Woodson v. District of Columbia ( 2019 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
D.W., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. Civil Action No. 18-cv-1824 (CRC) (DAR)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Defendant.
ORDER
Upon careful consideration of the record in this case and the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation filed July 15, 2019, and hearing no objections from the Defendant, the Court
hereby ADOPTS the Report of the Magistrate Judge and ACCEPTS her Recommendation.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that [12] Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED. It is
further
ORDERED that [14] Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Date: July 30, 2019
CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER
United States District Judge
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Woodson et al.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-01824
District of Columbia,
CRC/DAR
Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Arika Woodson commenced this action pursuant to the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004 (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482, and the
Special Education Student Rights Act of 2014 (“Student Rights Act”) D.C. Code § 38-2571.02 –
38-2573.01, seeking judicial review of a final decision of an Independent Hearing Officer
(“IHO”) of the District of Columbia Office of the State Superintendent of Education with respect
to D.W., her minor child, a student who is eligible for special education and related services. See
Complaint (ECF No. 1) ¶ 1.
In her complaint, Plaintiff claims that the Hearing Officer Decision (“HOD”) was
erroneous as a matter of law, and that the Hearing Officer erred by placing a condition on the
Plaintiff’s right to have a designee observe D.W. by finding that the Defendant, the District of
Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”), could require the designee to certify by signing a non-
disclosure agreement that he would not testify about the observation in a due process hearing
involving D.W. See Complaint ¶¶ 52-61. Plaintiff requests that the court vacate the May 18,
Woodson et al. v. District of Columbia
2018 HOD and order the Defendant to allow the Plaintiff’s designee to observe D.W. without
any restrictions outside those explicitly listed in the D.C. Code. Id. at ¶ 62.
I. BACKGROUND1
A. Factual Background
D.W. is eligible for services as a student who has been diagnosed with Angelman’s
Syndrome, Agenesis of the Corpus Callosum, asthma, allergies, microencephaly, cerebral palsy
(mild), and global delays across developmental levels. See Hearing Officer’s Determination
(“HOD”) (ECF No. 10-1) at 7. During the 2016-2017 school year, D.W. attended Francis-
Stevens Elementary School, and was in a self-contained classroom with a dedicated aide. Id. At
the end of that school year, DCPS informed the Plaintiff that it would be placing D.W. in a
different day school without the dedicated aide. Id. The Plaintiff objected and filed a due process
complaint on August 14, 2017. Id.The due process hearing resulted in a determination by IHO Coles Ruff that DCPS had
denied D.W. a free and appropriate public education (“FAPE”) when it proposed to place D.W.
in a more restrictive educational placement. Id. at 7-8. In an interim order, IHO Ruff denied the
Plaintiff’s request for her education expert, Dr. Paul Livelli to observe the student at Beers
Elementary because he believed Dr. Livelli had a potential financial interest in the litigation. Id.1
The facts pertinent to this recitation of the background are summarized from the Hearing Officer Determination
which is a part of the Administrative Record. Plaintiff, in her opposition to Defendant’s cross motion contends that
the Defendant failed to oppose the Plaintiff’s statement of material facts, which includes documents that are in
addition to the Administrative Record, and asked that her Statement of Facts be admitted. See Plaintiff’s
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply Memorandum in
Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Memo in Opposition”) (ECF No. 15) at 1, n.1. This
contention is incorrect; LCvR 7(h)(2) states that in cases that are based solely on the Administrative Record,
“motions for summary judgment and oppositions thereto shall include a statement of facts with references to the
administrative record.” LCvR 7(h)(2). See also LCvR cmt. to LCvR 7(h) (“this provision recognizes that in cases
where review is based on an administrative record the Court is not called upon to determine whether there is a
genuine issue of material fact, but rather to test the agency action against the administrative record.”); Kelsey v.
District of Columbia, No. 13-1956 BAH/DAR, 2015 WL 13658063 at *2 n.4 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2015) (“review of
cross-motions for summary judgment will be based solely on the administrative record”).
