Lane v. District of Columbia ( 2021 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MICHAEL S. LANE,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civ. Action No. 17-01484
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, (EGS)
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Michael Lane (“Mr. Lane”) brings this action
against Defendant the District of Columbia (“the District”)
alleging: (1) age discrimination 1 in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1997, (“ADEA”), 19 U.S.C.
§ 623(a) et seq., and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act
(“DCHRA”), D.C. Code § 2-1402.01, et seq.; (2) retaliation for
complaining about the discrimination when he was terminated in
violation of the ADEA and DCHRA as well as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and
1983; and (3) Misuse and Diversion of Government Funds. See
generally, Am. Compl., ECF No. 1-1.
Pending before the Court is the District’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 22. The Court has
1 Mr. Lane withdrew his discrimination and retaliation claims
based on race. See Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 26 n.1.
carefully considered the motion, the response and reply thereto,
the applicable law, and the entire record herein. The Court
GRANTS the District’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Additionally,
the Court DISMISSES Mr. Lane’s claim of misuse and diversion of
government funds.
II. Background
A. Factual Background
Except where indicated, the following material facts are
not in dispute. At all relevant times, Mr. Lane was over 40
years of age. 2 See Am. Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 7. In 2003, Mr. Lane
was hired by the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) as
an Architect on the Education Service System (EG) pay scale at a
Grade 13, Step 10. Pl.’s Summary and Response to Def.’s
Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SOF”), ECF No. 26-1 ¶ 1. Mr.
Lane’s position was subsequently transferred from DCPS to the
Office of Public Education Facilities Management (“OPEFM”) 3 and
he remained on the EG pay scale. Id. ¶¶ 2, 3.
Thereafter, effective October 1, 2011, Mr. Lane’s position
was transferred from OPEFM to the Department of General Services
2 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the
Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the
filed document with the exception of deposition testimony, which
is to the page number of the deposition transcript.
3 Mr. Lane disputes this, but what he states that he remained on
the DCPS payroll and pay scale and his position continued to be
funded by the DCPS budget. SOF, ECF No. 26-1 ¶ 2. Accordingly,
it is undisputed that Mr. Lane was transferred to OPEFM.
2
(“DGS”), a newly created agency. See Agency Response to EEOC
Charge (“Agency Response”), ECF No. 22-5 at 2. 4 At DGS, Mr. Lane
was assigned to the DGS Capital Construction Division (“CCD”).
SOF, ECF No. 26-1 ¶ 5. When he was transferred to DGS, there was
no change in his pay, grade, title, and series. Id. ¶ 6.
Mr. Lane was a member of a collective bargaining unit,
represented by the Teamsters, and the compensation of the unit
was based on the EG pay scale. 5 See Agency Response, ECF No. 22-5
at 6. Mr. Lane’s membership in this unit restricted DGS’s
4 Mr. Lane disputes this, but what he states is that his
“function and job title were transferred to DGC, but Plaintiff
and his colleagues remained on an inactive DCPS EG pay scale,
while their colleagues in DGS were paid on the [Career Services
(“CS”)] pay scale.” Id. That Mr. Lane remained on the EG pay
scale is undisputed. Owens Dep., ECF No. 26-3 at 17:16-18
(“Employees who came from OPEFM and DCPS were on the EG pay
scale.”).
5 Mr. Lane disputes this, pointing to his deposition testimony
where he stated that from 2008 to 2011, while he was at OPEFM,
he did not receive any cost of living adjustments. Lane Dep.,
ECF No. 26-2 at 63:5-13. He also points to the following
evidence: (1) FY 2009-FY 2012 District of Columbia Salary
Schedule for Comp Unit Exhibit 4, ECF No. 26-6 at 4-14; (2) FY
2008 – OPEM Budget v. Expenditures, Exhibit 5, ECF No. 26-6 at
21-26; (3) Mr. Lane’s April 18, 2014 pay stub, Exhibit 6, ECF
No. 26-6 at 28; (4) FY 2006, 2008, DCPS Non Union Educational
Service Employees pay scale steps, Exhibit 7, ECF No. 26-6 at
30-31; (5) An Addendum directing DCHR to place certain
bargaining unit employees on appropriate compensation units
beginning October 5, 2014, Exhibit 20, ECF No. 26-9 at 13-15;
and (6) A list of Capital Construction Division Vacancies from
10/1/2011-09/30/2014, Exhibit 21, ECF No. 26-9 at 18. This
evidence does not rebut the fact that compensation for the
bargaining unit in which Mr. Lane was a member was based on the
EG pay scale.
