Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Miski ( 2010 )


Menu:
  •                         UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                            FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    _______________________________________
                                            )
    GREAT SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S LIBYAN         )
    ARAB JAMAHIRIYA and EMBASSY OF          )
    THE LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA,             )
                                            )
                Plaintiffs,                 )
                                            ) Civil Action No. 06-2046 (RBW)
          v.                                )
                                            )
    AHMAD MISKI,                            )
                                            )
                Defendant.                  )
    _______________________________________)
    
                                            MEMORANDUM OPINION
    
             The plaintiffs, the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (the "Libyan
    
    Government") and the Embassy of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya ("Libyan Embassy"), bring this
    
    action against the defendant, Ahmad Miski, for allegedly infringing their trademark rights in
    
    violation of two provisions of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(a)(1)(A) and (B) (2006), and
    
    the AntiCybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006). See
    
    generally Complaint (“Compl.”). The defendant has responded by asserting counterclaims for
    
    monetary damages, costs, and attorneys' fees arising from the plaintiffs' alleged tortuous
    
    interference with the defendant’s contracts and prospective business advantage. See Counter
    
    Claim [sic] ¶¶ 54-62. 1 The defendant also pleads an abuse of process counterclaim against the
    
    plaintiffs based on the plaintiffs' initiation of this lawsuit. Id. ¶¶ 71-75. Currently before the
    
    
    
    1
             The defendant has failed to number the pages of any of his submissions filed with the Court throughout the
    course of this litigation, although in some instances he numbered the paragraphs of the documents. Therefore,
    throughout this Order, to the extent that the defendant has failed to provide paragraph numbers, the Court will refer
    to the pages consecutively in the order in which they were filed. The defendant is instructed to number the pages of
    any future filing submitted to the Court.
    Court are seven motions seeking various forms of relief by both the plaintiffs and the defendant.
    
    Each of these motions will be addressed in this opinion.
    
    I.     The Motions Related to Questions of Immunity
    
           The four motions before the Court related to the question of immunity are the following:
    
    (1) the plaintiffs' motion to strike the defendant's answer and counterclaims, see generally
    
    Plaintiff Libyan Government’s Motion to Strike Defendant Miski’s Amended Answer,
    
    Counterclaim and Jury Demand (Docket #36), or in the Alternative, Motion to Dismiss, and
    
    Motion for Default Judgment ("Pls.' Mot. to Strike"); (2) a motion by the Ambassador for the
    
    Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya ("the Ambassador") seeking to quash the
    
    defendant's notice to take the Ambassador's deposition, see generally Ambassador Aujali’s
    
    Motion to Quash Defendant Miski’s Notice of Deposition ("Ambassador's Mot. to Quash"); (3)
    
    the plaintiffs' motion to discharge Magistrate Judge Robinson's imposition of sanctions against
    
    them, see generally Plaintiff Libyan Government's Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Order
    
    Regarding Sanctions ("Pls.' Mot. re Sanctions"); and (4) the defendant's motion to dismiss the
    
    plaintiffs' complaint, see generally Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Objection to Magistrate
    
    Judge’s Order Regarding “Sanctions” and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Case
    
    ("Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss"). While each of these motions seeks various forms of relief and sets
    
    forth various legal theories in support of the relief sought, they all turn on two issues concerning
    
    immunity: (1) whether the Libyan government has waived its sovereign immunity with respect to
    
    the defendant's counterclaims, see Pls.' Mot. to Strike at 4, and (2) whether the Ambassador of
    
    the Libyan government has waived his diplomatic immunity in this matter by filing with the
    
    Court an affidavit in response to the defendant's motion to transfer venue, see Ambassador's Mot.
    
    
    
                                                     2
    to Quash at 2; Pls.' Mot. re Sanctions at 6; Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 12; see also Plaintiff Libyan
    
    Government’s Response to Defendant Ahmad Miski’s Motion to Transfer Venue, Ex. 4
    
    (Affidavit of Ambassador Aujali in Support of the Libyan Government’s Response to Defendant
    
    Ahmad Miski’s Motion to Transfer Venue ("Ambassador Aujali Aff.")). For the reasons set
    
    forth below, the Court finds: (1) that the plaintiffs have waived their sovereign immunity by
    
    initiating this lawsuit against the defendant, and therefore must answer to the defendant's
    
    counterclaims arising from the same transaction or occurrence as the subject matter of the
    
    allegations set forth in their complaint, but need not answer the defendant's separate abuse of
    
    process counterclaim; and (2) that the Ambassador did not waived his diplomatic immunity by
    
    submitting an affidavit in connection with the defendant's motion to transfer venue, and
    
    therefore, he cannot be unwillingly deposed in this matter. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth
    
    below, the Court must grant in part and deny in part the plaintiffs' motion to strike the
    
    defendant's answer and counterclaims, grant the Ambassador's motion to quash a notice to take
    
    his deposition, deny the plaintiffs’ motion seeking to discharge an imposition of sanctions
    
    against them, and deny the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint. 2
    
    
    
    
    2
              The Court also considered the following documents in resolving these motions: Defendant’s Response to
    Ambassador Aujali’s Motion to Quash Defendant’s Notice of Deposition and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
    Plaintiffs’ Case; Defendant’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Defendant Miski’s Amended Answer,
    Counterclaim and Jury Trial and Plaintiffs’ Alternative Motion to Dismiss and Default Judgment; Defendant’s
    Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Order Regarding “Sanctions” and Defendant’s Motion to
    Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Case; Libyan Government’s Opposition to Defendant Miski’s Opposition [#54/57] to the Libyan
    Government’s Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Order Regarding Sanctions [#53] and Defendant Miski’s Motion
    to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Case [#54/57]; Ambassador Aujali’s and the Libyan Government’s Reply to Defendant
    Miski’s Opposition (Docket #37) to Ambassador Aujali’s and the Libyan Government’s Motion to Quash Defendant
    Miski’s Notice of Deposition (Docket #35); and Plaintiff Libyan Government’s Reply to Defendant Miski’s
    Opposition (Docket #43) to Plaintiff Libyan Government’s Motion to Strike Defendant Miski’s Amended Answer,
    Counterclaim and Jury Trial and Plaintiff Libyan Government’s Alternative Motion to Dismiss (Docket #41).
    
