Nyambal v. Allied Barton Security Services, LLC , 153 F. Supp. 3d 309 ( 2016 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________
)
EUGENE NYAMBAL, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Civil Action No. 14-01904(EGS)
v. )
)
ALLIEDBARTON SECURITY )
SERVICES, LLC, )
Defendants. )
______________________________)
Memorandum Opinion
Plaintiff Eugene Nyambal (“Mr. Nyambal”) filed this lawsuit
against AlliedBarton Security Services LLC (“AlliedBarton”)
based on the company’s role in facilitating his removal from the
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) and the World Bank’s
Washington, D.C. locations. Compl., ECF No. 1-3. Mr. Nyambal
alleges that AlliedBarton and the IMF conspired to retaliate
against him after he accused the IMF of participating in corrupt
practices. Id. Specifically, Mr. Nyambal alleges claims against
1
AlliedBarton for tortious interference with his business
relationships, defamation, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 1 Id. AlliedBarton moves to dismiss Mr.
Nyambal’s claims. Upon consideration of the motion, the response
thereto, the applicable law, and the entire record,
AlliedBarton’s motion is GRANTED.
I. Background
AlliedBarton provides security services to the IMF and World
Bank’s Washington D.C. offices. Id. at ¶ 2. This lawsuit arises
from several encounters Mr. Nyambal, an economist in the field
of international development, had with AlliedBarton staff
between 2009 and 2014. Id. at ¶ 1.
Mr. Nyambal served as a senior advisor to Executive Director
Laurean Rutayisire, an IMF board member, until 2009. Id. While
at the IMF, Mr. Nyambal was responsible for advising member
countries during economic aid negotiations with the aim of
protecting IMF resources on behalf of its shareholders. Id. at ¶
5. Mr. Nyambal previously worked at the World Bank. Id. In 2009,
1 Mr. Nyambal also pled punitive damages in his Complaint, but
concedes that his “claim for punitive damages is not an
individual cause of action” and that he will “seek leave to
amend the Complaint in order to seek punitive damages in a
prayer for relief.” Pl.’s Mem. Opp., ECF No. 9 at 8.
2
Mr. Nyambal “raised serious concerns” about the lack of
transparency and potential corruption relating to a mining
project between the IMF and the Cameroon government. Id. at ¶ 6.
On June 25, 2009, Mr. Nyambal’s employment at the IMF was
terminated “without notice or explanation”. Id. at ¶ 7. He was
immediately barred from entering his office, his personal
effects were confiscated, and all files pertaining to his work
on the Cameroon mining project were removed from his office. Id.
A. Mr. Nyambal’s 2009 Encounter with AlliedBarton.
In July 2009, Mr. Nyambal entered a publicly-accessible credit
union located in the IMF building to conduct a personal business
transaction. Id. at ¶ 8. Mr. Nyambal claims that two
AlliedBarton security officers “accosted and escorted” him from
the credit union “in full view of the public and a professional
colleague who had accompanied him into the premises.” Id. 2
Mr. Nyambal claims that this incident was the first in a
series that demonstrate the IMF and AlliedBarton’s civil
2 After this incident, Mr. Nyambal brought suit against the IMF
for assault, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Case No. 12-CV-1037. The D.C. Circuit
reversed this Court’s Order permitting jurisdictional discovery.
Nyambal v. Int'l Monetary Fund, 772 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2857 (2015). Mr. Nyambal voluntarily
withdrew his complaint in that lawsuit on June 29, 2015. See
Case No. 12-CV-1037, ECF No. 41.
3
conspiracy against him, aimed at retaliating against him for his
public denunciations of the IMF’s role in the Cameroon mining
project. Id. at ¶ 9. Specifically, Mr. Nyambal claims the IMF
“blacklisted” him by placing his name and photograph on the
World Bank’s “No Admit List”, a list enforced by AlliedBarton
and “ordinarily maintained for people deemed to represent a
security threat to the World Bank and its staff.” Id. at ¶ 10.