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at 8. As relief, IHO Ruff ordered DCPS to conduct new evaluations, and to convene a meeting to
review and revise D.W.’s Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) to determine a placement for
the student. Id.Prior to this meeting, Plaintiff again sought to have Dr. Livelli observe D.W. at Francis-
Stevens Elementary, but on December 5, 2017, DCPS informed the petitioner that it would not
allow the observation because IHO Ruff had denied the Plaintiff’s request for Dr. Livelli to
observe the student in prior litigation. Id. at 9. At the time of this request, there was no current
litigation ongoing between the parties. Id. On January 22, 2018, DCPS convened a meeting to
review the new evaluations, which Dr. Livelli attended. Id.2
On February 2, 2018, Plaintiff filed an administrative due process complaint against
DCPS, alleging that DCPS violated the Student Rights Act by denying the Plaintiff’s designee
the chance to observe D.W., and that this denied D.W. a FAPE. See Due Process Complaint
Notice (ECF No. 10-1) at 28. DCPS moved on February 22, 2018 to dismiss the complaint,
alleging that the action was barred by collateral estoppel and/or res judicata because the proposed
observation was the same kind of observation that was barred by IHO Ruff’s HOD. See HOD at
3-4. IHO Michael S. Lazan stated that the issue to be determined was, “[d]id DCPS deny the
Petitioner’s expert an opportunity to observe the Student’s classroom in violation of the Special
Education Student Rights Act, located at D.C. Code Sect. 38-2571.03(5)(A)?” See id. at 7.
2
The new evaluations included three observations by a DCPS psychologist, interviews with D.W.’s special
education teacher, speech and language pathologist occupational therapist, paraprofessional classroom aide, and
dedicated aide, as well as an Assistive Technology Evaluation. See HOD (ECF 10-1) at 9. The Plaintiff maintains
that her participation in the January IEP meeting was limited because her designee was not allowed to observe
D.W. in the classroom, while DCPS had employees who had conducted evaluations. See Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF 12) at 6.
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B. Summary of the Hearing Officer Determination
Following the due process hearing, IHO Lazan found on May 18, 2018 that the Plaintiff
was entitled to have her designee observe D.W. at D.W.’s school, but before the observation,
DCPS could require the designee to sign a document under oath affirming that he would “not use
the information gathered during the observation 1) in any subsequent special education litigation
against DCPS; and 2) in an effort to retain additional clients so that they can engage in special
education litigation against DCPS.” HOD at 13.
In his discussion of the case, IHO Lazan relied on his interpretation of two sections of the
Student Right’s Act, set out in D.C. Code § 38-2571.03(5)(A) and (E), which provide that:
Upon request, an LEA shall provide timely access, either together
or separately, to the following for observing a child’s current or
proposed special education program: (i) The parent of a child with a
disability; or (ii) a designee appointed by the parent of a child with
a disability who has professional expertise in the area of special
education being observed or is necessary to facilitate an observation
for a parent with a disability or to provide language translation
assistance to a parent; provided that the designee is neither
representing the parent’s child in litigation related to the provision
of free and appropriate public education for that child nor has a
financial interest in the outcome of such litigation.
D.C. Code § 38-2571.03(5)(A), and that:
An observer shall not disclose nor use any information obtained
during the course of an observation obtained during the course of an
observation for the purpose of seeking or engaging clients in
litigation against the District or the LEA.
Id. at (E).
IHO Lazan determined that the reference to “such litigation” in § 38-2571.03(5)(A)
referred to current litigation, and that because there was no current litigation, the Plaintiff’s
designee could conduct an observation. See HOD at 12. Further, IHO Lazan determined that the
§ 38-2571.03(5)(E) placed a condition on observers who intend to use the information in future
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litigation. Id. IHO Lazan then determined that because Dr. Livelli did not understand what this
clause meant and had indicated in testimony that he may use the information in future litigation,
DCPS could require Dr. Livelli to sign a document precluding him from using the information
obtained in the observation in any subsequent litigation against DCPS involving this student or
any other student. Id.
II. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
A. Contentions of the Plaintiff in her Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff alleges that the IHO erred in interpreting the Student Rights Act by preventing
the Plaintiff’s designee from observing D.W. in his current placement and testifying about what
he observed in any subsequent due process proceeding involving D.W. See Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Motion
for Summary Judgment”) (ECF No. 12) at 1. In her Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff
claims that the HOD is contrary to the plain language of the Student Rights Act, and that D.C.
Code § 38-2571.03(5)(E) ( “An observer shall not disclose nor use any information obtained
during the course of an observation for the purpose of seeking or engaging clients in litigation
against the District or the LEA”) does not refer to observers who have already been engaged by a
Plaintiff. See Id. at 12. In support of this conclusion, the Plaintiff cited the legislative history of
the statute, which she alleges gives no clear indication anything other than the plain meaning of
the statute was intended. Id. Plaintiff further contends that the purpose of the statute was to
“ensure that ‘parents have the tools they need to stay informed, engaged, and empowered
throughout the special education process.’” Id. (quoting D.C. Council, Report on Bill 20-723 at
1 (July 10, 2014)).
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The Plaintiff further contended that the IHO’s interpretation of the Student Rights Act
would lead to unjust or absurd consequences, because while schools would have multiple experts
who could observe the student and offer testimony at a due process hearing, the parents would
only be able to bring in an expert if the expert had not observed the student in the program. Id. at
18. As evidence of this claim, the Plaintiff alleges that the IHO who issued the HOD in question
later revisited his interpretation of the Student Rights Act in a subsequent case and determined
that “the words ‘seeking’ or ‘engaging’ in the statute are better read as a reference to an observer
looking for, or working with, ‘new’ clients.” Id. at 31.
Finally, the Plaintiff alleges that the HOD would violate the principles of IDEA, as it
would limit the Plaintiff’s participation in the IEP process, as well as her ability to evaluate the
Student’s IEP. Id. at 21. Plaintiff contends that for the foregoing reasons, they are entitled to
summary judgment. Id. at 1.
B. Contentions of the Defendant in Opposition and Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment
Defendant believes DCPS is entitled to summary judgment. See District of Columbia’s
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment (“Def.’s Cross Motion”) (ECF No. 13) at 1. The Defendant contends that the Court
lacks the jurisdiction to hear the challenge because the HOD awarded the Plaintiff the relief that
they sought, and the IDEA does not create a right of action to challenge a favorable HOD. Id. at
8. Defendant further contends that the complaint is moot, because the Plaintiff’s received the
“precise legal relief that they were seeking.” Id. at 14.
Next, Defendant suggests that IHO correctly applied D.C. Code §38-2571.03(5)(E), and
that the statutory language is unambiguous. Id. at 15. The Defendant maintains that the plain
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Woodson et al. v. District of Columbia
intent of the provision is to bar designees that are representing the parent’s child in litigation or
that have a financial interest in the outcome of the litigation. Id. at 17. Defendant also maintains
that the intent of the statute was to prevent needless litigation against the District and the LEA.
Id. at 18. DCPS further argues that the legislative intent behind the Student Rights Act was
meant to create a series of rights for parents, but that this does not support the notion that these
rights would not be empowering if parents did not have “unrestricted” use of their experts to
testify. Id.at 21.
The Defendant further argued that IHO Lazan’s later HOD did not affect the outcome of
the current case, because the parents in that case were not granted any rights than the Plaintiff is
granted in the instant case. Defendant stated that “[n]othing in the HOD in the instant case stands
for the proposition that Plaintiffs’ expert could not use the result of his observations to testify in
relation to a due process hearing for D.W., if he complied with the HOD’s terms and signed the
non-disclosure agreement with the school.” Id. at 22.
