Lesesne v. John Doe , 146 F. Supp. 3d 190 ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •                              UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    JOHN B. LESESNE,
    Plaintiff,
    v.                           Case No. 10-cv-00602 (CRC)
    DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
    Defendant.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
    Plaintiff John Lesesne alleges that he suffered physical injuries and emotional distress
    due to negligent treatment by the District of Columbia Department of Corrections (“DOC”)
    following his arrest and subsequent hospitalization for a gunshot wound. Defendant District of
    Columbia moves for summary judgment on the two of Lesesne’s claims that survived the
    District’s previous motion to dismiss—negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
    Because expert testimony is required to establish each of these claims and Lesesne has not
    presented such testimony, and because he has not made the required showing for negligent
    infliction of emotional distress, the Court will grant the District of Columbia’s motion.
    I.      Background
    The factual allegations and procedural background of this dispute were summarized in
    the Court’s opinion on Defendants’ motion to dismiss:
    Lesesne was shot in the abdomen by his brother, a D.C. police officer, who,
    according to a police report, Lesesne had attacked with a knife. Defs.’ Mem. in
    Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 1 at 2. He was arrested and taken to a nearby hospital
    where he underwent surgery. During his ensuing hospital stay, Lesesne was in the
    custody of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections [“DOC”]. In his
    amended complaint, Lesesne allege[d] that DOC personnel continuously
    handcuffed him to his bed and ignored his attending physicians’ requests that he be
    allowed to receive physical and occupational therapy, causing long-term injury. 
    Id. 1 ¶¶
    15–18. Later, when the hospital discharged him, DOC officers allegedly made
    Lesesne walk to a transport vehicle while shackled and then dropped him, causing
    a pulmonary embolism. 
    Id. ¶¶ 20–22.
    After a second trip to a hospital and a return
    to the D.C. Jail, Lesense claims he contracted a staph infection because DOC denied
    him adequate medical treatment. 
    Id. ¶¶ 26–28.
                   Lesesne brought suit in this Court against the DOC, the District of Columbia
    and three individuals: an unnamed DOC officer that oversaw his detention; Captain
    David Holmes, a DOC employee; and Henry R. Lesansky, a DOC health services
    administrator. His initial complaint listed sixteen claims, including for violations
    of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and intentional infliction of
    emotional distress. Compl. ¶¶ 27–42. Judge Wilkins, who was previously assigned
    to this case, granted the District’s motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust
    administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. 104–134,
    110 Stat. 1321, and for failure to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
    distress. Order, Dkt. 32 (Sept. 30 2011). The D.C. Circuit reversed as to Lesesne’s
    federal claims. Mandate, Dkt. 35 (June 4, 2014). After remand, Lesesne filed an
    amended complaint alleging a violation of the Eight Amendment’s prohibition
    against cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, negligence,
    and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Defendants move[d] to dismiss,
    or alternatively for summary judgment, as to Lesesne’s constitutional claims
    against the District of Columbia and Dr. Lesansky, and his claims for negligence
    and negligent infliction of emotional distress against all Defendants.
    Lesesne v. Doe, 
    65 F. Supp. 3d 1
    , 3–4 (D.D.C. 2014). The Court granted the Defendants’
    motion to dismiss as to the “constitutional claims against the District of Columbia, all claims
    against the DOC, all claims against individual defendants in their official capacities, and all
    claims against Dr. Lesansky in any capacity,” 
    id. at 8,
    but denied the motion as to Lesesne’s
    negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) claims against the District of
    Columbia.
    The District now moves for summary judgment on those two claims, arguing that the
    claims fail because Lesesne has not proffered expert testimony in support of his negligence claim
    and because he has not established negligence or fear as required for his NIED claim. Because
    expert testimony is required to establish both claims and Lesesne has not proffered such
    testimony, and because Lesesne has not demonstrated that there was a special relationship
    between him and the District of Columbia or that the zone of danger rule applies with respect to
    2
    his negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, the Court will grant the District of
    Columbia’s motion for summary judgment.