B. Mr. Nyambal’s July 2013 Encounter with AlliedBarton.
In July 2013, nearly four years after Mr. Nyambal was
physically removed from the credit union, he was denied entry to
the building and thus not allowed to attend a meeting at the
World Bank. Id. at ¶ 11. Mr. Nyambal claims he was “humiliated
in the presence of many professional acquaintances.” Id. Mr.
Nyambal contacted the IMF, the World Bank, and AlliedBarton for
an explanation. Id. at ¶ 12. Neither AlliedBarton nor the IMF
responded to Mr. Nyambal’s inquiry. Id. The World Bank denied
giving AlliedBarton the instruction to place Mr. Nyambal’s
information on the No Admit List. Id. at ¶ 11-12.
C. Mr. Nyambal’s October 2013 Encounter with AlliedBarton.
Several months later, in October 2013, Mr. Nyambal and his
colleagues again sought to enter the World Bank to attend its
Annual Meeting and “meet with government officials and secure
contracts.” Id. at ¶ 13. Mr. Nyambal alleges he obtained a
4
three-day visitor pass, but was once again denied entry. Id. Mr.
Nyambal argues he was “publicly humiliated in the presence of
former colleagues, professional acquaintances and government
officials.” Id. Mr. Nyambal alleges that the World Bank’s Human
Resources Department indicated that it did not know why his
access was restricted and that the World Bank did not place him
on the No Admit List. Id.
D. Subsequent Events.
In November 2013, an article entitled “IMF Whistleblower
Banned from the World Bank” was published on the Free Beacon’s
website. Compl. at ¶ 14; Pl.’s Mem. Opp., ECF No. 9 at 7. Mr.
Nyambal claims that publicity about his “blacklisting” tarnished
his reputation and resulted in the loss of several employment
opportunities in the development community. Compl. at ¶ 10. For
example, Mr. Nyambal’s work on a project with the Republic of
Equatorial Guinea ceased after authorities were informed by an
unspecified source that he was blacklisted from the World Bank.
See id. at ¶ 15. Although Mr. Nyambal has written a few
articles, he stopped working on his next book due to “financial
and emotional distress.” Id. Mr. Nyambal claims he can “barely
sleep more than 4 hours a night and has been under anti-
depressants sleeping pills, and heart medication for an extended
5
period of time” to cope with his “public humiliation, and cruel
inhumane treatment” by AlliedBarton and the IMF. Id. at ¶ 21.
E. Mr. Nyambal’s Communication with the World Bank.
In June 2014, the World Bank denied responsibility for the
placement of Mr. Nyambal’s name on the No Admit List. Id. at ¶
16. At a June 5, 2014 meeting with the World Bank and
AlliedBarton, Mr. Nyambal alleges that AlliedBarton acknowledged
that Mr. Nyambal’s “blacklisting of October 9, 2013, was
triggered by the information provided by the IMF to the World
Bank through AlliedBarton” and “that the July 23, 2013,
blacklisting was triggered by a technical error in the process
of changing Mr. Nyambal’s access status from ‘former staff
member’ to ‘visitor.’” Id. at ¶ 17.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review.
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Browning v.
Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The pleading must
contain a “short plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2);
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The pleading
standard does not require detailed factual allegations, but
should be “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
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harmed-me accusation.” Id. at 678. Naked assertions without
factual enhancements or formulaic recitations of the elements of
a cause of action will not suffice. Id. Rather, to survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual
matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.’” Id. Plausibility entails that the plaintiff has
plead factual content that is not merely consistent with
liability but allows the Court to draw a reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id.
In considering a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court should liberally
view the complaint in the plaintiff’s favor, accepting all
factual allegations as true, and giving the plaintiff the
benefit of all inferences that can be drawn therefrom. Redding
v. Edwards, 569 F. Supp. 2d 129, 131 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing Kowal
v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
B. Mr. Nyambal’s Tort Claims are Subject to a One-Year
Statute of Limitations Period.
AlliedBarton argues that the one-year statute of limitations
period that applies to Mr. Nyambal’s defamation claim also
applies to Mr. Nyambal’s claims for intentional infliction of
emotional distress and tortious interference with business
relations because the three alleged torts are “inexorably
7
intertwined.” Def.’s Mem. Supp., ECF No. 7-1 at 16. 3 Mr. Nyambal
maintains that each tort claim stands on its own evidentiary
foundation. Pl.’s Mem. Opp. at 8.