    
                                                          3
           A.      The Plaintiffs' Sovereign Immunity
    
           The plaintiffs seek to strike the defendant's amended answer and counterclaims, or in the
    
    alternative, request that judgment be entered in their favor on the defendant's counterclaims on
    
    two grounds: first, that the defendant's amended answer was untimely filed without leave of the
    
    Court, Pls.' Mot. to Strike at 3, and second, that sovereign immunity precludes the defendant
    
    from maintaining his counterclaims, id. at 4-5.
    
           The first issue is easily resolved. The plaintiffs argue that the defendant's amended
    
    answer and counterclaims were filed without first seeking leave of Court in compliance with
    
    Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 15, given that over a year had lapsed since the
    
    defendant's first answer was filed, and the defendant sought neither the consent of the plaintiffs
    
    nor leave of the Court before the amended answer and counterclaims were filed. Id. at 3-4; see
    
    also Plaintiff Libyan Government’s Reply to Defendant Miski’s Opposition (Docket #43) to
    
    Plaintiff Libyan Government’s Motion to Strike Defendant Miski’s Amended Answer,
    
    Counterclaim and Jury Trial and Plaintiff Libyan Government’s Alternative Motion to Dismiss
    
    (Docket #41) at 4. It is the defendant's position, however, that the parties had an agreement, as
    
    set forth in their joint status report filed with the Court on January 15, 2009, that the "pleadings
    
    [could] be amended at any time until 30 days after the completion of discovery," which gave him
    
    until July 30, 2009, to file any amended pleadings. Defendant’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion
    
    to Strike Defendant Miski’s Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Jury Trial and Plaintiffs’
    
    Alternative Motion to Dismiss and Default Judgment at 6.
    
           Regardless whether the parties had an agreement prior to the initial scheduling
    
    conference, the Court's issuance of its February 3, 2009 Scheduling Order, issued following that
    
    
    
                                                      4
    conference, designated the deadlines for the parties to follow. The Scheduling Order did not
    
    incorporate the agreement relied upon by the defendant, and the parties cannot agree to filing
    
    deadlines inapposite to a court order. Moreover, considering that under the agreement any post-
    
    discovery amendment of a party's pleadings would theoretically foreclose the other party from
    
    obtaining discovery on newly asserted allegations or claims, the agreement would wreak havoc
    
    on the Court's ability to control its calendar and advance this action to final resolution, as the
    
    Court is confident that the agreement would inevitably result in the Court having to entertain
    
    requests to reopen discovery to avoid a potential unfair resolution of this litigation. Therefore,
    
    the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court's Scheduling Order must govern the parties'
    
    actions in this dispute, including the applicable filing deadlines.
    
             Rule 15 states that after the time during which a party may amend a pleading "as a matter
    
    of course" has passed, "a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written
    
    consent or the court's leave." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (emphasis added). Here, the defendant
    
    answered the plaintiffs' complaint on December 14, 2007, and he was not entitled to amend his
    
    answer without complying with Rule 15 by acquiring either the consent of the plaintiffs or leave
    
    of the Court. 3 Accordingly, as the plaintiffs correctly contend, the defendant's First Amended
    
    
    3
               Even if the parties had entered into an agreement prior to the initial scheduling conference, the agreement
    would not render the amendment proper under the theory that the parties' joint statement amounted to written
    consent by the plaintiffs' for purposes of Rule 15, because the Court's issuance of its February 3, 2009 Scheduling
    Order superseded any agreement by the parties, the Scheduling Order did not incorporate the parties' joint statement,
    and the parties cannot agree to filing deadlines inapposite of a court order. Nor is there any indication in the record
    that the defendant specifically sought the plaintiffs' consent to this particular amendment. See generally First
    Amended Answer and Counterclaim; see also Pls.' Mot. to Strike at 4. Moreover, Rule 15's mandate requiring "the
    opposing party's written consent" is not satisfied by a general waiver by the opposing party or the opposing party's
    failure to oppose an amendment, see, e.g., Wildauer v. Frederick County, 
    993 F.2d 369
    , 372 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding
    the trial court's denial of leave to amend the complaint not an abuse of discretion because "[a]lthough appellees did
    not oppose plaintiff's motion [to amend the complaint], they did not give the written consent required by [Rule
    15(a)]"), given Rule 15(a)'s objective of avoiding "undue delay" and "undue prejudice to the opposing party,"
    Foman v. Davis, 
    371 U.S. 178
    , 182 (1962); cf. Doe v. McMillan, 
    566 F.2d 713
    , 720 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("When a
    plaintiff seeks to file an amended complaint this tardily, it is within the sound discretion of the district court, in
                                                                                                               (continued . . . )
                                                                 5
    Answer and Counterclaim must be stricken, with the result being that the defendant's original
    
    answer and counterclaims are the operative pleadings on behalf of the defendant properly before
    
    the Court. 4
    
    
    