3
ability to change his salary or position. 6 See id. On February
20, 2014, the Teamsters notified OPEFM that it disclaimed any
interest in representing the collective bargaining unit. See
Letter from Warehouse Employees Union to Dean Aqui, Office of
Public Education Facilities Management (“Teamster Letter”) (Feb.
20, 2014), ECF No. 22-6 at 1. As a result of this disclaimer,
Mr. Lane’s compensation was exclusively governed by the District
Personnel Manual, which requires a competitive process to move
Mr. Lane to a new pay plan. 7 See Agency Response, ECF No. 22-5 at
6.
Effective January 2, 2014, DGS was approved for
“realignment,” meaning that, with regard to Mr. Lane, his EG pay
scale position would be abolished and he “would be allowed to
move competitively to newly established other existing titles,
series and grades” and would face no monetary loss. See
Memorandum from DGS Interim Director to the City Administrator
on the Request for Approval of Reduction-in-Force Within the
Department of General Services (“RIF Memorandum”) (May 11,
6 Mr. Lane disputes this, asserting that “new hires into the
collective bargaining unit were not put on the same EG pay
scale.” SOF, ECF No. 26-1 ¶ 9. However, the deposition
transcript cite Mr. Lane relies on does not support his
assertion. See Owens Dep., ECF No. 26-3 at 17.
7 Mr. Lane disputes this, asserting that the provisions of
Chapter 8 were generally applicable throughout his tenure. SOF,
ECF No. 26-1 ¶ 13. However, Mr. Lane’s position is consistent
with his compensation being “exclusively” governed by the manual
following the Union’s disclaimer.
4
2015), ECF No. 22-8 at 1. Mr. Lane disputes that a realignment
occurred. SOF, ECF No. 26-1 ¶ 10.
DGS did not have the regulatory authority to move Mr. Lane
to the CS pay scale other than through a competitive process.
See Agency Response, ECF No. 22-5 at 6. Accordingly, “DGS
identified comparable positions in the new proposed structure
which would ensure that the impacted employees would not lose
jobs or face a salary loss in a realignment” and “proposed to
permit the impacted employees to move competitively to the newly
established or other exiting titles, series and grades in the
realigned DGS.” Agency Response, ECF No. 22-5 at 3. Mr. Lane
disputes that a competitive process was required. SOF, ECF No.
26-1 ¶ 14. Mr. Lane also disputes that the jobs were comparable
because they consisted of “the same work but at a demoted
position and a depressed wage rate.” SOF, ECF No. 26-1 ¶ 15.
When the realignment began, 34 employees were still on the
EG pay scale. See RIF Memorandum, ECF No. 22-8 at 2.
In 2014, Mr. Lane applied for a CS 13 Architect Position and he
was selected for the position. See Lane Dep., ECF No. 22-4 at
79:4-5. Mr. Lane declined the position because it was at a step
two whereas his EG position was at a step 10. See id. at 87:5-8.
The CS 13 step two position had a higher salary than Mr. Lane’s
EG 13 step 10 position. See id. at 87:17-22. While employed at
DGS, Mr. Lane was eligible to apply for 11 positions at the CS
5
13 through CS 15 level. 8 See SOF, ECF No. 26-1 ¶ 19. Mr. Lane did
not apply for any of these positions. See id. ¶ 26. 9 “Of the
eleven new hires[,] eight were over the age of forty (40), and
ranged in age from 40 to 56 years old.” 10 See Agency Response,
ECF No. 22-5 at 6. They “were given salaries commensurate with
their depth and quality of directly related experience,
education, certifications and prior salary.” Id. at 6.
As of May 11, 2015, DGS realigned all but seven employees
from the EG pay plan to the CS pay plan. See RIF Memorandum, ECF
No. 22-8 at 2. Mr. Lane asserts that in 2014, the ages of the
seven employees ranged from 47 to 68. Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 26 at
16. In seeking approval for a RIF to abolish these seven
positions, DGS stated:
Although positions have been identified for
these EG employees, they have either not
applied for an available position or have
applied and been selected for a position, but
refused to accept the salary and position
offered. Despite our repeated discussions with
these employees to address and resolve an
remaining issues, the employees have chosen to
8 Mr. Lane disputes this, asserting that accepting such a
position would mean a demotion and forgone compensation. SOF,
ECF No. 26-1 ¶ 20. This, however, does not rebut the factual
statement.
9 Mr. Lane disputes this, pointing to his 2014 application. SOF,
ECF No. 26-1 ¶ 26. That he applied for a position in 2014 does
not rebut the factual statement.