Finally, the Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s designee was not prevented from observing
D.W. in his class setting and was free to do so and then educate the Plaintiff based on his
observation. The designee just had to comply with the provisions of the Student Rights Act,
which involved signing a non-disclosure agreement as the HOD required. Id. at 23.
C. Contentions of the Plaintiff in her Memorandum in Opposition to the Cross-Motion
In her Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment, the Plaintiff disputes the Defendant’s interpretation of the plain language of the statute
and the legislative history discussing it. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Memo in Opposition”) (ECF No. 15) at 4-5. In
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addition, the Plaintiff contends that she was not granted the relief she requested, because she
asked for “meaningful school observations,” and the HOD limited the Plaintiff’s ability to use
the observation if she disagreed with the school later. Id. at 12-13. The Plaintiff contends that the
HOD has resulted in and will continue to result in prejudice when it comes to special education
decisions being made for her child. Id. at 15.
Further, the Plaintiff claims the case is not moot because there is an ongoing controversy
and she has not obtained the relief she seeks. Id. at 16. The Plaintiff further notes that even if the
current case was moot, the case should be heard because it involves an interpretation of the
Student Rights Act that could occur repeatedly but may evade review. Id. at 17. She argues that
the time frame of a HOD challenge may be too short to litigate before any subsequent IEP
meeting that the observation would be needed for. Id. at 17-18. The Plaintiff contends that she is
likely to be in a similar situation again and will continue to need access to independent
observations of her child, and that without relief, the Defendant will continue to limit her access
to observations. Id. at 19. Finally, the Plaintiff contends that other families seeking observations
of their children will be placed in a similar situation as her and may be “forced to give up the
ability to get an observation or to litigate their request to obtain a meaningful school
observation.” Id. at 20.
III. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
The purpose of IDEA is to “ensure that all children with disabilities have available to
them a free and appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related
services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education,
employment, and independent living.” M.G. v. District of Columbia, 246 F.Supp.3d 1,7 (D.D.C.
2017) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)). This requires state and local education agencies to
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Woodson et al. v. District of Columbia
create eligible students Individualized Education Plans in consultation with the student’s parents.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B). Parents must have an opportunity to participate in the IEP
process, and “procedural inadequacies that “seriously infringe upon the parents’ opportunity to
participate in the IEP formulation process… clearly result in the denial of a FAPE.”” Cooper v.
District of Columbia, 77 F.Supp.3d 32, 37 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting A.I. 3ex rel. Iapalucci v.
District of Columbia, 402 F.Supp.2d 152, 164 (D.D.C. 2005)) (alteration in original). To ensure
these requirements are followed, IDEA established procedural safeguards that allows parents to
seek review of IEP decisions they disagree with. See Middleton v. District of Columbia, 312
F.Supp.3d 113, 122 (D.D.C. 2018). Section 1415(f)(1)(A) provides “the parents or the local
education agency involved in such a complain shall have an opportunity for an impartial due
process hearing…” Following a due process hearing, § 1415 (i)(2)(A) provides that,
Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made under
subsection (f) or (k) who does not have the right to an appeal under
subsection (g), and any party aggrieved by the findings and decision
made under this subsection, shall have the right to bring a civil
action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this
section, which action may be brought in any state court of competent
jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States, without regard
to the amount in controversy.