    (. . . continued)
    consideration of the potential prejudice to the other party and the interest in eventual resolution of litigation, to deny
    leave to amend."). And these objectives are clearly not advanced when parties consent to the filing of an
    amendment before they even know what the landscape will be when an amendment is filed.
    4
              The defendant appears to seek, for the first time in his opposition filing, leave to amend his answer and
    counterclaims pursuant to Rule 15. Defendant’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Defendant Miski’s
    Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Jury Trial and Plaintiffs’ Alternative Motion to Dismiss and Default Judgment
    at 7. However, the defendant has not properly moved for the relief he seeks by filing a separate motion, but even if
    he were to properly seek such relief, the Court would find it imprudent to grant the motion. The defendant asserts
    that "absolutely no prejudice to the plaintiffs [would result] by granting [the] [d]efendant leave to amend . . . .
    [because] [n]othing has happened in the case." Id. He is incorrect. Despite the fact that the defendant filed his
    opposition prior to the termination of discovery, the parties had begun mediation at the time of the defendant's filing.
    Id. Now, however, this case has advanced to the point where discovery has closed and the parties have also already
    engaged in extensive settlement negotiations. Granting the defendant leave to amend at this time would likely force
    the Court to reopen discovery, which would further delay the resolution of this case. The time for the defendant to
    have timely amended his answer and counterclaim under these circumstances having long passed, the Court cannot
    permit the defendant to amend his pleadings at this time.
              Even had the Court considered the request to amend while discovery was still ongoing, granting it would
    have been futile. The defendant's proposed amended answer and counterclaims are identical to his previously filed
    answer and counterclaims in all but one respect: in his amended counterclaim, the defendant seeks to add factual
    allegations to support a breach of contract claim based on an oral contract the defendant and the Ambassador
    purportedly entered into "whereby [the defendant] grant[ed] use of one of [his company's] domain names to the
    [Libyan E]mbassy and the [Libyan E]mbassy [agreed to] use[] [the defendant's company's] services exclusively."
    See First Amended Counter Claim ¶¶ 51, 76-83. The defendant alleges that he was injured when "the Libyan
    [E]mbassy[] refus[ed] to serve [his and his company's] customers" after he "took steps to transfer one of [his
    company's] domain names to the [E]mbassy." Id. ¶¶ 51, 79. The defendant does not allege, however, that he ever
    transferred the domain names to the Libyan Embassy, because before he could, the plaintiffs commenced this action.
    Id. ¶ 51.
              Under District of Columbia law, the essential elements of a contract, whether expressed or implied-in-fact,
    are the following: "competent parties, lawful subject matter, legal consideration, mutuality of assent and mutuality
    of obligation." Henke v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 
    83 F.3d 1445
    , 1450 (D.C.Cir.1996); see also Donovan v. U.S.
    Postal Serv., 
    530 F. Supp. 872
    , 890 (D.D.C. 1981) ("[T]he elements of an express and an implied contract are the
    same."); Jordan Keys & Jessamy, LLP v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 
    870 A.2d 58
    , 62 (D.C. 2005) ("An
    implied-in-fact contract is a true contract, containing all necessary elements of a binding agreement; it differs from
    other contracts only in that it has not been committed to writing or stated orally in express terms, but rather is
    inferred from the conduct of the parties in the milieu in which they dealt." (quoting Vereen v. Clayborne, 
    623 A.2d 1190
    , 1193 (D.C.1993))). Given that the defendant does not allege in his proposed amended counterclaim that either
    he transferred a domain name to the plaintiffs or that the plaintiffs accepted or used the defendant's domain name,
    even reading the allegations in the defendant's proposed amended answer and counterclaims in the light most
    favorable to the defendant, the claim lacks any allegation from which the Court could find legal consideration or
    mutuality of assent and obligation. Thus, the proposed amended counterclaim does not allege an actionable claim
    for breach of an oral or an implied-in-fact contract. Accordingly, granting the amendment would be futile because it
    would not survive a motion to dismiss. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182; James Madison Ltd. by Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d
                                                                                                             (continued . . . )
                                                                6
            However, striking the defendant's amended answer and counterclaims does not resolve
    
    the second issue raised by the plaintiffs: whether they have sovereign immunity against the
    
    defendant's counterclaims for abuse of process and tortious interference. The plaintiffs argue
    
    that they are protected from suit by sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
    
    Act ("FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2006), which provides that a foreign state is "immune from the
    
    jurisdiction of courts of the United States" unless at least one of several exceptions applies, id.
    
    §1604 Those statutory exceptions relevant to this litigation include, in pertinent part,
    
    circumstances where "the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by
    
    implication," id. § 1605(a)(1), or where "money damages are sought against a foreign state for . .
    
    . damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or
    
    omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state while acting
    
    within the scope of his office or employment," id. § 1605(a)(5). The defendant's counterclaims
    
    for monetary damages arise from the plaintiffs' alleged tortuous interference with the defendant’s
    
    contracts and prospective business advantage, Counter Claim [sic] ¶¶ 54-62, and this alleged
    
    conduct clearly falls within this later exception. However, this exception does not apply to "any
    
    claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation,
    
    deceit, or interference with contract rights," id. § 1605(a)(5)(B) (emphasis added), which,
    
    without question, encompasses the defendant's claims. The plaintiffs rely entirely upon this
    
    limitation, arguing that because the defendant's counterclaims are the type of claims specifically
    
    identified in § 1605(a)(5)(B) and the "Libyan Government has not waived its immunity from
    
    suit, . . . the counterclaim[s] must be dismissed." Pls.' Mot. to Strike at 5. Were this exception
    
    (. . . continued)
    1085, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("Courts may deny a motion to amend a complaint as futile . . . if the proposed claim
    would not survive a motion to dismiss.").
    
                                                             7
    and its limitation the only provisions governing this dispute, the plaintiffs' position would be
    
    correct, as neither the defendant's abuse of process claim nor his tortious interference
    
    counterclaims fall within the sovereign immunity exceptions. However, the plaintiffs ignore one
    
    of the other exceptions to sovereign immunity under § 1605: waiver pursuant to § 1605(a)(1).
    
            Section 1607 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides, in pertinent part, that when a
    
    foreign state brings an action in a Court of the United States, it is not immune from a
    
    counterclaim "arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the claim
    
    of the foreign state[, id. § 1607(b),] or . . . to the extent that the counterclaim does not seek relief
    
    exceeding in amount or differing in kind from that sought by the foreign state[,]" id. § 1607(c).
    
    See also Wacker v. Bisson, 
    348 F.2d 602
    , 610 (5th Cir. 1965) ("[A] voluntary appearance by a
    
    foreign government waives immunity as to any essentially defensive measures taken by the
    
    private citizen."). Essentially, where "[a] sovereign has freely come as a suitor into [United
    
    States] courts," the principle of "fair dealing . . . allows a setoff or counterclaim based on the
    
    same subject matter" as the allegations upon which the sovereign is seeking relief. Nat'l City
    
    Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 
    348 U.S. 356
    , 364-65 (1955).
    
            In a previous memorandum opinion issued in this case by another member of this Court,
    
    the Court discussed the plaintiffs' previous motion to strike the defendant's counterclaims and set
    
    forth the governing law on immunity, see Dec. 9, 2008 Order & Memorandum at 6-7
    
    (Oberdorfer, J.), noting that parties claiming immunity, as the plaintiffs do here, also carry the
    
    burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that they are entitled to sovereign
    
    immunity, id. at 6 (citing Agudas Chasidei Chadbad of U.S. v. Russian Fed’n, 
    528 F.3d 934
    , 940
    
    (D.C. Cir. 2008)). In that earlier opinion, Judge Oberdorfer concluded that the plaintiffs did not
    
    
    
                                                       8
    meet their burden of establishing that they were entitled to immunity because "it appear[ed] that
    
    both [counter]claims [asserted by the defendant] ar[o]se out of the [d]efendant’s use of the
    
    [specified] domain names [that provided the basis for the plaintiffs' claims]." Dec. 9, 2008
    
    Order & Memorandum at 8.
    