The D.C. Code does not specify a statute of limitations period
for intentional infliction of emotional distress or tortious
interference with business relationships, thus both claims are
subject to a three-year statute of limitations. 4 See D.C. Code §
12-301(8) (noting that actions not subject to an otherwise
defined statute of limitation periods are subject to a three-
year limitation period). However, when such causes of action are
“intertwined” with claims subject to a specified limitations
period, the defined limitation period applies to all claims. See
Mittleman v. United States, 104 F.3d 410, 415-16 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (holding that a claim is “intertwined” with another claim
when the claims are based on the same underlying facts). See
3 A statute of limitations defense may be raised under a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Exec. Sandwich Shoppe,
Inc. v. Carr Realty Corp., 749 A.2d 724, 734 (D.C. 2000) (citing
Jones v. Rogers Mem’l Hosp., 442 F.2d 773, 775 (D.C. Cir.
1971)).
4
AlliedBarton removed this matter to federal court from the
Superior Court of the District of Columbia on November 12, 2014.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia sitting in
diversity must apply the substantive law of the District of
Columbia. Erie. R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938);
Novak v. Capital Mgmt. & Dev. Corp., 452 F.3d 902, 907 (D.C.
Cir. 2006).
8
also Browning, 292 F.3d at 244 (holding that defamation’s one-
year statute of limitations applied to tortious interference
with business expectancy claim where the defamatory conduct was
“the sole basis for . . . the tortious interference . . . .”);
Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim, 107 F.3d 913, 920 (D.C. Cir.
1997)(holding that plaintiff’s emotional distress claim was
subject to a one-year statute of limitations prescribed for
assault and battery because every incident that allegedly caused
plaintiff emotional distress involved an assault and battery).
Mr. Nyambal’s July 2013 and October 2013 allegations are
relevant to determine which statute of limitations period should
apply to his intentional infliction of emotional distress and
tortious interference with business relationships claims. The
facts alleged by Mr. Nyambal pertaining to the July 2013
incident include:
On July 23, 2013, as a private contractor, Mr. Nyambal
went to the World Bank building in Washington, D.C. to
conduct a routine business meeting. He was denied access
to the World Bank building by AlliedBarton security
officers who stated that their screen indicated that
there was a restriction against him and they refused to
allow him access to the building. Mr. Nyambal was
humiliated in the presence of many professional
acquaintances.
Compl. at ¶ 11. The facts alleged pertaining to Mr. Nyambal’s
October 9, 2013 encounter with Allied Barton include:
On October 9, 2013, with the belief that the restrictions
had been removed, Mr. Nyambal and a colleague made
arrangements to attend the Annual Meetings of the World
9
Bank in order to meet with government officials and
secure contracts. However, Mr. Nyambal was once again
publicly humiliated in the presence of former
colleagues, professional acquaintances and government
officials attending the Annual Meetings.
Id. at ¶ 13.
The above allegations are the most specific facts pled
against AlliedBarton and the same facts are pled for each
encounter giving rise to Mr. Nyambal’s claims. Similar to
Nassim, Mr. Nyambal’s claims are intertwined because every
incident that allegedly interfered with Mr. Nyambal’s
business relationships and caused him emotional distress
also allegedly defamed him. See Id. at ¶ 30
(“[A]lliedBarton defamed and slandered Mr. Nyambal by
blacklisting him at the World Bank.”). Put another way,
AlliedBarton’s alleged defamatory action of “unlawful
blacklisting” prevented Mr. Nyambal from entering the World
Bank building, thereby allegedly interfering with his
business relationships and causing him emotional distress.