20 U.S.C.A. § 1415 (i)(2)(A).
Further, IDEA allows states to create additional procedural and substantive protections if
they are consistent with IDEA. Middleton, 312 F.Supp.3d at 122. If a state creates a higher
standard, “an individual may bring an action under the federal statute seeking to enforce the state
standard.” Id. (quoting Gill v. Columbia 93 Sch. Dist.,217 F.3d 1027, 1035). In 2014, the
District of Columbia passed the Student Rights Act. Id. The Act “provides district parents with
additional procedural safeguards to help make sure parents have the tools they need to stay
informed, engaged, and empowered throughout the special education process.” See D.C. Council
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Woodson et al. v. District of Columbia
Comm. Rep. on B 20-723 (D.C. 2014) at 1. Recognizing that “parents who do not have a specific
background in the subject area… often cannot adequately evaluate whether their child’s
instruction is sufficient [and that] parents are concerned that an LEA may limit such access to the
point that the observation is unable to provide meaningful input into their child’s educational
progress,”3 the Student Rights Act expanded on a parent’s “right to observe” under the IDEA,
and states:
Upon request, an LEA shall provide timely access, either together
or separately, to the following for observing a child’s current or
proposed special education program: (i) The parent of a child with a
disability; or (ii) a designee appointed by the parent of a child with
a disability who has professional expertise in the area of special
education being observed or is necessary to facilitate an observation
for a parent with a disability or to provide language translation
assistance to a parent; provided that the designee is neither
representing the parent’s child in litigation related to the provision
of free and appropriate public education for that child nor has a
financial interest in the outcome of such litigation.
D.C. Code § 38-2571.03(5)(A). Restrictions on this right to observe are detailed in § 38-
2571.03(5)(D):
The LEA shall not impose any conditions or restrictions on such
observations except those necessary to:
(i) Ensure the safety of the children in the program;
(ii) Protect other children in the program from disclosure by an
observer of confidential and personally identifiable
information in the event such information is obtained in the
course of an observation by a parent or a designee; or
(iii) Avoid any potential disruption arising from multiple
observations in a classroom simultaneously.
D.C. Code § 38-2571.03(5)(D).
Finally, D.C. Code § 38-2571.03(5)(E) provides that “[a]n observer shall not disclose nor
use any information obtained during the course of an observation obtained during the course of
3
D.C. Council Comm. Rep. on B. 20-723 (D.C. 2014) at 3.
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an observation for the purpose of seeking or engaging clients in litigation against the District or
the LEA.” D.C. Code § 38-2571.03(5)(E).
IV. APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW
In civil actions seeking review of an HOD under the IDEA, “a motion for summary
judgment operates as a motion for judgment based on the evidence comprising the record and
any additional evidence the Court may receive.” Q.C-C., et al. v. District of Columbia, 164
F.Supp.3d 35, 43-44 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting D.R. ex rel. Robinson v. District of Columbia, 637
F.Supp.2d 11,16 (D.D.C. 2009). In cases that appeal the IHO’s interpretation of a statute, the
issue is a pure question of law that is reviewed de novo. See, e.g., Reid ex. Rel. Reid v. District of
Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 521 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
V. DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff’s claim is not moot.
As a preliminary issue, the undersigned finds that the Court may hear the case and that
the Plaintiff’s claim is not moot. The Defendant contends that the instant case is moot because
(1) the Plaintiffs have received the relief they requested and cannot sue to enforce a favorable
HOD, and (2) therefore no case or controversy exists between the parties. See Def.’s Cross
Motion at 14. These issues are intertwined, and a determination of whether the Plaintiffs received
the relief they requested will also determine whether there is a case or controversy between the
parties. “A case is considered “moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties
lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome… [a] case… is ‘not moot so long as any single
claim for relief remains viable, whether that claim was the primary or secondary relief sought.”
Morris v. District of Columbia, 38 F.Supp.3d 57, 66 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation omitted). This court
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Woodson et al. v. District of Columbia
has previously determined that “[w]here a school district has provided a parent with some forms
of relief, but not with all of the specific relief requested by her, her claims are not moot.” Suggs
v. District of Columbia, 679 F.Supp.2d 43, 54 (D.D.C. 2010).
The instant case will be determined based on whether this Court finds that the May 2018
HOD provided the Plaintiff with a chance to meaningfully observe her child under the Student
Rights Act. The central issue to this inquiry is whether the Act allows an LEA to require the
signing of a non-disclosure agreement forbidding observers from testifying about their
observations in due process hearings. The answer will determine whether the May 2018 HOD
provided for a “meaningful observation” under the Act and will determine whether the Plaintiff
has received the relief asked for. The Defendant’s contention that the Plaintiff has received the
precise relief asked for in her due process complaint is therefore speculative and cannot render
the present case moot.