           Nothing about the nature of the plaintiffs' claims or the defendant's counterclaims has
    
    changed since Judge Oberdorfer weighed in on the issue. The defendant asserts in his
    
    counterclaims allegations regarding his online-based document-services business, his
    
    interactions with the plaintiffs, and his discussions with the Ambassador. See Counter Claim
    
    [sic] ¶¶ 51-52, 55-56, 64-68. These are essentially the same type of allegations relied upon by
    
    the plaintiffs, see generally Compl.; see also Plaintiff Libyan Government’s Response to
    
    Defendant Ahmad Miski’s Motion to Transfer Venue, Ex. 4 (Ambassador Aujali Aff.), but from
    
    a view unfavorable to them. In their renewed motion to strike, the plaintiffs simply have not
    
    addressed the Court's concern by submitting any additional evidence or legal authority
    
    establishing that the defendant's counterclaims are unrelated to the claims being pursued in their
    
    complaint. As noted earlier, the plaintiffs' entire sovereign immunity argument relies on the
    
    exceptions recognized in 28 U.S.C. § 1605, but completely ignores the counterclaim waiver
    
    provision of § 1607, as well as the fact that the claims asserted in the plaintiffs' complaint and the
    
    defendant's tortious interference with contract and prospective economic advantage
    
    counterclaims arise out of the defendant’s use of the domain names identified in the plaintiffs'
    
    complaint. Merely because the plaintiffs refer in their complaint to the specified domain names,
    
    while the defendant instead refers to the name of his business which operates at those domain
    
    names, does not distract from the fact that at the heart of both sides' positions is the question of
    
    
    
                                                      9
    whether the defendant and his business have used the domain names at issue in a legally
    
    permissible manner.
    
           The same is not the case as to the defendant's counterclaim for abuse of process. Unlike
    
    the defendant's other two counterclaims, his counterclaim for abuse of process does not arise out
    
    of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiffs' complaint. Instead, the
    
    defendant's abuse of process counterclaim seeks relief stemming from the plaintiffs' initiation of
    
    this lawsuit itself, not his use of the specified domain names. While the sometimes acrimonious
    
    litigation process can result in the filing of additional tangentially related claims in a case, where,
    
    as here, the plaintiffs are foreign sovereigns, the principle of sovereign immunity stands as a bar
    
    to such claims. The plaintiffs cannot be said to have waived their sovereign immunity for all
    
    counterclaims filed against them by the defendant, just counterclaims arising from the
    
    transactions and occurrences specified in their complaint. Moreover, it is not clear that an abuse
    
    of process claim could even lie based on the allegations asserted by the defendant, which are that
    
    the plaintiffs initiated this case without proper motive, Counter Claim ¶ 73. See Hall v.
    
    Hollywood Credit Clothing Co., 
    147 A.2d 866
    , 868 (D.C. 1959) ("The complaint alleges that
    
    [the opposing party] knowingly brought suit on an unfounded claim, which by itself is not an
    
    abuse of process."). Therefore, while the plaintiffs are not entitled to the protections of
    
    sovereign immunity as to the counterclaims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as
    
    the plaintiffs' claims, they are entitled to employ sovereign immunity as a shield against the
    
    defendant's abuse of process counterclaim.
    
           The final argument asserted by the plaintiffs in their motion to strike is that the defendant
    
    is not entitled to a jury trial because jury trials are precluded in cases against foreign sovereigns.
    
    
    
                                                      10
    Pls.' Mot. to Strike at 5. The defendant counters that he is entitled to a jury trial under the
    
    Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution because the plaintiffs have initiated this
    
    action against him. Defendant’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Defendant Miski’s
    
    Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Jury Trial and Plaintiffs’ Alternative Motion to Dismiss
    
    and Default Judgment at 8-9.
    
            The plaintiffs' argument is essentially rendered moot by the Court's finding that the
    
    defendant's attempt to amend his answer and counterclaims was fatally untimely, having been
    
    submitted almost twenty-eight months after the initiation of this litigation. And it was only in
    
    the defendant's proposed amended filing when he first sought to invoke his right to a jury trial,
    
    more than two years after his written demand was due. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
    
    require a party demanding a jury trial to "serv[e] the other parties with a written demand – which
    
    may be included in a pleading – no later than 10 days after the last pleading directed to the issue
    
    is served." 5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b). In other words, the 10 day period begins when "an issue is
    
    raised for the first time" in a pleading. In re Zweibon, 
    565 F.2d 742
    , 748 (D.C. Cir. 1977). "A
    
    party waives a jury trial unless its demand is properly served and filed," Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(d),
    
    and an amended pleading "does not revive any jury trial right already waived," Bricks, Blocks &
    
    Concrete Co., v. Frontier Ins. Co., 39 Fed. Appx. 610, 611 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing 9 Charles
    
    Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2320 (ed. unspecified); Rosen
    
    v. Dick, 
    639 F.2d 82
    , 94-96 (2d Cir.1980); Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Summa Corp., 
    610 F.2d 614
    ,
    
    
    
    
    5
              As of December 1, 2009, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38 provides that a party has 14 days to demand a
    trial by jury. The former rule, which provided for a 10-day timeframe, is the rule that was applicable when the
    pleading was filed.
    
    
                                                           11
    620 (9th Cir.1979); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 
    479 F.2d 1277
    , 1310 (2d Cir.1973)). Accordingly,
    
    the defendant has waived any right he had to demand a jury trial.6
    
              B.      The Libyan Ambassador's Diplomatic Immunity
    
             Also currently before the Court are three motions that raise the issue of whether the
    
    Libyan Ambassador has diplomatic immunity and cannot be compelled to submit to a deposition
    
    in this action. The three motions are: first, the Ambassador's motion to quash the defendant's
    
    notice of his deposition, Ambassador's Mot. to Quash at 2; second, the plaintiffs' motion to
    
    discharge the sanctions imposed upon them by the Magistrate Judge arising from the
    
    Ambassador's failure to appear at a settlement conference, Pls.' Mot. re Sanctions at 6; and third,
    
    the defendant's motion to dismiss this case should the Ambassador refuse to submit to the
    
    
    