In sum, Mr. Nyambal’s claims arise out of the same set of
facts and are thus “intertwined.” The one-year statute of
limitations period applicable to Mr. Nyambal’s defamation
claim shall also govern his intentional infliction of
emotional distress and tortious interference with business
relations claims. Thus, only those alleged facts that
10
occurred on or after October 9, 2013 shall be considered in
analyzing whether Mr. Nyambal has pled sufficient facts to
state a tortious interference claim. This excludes
consideration of Mr. Nyambal’s July 2013 encounter with
AlliedBarton, but includes consideration of Mr. Nyambal’s
October 2013 encounter with AlliedBarton.
C. Mr. Nyambal’s Tortious Interference Claim Fails.
AlliedBarton argues that Mr. Nyambal fails to state a tortious
interference with business relationships claim because Mr.
Nyambal does not allege any specific business relationships or
contracts that were compromised by AlliedBarton. Def.’s Mem.
Supp. at 5-7. Moreover, AlliedBarton argues that Mr. Nyambal has
not sufficiently pled that it had knowledge of any business
relationships that were allegedly compromised due to its
enforcement of the No Admit list. Id. Mr. Nyambal responds that
“the very purpose of blacklisting [him] from the World Bank was
to interfere with his on-going business relationships.” Pl.’s
Mem. Opp. at 6.
To plead a tortious interference with business relationships
claim under District of Columbia law, one must allege: (1) the
existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy, (2)
knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the
interferer, (3) intentional interference inducing or causing a
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breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy, and (4)
resultant damage. Browning, 292 F.3d at 242; Bennett Enters.,
Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 45 F.3d 493, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
Mr. Nyambal fails to adequately plead facts in support of
several elements necessary to state a tortious interference
claim. First, in regard to the existence of a valid business
relationship or expectancy, Mr. Nyambal alleges that he
attempted to enter the World Bank during its annual meeting “to
meet with government officials and secure contracts” but was
unable to secure expectant business because AlliedBarton denied
him access to the building. Compl. at ¶ 13. Valid business
expectancies may include lost future contracts, but the
expectancy must be “commercially reasonable to anticipate.”
Command Consulting Group LLC, v. Neuraliq, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d
49, 52 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Browning, 292 F.3d at 242). For
this reason, tortious interference claims are routinely
dismissed where the plaintiff fails to name specific contractual
relationships that the defendant allegedly interfered with, or
to identify any facts related to future contracts compromised by
the alleged interferer. See Williams v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage
Ass’n, 2006 WL 1774252, at *8 (D.D.C. June 26, 2006) (dismissing
tortious interference claim where plaintiff did not name third
parties with whom plaintiff had a business relationship); Kwang
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Dong Pharm. Co. v. Han, 205 F. Supp. 2d 489, 496-97 (D. Md. 2002)
(dismissing tortious interference claim under D.C. law because
plaintiff did not point to any specific contractual
relationships that defendant interfered with).
Here, Mr. Nyambal makes only a general reference to meetings
with “government officials.” Compl. at ¶ 13. Mr. Nyambal’s
general and conclusory pleading thus lacks the specificity
required to hold AlliedBarton liable for interference with
expectant business relationships, or to establish that the
expectant business was commercially reasonable to anticipate.
Furthermore, Mr. Nyambal has not pled facts alleging
AlliedBarton had knowledge of the business relationships it
compromised. Mr. Nyambal argues that because the IMF knew of his
business relationships, its co-conspirator AlliedBarton must be
presumed to have shared that knowledge. As argued by Mr.
Nyambal:
Certainly, the IMF, whose knowledge of Mr. Nyambal’s
contracting projects is attributable to AlliedBarton as
a co-conspirator, was aware that Mr. Nyambal was working
through the World Bank. . . . The IMF was certainly aware
that Mr. Nyambal had been working for the World Bank as
a private contractor since leaving the IMF in 2009.
Pl.’s Mem. Opp. at 5.
Mr. Nyambal cannot rely on his civil conspiracy theory to
impute knowledge of his business relationships from the IMF to
AlliedBarton to state a tortious interference claim. “Civil
13
conspiracy is not an independent tort but only a means for
establishing vicarious liability for an underlying tort.” Exec.