However, even if the case were moot, the “capable of repetition yet evading review”
doctrine would allow the Court to hear the claim. This doctrine applies in “[e]xceptional
circumstances… when “(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated
prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same
complaining party will be subject to the same action again.” N.W. v. District of Columbia, 253
F.Supp.3d 5, 14 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998)). In the instant
case, the request for observation at the core of the Plaintiff’s claim was denied in December of
2017, in preparation for a January IEP meeting. See HOD at 9. The Plaintiff did not receive a
determination until May of 2018, and her subsequent appeals process has taken her well into
2019. Given the prolonged time between even her initial claim and the HOD issued in May, the
Plaintiff is correct to point out that, “requiring a parent to begin a due process proceeding each
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time she requests, and is denied, an observation, would ensure that no parent would have access
to information obtained from a school observation in time for the meeting which he or she
requested.” Pl.’s Memo in Opposition at 18-19.
Turning to the second prong, there is a “reasonable expectation” that the Plaintiff’s claim
will repeat if no determination is made today. The observation requested by the plaintiff in the
instant case is the second observation she has asked for. See HOD at 8. In addition, her son is
eight, and has annual numerous IEP meetings in his future. It is likely that she may request
observations in the future to prepare for these IEP meetings, and the Plaintiff has shown a
willingness to bring due process claims against DCPS. As such, it would be improper to forego
a determination of the case today on the grounds of mootness, and a final determination may
head off numerous challenges in the future.
B. The HOD’s requirement that the Plaintiff’s expert signs a non-disclosure
agreement goes against the plain language of the statute and prevents her fully
participating in her son’s IEP.
The undersigned finds that the Student Rights Act’s plain language and legislative history
support a finding that the HOD placed an unlawful burden on the Plaintiff by requiring her
expert to sign a non-disclosure agreement prior to observing her child, and that this prevented her
from fully participating in his IEP meeting. The issue of whether a school may prevent a parent’s
designee from observing a student unless they sign a non-disclosure agreement has been
discussed to a limited extent in Middleton v. District of Columbia, but whether an LEA may
prevent an observer from participating in future litigation appears to be a matter of first
impression in this district. To resolve the issue, the undersigned first applies the tools of statutory
construction to the provisions of the Student Rights Act. “The traditional tools [of statutory
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construction] include examination of the statute’s text, legislative history, and structure, as well
as its purpose.” Petit v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., 675 F.3d 769 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
The pertinent language is as follows:
5(A) Upon request, an LEA shall provide timely access, either
together or separately, to the following for observing a child’s
current to proposed special education program:
(i) the parent of a child with a disability; or
(ii) a designee appointed by the parent of a child with a disability
who has professional expertise in the area of special education being
observed or is necessary to facilitate an observation for a parent with
a disability or to provide language translation assistance to a parent;
provided, that the designee is neither representing the parent’s child
in litigation related to the provision of a free and appropriate public
education for that child nor has a financial interest in the outcome of
such litigation.
(C) A parent, or the parent’s designee, shall be allowed to view the
child’s instruction in the setting where it ordinarily occurs or the
setting where the child’s instruction will occur if the child attends
the proposed program.
(D) the LEA shall not impose any conditions or restrictions on such
observations except those necessary to:
(i) Ensure the safety of the children in the program;
(ii) Protect other children in the program from disclosure by an
observer of confidential and personally identifiable information in
the event such information is obtained in the course of an
observation by a parent or a designee; or
(iii) Avoid any potential disruption arising from multiple
observations occurring in a classroom simultaneously.
(E) An observer shall not disclose nor use any information obtained
during the course of an observation for the purpose of seeking or
engaging clients in litigation against the District or the LEA.
D.C. Code § 38-2571.03. (emphasis added).
Turning first to subsection (A), the Act allows for observations by parents or by
designees with expertise in special education “provided… the designee is neither representing
the parent’s child in litigation… nor has a financial interest in the outcome of such litigation.”