10
The District also states that the persons selected for these
positions ranged in age from 41 to 81 years of age. See Agency
Response, ECF No. 22-5 at 5. Mr. Lane did not provide any
evidence showing the ages of the persons selected. See generally
SOF, ECF No. 26-1.
6
maintain their status as EG employees. Their
actions have effectively stymied DGS’ ability
to bring closure to our realignment
implementation activities.
RIF Memorandum, ECF No. 22-8 at 2.
On June 1, 2015, Mr. Lane was informed that his separation
from District government service would be effective July 2,
2015. See Letter from DGS to Michael Lane (“Separation Letter”)
(June 1, 2015), ECF No. 22-9 at 1. The letter further informed
him that he “ha[d] a right to priority placement consideration
through the Agency Reemployment Priority Program” (“ARPP”). Id.
at 2.
On June 17, 2015, Mr. Lane was informed that he had been
selected for a Project Manager position at CS 13, step 1, at an
annual salary of $76,397, a higher salary than Mr. Lane had been
earning, and that the effective start date of his appointment
was June 28, 2015. See Letter from DGS to Michael Lane (“Offer
Letter”) (June 17, 2015), ECF No. 22-10 at 1; see also SOF, ECF
No. 26-1 ¶ 33. The offer letter explains that:
This offer of employment is being extended to
you under the Agency Reemployment Priority
Program (ARPP) that has been established in
the Department of General Services. The ARPP
provides assistance to employees who will or
have been affected by a reduction-in-force
(RIF). The ARPP provides employees or former
employees separated in tenure groups I and
groups II with reemployment priority
consideration for vacancies within the agency,
as provided in Chapter 24 of the regulations.
Employees are automatically entered on the
7
reemployment priority list immediately after
it has been determined that the employee is to
be adversely affected by a reduction-in-force
and not later than the issuance of the notice
of reduction-in-force.
Offer Letter, ECF No. 22-10 at 1. Mr. Lane did not accept this
position. See SOF, ECF No. 26-1 ¶ 34.
B. Procedural History
Following the District’s removal of this case from the
Superior Court of the District of Columbia, the Complaint was
filed in this Court on July 25, 2017. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 1-
1. The District filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on
November 25, 2019. See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 22. Mr. Lane filed
his Opposition Response on February 19, 2020, see Pl.’s Opp’n,
ECF No. 26; and the District filed its Reply on March 16, 2020.
See Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 27. The motion is ripe and ready for
the Court’s adjudication.
III. Legal Standard
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary
judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)
Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989, 991 (D.C. Cir.
2002). The moving party must identify “those portions of the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which
8
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). To defeat summary
judgment, the nonmoving party must demonstrate that there is a
genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 324. A material fact is
one that is capable of affecting the outcome of the
litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). Mere conclusory allegations with no factual basis are
not sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment. Diaz
v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 243 F. Supp. 3d 86, 88
(D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO
v. United States Dep’t of Transp., 564 F.3d 462, 465 (D.C. Cir.
2009)). A genuine dispute is one where “the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Id. Further, in the summary judgment analysis “[t]he
evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at
255.
IV. Analysis
A. Mr. Lane’s Discrimination Claims Arising Out of the
Failure to Convert His Position From the EG Pay Scale to
the CS Pay Scale and Associated Loss of Compensation Are
Time Barred
The District argues that Mr. Lane’s claims regarding the
District’s failure to convert his position from the EG pay scale
9
to the CS pay scale when he was transferred from OPEFM to DGS on
October 1, 2011 are time barred because he did not file a claim
with the EEOC until 2016. See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 22 at 12. Mr.
Lane contends that the “seminal” discriminatory act occurred in
2007, when he was transferred from DCPS to OPEFM, but was not
moved to the CS pay scale, and that his claims are not time
barred because the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act applies to his
claims. See Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 26 at 26.
An employee must first exhaust administrative remedies with
the EEOC within 180 days of the unlawful employment practice,
but if the plaintiff has first instituted proceedings with a
state or local agency, the period is extended to 300 days.
Cooper v. Henderson, 174 F. Supp. 3d 193, 202 (D.D.C. 2018)
(Sullivan, J.). A discrete retaliatory or discriminatory act
occurs on the day it happened, and each discrete act starts a
new clock. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S.