Sandwich Shoppe, Inc., 749 A.2d at 738. “If the underlying tort
claim fails, a conspiracy claim based on such a tort also
fails.” Nanko Shipping USA, et al. v. Alcoa, Inc., et al., Case
No. 14-1301, 2015 WL 3534155 at * 7 (D.D.C. June 5, 2015)(citing
Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1983). For all
of these reasons, Mr. Nyambal fails to state a tortious
interference with business relationships claim against
AlliedBarton. 5 Because Mr. Nyambal fails to establish the first
or second element of a tortious interference claim, the Court
need not discuss the third or fourth elements.
D. Mr. Nyambal Fails to State a Defamation Claim.
AlliedBarton argues Mr. Nyambal’s defamation claim fails
because he does not identify a defamatory statement made by
AlliedBarton personnel and also fails to identify third parties
to whom a defamatory statement was published. Def. Mem. Supp.,
5 Mr. Nyambal alleges that a contract with the Government of
Equatorial Guinea, which arose well after the World Bank’s 2013
Annual Meeting, fell through due to his “blacklisting.” “[O]n or
about May 21, 2014, the contracting authorities in Equatorial
Guinea were advised that Mr. Nyambal had been blacklisted at the
World Bank and IMF for wrongdoing and unethical actions.” Id. at
¶ 15. However, Mr. Nyambal does not allege that AlliedBarton had
knowledge of this contract when he was denied access to the
World Bank in October 2013.
14
ECF No. 7 at 11-12. Mr. Nyambal contends that his name and photo
on the Do Not Admit list constitutes a defamatory statement.
Pl.’s Mem. Opp., ECF No. 9 at 6. Mr. Nyambal also argues that
being denied entry to the World Bank in October 2013 was
defamatory by implication. Id. 6-7.
To state a defamation claim under District of Columbia law,
one must allege that (1) the defendant made a false and
defamatory statement about the plaintiff, (2) the defendant
published the statement without privilege to a third party, (3)
the defendant’s fault in publishing the statement amounted to at
least negligence, and (4) the statement was actionable as a
matter of law irrespective of special harm or that its
publication caused the plaintiff special harm. Solers, Inc. v.
Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 948 (D.C. 2009) (citing Oparaugo v. Watts,
884 A.2d 63, 76 (D.C. 2005)).
Mr. Nyambal’s defamation claim fails because he has not pled
sufficient facts to establish the third element, namely that
AlliedBarton acted negligently in publishing his name on the Do
Not Admit list. As with his tortious interference claim, Mr.
Nyambal imputes liability for his alleged defamation onto
AlliedBarton only through a theory of civil conspiracy. In his
complaint Mr. Nyambal alleges that the IMF was responsible for his
name appearing on the Do Not Admit List:
15
[w]hile acknowledging that Nyambal’s blacklisting of
October 9, 2013 was triggered by the information
provided by the IMF to the World Bank through
AlliedBarton . . .” and “[d]espite Nyambal’s multiple
requests to the IMF Managing Director and Executive
Board and the available evidence provided by the World
Bank, the IMF has refused to provide any explanation or
to investigate Nyambal’s illegal blacklisting at the
World Bank.
Compl. at ¶ 17 and 20(emphasis added). In his memorandum in
opposition, Mr. Nyambal emphasizes that the “blacklisting” memo
was “created by the IMF.” ECF No. 9 at 6.
To satisfy the third element of a defamation claim, a
plaintiff must allege that the defendant was at least negligent
in publishing the alleged defamatory statement. 6 See, e.g. Jones
v. U-Haul Co. of Dist. of Columbia, Inc., 169 Fed. Appx. 590,
591 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (affirming District Court’s dismissal of
Plaintiff’s defamation claim, holding that Plaintiff failed to
establish Defendants were negligent in publishing allegedly
defamatory statements).
6 Although novel, the Court accepts Plaintiff’s assertion that
inclusion of his name on the Do No Admit list constitutes a
“publication” for purposes of analyzing his defamation claim.
See e.g., Afro-Am. Pub. Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 654-55 (D.C.
Cir. 1966)(holding that “defamation turns on whether the
communication or publication tends, or is reasonably calculated,
to cause harm to another’s reputation.”).
