11-4, ¶ 11. A Commission subcommittee then reviewed Plaintiff’s application materials
and “concluded that [he] should be denied certification in part based on the decision of the
Maryland Court of Appeals denying him admission in Maryland and in part because he had failed
to provide a comprehensive list of jurisdictions to which he had applied to become a member of
the bar.” Goodwin Aff., ECF No. 11-7, ¶ 38.
In May 2019, a Bar Admissions Administrator from the Montana Bar sent Plaintiff a letter,
addressed to his residence in Bowie, Maryland, informing Plaintiff that his application for
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admission to the Montana Bar had been denied on character and fitness grounds. See May 15,
2019 Letter, ECF No. 11-5, at 1–2. The letter explained to Plaintiff that he had “failed to . . .
provid[e] a comprehensive list of jurisdictions where he had applied to take the bar exam,” and
had not adequately disclosed “his denial into the Maryland Bar.” Compl. ¶ 28. In response,
Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing before the Commission to challenge its character and
fitness finding and its decision to deny Plaintiff admission to the Montana Bar. See Lynch Aff.,
ECF No. 11-4, ¶ 13. Thereafter, the Commission scheduled an “adversarial” hearing to consider
Plaintiff’s challenge. See Compl. ¶¶ 63–82, 88. At Plaintiff’s request, however, the administrative
proceeding before the Commission has been stayed. See Lynch Aff., ECF No. 11-4, ¶ 14.
On July 21, 2020, Plaintiff filed a civil action before this Court, challenging the denial of
his application to the Montana Bar and the conditions of his forthcoming “adversarial hearing”
before the Commission. See Compl. ¶¶ 83–134. In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts five civil rights-
based claims against the Commission and its Chairwoman, Ms. Annie Goodwin. See id. The
Commission is a body of volunteers appointed by the Montana Supreme Court, charged with
evaluating the character and fitness of applicants to the Montana Bar and administering pro hac
vice appearances. See Goodwin Aff., ECF No. 11-7, ¶¶ 2–5. The Commission is located in
Montana and does not carry out any work in the District of Columbia. Id. ¶ 33. Ms. Goodwin,
herself, is the Chair of the Commission. See id. ¶ 1. Ms. Goodwin resides in Helena, Montana,
where she practices law. See id. ¶ 19. Ms. Goodwin is not a member of the District of Columbia
Bar, she owns no property in the District of Columbia, and she does not carry out any business
activity in the District of Columbia. See id. ¶¶ 25, 27–30. Ms. Goodwin’s most recent contact
with the District of Columbia occurred in 2016, when she traveled to the District of Columbia for
a four-day conference. See id. ¶ 32. Nonetheless, Plaintiff elected to file the present action against
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the Commission and Ms. Goodwin in the District of Columbia, asserting that this “court possesses
an independent basis for jurisdiction.” Compl. ¶ 4.
By October 2020, the Commission and Ms. Goodwin had not responded to Plaintiff’s
complaint, and on October 8, 2020, the Clerk of the Court entered default against them. See Entry
of Default, ECF No. 7, at 1. In response, Defendants filed a motion on October 26, 2020 requesting
that this Court set aside the Clerk’s entry of default, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
55(c). See Defs.’ Default Mot. at 1. Simultaneously, Defendants moved for the dismissal of
Plaintiff’s complaint under Federal of Civil Procedure 12(b), including for lack of personal
jurisdiction. See Defs.’ Mot. at 1, 16–22. In turn, Plaintiff filed a miscellaneous “Motion to
Condition Setting Aside Default,” which requests that the Court “condition the setting aside of
default on Defendants willfully consenting to be sued in this Court.” Pl.’s Mot. to Condition at
10. The parties have fully briefed each of these motions, and these motions are now ripe for the
Court’s review.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Rule 55(c)
A court may set aside an entry of default for “good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). “In
determining whether or not to set aside a default, a court must consider: (1) the willfulness of the
respondent’s default, if any; (2) whether there is any prejudice to the petitioner; and (3) the merit
of respondent’s alleged defenses.” Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Gabonese Republic, 406 F. Supp.