101, 110, 113 (2002). The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act allows
for the statute of limitations to reset with each paycheck that
is the result of a discriminatory compensation decision, thereby
extending the amount of time in which the plaintiff can file a
complaint. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A). For the Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act to apply, Mr. Lane “must bring a claim
involving discrimination in compensation and point to a
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice.” Schuler
10
v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 595 F. 3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Discrimination in
compensation means paying different wages or providing different
benefits to similarly situated employees.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
With regard to Mr. Lane’s transfer from DCPS to OPEFM in
2007, it is undisputed that similarly situated employees—the
DCPS CCD employees who were transferred from DCPS to OPEFM—were
not converted to the CS pay scale. Lane Dep., ECF No. 26-2 at
57-59. Following the transfer, the Teamsters began negotiations
regarding converting the CCD employees to the CS pay scale. See
id. at 53-54. On October 1, 2011, Mr. Lane and other CCD
employees were transferred from OPEFM to DGS. See SOF, ECF No.
26-1 ¶ 4. In February 2014, the Teamsters disclaimed any further
interest in representing this group of employees. See Teamsters
Letter, ECF No. 22-6 at 1. In January 2014, DGS initiated a
realignment to address, among other things, the 34 DGS employees
still on the EG pay scale. See RIF Memorandum, ECF No. 26-9 at
2. As of May 11, 2015, all but seven employees had been moved
from the EG pay scale to the CS pay scale. See id.The undisputed facts show that the failure to automatically
convert Mr. Lane from the EG pay scale to the CS pay scale did
not constitute “discrimination in compensation” because Mr. Lane
was not paid different wages from similarly situated employees,
11
specifically, the DCPS CCD employees who were transferred from
DCPS to OPEFM, and then from OPEFM to DGS, and were not
converted to the CS pay scale. See Schuler, 595 F. 3d at 374(D.C. Cir. 2010). The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act therefore
does not apply.
The discriminatory acts—the failure to convert Mr. Lane
from the EG pay scale to the CS pay scale in 2007 and in 2011—
occurred on the date of the transfer from DCPS to OPEFM and then
on the date of the transfer from OPEFM to DGS respectively. Mr.
Lane states that he contacted the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) on or about January 29, 2016 and
subsequently filed a claim of discrimination, which was cross-
filed with the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights
(“DCOHR”). Am. Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 5. Since the allegedly
discriminatory acts occurred in 2007 and 2011, but Mr. Lane did
not file a claim with the EEOC or with DCOHR until years later,
Mr. Lane’s discrimination claims based on the failure to convert
his position from the EG pay scale to the CS pay scale and
associated loss of compensation are time barred.
12
B. Mr. Lane Has Failed to Produce Sufficient Evidence From
Which a Reasonable Jury Could Find that the District’s
Stated Reasons For Allegedly Demoting Him and Then
Terminating Him Were Pretext for Discrimination Based on
Age
1. Legal Standards
Under the ADEA, it is unlawful for an employer to:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual’s
age; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such
individual’s age; or (3) to reduce the wage
rate of any employee in order to comply with
this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)-(3).
The DCHRA prohibits certain discriminatory practices “[b]y
an employer,” making it unlawful for an employer to “fail or
refuse to hire, or to discharge, any individual; or otherwise
discriminate against any individual, with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”
based upon several protected categories including the person’s
age. D.C. Code § 2–1402.11(a)(1). When construing provisions of
the D.C. Code—including the DCHRA—this Circuit “defer[s] to the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals on questions of statutory
interpretation.” United States v. Edmond, 924 F.2d 261, 264
(D.C.Cir. 1991). District of Columbia courts look to cases
13
construing Title VII in construing the DCHRA, see Arthur Young &
Co. v. Sutherland, 631 A.2d 354, 361 n.17 (D.C.1993); as ‘[t]he
anti-discrimination provisions of both statutes are
substantially similar, id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, the
McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework governs the
analysis. Cain v. Reinoso, 43 A.3d 302, 306 (D.C. 2012).
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the
plaintiff must show: “(1) she is a member of a protected class;
(2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the
circumstances gave rise to an inference of discrimination.”
Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2002), see also
Kumar v. Dist’ of Columbia Water & Sewer Auth., 25 A.3d 9, 17
(D.C. 2011) (same).
Discrimination and retaliation claims are subject to the
burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973). The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit has instructed that if a
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case,
the burden shifts to the employer to identify
the legitimate, nondiscriminatory or non-
retaliatory reason on which it relied in
taking the complained-of action. Holcomb v.
Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 896 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
Assuming the employer proffers such a reason,
the “central question” at summary judgment
becomes whether “the employee produced
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
find that the employer's asserted
nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory reason
14
was not the actual reason and that the
employer intentionally discriminated or
retaliated against the employee.” Allen v.