    II.     Standard of Review
    Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate
    “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
    entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty
    Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 247 (1986). At the summary judgment stage, the court draws all
    justifiable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor. 
    Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255
    . But the
    nonmoving party may not rely solely on allegations or conclusory statements and instead must
    demonstrate facts that would enable a reasonable jury to find in her favor. Greene v. Dalton, 
    164 F.3d 671
    , 675 (D.C. Cir. 1999). “The moving party is ‘entitled to a judgment as a matter of law’
    [where] the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of
    her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 323 (1986) (quoting 
    Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250
    ).
    III.    Analysis
    A.      Negligence
    Lesesne alleges that the District of Columbia owed him a special duty of care while he
    was in the DOC’s custody. According to Lesesne, the District breached its duty by “failing to
    provide or allow medical rehabilitation services [to be provided to Lesesne] as requested by [his]
    attending physician(s) while [he] was in their custody.” Am. Compl. ¶ 41. And the breach of
    that duty, Lesesne contends, proximately caused his current physical limitations and disability,
    which he describes as being recognized by the Social Security Administration. The District
    responds that Lesesne’s negligence claim must fail because its success hinges on testimony by an
    3
    expert as to the standard of care for detainment, the standard of care for rehabilitation, and
    medical causation, which Lesesne has not presented.
    Under District of Columbia law, a “plaintiff in a negligence action bears the burden of
    proof on three issues: ‘the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the
    defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiff’s injury.’” Toy v.
    District of Columbia, 
    549 A.2d 1
    , 6 (D.C. 1988) (quoting Meek v. Shepard, 
    484 A.2d 579
    , 581
    (D.C. 1984)). Expert testimony is not required if the “alleged negligent act is ‘within the realm
    of common knowledge and everyday experience.’” 
    Id. (quoting District
    of Columbia v. White,
    
    442 A.2d 159
    , 164 (D.C. 1982)). However, “a plaintiff is required to put on expert testimony
    where the subject presented is ‘so distinctly related to some science, profession, or occupation as
    to be beyond the ken of the average layperson.’” 
    Id. (quoting District
    of Columbia v. Peters, 
    527 A.2d 1269
    , 1273 (D.C. 1987)).
    District of Columbia courts have required expert testimony regarding the standard of care
    required of police officers in using and discharging their firearms, Fletcher v. District of
    Columbia, No. 01-cv-0297, 
    2005 WL 670676
    , at *6 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing 
    White, 442 A.2d at 164
    –65); police officers in using force to break up a fight, Smith v. District of Columbia, 
    882 A.2d 778
    , 793 (D.C. 2005); and doctors accused of medical malpractice, Washington v. Wash.
    Hosp. Ctr., 
    579 A.2d 177
    , 181 (D.C. 1990). These cases instruct that, where the standard of care
    at issue arises from a particular occupational setting, and depends on knowledge of typical
    practices by professionals of that occupation, a plaintiff cannot establish a negligence claim
    against such a professional—for actions taken in her professional capacity—without proffering
    expert testimony as to the standard of care particular to that occupational setting. In addition,
    where the causation alleged in support of a negligence claim concerns the relationship between a
    4
    deviation from a standard of care and a plaintiff’s medical injury, courts require expert testimony
    as to causation as well. See id.; Psychiatric Inst. of Wash. v. Allen, 
    509 A.2d 619
    , 623–24 (D.C.
    1986). Here, Lesesne alleges that DOC officers breached their duty to provide the standard of
    care owed to him by keeping his arms and legs restrained throughout his recovery at the hospital,
    exacerbating his injuries, and by preventing him from receiving physical and occupational
    therapy as well as other rehabilitation recommended by his doctors, lengthening his recovery
    time. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13–18, 39–46.
    Because Lesesne’s negligence claim requires proving that the agency in fact breached
    that duty of care to him, proximately resulting in his medical injuries, expert testimony is
    necessary to support his claim. And because Lesesne merely asserts the elements of this claim
    without providing expert testimony in support, the Court will grant the DOC’s motion for
    summary judgment as to this claim. See Edwards v. Okie Dokie, Inc., 
    473 F. Supp. 2d 31
    , 45
    (D.D.C. 2007) (“When expert testimony is necessary to establish the standard of care, a
    plaintiff’s failure to name an expert constitutes grounds for dismissal.”).
