United States v. Robinson ( 2023 )

Case: 22-30269 Document: 00516632965 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/02/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
February 2, 2023
No. 22-30269 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Marquel Devon Robinson,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:19-CR-363-1
Before Elrod, Haynes, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Marquel Devon Robinson pleaded guilty (pursuant to a plea
agreement) to possessing heroin with intent to distribute. Before entering
that plea, Robinson filed a motion to suppress certain evidence that he alleged
was the product of an unconstitutional search warrant. The district court
denied that motion, adopting the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation. On appeal, Robinson argues that the good-faith exception
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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to the exclusionary rule is inapplicable because the affidavit supporting the
search warrant altogether lacked the factual indicia required to justify an
officer’s reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause for a search. He
also argues that probable cause was absent. Because we reject Robinson’s
first argument, we need not reach his second, and we therefore AFFIRM.
* * *
Robinson asked the district court to suppress evidence that officers
discovered while executing a warrant to search a residence. The affidavit
supporting the warrant relayed the following information:
• Robinson is a “well known drug dealer,” and his sister has
“a previous drug arrest.”
• Robinson and his sister were “in” the residence, which
their mother owned and which saw “a high traffic volume”
involving stays of “less than five minutes per visit.”
• Because of this pattern, Officer Guidry (the affiant)
believed that the residence’s “occupants [we]re involved in
narcotic[s] distribution.”
• Further, during “surveillance,” officers observed a Honda
Accord parked in front of the residence.
• When the Honda departed, the driver (not a party here)
committed a traffic infraction that led to a stop, and during
that stop officers discovered in the vehicle what they
believed to be heroin and related paraphernalia.
• A search of the driver’s person also revealed a “large
amount of cash” and plastic bags containing what the driver
described as “Crack.”
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Citing United States v. Leon, Robinson argues that the affidavit is “so
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
entirely unreasonable.” 468 U.S. 897, 899 (1984). In particular, he argues
that “no evidence linked the occupant or drugs in the Honda Accord to [the
residence].” As a result, he argues, the “affidavit provides no basis
whatsoever to believe anyone at [the residence] was involved in criminal
activity.” We disagree.
An affidavit lacks indicia of probable cause, and thereby defeats the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, when it is “wholly conclusory”
and “do[es] not detail any facts” but instead “allege[s] only conclusions.”
United States v. Morton, 46 F.4th 331, 337 (5th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (emphasis
added), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Jan. 9, 2023) (No. 22-6489). If the affidavit
contains enough factual information to allow the judge to “ma[k]e a
judgment call,” then it is “reasonable” for an officer to “rely on the
warrant[].” Id. at 338. The affidavit here was far from the “bare bones”
recitations that fail constitutional muster. See id. It alleged specific facts
regarding the residence and its occupants, and about their connection to drug
trafficking. Those indicia are plenty to give an officer “reasonable grounds
for believing that the warrant was properly issued.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
Robinson’s contrary arguments are unpersuasive. He argues that
“[s]anctioning the instant search warrant would mean that any car containing
contraband parked on the street outside a house would provide sufficient
probable cause to search that house.” But the question under the good-faith
exception is not whether probable cause exists, but instead whether the
affidavit is so factually defective as to render “entirely unreasonable” an
officer’s reliance on the warrant. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (citation omitted).
Robinson’s argument also ignores the specific facts that here linked the
residence to drug trafficking (for example, several vehicles making short
stops, and the fact that a “well known drug dealer” was “in” the residence).
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If the affidavit mentioned only the Honda Accord’s one-time location
in front of the residence, then this case would be closer to United States v.
Brown, 567 F. App’x 272 (5th Cir. 2014). There, “the affidavit provided no
information . . . [or] any evidence, either direct or inferential, linking the
investigation to Brown’s home.” Id. at 282. Instead, the affidavit recited only
the mere “belie[f] that additional narcotics and paraphernalia are located at
Brown’s residence.” Id. at 283. Given that “bare-bones statement[],” the
officers in Brown “could not have acted in objectively-reasonable good-faith
reliance upon the search warrant.” Id.
Here, by contrast, the affidavit contained specific factual information
far beyond mere “belief” regarding the residence. See id (citation omitted).
It provided information regarding the residence’s unusual traffic pattern, and
it also linked Robinson and his sister to the residence and to “drug deal[ing]”
and to a “previous drug arrest.” The affidavit is neither “wholly conclusory”
nor devoid of “any facts,” and it does not allege “only conclusions.” See
Morton, 46 F.4th at 337. Accordingly, the affidavit did not foreclose
reasonable reliance on the warrant. Leon’s good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule thus applies, and that brings our inquiry to an end.
We do not decide whether “the state judge should have” issued the
warrant, but rather “only that the officers acted in good faith when relying
on the judge’s decision to issue the warrant[].” Id. at 339. We AFFIRM.
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