Johnson, 795 F.3d 34, 39, No. 13–5170, 2015 WL
4489510, at *3 (D.C. Cir. July 24, 2015)
(brackets omitted) (quoting Brady, 520 F.3d at
494); see also Hamilton, 666 F.3d at 1351.
A plaintiff may support an inference that
the employer's stated reasons were pretextual,
and the real reasons were prohibited
discrimination or retaliation, by citing the
employer's better treatment of similarly
situated employees outside the plaintiff's
protected group, its inconsistent or dishonest
explanations, its deviation from established
procedures or criteria, or the employer's
pattern of poor treatment of other employees
in the same protected group as the plaintiff,
or other relevant evidence that a jury could
reasonably conclude evinces an illicit motive.
Walker v. Johnson, 798 F.3d 1085, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The
Court may not “second-guess an employer’s personnel decision
absent demonstrably discriminatory motive.” Fischbach v.
District of Columbia Dep’t of Corr., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“Once the employer has articulated a non-discriminatory
explanation for its action, as did the [employer] here, the
issue is not the correctness or desirability of [the] reasons
offered . . . [but] whether the employer honestly believes the
reasons it offers.” Id. An inference of pretext could be
appropriate where “the employer made an error too obvious to be
unintentional” because in such a situation, “perhaps [the
employer] had an unlawful motive for doing so.” Id.
15
2. Analysis
Mr. Lane claims that he was discriminated against based on
his age when he was allegedly demoted and then ultimately
terminated. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 58.
The District asserts that its legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for eliminating Mr. Lane’s position
through a RIF was because of adverse impact “the defunct EG pay
scale was having on the agency’s realignment.” Def.’s Mot., ECF
No. 22 at 2. “Being both reasonable and non-discriminatory,”
Fischbach v. District of Columbia Dept. of Corrections, 86 F.3d
1180, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Mr. Lane must now “‘produce[]
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the
employer's asserted nondiscriminatory [or nonretaliatory] reason
was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally
discriminated [or retaliated] against the employee.’” Allen v.
Johnson, 795 F.3d 34, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Brady v.
Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).
Mr. Lane asserts that after the Teamsters disavowed
representation, seven employees remained on the EG pay scale,
half of whom were over age 60. See Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 26 at
16. Mr. Lane argues that the there was no requirement for
competitive bidding to transfer employees to the CS pay scale.
See SOF, ECF No. 26-1 ¶ 14. To support his argument, Mr. Lane
makes a number of assertions and points to evidence he contends
16
supports his position. First, Mr. Lane asserts that many
employees were transferred without competitive bidding. Id. at
17. However, the evidence he points to—the deposition of Latrena
Owens, who was certified as the Rule 30(b)(6) deponent to speak
on behalf of the District—does not support his assertion. See
Owens Dep., ECF No. 26-3 at 7:3-10. Rather, Ms. Owens quoted the
language in the RIF Memorandum stating that all but seven of the
34 employees transferred from OPEFM to DGS were transitioned to
CS positions in the realignment. See Owens Dep., ECF No. 26-3 at
28:16-19. Second, Mr. Lane points to his own deposition
testimony. See Lane Dep., ECF No. 26-2 at 105. The cite does not
support this assertion, but even if it did, his own self-serving
assertions do not give rise to a triable issue of fact. Toomer
v. Mattis, 266 F. Supp. 2d 184, 200 (D.D.C. 2017) (Sullivan,
J.). Third, Mr. Lane points to an October 8, 2013 DGS
realignment request. See Memorandum From DGS Director to City
Administrator, Request for Approval of Realignment within the
Department of General Services, (Oct. 8, 2013), ECF No. 26-8 at
20. However, the Memorandum states the opposite of what Mr. Lane
contends: “[i]n order to appropriately place the EG employees
within the career service, employees will be selected for
positions in the new structure through competitive means.” Id.Fourth, Mr. Lane points to the October 1, 2008 through September
2012 Teamsters Collective Bargaining Proposal which, among other
17
things, proposed the promotion of EG professionals to CS
positions at current grade and step effective FY 2009. See Union
Proposal for a Collective Bargaining Agreement, ECF No. 26-6 at
57. However, Mr. Lane does not point to any evidence indicating
that this proposal was adopted. Finally, Mr. Lane argues that
the District was wrong to interpret the applicable regulations
to require competitive bidding to move the EG pay scale
employees to the CS pay scale. See Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 26 at
17-18.
