Atwal v. Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC ( 2011 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_____________________________
)
KIRAN P. ATWAL, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 10-1111 (RWR)
)
LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL )
SECURITY, LLC, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
_____________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se plaintiff Kiran Atwal brings this employment
discrimination action against Lawrence Livermore National
Security, LLC (“LLNS”) and its Chief Executive Officer, George
Miller, alleging that they discriminated against him on the basis
of race in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 1985, and
that the defendants defamed him. The defendants have moved to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and for improper venue,
or in the alternative to transfer the case to the Northern
District of California. Because Atwal has not met his burden of
establishing that this court has personal jurisdiction over the
defendants, and because venue is improper here but would be
proper in the Northern District of California, the defendants’
motion will be granted in part and the case will be transferred
to the Northern District of California.
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BACKGROUND
Atwal alleges that he is a former employee of LLNS in
Livermore, California. His short complaint states that from 2006
through 2008, the defendants discriminated against him and
retaliated against him by suspending him, placing him on
disability, and eventually terminating his employment, and
defamed him by making false statements about him. It also
asserts that “[a]ll jurisdictional prerequisites for claims under
Title VII have been met.” (Compl. at 2-3.) The defendants have
moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and for
improper venue. (Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss
(“Defs.’ Mem.”) at 1.) The plaintiff opposes.
DISCUSSION
“‘It is plaintiff’s burden to make a prima facie showing
that the Court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants.’”
Gomez v. Aragon, 705 F. Supp. 2d 21, 23 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting
Ballard v. Holinka, 601 F. Supp. 2d 110, 117 (D.D.C. 2009)).
That burden must be satisfied as to each individual defendant.
Moore v. Motz, 437 F. Supp. 2d 88, 92 (D.D.C. 2006); see also
Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc’y, 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir.
1990). A plaintiff cannot rely on conclusory allegations as the
basis for establishing personal jurisdiction. Akers v. Watts,
740 F. Supp. 2d 83, 90-91 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Moore 437 F.
Supp. 2d at 91); see also Dean v. Walker, Civil Action No. 09-
-3-
2235 (EGS), 2010 WL 5209335, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 2010)
(stating that “[b]are allegations or conclusory statements are
insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction”). “Pro se
plaintiffs are not freed from the requirement to plead an
adequate jurisdictional basis for their claims.” Gomez, 705 F.
Supp. 2d at 23 (dismissing pro se plaintiffs’ claims against 11
individual defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction).
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, personal
jurisdiction in this case “must be determined by reference to
District of Columbia law.” United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d
825, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1995). “A District of Columbia court may
exercise personal jurisdiction over a person domiciled in, . . .
or maintaining his . . . principal place of business in, the
District of Columbia as to any claim for relief.” D.C. Code
§ 13-422. For a defendant that is not domiciled in the District
of Columbia or does not maintain its principal place of business
here, the D.C. Circuit has set forth a two-part inquiry for
assessing personal jurisdiction. First, the court determines
whether there is a basis for personal jurisdiction under the
District of Columbia’s long-arm statute. See GTE New Media
Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir.
2000). The District of Columbia long-arm statute allows a court
in the District of Columbia to exercise personal jurisdiction
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over a defendant who does not reside in the District with regard
to claims arising from the defendant’s conduct in:
(1) transacting business in the District of Columbia;
(2) contracting to supply services in the District of
Columbia;
(3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia
by an act or omission in the District of Columbia;
(4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia
by an act or omission outside the District of Columbia
if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in
any other persistent course of conduct, or derives
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or
services rendered, in the District of Columbia[.]
D.C. Code § 13-423(a). Second, the court determines whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with the
requirements of due process. See GTE New Media Servs., Inc., 199
F.3d at 1347. Exercising personal jurisdiction over a defendant
comports with due process when a defendant’s “minimum contacts”
with the District of Columbia establish that “the maintenance of
the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted). “These
minimum contacts must arise from ‘some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails [himself] of the privilege of conducting
activities with the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.’” Gomez, 705 F. Supp. 2d at 23 (quoting
Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Solano Cty.,
480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987) (internal quotation omitted)). “In
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other words, ‘the defendant’s conduct and connection with the
forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being
haled into court there.’” Gomez, 705 F. Supp. 2d at 23 (quoting
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297
(1980)).
Here, Atwal’s complaint pleads no facts that establish
personal jurisdiction over the defendants in the District of
Columbia. Neither of the defendants is alleged to be domiciled
in the District of Columbia, nor does the complaint allege that
the District of Columbia is their principal place of business.
Moreover, Atwal’s complaint does not plead an adequate basis to
assert personal jurisdiction over the defendants under the
District of Columbia long-arm statute. The complaint does not
allege that Atwal’s claims arise from the defendants transacting
business or contracting to supply services in the District of
Columbia. There are no allegations in the complaint that the
harms of which Atwal complains arose from conduct that occurred
in the District of Columbia, or that Atwal suffered a tort in the
District of Columbia, or that LLNS regularly does business here.
In their motion to dismiss the complaint, the defendants assert,
and Atwal does not contest, that all of the events at issue in
this litigation occurred in California. (Defs.’ Mem. at 4.) The
only mention of the District of Columbia in the entire complaint
is that it is Atwal’s current address.
