Thomas v. Wilkins , 61 F. Supp. 3d 13 ( 2014 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
HOMER THOMAS, :
:
Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 13-1590 (RC)
:
v. : Re Document No.: 9, 13
:
ROBERT WILKINS,
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE, et al. :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
I. INTRODUCTION
Homer Thomas brings this action against United States Circuit Judge Robert L. Wilkins 1
and his former Courtroom Deputy Clerk, Terri Barrett, challenging certain actions that allegedly
occurred during another of Plaintiff’s lawsuits over which then District Court Judge Wilkins
presided. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated his Constitutional rights and
engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68, by allegedly refusing to file certain court
documents and committing other alleged harmful legal actions. The Defendants moved to
dismiss on grounds of judicial immunity, failure to state a claim, and lack of standing. For the
reasons that follow, the Court will grant the Defendants’ motion.
1
The present litigation concerns actions taken while Judge Wilkins was serving as a
judge on the District Court for the District of Columbia.
II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff was a party to a previous suit pending before Judge Wilkins, Coe, et al. v.
Holder, et al., 1:13-cv-00184-RLW, in which Plaintiff and several other individuals attempted to
challenge certain foreclosures in Texas through a suit against various financial companies, the
Attorney General of the United States, and the Attorney General of Texas. See Coe, ECF Nos.
1-2). This suit concerned a large settlement between mortgage servicers, the federal government,
and forty-nine state attorneys general. See id.
Plaintiff alleges that during the course of this suit, Judge Wilkins and his courtroom
deputy clerk, Terri Barrett, improperly rejected several filings, failed to acknowledge certain
filings, and documented receipt of certain filings on erroneous dates. See Compl. at 6-12, ECF
No. 1. Specifically, Plaintiff challenges five separate acts as violations of RICO and the First
and Fifth Amendments: (1) Defendants’ refusal to grant Plaintiff leave to file an “Emergency
TRO/PI” motion and refusal to file said TRO/PI motion; (2) Defendants’ refusal to file Plaintiff’s
Motion for Reconsideration averring that the court miscalculated the time limits to file an
amended complaint; (3) Defendants’ refusal to file Plaintiff’s “Motion for sum certain Default
Judgment,. . .Affidavits in support,. . .proposed Order, and . . . request for entry of default”; (4)
Defendants’ refusal to file Plaintiff’s petition for Writ of Mandamus; and (5) Defendants’ refusal
to file Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Judge’s previous Order. See Compl. at ¶¶
44-48. Plaintiff alleges that both Judge Wilkins and Ms. Barrett were acting in an administrative
capacity while performing these acts, and not a judicial capacity. See id. at ¶¶ 5-6.
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As result of these actions, Plaintiff alleges that his First Amendment right to petition 2 and
Fifth Amendment due process rights have been violated. See Compl. Count I. Further, Plaintiff
asserts that the Defendants’ actions constituted a “pattern of racketeering activity” in violation of
RICO. See Compl. Count II. Plaintiff seeks both damages and declaratory and injunctive relief.
Compl. at 18-19. Defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1),
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 3, and 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim, arguing that
Plaintiff’s claims are barred by judicial immunity. See Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot.
to Dismiss, ECF No. 13 (“Def.’s Mot.). The Court now turns to the relevant legal standards. 4
2
While Plaintiff does not specifically assert which of his First Amendment rights have
been violated, Plaintiff appears to refer to his right to “petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.” U.S. Const. amend I; see also Cheeks v. Fort Myer Const. Co., 722 F. Supp. 2d 93,
107 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Where . . . the action is brought by a pro se plaintiff, the Court must take
particular care to construe the plaintiff’s filings liberally, for such complaints are held ‘to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)).
3
Because the Court finds Plaintiff’s claims barred by judicial immunity, it does not reach
Defendants’ standing argument.
4
In a separate motion, Plaintiff moved to disqualify the United States from representing
the Defendants in this matter claiming a conflict of interest because the United States Attorney
General is a named defendant to the underlying suit. See Pl.’s Mot. to Disqualify 3, ECF No. 9.
The United States argues that it has broad discretion to participate in the suit pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 517. See Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to Disqualify 1, ECF No. 10. The Court agrees. Section
28 U.S.C. § 517 allows “any officer of the Department of Justice” to “attend to the interests of
the United States in a suit pending in a court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 517. This
Circuit has previously recognized the “entirely discretionary nature of [this] power and the
breadth of that discretion,” and that “neither the statute, nor any regulation, nor any
administrative practice cabins this discretion or furnishes any standard by which to review the
Attorney General’s determinations in this area.” Falkowski v. EEOC, 783 F.2d 252, 253 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (“We further observe that the Attorney General has long possessed the power to
decide whether to provide counsel for a federal employee.”). Because Judge Wilkins and Deputy
Clerk Barrett are federal employees, the United States has authority to provide representation to
protect its interests. See Hall v. Clinton, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2001) (noting that under §
517, the Attorney General is “empowered to provide representation whenever in his opinion [the
United States’] interests may be jeopardized,” and further explaining that this decisions is “non-
reviewable”) (citations omitted). Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the
individuals handling this case on behalf of the Defendants have an actual conflict of interest.