Mr. Lane has provided no evidence that calls into question
that the District honestly believed that it needed to eliminate
the EG pay scale positions so that it could complete its
realignment and that employees could only be moved from the EG
pay scale to the CS pay scale through a competitive process. See
Fischbach, 86 F.3d at 1183. None of the evidence he points to
supports his assertion that a competitive process was not
required to transfer from the EG pay scale to the CS pay scale.
And his opinion that the District was wrong in how it
interpreted the applicable regulations does not call into
questions that the District honestly believed what the
regulations required.
18
Mr. Lane would have the Court infer discriminatory intent
because the District “articulate[d] no legitimate reason to
demote and remove ranking steps from Mr. Lane related to his job
skills or performance” because the EG pay scale and CS pay scale
job descriptions are nearly identical. Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 26
at 19. Even if the job descriptions are nearly identical, it is
undisputed that DGS needed to move the remaining employees from
a defunct pay scale to the CS pay scale. While it is undisputed
that CS pay scale position was at a lower grade but higher
salary than the EG pay scale position, Mr. Lane has provided no
support for his position that a lower grade on a different pay
scale at a higher salary constitutes a demotion.
Further evidence of discriminatory intent, according to Mr.
Lane, is that new hires on the CS pay scale “were given market-
rate salaries while the same was denied to [him] and his
colleagues. They were also given COLA increases and promotion
opportunities that were denied to [him].” SOF, ECF No. 26-1 ¶
25. Mr. Lane also contends that the new hires had less
experience and were younger than him; some of whom earned more
money than he did. See Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 26 at 20 (citing
Exhibits 20, 21, 22). However, Mr. Lane has provided no evidence
to support these assertions. Exhibit 20 is an Addendum directing
DCHR to place certain bargaining unit employees on appropriate
compensation units beginning October 5, 2014. The Addendum
19
provides the name and position of a list of employees, indicates
their grade, step and salary, with a hand-written notation of
“New Hire” next to some employees. See Exhibit 20, ECF No. 26-9
at 13-15. Exhibit 21 is a list of CCD Vacancies from 10/1/2011-
09/30/2014. See Exhibit 21, ECF No. 26-9 at 18. Exhibit 22 is a
June 13, 2013 “Frequently Asked Questions” regarding Pay
Increase for District Government Employees. See Exhibit 22, ECF
No. 26-9 at 20-22. None of this evidence supports Mr. Lane’s
assertions that the new hires on the CS pay scale were given
market rate salaries that were denied to him and that they had
less experience and were younger than Mr. Lane. Furthermore, it
is undisputed that the CS pay scale positions Mr. Lane was
offered were at a higher salary than his EG pay scale position.
Mr. Lane has failed to present evidence from which “a
reasonable jury could not only disbelieve the employer's
reasons, but conclude that the real reason the employer took a
challenged action was a prohibited one.” Walker, 798 F.3d at
1093. Accordingly, the District’s Motion for Summary Judgment as
to Mr. Lane’s discrimination claim is GRANTED.
20
C. Mr. Lane has Failed to Produce Sufficient Evidence From
Which a Reasonable Jury Could Find that the District’s
Stated Reasons for Terminating Him Were Pretext for
Retaliation For Having Engaged in Protected Activity
1. Legal Standards
“To prove retaliation [under the ADEA], the plaintiff
generally must establish that he or she suffered (i) a
materially adverse action (ii) because he or she had brought or
threatened to bring a discrimination claim.” Baloch v.
Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2008). “Under the
DCHRA, it an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer to
retaliate against a person on account of that person’s
opposition to any practice made unlawful by the DCHRA.” Howard
University v. Green, 652 A.2d 41, 45 (D.C. 1994). Consistent
with the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework, once the
defendant “assert[s] legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
[its actions],” the plaintiff must “produce sufficient evidence
that would discredit those reasons and show that the actions
were retaliatory.” Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1200 (citations omitted.)
As with a discrimination claim, the Court may not “second-
guess an employer’s personnel decision absent demonstrably
discriminatory motive.” Fischbach v. District of Columbia Dep’t
of Corr., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “Once the employer has
articulated a non-discriminatory explanation for its action, as
21
did the [employer] here, the issue is not the correctness or
desirability of [the] reasons offered . . . [but] whether the
employer honestly believes the reasons it offers.” Id. An
inference of pretext could be appropriate where “the employer
made an error too obvious to be unintentional” because in such a
situation, “perhaps [the employer] had an unlawful motive for
doing so.” Id.