    
    6
               Even if the defendant had timely filed his request for a trial by jury, or even if his breach of contract
    counterclaim could be considered a new issue raised for the first time in his amended counterclaim, he would not be
    entitled to a jury trial on his counterclaims due to the plaintiffs' entitlement under the FSIA to nonjury fact-finding
    "as to all fact issues that underlie liabilities of the foreign sovereign that arise as a matter of law." Matthews v. CTI
    Container Transp. Int'l. Inc., 
    871 F.2d 270
    , 279 (2d Cir. 1989); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2006); Arango v.
    Guzman Travel Advisors, 
    761 F.2d 1527
    , 1532 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding that "[b]y their express terms, 28 U.S.C. §§
    1330 and 1441(d) prohibit a case brought against a foreign state, as defined in section 1603, from being tried before
    a jury. . . . [and] efforts to circumvent this prohibition against jury trials" have been rejected in other circuits);
    Houston v. Murmansk Shipping Co., 
    667 F.2d 1151
    , 1154 (4th Cir. 1982) ("If a complaint contains a request for a
    jury trial and the court determines, either from the complaint or after investigation, that the defendant is a "foreign
    state" as defined in [§] 1603, the complaint should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The sensible practice is
    simply to strike the jury demand." (citation omitted)); Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de Vapores “Inca Capac
    Yupanqui”, 
    639 F.2d 872
    , 875 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[T]here are sufficient reasons why newly authorized suits against
    foreign sovereigns, authoritatively determined to have been unknown to the common law in 1791, are sui generis
    and should not be deemed to be within the scope of the Seventh Amendment's preservation of jury trial."); Croesus
    EMTR Master Fund L.P. v. Federative Republic of Brazil, 
    212 F. Supp. 2d 30
    , 40 (D.D.C. 2002) ("claims under the
    FSIA are not eligible for resolution by a jury"). As to whether the plaintiffs could be said to have waived their
    privilege against having their claims resolved by a jury as a result of having waived their sovereign immunity by
    initiating this action against the defendant, the answer must be no for several reasons. First, because the issues that
    underlie the complaint and the counterclaims arise out of the same facts, to hold otherwise would impermissibly
    circumvent FSIA, and second, because waiver of sovereign immunity does not somehow remove the plaintiffs from
    the protections of the FSIA. See, e.g., Bailey v. Grand Trunk Lines New England, 
    805 F.2d 1097
    , 1101 (2d Cir.
    1986) ("Although [the Canadian National Railway] has waived its immunity from suit in the United States by
    [virtue] of its commercial activities, see 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), it remains amenable to suit in our courts only to the
    extent permitted by, and in accordance with the express terms of, the FSIA.").
    
    
                                                               12
    deposition, Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 12. A brief review of the law of diplomatic immunity is
    
    necessary as a prelude to addressing these motions.
    
           Diplomatic immunity flows from foreign state sovereign immunity, and consequently the
    
    underlying principles supporting the doctrines mirror each other. Abdulaziz v. Metro. Dade Cty,
    
    
    741 F.2d 1328
    , 1330 (11th Cir. 1984) ("The courts have recognized that diplomatic immunity
    
    serves the needs of the foreign sovereign and that the diplomat's privilege is 'merely incidental to
    
    the benefit conferred on the government he represents.'" (citation omitted)). With limited
    
    exceptions, diplomatic immunity shields foreign persons with diplomatic status from being sued
    
    in the courts of this country as prescribed by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
    
    22 U.S.C. § 254d (2006) ("Any action or proceeding brought against an individual who is
    
    entitled to immunity with respect to such action or proceeding under the Vienna Convention on
    
    Diplomatic Relations, under section 254b or 254c of [title 22 of the United States Code], or
    
    under any other laws extending diplomatic privileges and immunities, shall be dismissed."). And
    
    diplomatic immunity, like sovereign immunity, can be waived. For example, courts are willing
    
    to find waiver where a diplomat makes an untimely assertion of immunity, Wacker v. Bisson,
    
    
    348 F.2d 602
    , 609 (5th Cir. 1965), "continu[es] to assert a claim while at the same time seeking
    
    immunity from a counterclaim," Abdulaziz, 741 F.2d at 1331 (citing Nat'l City Bank, 
    348 U.S. 356
     (1955)), or attempts to shield himself behind a corporate veil while commencing an action
    
    through the corporation although the corporation has no meaningful "independent existence"
    
    from the diplomat, Lasidi, S.A. v. Financiera Avenida, S.A., 
    538 N.E.2d 332
    , 334 (N.Y. 1989).
    
    Clearly, all of these waiver exceptions stem from the principle of fairness, as a diplomat, like a
    
    foreign sovereign, cannot use the United States courts as both a sword and shield simultaneously.
    
    
    
                                                     13
           Here, the situation is not easily resolved because it does not involve a party's claim of
    
    immunity. Rather, the Ambassador, from whom the defendant seeks deposition testimony, is not
    
    a party to this action at all. Indeed, the plaintiffs that have commenced this action are two legal
    
    entities, a foreign country and its embassy. Therefore, the Ambassador cannot be said to have
    
    waived his immunity by commencing this action. And, while the Ambassador is in charge of the
    
    embassy and a representative of his country, similar to a lawsuit where a corporation is a party,
    
    McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    185 F.R.D. 70
    , 79-80 (D.D.C. 1999) (finding that a
    
    foreign sovereign is subject to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) just as any other entity to
    
    whom a deposition notice is served), the head of the corporation, like the Ambassador here, may
    
    or may not be an appropriate representative or witness for the entity for the purposes a particular
    
    litigation, see Cmty. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 
    96 F.R.D. 619
    , 621
    
    (D.D.C. 1983) ("In the absence of such extraordinary circumstances, however, an agency
    
    official—even if nominally a party—is generally not to be required to submit to an oral
    
    discovery deposition in connection with civil litigation when the agency itself has or is willing to
    
    respond institutionally to discovery initiatives by producing the administrative record or other
    
    documents, answering interrogatories, or by designating a single representative to speak for the
    
    agency on deposition in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6)."). However, the fact that the
    
    Ambassador is not a party to this litigation, but merely a potential representative of the two
    
    sovereign plaintiffs, does not preclude the Court from finding that either the foreign sovereign or
    
    the Ambassador himself has waived his diplomatic immunity, either expressly or implicitly, by
    
    actively participating in this litigation. See Doe v. United States, 
    860 F.2d 40
    , 45 (2d Cir. 1988)
    
    (finding that the foreign sovereign expressly waived the diplomats' immunity); cf. Aquamar,
    
    
    
                                                     14
    S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 
    179 F.3d 1279
    , 1291 & n.24, 1292-93, 1297 (11th
    
    Cir. 1999) (observing that the Republic of Ecuador was acting through its Ambassador and
    
    finding that the Ambassador waived his country's sovereign immunity expressly through the
    
    content of his sworn affidavit). Yet, "[t]he courts [are] loath" to find an "implied waiver" by a
    
    diplomat absent an "'unmistakable'" or "'unambiguous'" waiver. Aquamar, 179 F.3d at 1291 n.24
    
    (quoting Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 
    930 F.2d 1013
    , 1017 (2d Cir. 1991) (collecting cases)).
    