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim” so as to give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon
which it rests. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); accord Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per
curiam). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) does not test a plaintiff’s ultimate likelihood
of success on the merits; rather, it tests whether a plaintiff has properly stated a claim. See
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). A court considering such a motion presumes that
the complaint’s factual allegations are true and construes them liberally in the plaintiff’s favor.
See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2000). A court,
however, need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009), nor must a court presume the veracity of the legal conclusions that are couched
as factual allegations. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). It is not
necessary for the plaintiff to plead all elements of her prima facie case in the complaint. See
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511-14 (2002); Bryant v. Pepco, 730 F. Supp. 2d 25,
28–29 (D.D.C. 2010).
Moreover, when a pro se claimant is involved, “the Court must take particular care to
construe the plaintiff’s filings liberally, for such [filings] are held ‘to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Cheeks, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 107 (quoting Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972)). Yet, “even a pro se complainant must plead ‘factual
matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more than the mere possibility of misconduct.’” Atherton
v. D.C. Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681–82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678). Dismissal remains appropriate “where the plaintiff’s complaint provides no factual or legal
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basis for the requested relief.” Strunk v. Obama, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2011) (internal
citations omitted).
IV. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues that the Defendants rejected various court filings and engaged in other
harmful legal actions while acting in an administrative capacity in violation of the Constitution
of the United States and RICO. See Compl. Count I & II. The Defendants argue that the Court
should dismiss the action because Plaintiff’s claims are barred by judicial immunity, and thus
Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim. See Def.’s Mot. at 1. The Court agrees.
A. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Judge Wilkins Are Barred By Judicial Immunity
Plaintiff alleges that Judge Wilkins, while acting in an administrative capacity, violated
his First and Fifth Amendment rights by refusing to file certain court documents that Plaintiff
had proffered. See Compl. at 6-11. The Defendants argue that these actions were taken in a
judicial capacity, and thus are protected under the doctrine of judicial immunity. See Def.’s Mot.
at 4.
Judges are absolutely immune from suits for money damages for “all actions taken in the
judge’s judicial capacity, unless these actions are taken in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction.” Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Mireles v. Waco,
502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (acknowledging that a long line of Supreme Court precedents have found
that a “judge is immune from a suit for money damages”); Caldwell v. Kagan, 865 F. Supp. 2d
35, 42 (D.D.C. 2012) (“Judges have absolute immunity for any actions taken in a judicial or
quasi-judicial capacity.”). “The scope of the judge’s jurisdiction must be construed broadly
where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).
Further, “a judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was
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done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Id.; see also Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11
(“[J]udicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice.”). In determining
whether a judge was acting in his judicial capacity, courts should look to the “nature of the act
itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the
parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12
(quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 362).
Here, Judge Wilkins was clearly acting in his judicial capacity when he refused to file
various court documents submitted by Plaintiff. A judge’s decision to file or deny a party’s
motions or requests is an action routinely performed by a judge in the course of litigation, and
thus would constitute a judicial act immune from suit. See Jenkins v. Kerry, 928 F. Supp. 2d
122, 134 (D.D.C. 2013) (“[A] judge acting in his or her judicial capacity—i.e., performing a
function normally performed by a judge—is immune from suit on all judicial acts.”) (citations
and quotations omitted); Sibley v. U.S. Supreme Court, 786 F. Supp. 2d 338, 344 (D.D.C. 2011)
(explaining that the “receipt and processing of a litigant’s filings are part and parcel of the
process of adjudicating cases”) (citations omitted); Doggett v. Gonzales, No. 06-0575, 2007 WL
2893405, at 3 (D.D.C. 2007) (noting that “[r]esolution of a motion filed by a party” is
“characterized as judicial action”) (quotations and citations omitted). In fact, courts have upheld
judicial immunity in a multitude of scenarios involving functions performed less commonly by
judges than those alleged here. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12 (judge was performing
a judicial function when he directed officers to physically bring lawyer who was late into his
courtroom and excessive force was allegedly applied); Stump, 435 U.S. at 360-63 ((judge who
ordered sterilization of fifteen-year-old girl was absolutely immune from suit even if Indiana law
did not authorize his acts).