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In Atwal’s opposition to the motion to dismiss, he argues
that “LLNL [sic]1 maintains offices in Washington, D.C. and has
attorneys in Washington, D.C.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 2.) However,
Atwal’s argument supplies no connection between Miller and the
District of Columbia and adds no basis for exercising personal
jurisdiction over Miller. Nor does Atwal provide any authority
showing that a court in the District of Columbia may exercise
jurisdiction over a defendant solely because the defendant is
represented by Washington, D.C. attorneys.
Assuming the truth of the allegation that LLNS has offices
in the District of Columbia, Atwal presents no facts
demonstrating that personal jurisdiction is satisfied under the
long-arm statute. Aside from that fact that Atwal identifies no
business transaction or service contract here or act in this
district that caused tortious injury here, he presents no office
address for LLNS here or any facts establishing that the LLNS
offices here regularly do business here. Moreover, merely
alleging that LLNS has offices here does not establish under
§ 13-422 that the offices are LLNS’ principal place of business
or that LLNS is domiciled here. See Lindsey v. Rice, Civil
Action No. 05-219 (RMC), 2005 WL 3275918, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 27,
2005) (finding that plaintiff failed to establish that the
1
The pro se plaintiff’s filing will be construed liberally,
see Howerton v. Ogletree, 466 F. Supp. 2d 182, 183 (D.D.C. 2006),
and “LLNL” will be deemed to refer to “LLNS.”
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defendants were domiciled in or maintained their principal places
of business in the District of Columbia where the complaint
“merely provide[d] mailing addresses in the caption” that were
located in the District of Columbia); see also Hertz Corp. v.
Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192-1193 (2010) (holding that a
corporation’s “principal place of business” for determining
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) is the “nerve
center,” meaning the corporation’s headquarters, or “the place
where a corporation’s officers direct, control, and coordinate
the corporation’s activities”).
In addition, Atwal’s complaint does not establish that venue
is proper in the District of Columbia under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
When, as here, jurisdiction is not based solely on diversity of
citizenship, the applicable venue provision is 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b), which states that venue is proper in a judicial
district (1) “where any defendant resides, if all defendants
reside in the same State,” (2) “in which a substantial part of
the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a
substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is
situated,” or (3) “in which any defendant may be found, if there
is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.”
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)-(3). A corporate defendant is deemed to
reside in “any district in which it is subject to personal
jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” 28 U.S.C.
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§ 1391(c). Here, Atwal has not established that all of the
defendants reside in the District of Columbia or that they are
subject to personal jurisdiction here, or that the events that
gave rise to the claim occurred here. Since Atwal does not
dispute that the events at issue happened entirely in California,
Atwal has not shown that there is no other district in which the
action could have been brought. Therefore, venue is not proper
in the District of Columbia.
Although this court lacks personal jurisdiction over the
defendants and venue here is improper, this action may be
transferred nevertheless to a proper venue. See Naartex
Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), the “district court of a district in
which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or
district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice,
transfer such case to any district . . . in which it could have
been brought.” Transfer is appropriate under § 1406(a) when
procedural obstacles prevent a timely adjudication on the merits.
Sinclair v. Kleindienst, 711 F.2d 291, 293-94 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(citing Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466-67 (1962)).
Procedural obstacles include “lack of personal jurisdiction,
improper venue, and statute of limitation bars.” Sinclair, 711
F.2d at 294. “The decision to transfer an action [under
§ 1406(a)] is left to the discretion of the Court.” Baez v.
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Connelly, 734 F. Supp. 2d 54, 58 (D.D.C. 2010). “Courts can
determine venue by applying a ‘commonsense appraisal’ of events
having operative significance.” James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton,
Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d 16, 20 (D.D.C. 2002) (quoting Lamont v.
Haig, 590 F.2d 1124, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). Here, the
defendants suggest that transferring the case to the Northern
District of California would be appropriate because “[e]very
activity referenced by Atwal occurred in California, and all
witnesses and documents pertinent to those activities are in
California.” (Defs.’ Mem. at 4.) Atwal merely argues that
“Washington D.C. is the most convenient location” for him.
(Pl.’s Opp’n at 2.)
Transferring the case to the Northern District of California
would be in the interest of justice. “Generally, the interests
of justice require transferring such cases to the appropriate
judicial district rather than dismissing them.” Poku v. FDIC,
752 F. Supp. 2d 23, 25 (D.D.C. 2010). And, a commonsense
appraisal of the record reflects that Atwal’s claim could have
been brought in the Northern District of California. Atwal does
not dispute that the events during his employment at LLNS that
gave rise to his claim occurred entirely within California, and
he lists LLNS’ address as Livermore, California, a city located
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in Alameda County within the Northern District of California.
See 28 U.S.C. § 84. (Defs.’ Mem. at 4.) Significantly, Atwal
pursued an underlying EEOC complaint in the Northern District of
California, not in this district. (Compl. at 4.) Therefore,
this case will be transferred to the Northern District of
California.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Because Atwal has failed to present specific facts on which
personal jurisdiction over these defendants can be based, and
because venue is improper here but would be proper in the
Northern District of California, it is hereby
ORDERED that the defendants’ motion [3] to dismiss or in the
alternative to transfer to the Northern District of California
be, and hereby is, GRANTED IN PART. The Clerk is DIRECTED to
transfer this case to the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California.
SIGNED this 23rd day of May, 2011.
/s/
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
United States District Judge