2. Analysis
Mr. Lane alleges that he was retaliated against for having
engaged in protected activity when his position was eliminated
through an allegedly illegal RIF. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶
21. The District responds that it had a legitimate, non-
retaliatory reason for the RIF. Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 22 at 20-
21. Specifically, “having seven employees (including [Mr. Lane])
remaining on the EG pay scale presented an impediment to DGS’s
reorganization and realignment.” Id. at 21. Accordingly, DGS
proposed, and the City Administrator and Interim Director of
Human Resources approved, a RIF to eliminate these positions. 11
11While the District argues that Mr. Lane made not made out a
prima facie case because he has not demonstrated that the
persons who approved the RIF knew about his protected activity,
see Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 22 at 20; whether or not he has made
out a prima facie case is not relevant at this point because the
District has “asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for” terminating Mr. Lane. Accordingly, the Court need not
examine whether Mr. Lane made out a prima facie case of
retaliation as it is “no longer relevant.” Brady v. Office of
Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
22
“Being both reasonable and non-discriminatory,” Fischbach v.
District of Columbia Dept. of Corrections, 86 F.3d 1180, 1182
(D.C. Cir. 1996); Mr. Lane must now “‘produce[] sufficient
evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer's
asserted nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory reason was not the
actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated
or retaliated against the employee.’” Allen, 795 F.3d at 39.
Mr. Lane argues that the RIF eliminating the positions was
a “ruse” because “[t]he work did not go away. Rather[,] the
employees were notified of termination . . . and then notified
of being offered a new lower level position on the CS pay
scale.” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 26 at 24. He also claims that
“neither [he], nor any of his colleagues actually ‘competitively
bid’ for the positions they were offered on rehire,” and that
this demonstrates that if the District could terminate him and
then offer him a CS pay scale position, as occurred here, “it
always had the ability to do so.” Id.
In support of his arguments, Mr. Lane relies on the
testimony of Ms. Owens, who testified that DGS received
“permission to RIF [the seven employees]. However, the positions
were posted simultaneously so the people could apply for the
positions, and while [they] may have been RIF’d, they still did
not miss any money because if [they] applied for [their] job and
accepted it, [they] could just come back to work.” Id. at 122:7-
23
13. Ms. Owens further testified that DGS “needed [the seven
employees] to come into the larger alignment.” Id. at 122:18-19.
In response to whether what occurred was really a RIF since the
work still needed to be done, Ms. Owens testified that “it was
really a realignment, and it would have been a reduction in
force based just upon the EG positions.” Id. at 123:4-7.
Here, Mr. Lane would have the Court infer that the
District’s proffered reasons are pretextual because although the
positions on the EG pay scale were eliminated, but the work
still needed to be done, the elimination of the positions was a
pretext for retaliating against him for having engaged in
protected activity. However, Mr. Lane has provided no evidence
that calls into question that the District honestly believed
that it needed to eliminate the EG pay scale positions so that
it could complete its realignment. See Fischbach, 86 F.3d at
1183. And while Mr. Lane disputes that a realignment occurred,
he has provided no evidence that calls into question that the
District honestly believed that it was engaging in a
realignment. See id. The undisputed evidence shows that the
realignment resulted in the elimination of the EG positions and
the creation of comparable CS positions.
Mr. Lane would also have the Court infer that because
“neither [he], nor any of his colleagues actually ‘competitively
bid’ for the positions they were offered on rehire,” Pl.’s
24
Opp’n, ECF No. 26 at 24; the elimination of the positions was
pretext for retaliating against him for having engaged in
protected activity. However, the Separation Letter informed Mr.
Lane that he “ha[d] a right to priority placement consideration
through the [ARPP],” Separation Letter, ECF No. 22-9 at 2; and
the Offer Letter informed him that he had been “automatically
entered on the reemployment priority list,” Offer Letter, ECF
No. 22-10 at 1. Mr. Lane has provided no evidence that calls
into question that the District honestly believed he was
entitled to be offered this position through the AARP. See
Fischbach, 86 F.3d at 1183.
Finally, Mr. Lane would have the Court infer that because
he was offered a position on the CS pay scale at a higher salary
but lower grade than his EG pay scale grade, this demonstrates
pretext for retaliating against him for having engaged in
protected activity. The District has explained that it needed to
eliminate the EG pay scale positions so that it could complete
the implementation of the realignment. RIF Memorandum, ECF No.
22-8 at 8. Mr. Lane has provided no evidence that calls into
question that the District honestly believed that it needed to
eliminate the remaining seven EG pay scale positions to complete
its realignment. Fischbach, 86 F.3d at 1183.
