Wilder v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ ( 2023 )

Case: 21-40806 Document: 00516633118 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/02/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
February 2, 2023
No. 21-40806 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Ann Wilder,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Stephen F. Austin State University,
Defendant—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 9:20-CV-40
Before Smith, Barksdale, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
At issue are jury-trial rulings: (1) admitting defendant’s exhibit 6
(compilation of complaints against plaintiff); (2) admitting evidence
pertaining to her subsequent employment; (3) excluding evidence of
complaints against a male professor; and (4) denying plaintiff’s mistrial
motion. AFFIRMED.
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 21-40806 Document: 00516633118 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/02/2023
No. 21-40806
I.
Stephen F. Austin State University (SFA) in July 2014 hired Ann
Wilder, Ph.D., as a tenure-track professor in the Master of Social Work
program. Informal student complaints against her began as early as that
October; and, in 2017, six formal harassment complaints were filed by
students.
An investigation was conducted by her dean; and, in January 2018, he
concluded Dr. Wilder violated SFA’s harassment policy, with immediate
termination recommended to, and accepted by, SFA’s provost. On appeal,
the discrimination review board (DRB), in May 2018 determined her conduct
did not rise to harassment.
While awaiting the outcome of the DRB hearing, Dr. Wilder in March
2018 learned of alleged pay inequities between her and a similarly-situated
male professor. She filed a formal complaint with SFA on 19 June 2018,
claiming sex discrimination based on pay disparity.
SFA on 24 July 2018 signed a terminal-year contract for Dr. Wilder
for school-year 2018–19. She was notified of the contract that 8 August,
subsequently declining it and giving her notice of resignation on 23 August.
She accepted a position at Carlow University in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, that
same day.
Dr. Wilder filed this action in 2020. The claims against SFA were for,
inter alia, violations of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII. (The parties
consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 73.) A three-day jury trial—during which Dr. Wilder’s mistrial
motion was denied—resulted in a verdict for SFA on all claims. Final
judgment was entered in September 2021, dismissing this action with
prejudice.
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II.
Dr. Wilder challenges three evidentiary rulings and the denial of her
mistrial motion. We turn first to the evidentiary challenges.
A.
Preserved challenges to evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of
discretion. E.g., Caparotta v. Entergy Corp., 168 F.3d 754, 755 (5th Cir. 1999).
“A district court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on an erroneous
view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.”
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Axon Pressure Prod., Inc., 951 F.3d 248, 256
(5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Evidentiary rulings are “subject to the
harmless error doctrine”; therefore, even if the court abused its discretion,
“the ruling will be reversed only if it affected the substantial rights of the
complaining party”. Adams v. Memorial Hermann, 973 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir.
2020) (citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Evid. 103(a); Perez v. Texas Dept.
of Crim. Just., Inst. Div., 395 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 2004) (“An erroneous
evidentiary ruling is reversible error only if the ruling affects a party’s
substantial rights.”). For the reasons that follow, there was no reversible
error.
1.
Dr. Wilder contends SFA’s exhibit 6 (compilation of complaints
against her) should have been excluded, at least in part, as unfairly prejudicial
under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. (In addition, and for the first time on
appeal, she challenges the exhibit as defamatory and in violation of her First
Amendment rights. And, despite raising a hearsay challenge to that exhibit
in district court and in her reply brief here, she failed to present that challenge
in her opening brief. Pursuant to our general rules—subject to exceptions
which don’t apply here—regarding forfeited and waived claims, we decline
to address these contentions. E.g., Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393,
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397–98 (5th Cir. 2021); United States v. Ramirez, 557 F.3d 200, 203 (5th Cir.
2009).)
SFA asserted in district court the decision to issue Dr. Wilder the
terminal contract was based on, among other reasons, complaints made
against her. Dr. Wilder fails to show those contained in exhibit 6 were not
part of that decision. Accordingly, the court reasonably found the complaints
were probative to SFA’s defense, and Dr. Wilder does not show any
prejudice resulting from admission was unfair, nor that it substantially
outweighed the exhibit’s probative value. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Therefore, the Rule 403 balancing test favored admission. E.g., Wellogix, Inc.
v. Accenture, L.L.P., 716 F.3d 867, 882 (5th Cir. 2013).
2.
Dr. Wilder claims evidence regarding her termination from her
subsequent position at Carlow University was, again, unduly prejudicial
under Rule 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. After hearing the parties’
positions and reasonably assessing the evidence, the court allowed limited
testimony about Dr. Wilder’s belief regarding discrimination against her at
Carlow University for the purpose of inquiring about the bases for her
claimed emotional-distress damages in this action.
Her mental state at her subsequent place of employment in the year
following her termination from SFA was relevant to the compensatory
damages for emotional distress she sought from SFA; and, pursuant to the
above discussed standard, she fails to show the probative value of the limited
testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Alternatively, even assuming error, and pursuant to the earlier described
harmless-error standard, it did not affect her substantial rights.
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3.
For her final evidentiary issue, Dr. Wilder contests the exclusion of
evidence of complaints against a male colleague and of the subsequent lack of
investigation of them by SFA. The court conducted a “fact-intensive,
context-specific inquiry” and concluded this evidence was irrelevant and its
admission would confuse the issues. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn,
552 U.S. 379, 388 (2008). There was no abuse of discretion.
B.
Denial of a mistrial motion is also reviewed for abuse of discretion.
E.g., Zamora v. City of Hous., 798 F.3d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 2015). “The
decision to declare a mistrial is left to the sound discretion of the judge, and
granting a mistrial is appropriate when there is a high degree of necessity.”
Id. at 337 (citation omitted). Because “the trial judge is in the best position
to evaluate accurately the potential impact” of improper intrusion of
extrinsic evidence on the jury, our court “should accord great weight to the
trial court’s finding that the evidence in no way interfered with any juror’s
decision”. Id. (citation omitted).
Ten days before trial, SFA disclosed, for the first time, two documents
relevant to the timeline forming the basis of Dr. Wilder’s retaliation claims.
(She maintains the decision to issue her terminal contract occurred after she
filed her formal complaint on 19 June 2018; as noted, she claimed sex
discrimination based on pay disparity.) The court in a 13 August 2021 order
granted Dr. Wilder’s motion to exclude this evidence: “SFA may not
introduce these documents into evidence or allude to their existence”; and
“SFA must instruct its witnesses that they cannot testify that the decision to
offer Dr. Wilder a terminal contract was made on June 6, 2018, or any other
specific date prior to June 19, 2018”. (Emphasis in original.) As noted, 19
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June was the date she filed her complaint against SFA; it signed the terminal
contract on 24 July; and it was offered to Dr. Wilder on 8 August.
Dr. Wilder maintains: two witnesses testified about when the
terminal-contract-offer decision was made; and SFA discussed that decision
in closing argument. After SFA completed closing argument and before her
rebuttal, she moved orally for a mistrial (she had not objected to the
witnesses’ challenged testimony, however, and did not mention that
testimony in her motion; she only addressed SFA’s closing argument). The
motion was denied summarily.
Even assuming SFA violated the order, the limited amount of
prejudicial information was not so “pronounced and persistent that it
permeate[d] the entire proceeding”. Winter v. Brenner Tank, Inc., 926 F.2d
468, 473 (5th Cir. 1991). There was no abuse of discretion. E.g., Zamora,
798 F.3d at 337.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
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