           It is the defendant's position that the submission of the Ambassador's affidavit, which was
    
    attached to the plaintiffs' opposition to the defendant's motion to transfer venue at the start of this
    
    litigation, see Plaintiff Libyan Government’s Response to Defendant Ahmad Miski’s Motion to
    
    Transfer Venue, Ex. 4 (Ambassador Aujali Aff.), constitutes a waiver of the Ambassador's
    
    immunity because it amounts to the Ambassador's appearance and voluntary participation in this
    
    action, Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 8. The defendant further contends that the Ambassador's
    
    representations in his affidavit are "untruthful," and given the Ambassador's voluntary
    
    participation as a witness, fairness dictates that the defendant must be afforded the opportunity to
    
    depose the Ambassador to establish the untruthfulness of his affidavit. Id.; see also Defendant’s
    
    Response to Ambassador Aujali’s Motion to Quash Defendant’s Notice of Deposition and
    
    Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Case at 4. On the contrary, it is the plaintiffs' and the
    
    Ambassador's position that the Ambassador's affidavit did not waive his immunity because he
    
    has personal immunity that cannot be waived at any stage of these proceedings. Ambassador
    
    Aujali’s and the Libyan Government’s Reply to Defendant Miski’s Opposition (Docket #37) to
    
    Ambassador Aujali’s and the Libyan Government’s Motion to Quash Defendant Miski’s Notice
    
    of Deposition (Docket #35) at 3; Pls.' Mot. re Sanctions at 12; Libyan Government’s Opposition
    
    
    
                                                      15
    to Defendant Miski’s Opposition [#54/57] to the Libyan Government’s Objection to the
    
    Magistrate Judge’s Order Regarding Sanctions [#53] and Defendant Miski’s Motion to Dismiss
    
    Plaintiff’s Case [#54/57] at 5.
    
           While the Ambassador's position that he possesses impenetrable personal immunity is not
    
    correct, it is clear, as the Ambassador states in his motion, that he never made "'a conscious
    
    decision to take part in th[is] litigation.'" Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
    
    
    905 F.2d 438
    , 444 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
    761 F.2d 370
    , 378 (7th Cir. 1985)). Indeed, his affidavit spoke to the defendant's contacts with the
    
    District of Columbia, Plaintiff Libyan Government’s Response to Defendant Ahmad Miski’s
    
    Motion to Transfer Venue, Ex. 4 (Ambassador Aujali Aff.) ¶¶ 7-9, contacts the defendant
    
    himself acknowledges in his answer and counterclaims, Counter Claim ¶ 51, and in determining
    
    that venue in the District of Columbia is proper, the Court considered the affidavit only to that
    
    extent, and not as to whether any agreements between the parties were ever reached, let alone
    
    breached, based upon that contact, Memorandum Opinion 3, 6, 8, 12. Accordingly, the Court
    
    cannot find that the Ambassador has waived his diplomatic immunity in this action. And, to the
    
    extent that the Ambassador made representations about the substance of his conversations with
    
    the defendant, either in his affidavit or elsewhere, those representations amount to hearsay so far
    
    as the plaintiffs are concerned. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c) ("'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one
    
    made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
    
    truth of the matter asserted."). Thus, should the Ambassador continue his unwillingness to
    
    participate in this matter in the future, his representations cannot be relied upon by the plaintiffs
    
    as evidence in support of their claims or to challenge the defendant's counterclaims.
    
    
    
                                                      16
             Accordingly, the Court must grant the Ambassador's motion to quash the defendant's
    
    notice of deposition. However, the Court will not award the attorney's fees the Ambassador
    
    seeks, Ambassador's Mot. to Quash at 1, because the defendant's position, although unsuccessful,
    
    was "substantially justified" given that the Ambassador submitted an affidavit, which could be
    
    reasonably interpreted by the defendant as indicating the Ambassador's willingness to participate
    
    in this litigation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5). Similarly, the Court must deny the defendant's
    
    motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint even if the Ambassador chooses to invoke his
    
    diplomatic immunity. The defendant's position that the Ambassador's refusal to testify requires
    
    dismissal of this action, Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 12, overstates the significance of his testimony,
    
    as the plaintiffs represent that there are other officials employed by the Embassy who have
    
    personal knowledge of the underlying facts of their complaint and who can testify about the
    
    events that support their position, Libyan Government’s Opposition to Defendant Miski’s
    
    Opposition [#54/57] to the Libyan Government’s Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Order
    
    Regarding Sanctions [#53] and Defendant Miski’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Case [#54/57] at
    
    12. And given the restrictions that the Court has imposed on the plaintiffs' use of the
    
    Ambassador's affidavit, the defendant will not be prejudiced if the plaintiffs choose not to call
    
    the Ambassador as a witness at trial. 7
    
             As to the plaintiffs' motion to set aside the sanctions imposed by the Magistrate Judge,
    
    the Ambassador's legitimate claim of immunity is not a sufficient reason to set aside those
    
    
    7
              Moreover, the defendant cannot definitively establish what the Ambassador's testimony would be if he
    testified at trial. The defendant presumes that the Ambassador would testify consistent with his sworn affidavit as to
    the alleged interactions he had with the defendant, see Defendant’s Response to Ambassador Aujali’s Motion to
    Quash Defendant’s Notice of Deposition and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Case at 6, 8, which is a
    reasonable conclusion. However, without any further indication that such testimony would actually become part of
    the evidence at trial if the Ambassador testified, the defendant cannot establish the prejudice he presumes will occur
    based upon mere presumption and speculation.
    