    B.      Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
    Lesesne also contends that the District of Columbia “acted negligently and with callous
    disregard of [his] wellbeing causing serious emotional distress.” Am. Compl. ¶ 52. In
    particular, he asserts that the District was negligent “in denying physical and occupational
    therapy as directed by [Lesesne’s] attending physicians” while he was in DOC custody, and
    thereby, “caused [him] serious emotional distress.” 
    Id. ¶ 49.
    In addition to emotional distress,
    he maintains that he “has suffered severe and substantial damages,” including “medical bills, lost
    salary . . . , diminished earning capacity . . . , [and] humiliation.” 
    Id. ¶ 53.
    5
    Under District of Columbia law, a plaintiff may recover for negligent infliction of
    emotional distress under two tests. The well-established “zone of danger” test allows a plaintiff
    to recover “for mental distress if the defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff to be ‘in danger of
    physical injury’ and if, as a result, the plaintiff ‘feared for his own safety.’” Hedgepeth v.
    Whitman Walker Clinic, 
    22 A.3d 789
    , 796 (D.C. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Williams v. Baker,
    
    572 A.2d 1062
    , 1066 (D.C. 1990) (en banc)). Alternatively, the D.C. Court of Appeals permits
    NIED claims when a plaintiff was not within the zone of danger but where there is a “special
    relationship” between the parties:
    [A] plaintiff may recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress if the
    plaintiff can show that (1) the defendant has a relationship with the plaintiff, or has
    undertaken an obligation to the plaintiff, of a nature that necessarily implicates the
    plaintiff’s emotional well-being, (2) there is an especially likely risk that the
    defendant’s negligence would cause serious emotional distress to the plaintiff, and
    (3) negligent actions or omissions of the defendant in breach of that obligation have,
    in fact, caused serious emotional distress to the plaintiff.
    
    Hedgepeth, 22 A.3d at 810
    –11.
    The District of Columbia argues that Lesesne’s NIED claim fails because “he cannot
    establish the underlying negligence.” Defs.’ Mem. 10. “Without the underlying negligence,” the
    District asserts, “there is no way [to] prove that the District is actually legally responsible for the
    alleged distress.” 
    Id. The District
    further contends that, in his deposition, Lesesne “concede[d]
    that the conduct at issue actually did not cause him serious distress,” testifying that “[a]t the time
    [he was] being denied the rehabilitation treatment, . . . [he] was too fucked up to care.” 
    Id. (citing Pl.’s
    Dep. 124:19–125:7). Relying on Hedgepeth, Lesesne responds that the custodial
    relationship between him and the District constituted a “special relationship” under the NIED
    standard, and that his deposition statements regarding his reaction to the denial of rehabilitation
    6
    treatment at the time it was denied do not bear on his emotional response later on, after he had
    sustained his alleged injuries.
    Lesesne thus proceeds under the special-relationship theory of liability under Hedgepeth.
    But while the court in Hedgepeth did not “catalog all the undertakings or relationships that give
    rise to a duty to avoid causing emotional 
    distress,” 22 A.3d at 812
    , it stressed that, to qualify as
    “special,” a relationship must involve “the emotional well-being of others . . . at [its] core,” or
    must “necessarily implicate[]” such well-being, 
    id. at 814.
    Examples the court gave are the
    relationships between patients and mental-health caretakers and patients and physicians, which
    directly involve the patients’ emotional well-being, and relationships involving a “hospital’s
    false report of death” to a loved one, or “a funeral home’s mishandling of a corpse,” which
    necessarily implicate the loved ones’ emotional well-being. See 
    id. The court
    also mentioned
    appointed guardians and counsel for children, the elderly, and the disabled, as caretakers whose
    activities have the potential to implicate emotional well-being, but instructed that “court[s]
    should weigh several factors” to determine “whether such appointments comprise a duty to care
    for the emotional well-being of wards and clients.” 