3d 84, 87 (D.D.C. 2019) (citing Keegel v. Key West & Caribbean Trading Co., 627 F.2d 372, 373
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(D.C. Cir. 1980)). “On a motion for relief from the entry of default . . . all doubts are resolved in
favor of the party seeking relief.” Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
B. Rule 12(b)(2)
“A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a court’s personal jurisdiction over a defendant
who moves to dismiss the claims against him under Rule 12(b)(2).” West v. Holder, 60 F. Supp.
3d 190, 193 (D.D.C. 2014), aff’d sub nom. West v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citing
Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). To satisfy this burden, “a plaintiff must allege
specific acts connecting the defendant with the forum.” Second Amend. Found. v. U.S. Conf. of
Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (internal quotations marks and citations omitted).
“Conclusory statements” and “bare allegations” will not suffice. First Chicago Int’l v. United
Exch. Co., 836 F.2d 1375, 1378–79 (D.C. Cir. 1988). “Unlike with a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), the Court ‘may consider materials outside the pleadings in deciding whether to grant a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.’” Doe v. United States, 797 F. Supp. 2d 78, 81 (D.D.C.
2011) (quoting Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). “In
determining whether [a basis for personal jurisdiction] exists, factual discrepancies appearing in
the record must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff.” Crane v. New York Zoological Soc., 894 F.2d
454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Courts also have an obligation to construe a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings
liberally and consider his filings as a whole, before dismissing his claims. See Schnitzler v. United
States, 761 F.3d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
III. DISCUSSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ motion to set aside
the Clerk’s entry of default, pursuant to Rule 55(c), and DENY Plaintiff’s miscellaneous “Motion
to Condition Setting Aside Default.” Furthermore, the Court finds that it lacks personal
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jurisdiction over both Defendants. As such, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ Motion under
Rule 12(b)(2) and DISMISS Plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety.
A. Entry of Default
Defendants have filed a motion to set aside the Clerk’s October 8, 2020 entry of default.
See Entry of Default, ECF No. 7, at 1. Under Rule 55(c), courts consider three factors when
determining whether to set aside an entry of default: (1) the willfulness of the default, (2) the
prejudice to the plaintiff, and (3) the availability of a meritorious defense. Mohamad v. Rajoub,
634 F.3d 604, 606 (D.C. Cir. 2011). As set forth below, the Court finds that Defendants have
presented compelling arguments under each factor and have, therefore, established “good cause”
for the Court to set aside the entry of default against them. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c).
First, Defendants persuasively argue that their default was not willful, because Plaintiff did
not properly effectuate service of process upon them. See Defs.’ Default Mot. at 18; Fed. R. Civ.
P. 4. In particular, Defendants demonstrate that Plaintiff did not serve either Ms. Goodwin or the
Commission, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, but instead incorrectly served his
complaint upon the State Bar of Montana, see Goodwin Aff., ECF No. 11-7, ¶¶ 44–46; Lynch Aff.,
ECF No. 11-4, ¶¶ 15–21; Pl.’s Cert. of Service, ECF No. 4, at 1, an entity which is not authorized
to accept service on behalf of either Defendant, see Fed R. Civ. P. 4(e), (j); Mont. R. Civ. P. 4(l)
(setting forth requirements for service upon the state). This service defect alone militates directly
against a finding that Defendants failure to respond was willful. See Void-El v. O’Brien, 811 F.
Supp. 2d 255, 259 (D.D.C. 2011) (setting aside default where service was defective). Furthermore,
the Court notes that Defendants promptly retained counsel on the same day this Court ordered
Plaintiff to prosecute his case or risk dismissal. See Defs.’ Default Mot. at 23. Defendants’ counsel
then quickly filed an appearance on October 8, 2020, and Defendants subsequently moved to both
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set aside default and to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint shortly thereafter. Such litigation conduct
does not evince a willful disregard for the present action before the Court.
Second, the Court does not find that setting aside the Clerk’s entry of default will effectuate
prejudice upon Plaintiff. “[I]n evaluating the prejudice to a plaintiff in setting aside a default, a
court should consider not the mere fact of delay but rather any effects the delay may have on the
plaintiff, such as the loss of evidence or increased difficulties in obtaining discovery.” Serv. Emps.