                                                             17
    sanctions, as urged by the plaintiffs. Pls.' Mot. re Sanctions at 5. The plaintiffs essentially argue
    
    that the sanctions imposed against the Libyan government by the Magistrate Judge as a result of
    
    "Ambassador Aujali’s refusal to attend the August 7, 2009 settlement conference [are] both
    
    'clearly erroneous' and 'contrary to law' since Ambassador Aujali has absolute immunity from
    
    compulsory court appearances of any kind, much less a settlement conference pursuant to the
    
    Vienna Convention." Id. The plaintiffs request that the Court vacate the Magistrate Judge's
    
    order. Id. The defendant responds that the imposition of sanctions was reasonable under the
    
    circumstances due to the abrupt cancellation of negotiations by the plaintiffs, and his counsel's
    
    participation in several earlier conferences even though the plaintiffs obviously had no intentions
    
    of settling the case, which caused "the [d]efendant [to] incur[] substantial avoidable expenses."
    
    Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 6-7.
    
           The plaintiffs correctly acknowledge that the decision of the Magistrate Judge is entitled
    
    to deference unless it is "'found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.'" Boca Investerings
    
    P'ship v. United States, 
    31 F. Supp. 2d 9
    , 11 (D.D.C. 1998) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a)).
    
    Having reviewed that decision, however, the Court cannot determine the exact reasoning
    
    underlying the Magistrate Judge's imposition of sanctions against the plaintiffs. After the Court
    
    made its referral to the Magistrate Judge and she had already conducted a number of
    
    unsuccessful settlement conferences with the parties, she instructed the plaintiffs to appear at the
    
    next settlement conference with a representative who had the authority to approve a binding
    
    settlement agreement. Instead of complying, the plaintiffs did not appear, nor did they provide
    
    any meaningful notice to the Court or the defendant that they intended to take this action. The
    
    Magistrate Judge therefore imposed a monetary sanction of $750 against the plaintiffs "for the
    
    
    
                                                     18
    reasons set forth on the record." August 7, 2009 Minute Entry. However, the Minute Entry
    
    entered on the Magistrate Judge's docket does not indicate why the amount of $750 was selected.
    
    Therefore, the Court is unable to assess whether the Magistrate Judge's rationale was clearly
    
    erroneous or contrary to law under the circumstances, or whether the $750 sanction was
    
    reasonable. 8 Accordingly, the Court must deny without prejudice the plaintiff's motion to set
    
    aside the sanction and remand the issue to the Magistrate Judge so that she can supplement the
    
    record with her basis for the amount of the sanction. After the Magistrate Judge has provided the
    
    supplemental explanation, the plaintiffs may renew their motion if they still object to the
    
    Magistrate Judge's decision.
    
    II.      The Plaintiffs' Motions to Strike
    
             Also before the Court are two motions filed by the plaintiffs seeking to strike the
    
    defendant's interrogatories and expert designations as untimely. See generally Plaintiff Libyan
    
    Government’s Motion to Strike Defendant Miski's Expert Designations as Untimely; Plaintiff
    
    Libyan Government’s Motion to Strike Defendant Miski's Second Set of Interrogatories as
    
    Untimely. The defendant opposes both motions. See generally Defendant’s Opposition to
    
    Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Defendant’s Second Set of Interrogatories; Defendant’s Opposition
    
    8
             Presumably $750 would be a reasonable sanction if the Magistrate Judge intended to compensate the
    defendant for the expense he incurred to participate in all of the settlement conferences, because in addition to the
    telephone conference, the Magistrate Judge had the five face-to-face settlement conferences at which the defendant's
    counsel participated. Awarding the defendant's counsel $150 per face-to-face conference would seem reasonable
    considering that the market hourly rate in Washington D.C. for attorneys with at least ten years of experience, as the
    defendant's counsel has, presumably exceeds that amount. See Laffey Matrix,
    http://www.laffeymatrix.com/see.html (last accessed Jan. 25, 2010); DC Bar, Find a Member
    http://www.dcbar.org/find_a_member/index.cfm (search Kamal Nawash) (last accessed Jan. 25, 2010) (indicating
    that counsel for the defendant was admitted to the District of Columbia bar on June 5, 1998); see also Cobell v.
    Norton, 
    231 F. Supp. 2d 295
    , 302 (D.D.C. 2002) (relying upon the Laffey Matrix, a methodology for calculating the
    prevailing market rate for attorney's fees in the Washington D.C. community, to determine the reasonableness of
    attorney's fees); Cf. In re North, 
    50 F.3d 42
    , 44 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding attorney's fees of $180 and $250 per hour
    reasonable for attorneys in the Washington D.C. area). On remand, the Magistrate Judge can specify the basis for
    the amount of the sanction.
    
    
                                                             19
    to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Defendant Exert [sic] Witness Designation. The relief that the
    
    plaintiffs seek must be denied, as a cursory review of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
    
    informs that non-pleadings, such as discovery requests, are not subject to motions to strike. See
    
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) (identifying what may be stricken from pleadings); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
    
    7(a) (defining pleadings); cf. Brown v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, __ F.Supp.2d __, __ 
    2009 WL 2704586
     at *3 n.5 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding that an opposition to a motion is not a pleading and
    
    observing that "striking pleadings is an extreme and disfavored remedy"). However, the Court
    
    issued a Scheduling Order in this case on February 3, 2009, which set forth the deadlines for the
    
    submission of expert witness reports and indicated that discovery would conclude on July 30,
    
    2009. And because the Court finds that the defendant has thus far failed to offer a compelling
    
    reason why he could not abide by the dates set forth in that Order, he must demonstrate why the
    
    plaintiffs should be required to respond to his untimely discovery requests. Upon review of the
    
    defendant's opposition to the plaintiffs' motion, it is clear that he foresaw the discovery disputes
    
    that have arisen between the parties, including the sluggish pace the discovery process was
    
    taking, but instead of choosing to file a motion to compel (as the Court had advised in an earlier
    
    hearing) due to the potential delay he predicted in the resolution of any motion to compel, the
    
    defendant instead chose to submit to the plaintiffs untimely interrogatories hoping they would
    
    respond to them. See Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendant's Second
    
    Set of Interrogatories at 4.
    
            To permit a party who is frustrated with the speed of the litigation process to disregard
    
    judicial orders and render deadlines nullities would severely impede the Court's ability to control
    
    its calendar. Not only is the defendant's rationale for the submission of his untimely
    
    
    
                                                     20
    interrogatories unconvincing, but he has offered no valid reason why he was unable to timely file
    
    his expert witness designations. According to the defendant, he failed to file his expert witness
    
    designations because he believed that settlement was imminent. Defendant's Opposition to
    
    Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendant Exert [sic] Witness Designation at 3. Presumably, he
    
    surmised that filing the expert designations would ultimately be unnecessary, and therefore, he
    
    decided not to file them until it became clear that the litigation would continue. Yet, a mea culpa
    
    does not excuse the defendant from complying with Court-imposed discovery obligations.
    