    Id. In contrast
    to these relationships, the
    court pointed to those that involve fiduciary obligations, which will “generally not come within
    the rule because neither the purpose of the relationship nor the fiduciary’s undertaking is to care
    for the plaintiff’s emotional well-being.” 
    Id. at 815.
    Instead, “the object of the engagement is to
    obtain a financial, commercial or legal objective, even if its non-attainment due to the fiduciary’s
    negligence is emotionally distressing to the client.” 
    Id. at 815.
    A common thread connecting the above relationships—those that qualify as “special” as
    well as those that do not—is the exchange of services for the benefit of a client or patient. But
    the provision of such services alone is not sufficient to establish a special relationship for the
    7
    purposes of NIED. The purpose of the relationship must involve care for another’s emotional
    well-being, and “emotional distress” must be “especially likely to be caused by [a] breach” of
    duty. 
    Id. at 814.
    If the object of the relationship is not such care, but is rather “to obtain a
    financial, commercial or legal objective,” 
    id. at 815,
    emotional well-being is not necessarily
    implicated. In other words, even if the purpose of a relationship is to achieve an objective for the
    benefit of a client, if that objective does not necessarily implicate the client’s emotional well-
    being—even if it has an effect on it—the relationship is not “special” for purposes of NIED.
    The purpose of a custodial relationship undertaken by correctional officers is very
    different from that of the relationships listed above. It is not to provide a benefit to the person in
    custody, emotional or otherwise. Rather, it is to neutralize a threat allegedly posed by the person
    in custody, for the benefit of the community. The Court is therefore not convinced that, under
    Hedgepeth, a custodial relationship undertaken by law enforcement constitutes a “special
    relationship” for purposes of NIED.
    In its opinion with respect to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court suggested that it
    would be possible for Lesesne to allege that the District of Columbia’s negligence had placed
    him within a “zone of danger,” causing emotional distress. Although Lesesne does not pursue
    this argument at the summary judgment stage, the Court concludes that the “zone of danger” test
    does not apply to these circumstances. “In applying the zone of danger rule, [courts] recognize
    that its logic requires that the plaintiff’s presence in the zone of danger be contemporaneous with
    her fear for her own safety.” Jane W. v. President & Dirs. of Georgetown Coll., 
    863 A.2d 821
    ,
    826 (D.C. 2004) (emphasis added) (quoting Jones v. Howard Univ., 
    589 A.2d 419
    , 423 (D.C.
    1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). And because Lesesne acknowledges that at the time
    of the District of Columbia’s alleged negligence, he was not in a position “to care” given the
    8
    treatment he was undergoing—as well as that he did not experience the emotional distress that
    followed until later—he does not allege that his emotional distress was contemporaneous with
    his presence in a zone of danger, as required for NIED.
    In addition, just as for negligence claims, “expert testimony is needed to prove a claim
    for negligent infliction of emotional distress.” 
    Edwards, 473 F. Supp. 2d at 45
    ; see also Arias v.
    DynCorp, 
    752 F.3d 1011
    , 1018 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (affirming dismissal of an NIED claim due to a
    lack of expert testimony on whether plaintiffs fell within the “zone of physical danger” from an
    anti-drug herbicide spraying operation); Farooq ex rel. Estate of Farooq v. MDRB Corp., 498 F.
    Supp. 2d 284, 287 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing Fletcher, 
    2005 WL 670676
    , at *6, for the proposition
    that summary judgment should be granted on a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress
    when the plaintiff fails to present expert testimony on the standard of care owed). And Lesesne
    has proffered no such testimony. Because Lesesne has not alleged facts showing that the District
    owed him a duty of care by way of a special relationship or that he experienced
    contemporaneous distress from being placed in a zone of danger, or presented expert testimony
    as to his NIED claim, the Court will grant summary judgment as to this claim.
    IV.    Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
    ORDERED that [72] Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
    This is a final, appealable order.
    CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER
    United States District Judge
    Date:   November 25, 2015
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2010-0602

Citation Numbers: 146 F. Supp. 3d 190

Judges: Judge Christopher R. Cooper

Filed Date: 11/25/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023