Int’l Union Nat'l IndustryPension Fund v. Bristol Manor Healthcare Ctr., Inc., 307 F.R.D. 37, 42
(D.D.C. 2014). Here, the minor delay in Defendants’ response to Plaintiff’s complaint has not
caused any appreciable threat to the collection of evidence or discovery in this case, particularly
considering Defendants’ dispositive jurisdictional defense to Plaintiff’s claims, discussed below.
Consequently, the Court finds that setting aside the entry of default against Defendants will not
itself cause prejudice to Plaintiff.
Finally, as referenced above, Defendants have asserted meritorious defenses to Plaintiff’s
complaint. For the purposes of setting aside an entry of default, “the movant is not required to
prove a defense, but only to assert a defense that it may prove at trial.” Whelan v. Abell, 48 F.3d
1247, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Here, Defendants have asserted both merits-based and jurisdictional
defenses which could each be plausibly proven at trial, see Defs.’ Default Mot. at 5 (setting out
litigation defenses), including a personal jurisdiction defense which, as explained herein, compels
the dismissal of this action, see disc. infra at § III.B.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds “good cause” to set aside the Clerk’s entry
of default against Defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). Furthermore, the Court will also refuse
Plaintiff’s request in his “Motion to Condition Setting Aside Default” that the Court “exercise its
discretion and base the setting aside of the default on Defendants voluntarily consenting to be sued
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in this Court.” Pl.’s Mot. to Condition at 9. Plaintiff provides no authority supporting this request
to condition the vacatur of default on Defendants’ consent to suit in this jurisdiction, and the Court
finds no reason to set such a condition. As described above, Defendants have demonstrated “good
cause” under the applicable Rule 55(c) standard, which is independently sufficient to justify the
vacatur of default. In addition, Defendants may simultaneously assert jurisdictional defenses to
Plaintiff’s complaint, as they have done here. Accordingly, the Court will DENY Plaintiff’s
request for relief in his miscellaneous “Motion to Condition Setting Aside Default.”
B. Personal Jurisdiction
Next, the Court will address Defendants’ motion under Rule 12(b)(2) to dismiss Plaintiff’s
complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Defs.’ Mot. at 17–22. 2 “The Supreme Court has
developed two distinct analyses” authorizing the “exercise [of] contact-based personal jurisdiction
over a defendant:” general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. Erwin-Simpson v. AirAsia Berhad,
985 F.3d 883, 888 (D.C. Cir. 2021); see also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Court of Calif.,
San Francisco Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017). State law and the limits of Constitutional Due
Process circumscribe the contours of both general and specific jurisdiction. See Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 134 (2014) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A)); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). In this case, Plaintiff has not established either general or specific
jurisdiction over Defendants.
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In addition to their personal jurisdiction defense, Defendants raise additional grounds for dismissal,
including for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Pl.’s Mot. at 2–3. Nonetheless, “[a] complaint may
be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction without settling whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists.”
Jankovic v. Int’l Crisis Grp., 494 F.3d 1080, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 2007). “Personal jurisdiction, too, is an
essential element of the jurisdiction of a district court, without which the court is powerless to proceed to
an adjudication.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
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1. General Jurisdiction
To begin, the Court considers whether it possesses general jurisdiction over either
Defendant. “General jurisdiction, ‘permits a court to assert jurisdiction over a defendant based on
a forum connection unrelated to the underlying suit.’” Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 56
(D.C. Cir. 2017). The exercise of general jurisdiction over a defendant requires a demonstration
that the defendant maintains “continuous and systematic” contacts within the forum. Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984). In the District of Columbia, two
“statutes provide for general jurisdiction.” Erwin-Simpson, 985 F.3d at 889. Under D.C. Code
§ 13-422, an exercise of personal jurisdiction is permissible “over a person domiciled in, organized
under the laws of, or maintaining his or its principal place of business in the District of Columbia.”
Another statute, D.C. Code § 13-334(a), more narrowly provides for general jurisdiction over
“foreign” corporations, served within the District of Columbia and “doing business in the District.”