    Absent a proffer that the parties had reached a settlement in principle, the defendant's reliance on
    
    the potential of settlement is both naïve and legally unreasonable, and did not relieve him of his
    
    Court-imposed obligations, such as complying with the scheduling order. See New Econ.
    
    Capital, LLC v. New Mkts. Capital Group, 
    881 A.2d 1087
    , 1097 (D.C. 2005) (finding that no
    
    legally enforceable promise, and thus no reasonable reliance, can lie where the parties merely
    
    "promised [to enter into] an agreement if the material terms could be worked out between the
    
    parties" (citation omitted)). The defendant should have either sought an extension of the
    
    discovery deadlines or filed a motion to compel, as he was advised by the Court when his
    
    objection to the plaintiffs' compliance with discovery was first brought to the Court's attention.
    
    Having failed to timely file his interrogatories and expert designations, the plaintiff need not
    
    respond to the these submission unless the defendant can show that undue prejudice would result
    
    were he not permitted to compel the plaintiffs to respond to his interrogatories and file his expert
    
    designations, as compared to the prejudice the plaintiffs have sustained as a result of the
    
    defendant's untimely actions.
    
    
    
    
                                                     21
    III.   The Defendant's Duplicative Motions to Dismiss
    
           Finally, the remaining unresolved motion before the Court is an additional motion to
    
    dismiss filed by the defendant on March 28, 2009. This motion must be denied as moot because
    
    the defendant's second motion to dismiss, filed on August 24, 2009, which the above analysis
    
    resolves, completely moots this earlier filed motion. Compare Defendant’s Response to
    
    Ambassador Aujali’s Motion to Quash Defendant’s Notice of Deposition and Defendant’s
    
    Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Case at 4, 8 (filed on March 28, 2009), with Defendant’s
    
    Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Order Regarding “Sanctions” and
    
    Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Case at 7-8, 11-12 (filed on August 24, 2009).
    
    IV.    Conclusion
    
           For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that: (1) Plaintiff Libyan Government’s Motion
    
    to Strike Defendant Miski’s Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Jury Demand (Docket #36), or
    
    in the Alternative, Motion to Dismiss, and Motion for Default Judgment is granted in part in so
    
    far as it seeks to strike the defendant's untimely filed amended answer, counterclaim, and jury
    
    demand, and is denied in part in so far as it seeks further relief; (2) Ambassador Aujali’s Motion
    
    to Quash Defendant Miski’s Notice of Deposition is granted; (3) Plaintiff Libyan Government's
    
    Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Order Regarding Sanctions is denied without prejudice and the
    
    matter remanded to the Magistrate Judge for clarification; (4) Defendant’s Opposition to
    
    Plaintiffs’ Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Order Regarding “Sanctions” and Defendant’s
    
    Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Case is denied; (5) Plaintiff Libyan Government’s Motion to Strike
    
    Defendant Miski's Expert Designations as Untimely is denied; (6) Plaintiff Libyan Government’s
    
    Motion to Strike Defendant Miski's Second Set of Interrogatories as Untimely is denied; (7)
    
    
    
                                                    22
    Defendant’s Response to Ambassador Aujali’s Motion to Quash Defendant’s Notice of
    
    Deposition and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Case is denied as moot; and (8) the
    
    defendant must show cause by February 12, 2010, why the plaintiffs should be required to
    
    respond to his untimely interrogatories and accept his untimely expert witness designation. 9
    
                                                             _____/s/________________
                                                             Reggie B. Walton
                                                             United States District Judge
    
    
    
    
    9
           An Order consistent with the Court’s ruling accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
    
                                                       23
    

Document Info

DocketNumber: Civil Action No. 2006-2046

Judges: Judge Reggie B. Walton

Filed Date: 1/25/2010

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014

Authorities (27)

National City Bank of NY v. Republic of China , 348 U.S. 356 ( 1955 )

Foman v. Davis , 371 U.S. 178 ( 1962 )

Agudas Chasidei Chabad of US v. RUSSIAN FED. , 528 F.3d 934 ( 2008 )

J. Samuel Wacker v. J. G. Bisson, Consul General, Dominion ... , 348 F.2d 602 ( 1965 )

Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,959 Frank Lanza, Jr. v. Drexel & Co.,... , 479 F.2d 1277 ( 1973 )

In Re: Bertram Zweibon , 565 F.2d 742 ( 1977 )

john-doe-by-his-guardian-mary-doe-v-john-l-mcmillan-chairman-of-the , 566 F.2d 713 ( 1977 )

las-vegas-sun-inc-a-nevada-corporation-v-summa-corporation-dba , 610 F.2d 614 ( 1980 )

irving-m-rosen-trustee-in-reorganization-of-bermec-corporation-plaintiff , 639 F.2d 82 ( 1981 )

domenico-ruggiero-v-compania-peruana-de-vapores-inca-capac-yupanqui , 639 F.2d 872 ( 1981 )

frederick-houston-and-frederick-houston-and-willie-mae-houston-as-husband , 667 F.2d 1151 ( 1982 )

hrh-prince-turki-bin-abdulaziz-v-metropolitan-dade-county-michael , 741 F.2d 1328 ( 1984 )

Lois Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics , 761 F.2d 370 ( 1985 )

ramiro-arango-and-gabriella-arango-individually-and-as-parents-and-best , 761 F.2d 1527 ( 1985 )

Eileen Bailey v. Grand Trunk Lines New England, Canadian ... , 805 F.2d 1097 ( 1986 )

In Re Mr. And Mrs. Doe, Witnesses Before the Grand Jury. Mr.... , 860 F.2d 40 ( 1988 )

thomas-j-matthews-and-kathleen-matthews-plaintiffs-appellees-appellants , 871 F.2d 270 ( 1989 )

Foremost-Mckesson, Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran , 905 F.2d 438 ( 1990 )

David Shapiro v. The Republic of Bolivia, the Bolivian Air ... , 930 F.2d 1013 ( 1991 )

ann-wildauer-v-frederick-county-leslie-cruger-joseph-e-emerson-stephen , 993 F.2d 369 ( 1993 )

View All Authorities »