16
In this case, Mr. Nyambal alleges that the IMF was the only
entity with the power to decide what names appeared on the Do
Not Admit list. See e.g., Compl. at ¶ 17 and 20; ECF No. 9 at 6.
As such, the IMF is the only entity that could potentially be
liable for any alleged defamation. See e.g. Taylor v. Streicher,
465 Fed. Appx. 414, 422 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that only the
news article publisher, who had ultimate control of what was
published, could be held responsible for publication of alleged
defamatory statements); Willi v. American Airlines, Inc., Case
No. 05-453, 2007 WL 1650419, * 5 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (noting that
only the party responsible for publication of the alleged
defamatory statement could be held liable). By refusing Mr.
Nyambal access to the World Bank based on the Do Not Admit List,
AlliedBarton executed its duties as the IMF and World Bank’s
security company. AlliedBarton cannot be found negligent for
publishing Mr. Nyambal’s name on the Do Not Admit List because
it is not alleged that AlliedBarton published his name on the
list.
Because Mr. Nyambal has not alleged sufficient facts to
establish the third element of a defamation claim against
AlliedBarton, it is not necessary to reach the first, second and
fourth elements.
17
E. Mr. Nyambal Fails to State a Claim for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress.
AlliedBarton argues that its role in barring Mr. Nyambal’s
entry to the World Bank building does not constitute “extreme or
outrageous” conduct necessary to state a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Def.’s Mem. Supp. at 11. Mr.
Nyambal responds that whether AlliedBarton’s conduct was extreme
or outrageous is a question of fact. Pl.’s Mem. Opp. at 8.
To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress under District of Columbia law, a plaintiff must allege
that the defendant’s conduct was (1) “extreme and outrageous”,
(2) intentional or reckless, and (3) caused the plaintiff severe
emotional distress. The conduct must be “so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Kotsch v. D.C.,
924 A.2d 1040, 1045-46 (D.C. 2007) (citations omitted); Kerrigan
v. Britches of Georgetowne, Inc., 705 A.2d 624, 628 (D.C. 1997).
“Whether the conduct complained of is sufficiently outrageous is
a question of law that should be decided by the court on a
motion to dismiss.” Smith v. United States, 2015 WL 48880891,
at * 9 (D.D.C. August 14, 2015)(citing Abourezk v. N.Y.
Airlines, Inc., 895 F.2d 1456, 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
18
For many of the reasons discussed in Sections II C and D,
AlliedBarton’s refusal to permit Mr. Nyambal entry into the
World Bank was not, as a matter of law, outrageous or extreme
conduct. Because Mr. Nyambal’s name appeared on the Do No Admit
list, AlliedBarton was required to deny him entry. Thus, even if
Mr. Nyambal is correct that his name was not properly on the Do
Not Admit list, denying him entry was not extreme or outrageous
conduct. See e.g., King v. Kidd, 640 A.2d 656, 670–74 (D.C.
1993) (finding conduct not extreme and outrageous when
supervisor failed repeatedly to respond to employee’s sexual
harassment complaints, although noting that other retaliatory
conduct was sufficient to send case to jury); Waldon v.
Covington, 415 A.2d 1070, 1077–78 (D.C. 1980) (finding conduct
not outrageous when employer refused to give employee-professor
keys to laboratory and notice of departmental meetings,
threatened to begin actions to test competency with aim to
terminate, and assigned employee classes outside specialty
knowing it would cause difficulty and embarrassment).
F. Mr. Nyambal’s Civil Conspiracy Claim fails.
Mr. Nyambal’s civil conspiracy claim fails and will not be
discussed at length because he has not pled sufficient facts in
support of any of the underlying torts alleged. See, e.g. Nader
v. Democratic Nat. Comm., 567 F.3d 692, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
19
(citing Executive Sandwich Shoppe, Inc. v. Carr Realty Corp.,
749 A.2d 724, 738 (D.C. 2000) (“[C]ivil conspiracy depends on
performance of some underlying tortious act.”)).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, AlliedBarton’s Motion to Dismiss
is GRANTED. An appropriate order accompanies this memorandum.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Court Judge
January 26, 2016
20