Mr. Lane has failed to present evidence from which “a
reasonable jury could not only disbelieve the employer's
25
reasons, but conclude that the real reason the employer took a
challenged action was a prohibited one.” Walker, 798 F.3d at
1093. Accordingly, the District’s Motion for Summary Judgment as
to Mr. Lane’s retaliation claim is GRANTED.
D. Mr. Lane’s § 1981 and § 1983 Claims
The District did not move for summary judgment on Mr.
Lane’s claims that he was retaliated against in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, explaining in its Reply
brief that it inadvertently failed to do so. See Reply, ECF No.
27 at 5. However, the precedent in this Circuit is that courts
should not address arguments raised for the first time in a
reply brief, and the Court declines to do so here. See, e.g.,
McBride v. Merrell Dow & Pharm., 800 F.2d 1208, 1211 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (“Considering an argument advanced for the first time in a
reply brief ... is not only unfair to [a defendant], but also
entails the risk of an improvident or ill-advised opinion on the
legal issues tendered.” (citation omitted)); Conservation Force
v. Salazar, 916 F. Supp. 2d 15, 22 (D.D.C. 2013), aff'd 699 F.3d
538 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (forfeiting an argument made for the first
time in a reply brief); see also Jones v. Mukasey, 565 F. Supp.
2d 68, 81 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that D.C. precedent
consistently submits that courts should not address arguments
raised for the first time in a party's reply). Accordingly, the
parties will be ordered to file, by no later than 14 days
26
following the entry of this Memorandum Opinion and accompanying
Order, a Joint Status Report with recommendations for further
proceedings with regard to Mr. Lane’s remaining retaliation
claims in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
E. Mr. Lane’s Claim for Misuse of Government Funds Is
Dismissed
In Count IV, Mr. Lane alleges misuse and diversion of
government funds, seeking an order from the Court requiring the
District “to restore funds authorized for [his] position in the
budgets for fiscal years 2013-2016,” and enjoining the District
“from terminating jobs which would have otherwise been properly
funded and preserved except for its illegal reallocation of said
funds.” Am. Compl., ECF No. 101 ¶ 87. The District seeks
dismissal of this claim, arguing that Mr. Lane cannot maintain a
claim against the District for misuse and diversion of
government funds because there is no private cause of action for
alleged misuse and diversion of government funds in the civil
context. See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 22 at 21.
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in
order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, (2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Despite this liberal pleading standard, to survive a
27
motion to dismiss, a complaint "must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678,
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). A claim is facially
plausible when the facts pled in the complaint allow the court
to "draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Id. The standard does not amount to
a "probability requirement," but it does require more than a
"sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id.In support of his claim, Mr. Lane points to two cases which
affirm the existence of judicial review of certain agency action
and one case which finds it precluded. In Simpson v. District of
Columbia Office of Human Rights, 597 A.2d 392, (D.C. 1991), the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals (“DCCA”) held that
although the D.C. Humans Rights Act (“HRA”) does not explicitly
provide for judicial review of Office of Human Rights (“OHR”)
findings, an OHR determination that there was no probable cause
to believe that the HRA had not been violated was subject to
judicial review. Id. at 399-99. In District of Columbia v. Reid,
104 A.3d 859 (2014), the DCCA held that the Homeless Services
Reform Act (“HRSA”) entitled homeless families “the right to sue
to obtain apartment-style shelter.” Id. at 874. In People’s
Counsel of Dist. of Columbia v. Public Service Commission of the
District of Columbia, 474 A.2d 1275 (D.C. 1984), however, the
28
Court held that judicial review of the Public Service
Commission’s denial of declaratory relief was available. See id.
at 1276.
In each of these cases, the determination of whether
judicial review was available depended upon the particular
statutory provision at issue. Here, Mr. Lane has not indicated
the statutory provision(s) upon which his claim rests. See
generally Am. Compl., ECF No. 1-1; Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 26.
Accordingly, Mr. Lane’s claim for misuse of government funds is
DISMISSED.
V. Conclusion
Drawing every justifiable inference in Mr. Lane’s favor, as
the Court must, it finds no basis upon which a reasonable
factfinder could conclude the District discriminated against Mr.
Lane based on his age when it terminated him, or that it
retaliated against him for taking part in a protected activity
when it terminated him. Accordingly, the District’s Motion for
Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Additionally, Mr. Lane’s claim for
misuse of government funds is DISMISSED. An appropriate Order
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
August 31, 2021
29