United States v. Darion Graham ( 2023 )

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-4061
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DARION GRAHAM, a/k/a Pluck,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Wilmington. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (7:19-cr-00126-FL-1)
Submitted: November 30, 2022 Decided: February 1, 2023
Before KING, WYNN, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed in part, affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: W. Michael Dowling, THE DOWLING FIRM PLLC, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. G. Norman Acker, III, Acting United States Attorney, David A.
Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Darion Graham pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to conspiracy to
possess with the intent to distribute 1,000 grams or more of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846; two counts of distributing and aiding and abetting the
distribution of heroin, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C);
and aiding and abetting possession with the intent to distribute 100 grams of heroin, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B). The district court
sentenced Graham to 365 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Graham argues that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, the Government breached the plea
agreement, and the district court erred in calculating the Sentencing Guidelines range.
Graham first argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial
attorney lodged numerous objections to the presentence report but presented no evidence
or argument in support of those objections or in support of a lower Sentencing Guidelines
range. He cites United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), in arguing that a presumption
of prejudice applies, warranting remand to the district court. Alternatively, he argues that
this case should be remanded to the district court for a hearing on whether counsel’s
performance was deficient.
To demonstrate constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
prove both deficient performance and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984). Performance is deficient if “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id.We “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range
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of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered
sound trial strategy.” Id. at 689 (internal quotation marks omitted). To establish prejudice,
“[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.
Claims of ineffective assistance are cognizable on direct appeal “only where the record
conclusively establishes ineffective assistance.” United States v. Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214,
216 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010). Generally, a defendant should instead raise ineffectiveness claims
in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to permit sufficient development of the record.
See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504-06 (2003).
Nothing in the present record overcomes the strong presumption that counsel’s
representation was reasonable. Nor does the record support Graham’s contention that
counsel’s performance was so deficient as to have presumptively denied him the right to
counsel under Cronic. Because ineffective assistance of counsel is not conclusively
established on the face of the record, Graham must raise this claim, if at all, in a collateral
challenge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Massaro, 538 U.S. at 504-06.
Graham next argues that the Government breached the plea agreement by requesting
to be relieved from its obligation to move for a third offense level reduction for acceptance
of responsibility. Because Graham did not preserve this issue in the district court, we
review the issue for plain error. See United States v. Tate, 845 F.3d 571, 575
(4th Cir. 2017). “Plea agreements are grounded in contract law, and as with any contract,
each party is entitled to receive the benefit of his bargain.” United States v. Edgell, 914
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F.3d 281, 287 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The [G]overnment
breaches a plea agreement when a promise it made to induce the plea goes unfulfilled.”
Tate, 845 F.3d at 575. “In determining what promises the government made, we read a
plea agreement’s plain language in its ordinary sense.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). The party alleging a breach of the plea agreement must “establish[] that breach
by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Snow, 234 F.3d 187, 189
(4th Cir. 2000).
In the plea agreement, the parties agreed that a three-level decrease in the offense
level for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 3E1.1 (2018), was warranted. However, the agreement stated that the Government would
no longer be bound to its position on acceptance of responsibility “if Defendant’s conduct
prior to sentencing changes the circumstances with respect to [acceptance of
responsibility].” (J.A. 202-03). Because the evidence at the sentencing hearing supported
a finding that the circumstances had changed with respect to Graham’s acceptance of
responsibility, the district court did not plainly err in releasing the Government from its
obligation under the plea agreement.
Finally, Graham challenges the district court’s decision to grant only a two-level
reduction for acceptance of responsibility in calculating the Sentencing Guidelines range.
The Government argues that Graham waived the right to contest this issue by way of the
appeal waiver contained in the plea agreement. We review the validity of an appeal waiver
de novo and “will enforce the waiver if it is valid and the issue appealed is within the scope
of the waiver.” United States v. Adams, 814 F.3d 178, 182 (4th Cir. 2016). “A defendant
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may waive the right to appeal his conviction and sentence so long as the waiver is knowing
and voluntary.” United States v. Copeland, 707 F.3d 522, 528 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Generally, if the district court fully questions a defendant
regarding the waiver of his right to appeal during a plea colloquy performed in accordance
with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, and the record shows that the defendant understood the waiver’s
significance, the waiver is both valid and enforceable. United States v. Thornsbury, 670
F.3d 532, 537 (4th Cir. 2012).
We conclude that Graham’s appeal waiver was knowing and voluntary. Graham
does not argue otherwise, the language of the appeal waiver is clear and unambiguous, and
the magistrate judge questioned Graham regarding the waiver during the Rule 11 hearing.
Turning to the scope of the waiver, Graham agreed to waive his right to appeal his sentence
on any ground except for ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. As
Graham’s challenge to the district court’s calculation of the Sentencing Guidelines range
does not fall within an exception to the appeal waiver, Graham’s claim is barred by the
waiver.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as to Graham’s sentencing challenge that is
barred by the appellate waiver, affirm as to the claims not foreclosed by the waiver, and
deny Graham’s motion to file a pro se supplemental brief. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED IN PART,
AFFIRMED IN PART
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