See Erwin-Simpson, 985 F.3d at 889.
Plaintiff has not established that this Court has general jurisdiction over either Defendant.
Plaintiff’s complaint contains no allegations at all about the forum-connections Defendants
maintain with the District of Columbia, instead presenting only a conclusory allegation that this
“court possesses an independent basis for jurisdiction.” Compl. ¶ 4. And even construing
Plaintiff’s pro se pleadings liberally, his opposition brief provides no additional facts to
demonstrate that either Defendant is domiciled in or maintains a principal place of business in the
District of Columbia, see D.C. Code § 13-422, or that either is a “foreign corporation” served and
“doing business” in the District, see D.C. Code § 13-334(a). Moreover, Defendants have proffered
countervailing facts that directly undermine such propositions. For example, Defendants explain
that the Commission is part of the Supreme Court of Montana, located in the state of Montana, and
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does not carry out “any work in the District of Columbia.” Goodwin Aff., ECF No. 11-7, ¶¶ 1, 33.
Similarly, Ms. Goodwin resides in Helena, Montana, where she practices law. See id. ¶ 19. Ms.
Goodwin is not a member of the District of Columbia Bar, she owns no property in the District of
Columbia, and she does not carry out any business activity in the District of Columbia. See id. ¶¶
25, 27–30. Given these uncontroverted jurisdictional facts, the Court finds no basis for the exercise
of general jurisdiction over either Defendant in the District of Columbia.
2. Specific Jurisdiction
Next, the Court considers whether specific jurisdiction exists over either Defendant in this
case. “[S]pecific jurisdiction depends on an affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying
controversy, principally, activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is
therefore subject to the State’s regulation.” Erwin-Simpson v. AirAsia Berhad, 985 F.3d 883, 888
(D.C. Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). “For this reason, ‘specific jurisdiction is confined to
adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes
jurisdiction.’” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). “With respect to specific jurisdiction, the
Court ‘must engage in a two-part inquiry: first examine whether jurisdiction is applicable under
the [state’s] long-arm statute and then determine whether a finding of jurisdiction satisfies the
constitutional requirements of due process.’” Trump v. Comm. on Ways & Means, United States
House of Representatives, 415 F. Supp. 3d 98, 105 (D.D.C. 2019) (quoting GTE New Media Servs.
Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
Plaintiff has not satisfied either component of the specific jurisdiction analysis. In total,
Plaintiff presents the following assertions, which arguably support an exercise of specific
jurisdiction over Defendants: (1) “Montana allows . . . transfer applicants residing in the District
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[of Columbia] and seeking admission to submit an application from the District of Columbia for
the purpose of being admitted in the Montana State Bar,” (2) Plaintiff himself “applied to
Montana’s Bar while in the District, sat for the 8-hour Montana Law Seminar while in the District,
and executed the majority of the application at issue while in the District of Columbia,” and (3)
“Defendants avail themselves to residents within the District by soliciting and accepting
applications from D.C. residents.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 8.
First, these conclusory assertions, unsupported by documentary evidence or affidavits, do
not demonstrate that specific jurisdiction is proper under any of the enumerated sections of the
District of Columbia’s long-arm statute. See D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1)–(7). This is particularly
the case given Defendants’ uncontroverted factual assertions that neither the Commission nor Ms.
Goodwin transact any business within the District of Columbia. See Goodwin Aff., ECF No. 11-
7, ¶¶ 28–29, 33. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations regarding Montana’s bar
admissions activity ostensibly pertain to the State Bar of Montana, rather than to the Commission
or Ms. Goodwin themselves—the named defendants in this case. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 8. Finally,
the Court observes that the Commission is part of the Supreme Court of Montana, see Goodwin
Aff., ECF No. 11-7, ¶ 1, and is, therefore, part of the state, see Phillips v. Comm’n on Character
& Fitness, No. CV 20-41-M-DLC-KLD, 2020 WL 4003368, at *1 (D. Mont. June 9, 2020) (“The
Commission on Character and Fitness is an arm of the Montana Supreme Court.”). Similarly, a
lawsuit against Ms. Goodwin in her official capacity as Chair of the Commission also represents
a suit against the state. Kwok Sze v. Johnson, 172 F. Supp. 3d 112, 123 (D.D.C. 2016), aff’d sub
nom. Kwok Sze v. Kelly, No. 16-5090, 2017 WL 2332592 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 21, 2017). The District
of Columbia’s long-arm statute, however, applies only to “persons,” and not to “state” entities like
Defendants. D.C. Code § 13–421; see also Kwok Sze, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 123. For these reasons,
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the Court concludes that the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute, D.C. Code § 13-423(a), does
not support the exercise of specific jurisdiction over either Defendant.