6
Further, Judge Wilkins’ actions are dissimilar from the types of employment actions that
courts have found to be “administrative acts,” as Plaintiff alleges they are, see Forrester v.
White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (finding that judge’s act of demoting and discharging probation
officer was an administrative act); Kurowski v. Krajewski, 848 F.2d 767, 773-74 (7th Cir. 1988)
(judge’s firing of public defenders on basis of their political beliefs was an administrative act not
entitled to judicial immunity), and were surely not taken “in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction.” See Stump, 435 U.S. at 357 n.7 (giving the example of a “probate judge . . .
try[ing] a criminal case”, as an example of a judge acting in the absence of jurisdiction).
Likewise, Plaintiff’s contention that Judge Wilkins allegedly “used his office as a weapon
against [him] and sabotaged the entire case by falsifying documents, destroying documents and
infiltrating the administrative office of the clerk to perpetuate his malicious endeavors” is
immaterial. Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 1, ECF No. 15 (“Pl.’s Opp’n Mot.”). Under
the doctrine of judicial immunity, “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action
he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Stump, 435 U.S.
at 356. Therefore, because Judge Wilkins was acting in his judicial capacity when he refused to
file Plaintiff’s submissions and took the other acts Plaintiff alleges were wrongful, Plaintiff’s
claims are barred by judicial immunity.
B. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Deputy Clerk Barrett Are Also Barred by Judicial
Immunity
Plaintiff also alleges that Judge Wilkin’s Deputy Clerk, Terri Barrett, violated his
Constitutional rights by refusing to “file, docket, or acknowledge” certain court filings of
Plaintiff’s. See Compl. at 11-13. The Plaintiff further alleges that these acts were taken in an
administrative capacity, and thus are not protected by judicial immunity. Id. But Defendants
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correctly argue that Plaintiff’s claims against Barrett are barred because judicial immunity
extends not only to judges, but to court staff as well. Def.’s Mot. at 4.
“Clerks, like judges, are immune from damage suits for performance of tasks that are an
integral part of the judicial process.” Sindram, 986 F.2d at 1460; see also Roth v. King, 449 F.3d
1272, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“It is well established that judicial immunity ‘extends to other
officers of government whose duties are related to the judicial process.’”) (quoting Barr v.
Matteo 360 U.S. 564, 569 (1959)); Hester v. Dickerson, 576 F. Supp. 2d 60, 62 (D.D.C. 2008)
(“In this Circuit, absolute judicial immunity extends to clerks of the court.”) (citations omitted).
If immunity were not extended to clerks performing judicially related tasks, “courts would face
the danger that disappointed litigants, blocked by the doctrine of absolute immunity from suing
the judge directly would vent their wrath on clerks, court reporters, and other judicial adjuncts.”
Sindram, 986 F.2d at 1461 (citations omitted).
Here, Ms. Barrett’s actions that the Plaintiff is challenging—the refusal to file certain
court submissions—are the same actions allegedly committed by Judge Wilkins. As explained
above, these actions are clearly an “integral part of the judicial process” warranting absolute
immunity from suit. See Sindram, 986 F.2d at 1461 (finding that a clerk “instituting an
erroneous order against [a] [p]laintiff barring his access to the court” was performing an “integral
part[] of the judicial process”); Sibley, 786 F. Supp. 2d at 344 (“The clerk or deputy clerk’s
receipt and processing of a litigant’s filing are part and parcel of the process of adjudicating
cases.”); Reddy v. O’Connor, 520 F. Supp. 2d 124, 130 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding that a “deputy
clerk’s alleged refusal to file documents [the] plaintiff submitted” was an action “quintessentially
‘judicial’ in nature because [it was] an integral part of the judicial process”). Thus, because
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Defendant Barrett was acting in her capacity as a judicial clerk performing tasks that are an
integral part of the judicial process, she is entitled to absolute immunity.
C. Plaintiff’s RICO claims Are Likewise Barred
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants engaged in a “pattern of racketeering activity” in
violation of RICO. See Compl. at 17. Specifically, Plaintiff complains of a “scheme to punish
and silence [him] for having exercised his right of access to the courts, and to execute” this
scheme by “depriv[ing him] of the intangible right of honest services’.” Id. at 15.
In addition to the overall principle making it clear that a “judge is immune from a suit for
money damages,” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9, courts have further specified that RICO claims are
barred under the doctrine of judicial immunity. See Blackburn v. Calhoun, No. 207CV166, 2008
WL 850191, at *21 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 4, 2008); Stone v. Baum, 409 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1175 (D.
Ariz. 2005) (judges who issued rulings were entitled to absolute judicial immunity from liability
in subsequent action alleging RICO violations, where alleged acts were judicial acts taken within
each court's jurisdiction); Rolfes v. MBNA America Bank N.A., 416 F. Supp. 2d 745, 749 (D.S.D.
