Herndon v. State of Texas ( 2021 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FILED
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MAY 26 2021
Clerk, U.S. District & Bankruptcy
JACOB REA'SHAW HERNDON, et al., ) Court for the District of Columbia
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-01119 (UNA)
)
)
STATE OF TEXAS, et al., )
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Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court on its initial review of plaintiffs’ pro se complaint and
application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The court will grant plaintiffs’
application for leave to proceed IFP and dismiss the case because the complaint fails to meet the
minimal pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiff Herndon appears to be currently domiciled in Texas, though he only provides a
P.O. Box address, and at times contends that he is a citizen of California. As a preliminary matter,
the Local Rules of this court state that a plaintiff “filing pro se in forma pauperis must provide in
the [complaint’s] caption the name and full residence address or official address of each party.”
D.C. Local Civil Rule (“LCvR”) 5.1(c)(1). He attempts to bring this suit on behalf of himself and
his business, Ja’crea Evolved Studios and Management, LLC, which appears to be legally
registered in Texas. However, as to the latter, an entity may generally only appear as a party in
the federal courts “through licensed counsel.” See Greater Southeast Cmty. Hosp. Found., Inc. v.
Potter, 586 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194 (1993));
see also Am. Airways Charters, Inc. v. Regan, 746 F.2d 865, 873 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (internal
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quotation marks and citations omitted) (same); Diamond Ventures, LLC v. Barreto, 452 F.3d 892,
900 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (same). His business must thus be dismissed as a plaintiff.
He attaches two form complaints as one, in contravention of Federal Rule 10 and D.C.
LCvR 5.1(d) and (e), though it appears that the allegations may partially arise out of the same
nucleus of facts. He sues: the State of Texas, a Judge of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, the Harris County (Texas) District Attorney’s Office, the Harris County
Sherriff’s Department, the Harris County Public Defender’s Office, and the Texas Metropolitan
Transit Authority.
Apparently, Herndon received some sort of a traffic ticket, and he alleges that during its
issuance, he was mistreated, and his due process rights were somehow violated. He contends that
he should not have received this ticket because he is a “paying consumer” and because he is an
active litigant in cases before various state and federal courts in Texas. He alleges that the issuance
of the ticket is somehow tantamount to interference with his other court proceedings. He also
alleges, without any further detail, that unnamed individuals “failed to follow proper protocol” and
“tampered” in his civil lawsuits by “false entry upon government records.” He demands 20 million
dollars in damages, and additional percentages of “legal revenue.” Plaintiff fails to articulate
adequately the deprivation of a protected right. “Events may not have unfolded as Plaintiff wished,
but his dissatisfaction . . . [does] not form a basis for a due process violation.” Melton v. District
of Columbia, 85 F. Supp. 3d 183, 193 (D.D.C. 2015).
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires complaints to contain “(1) a
short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir.
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2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted
so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the
doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). When a
“complaint [] contains an untidy assortment of claims that are neither plainly nor concisely stated,
nor meaningfully distinguished from bold conclusions, sharp harangues and personal comments
[,]” it does not fulfill the requirements of Rule 8. Jiggetts v. D.C., 319 F.R.D. 408, 413 (D.D.C.),
aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. D.C., 2017 WL 5664737 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017). The instant complaint
falls within this category.
Even if these claims were pleaded with additional clarity, any connection between this
matter and these parties to this District is entirely unclear, and similarly, the ability of this court to
exercise personal jurisdiction over these defendants is equally uncertain. See International Shoe
Co. v Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). And the ability of this court, or any court, to exercise
subject matter jurisdiction over damages claims, as presented, against these particularly defendant,
is doubtful, at best. For these reasons, the case will be dismissed. A separate order accompanies
this memorandum opinion.
TREVOR N. McFADDEN
Dated: 5/26/2021 United States District Judge
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