Finally, the Court finds that an exercise of specific jurisdiction over Defendants would also
fall outside “the permissible bounds of the Due Process Clause.” GTE New Media, 199 F.3d at
1347. Due Process requires that a defendant possess “certain minimum contacts with [the
jurisdiction] such that the maintenance of the suit [therein] does not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). “The
primary focus of [this] personal jurisdiction inquiry is the defendant’s relationship to the forum
State.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1779. In the context of specific jurisdiction, courts
consider whether a defendant has directed its conduct towards or into the forum state, Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958), whether the plaintiff’s claim arises from the defendant’s
forum-based conduct, Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414, and whether it would be “reasonable” to
subject the defendant to suit in the forum state, Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal.,
Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 113–114 (1987).
Exercising specific jurisdiction over Defendants in this action would not be reasonable, nor
would it comport with the “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co.,
326 U.S. at 316. Again, both the Commission and Ms. Goodwin are based exclusively in Montana,
and neither “have contacts with the District [of Columbia].” Goodwin Aff., ECF No. 11-7, ¶¶ 1,
33. Moreover, undisputed facts in the record reflect that Ms. Goodwin herself had no personal
interaction with Plaintiff. See id. ¶¶ 34–35. At most, Plaintiff argues that he and others applied to
the Montana Bar from the District of Columbia. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 7–8. But such third-party
conduct does not show how Defendants themselves have directed acts towards the District of
Columbia, which would render specific jurisdiction over them in this case reasonable. See World-
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Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (“[I]t is that the defendant’s conduct
and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there.”) (emphasis added).
Finally, Plaintiff presents a conclusory assertion that Defendants “solicited” bar
applications from D.C. residents. Pl.’s Opp’n at 8. But there are two problems with this
jurisdictional allegation. First, the record demonstrates that Plaintiff corresponded with employees
of the Montana State Bar, not the Commission or Ms. Goodwin—the actual defendants in this
case. See Goodwin Aff., ECF No 11-7, ¶ 35 (“In the course of my work with the Commission, I
have not interacted with Mr. Phillips at all.”); Lynch Aff., ECF No. 11-4, ¶ 11 (identifying
communication between Plaintiff and employee of the State Bar of Montana). And second, even
these Montana State Bar employees directed their correspondence with Plaintiff to his residence
in Maryland, not the District of Columbia. See O’Connor Aff., ECF No. 18-5, ¶ 10; Lynch Aff.,
ECF No. 11-4, ¶ 11. In fact, Plaintiff provided a Maryland address and driver’s license on his
application to the Montana Bar. See O’Connor Aff., ECF No. 18-5, ¶ 10. For these reasons, the
Court finds no forum-based conduct carried out by Defendants in the District of Columbia, which
would support a reasonable exercise of specific jurisdiction over Defendants in this case.
****
In sum, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that this Court may exercise
either general or specific jurisdiction over Defendants. Plaintiff, therefore, has not met his burden
of establishing the existence of personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Erwin-Simpson v. AirAsia
Berhad, 985 F.3d 883, 888 (D.C. Cir. 2021). As such, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ Rule
12(b)(2) motion and dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this Memorandum Opinion, the Court will GRANT Defendants’
[11] Motion to Set Aside Default and DENY Plaintiff’s miscellaneous [15] Motion to Condition
Setting Aside Default. The Court will also GRANT Defendants’ [12] Motion to Dismiss, because
this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over both Defendants.
An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: April 30, 2021
/s/
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
United States District Judge
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