2005) (state court judge was entitled to absolute immunity from plaintiff’s claims for monetary
damages under RICO based on judge's entry of judgment against her). In Blackburn, the court
found that a plaintiff’s RICO claims—alleging a judge, who had previously presided over his
divorce, conspired to run a “good ole white boys’ club” in the Jefferson County, Alabama circuit
court system—were barred by judicial immunity. Blackburn, 2008 WL 850191, at *1, 21. The
court explained that “RICO claims must be denied if they simply constitute another way of
attacking a judge’s rulings,” and that judicial immunity “applies where the RICO-challenged acts
are judicial in nature.” Id. at *21. Thus, the Blackburn court held that to overcome judicial
immunity, the same as in other contexts, a plaintiff asserting a RICO violation “must allege facts
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showing that the judge was not acting in his judicial capacity, or that he acted in the complete
absence of all jurisdiction.” Id.
Here, Plaintiff’s RICO claims alleging a “pattern of racketeering activity” are predicated
on the same actions—i.e., the Defendants’ withholding of and refusal to file several of Plaintiff’s
documents—underlying Plaintiff’s Constitutional claims. Compl. at ¶¶ 56-59. Therefore, while
Plaintiff attempts to circumvent the judicial immunity doctrine by asserting RICO claims against
the Defendants in their personal capacities, the actions Plaintiff is challenging were performed
within the scope of the Defendants’ judicial duties. Thus, because the acts underlying the
Plaintiff’s RICO claims were “judicial in nature,” they are similarly protected by the judicial
immunity doctrine. See Blackburn, 2008 WL 850191, at *21 (“[Judicial] immunity applies
where the RICO-challenged acts are ‘judicial in nature’.”) (citations omitted); Sisk v. U.S., No.
06-2396, 2007 WL 1963000, at *3 (“[A] judicial act does not become less judicial by virtue of
an allegation of malice, corruption or conspiracy…[n]either does the fact that a RICO violation
is alleged change the fact of judicial immunity,” as long as the acts “were judicial in nature.”).
Accordingly, the Defendants’ actions of refusing to file several of Plaintiff’s court documents are
certainly within the scope of their judicial duties, and thus are appropriately protected under
judicial immunity, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s attempted RICO claim.
D. The Court Cannot Grant Plaintiff Equitable Relief As This Is Not A Reviewing
Court
To the extent Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, this is not the appropriate
avenue to seek such relief. This Court is not a “reviewing court and cannot compel . . . other
Article III judges in this or other districts or circuits to act.” Sibley, 786 F. Supp. 2d at 345.
“Declaratory relief against a judge for final actions taken within his or her judicial capacity is . . .
available by way of direct appeal of the judge’s order.” Jenkins, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 135; see also
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Lewis v. Green, 629 F. Supp. 546, 553 (D.D.C. 1986) (District Court explaining that
“[c]hallenges to rulings made during the course of judicial proceedings should be made by
appeal in those cases,” before noting that it lacked the authority to issue an order compelling
another District Court to vacate an earlier decision). “Simply stated, neither the public interest,
nor the interests in practical judicial administration, would be served by a federal court reviewing
the decisions of our local judicial officers who are acting pursuant to their judicial authority.”
Hoai v. Superior Court, 539 F. Supp. 2d 432, 435 (D.D.C. 2008).
Here, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief asking the Court to compel the Defendants to
refrain from “retaliating, blocking, or otherwise obstructing Plaintiff from filing his court
documents.” Compl. at 19. As this Court lacks the authority to review another District Court’s
decisions, it cannot compel the Defendants to take the action Plaintiff requests. See Sibley, 786
F. Supp. 2d at 345. Further, to the extent Plaintiff requests a declaratory judgment “declaring
Defendants’ [actions]. . . non-judicial in nature” and “unconstitutional,” this claim cannot
survive. “The Declaratory Judgment Act neither expands a court’s jurisdiction nor creates new
substantive rights.” B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbot Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
The Act was not intended to “allow a declaratory judgment plaintiff to avoid the requirements
imposed by the substantive law as a predicate to obtaining such relief.” Id. Accordingly, “a
request for declaratory relief is barred to the same extent that the claim for substantive relief on
which it is based would be barred.” Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Tenn.
Valley Auth., 108 F.3d 658, 668 (6th Cir. 1997). Given that this Court, as set forth above, has
concluded that Plaintiff’s substantive claims are barred by judicial immunity because
Defendants’ actions were, in fact, judicial in nature, Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory relief are
likewise barred, and thus must also fail.
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V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ motion is GRANTED. An order consistent
with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.
Dated: July 24, 2014 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
United States District Judge
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