D.C. Code § 38-2571.03 (A). The HOD correctly concluded that this references existing
litigation, and not future litigation that has not occurred. AR at 12. This does not conflict with
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this Court’s conclusion in Middleton that “the right-to-observe provision does not apply to a
designee that is representing the parent’s child in litigation related to the provision of FAPE for
that child or to a designee who has a financial interest in the outcome of such litigation.”
Middleton v. District of Columbia, 312 F.Supp.3d 113, 147 (D.D.C. 2018). The facts of
Middleton support the HOD’s conclusion. In that case, an educational advocate who had been
retained for at least a year before the due process complaint was commenced was kept from
conducting a school observation. See Id. at 122-127. The Court found that by keeping the
educational advocate from observing, the defendant had denied the plaintiff’s participation rights
and denied the student a FAPE. Id. at 147. The Court did not seem to consider that the
educational advocate was “representing the parent in litigation” simply by being retained and
may have implicitly taken the same stance as the IHO in the instant case.
In subsection (D), The Act states what restrictions an LEA may provide and limits these
restrictions to three areas: student safety, preventing the disclosure of confidential information,
and avoiding disruptions. The act explicitly states that schools “shall not impose any conditions
or restrictions” except those necessary to fulfill these goals. D.C. Code § 38-2571.03 (D). In the
present case, there is no connection, nor does DCPS claim there is, between these goals and the
restriction placed on the Plaintiff’s expert.
Because there is no nexus between the restrictions on the Plaintiff’s observer and
subsection (D), the HOD relied on subsection (E), which has not been interpreted by this Court.
Turning to the plain language of the statute, subsection (E) governs what a school observer may
do with information that has been “obtained”4 during the observation: they may not use this
4
Merriam Webster defines “obtain” as “to gain or attain usually by planned action or effort.” Obtain, Merriam-
Webster’s Dictionary (Online ed. 2019). The use of past tense in subsection (E) implies that the subsection governs
conduct after the information has already been obtained.
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information “for the purpose of seeking or engaging clients.” D.C. Code § 38-2571.03 (E)
(emphasis added). This language implies that IHO Lazan’s later interpretation of the statute, that
the information obtained on a previous observation cannot be used in efforts to obtain new
clients, was correct. See Attachment 2 to Pl.’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 31. Indeed, it
would be impossible to use information obtained during an observation to seek or engage a client
the observer had already been retained by.
This interpretation is bolstered by the legislative intent and the purpose of the statute. The
Act “provides District parents with additional procedural safeguards to help make sure parents
have the tools they need to stay informed, engaged, and empowered throughout the special
education process.” D.C. Council Comm. Rep. on B 20-723 (D.C. 2014) at 1. The Council report
stated that observations are a “critical tool” for parents, and the ability to designate an observer
was a “significant issue for special education… as parents who do not have a specific
background in the subject area… often cannot adequately evaluate whether their child’s
instruction is sufficient.” Id. at 3. At no point in the Report’s discussion of “parental access to
schools” does the Council discuss preventing the observer from being involved in litigation for
the student they have observed.
In addition, the legislative report indicates that the Act was meant to address the unequal
distribution of information between an LEA – who “is typically the party who has access to all of
the compliance information” – and parents who “[must] procure more extensive, and expensive,
legal services, including expert witnesses, in an effort to match the resources of the LEA.” Id. at
4-5. While these quotes are addressing changes the Act made to the “Burden of Proof,” under
IDEA, this discussion further shows the importance the Council put on ensuring parents were on
an equal footing with the school. Allowing only the school, and not the parents, to bring experts
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into due process hearings would go directly against this goal and would create additional
expenses by forcing parents to retain a separate witness for litigation purposes.
The Defendant’s claim that the intent of the statute was to “prevent needless litigation
against the District and the LEA,”5 is too narrow a reading of subsection (E), which merely
prevents observers from engaging in new clients while observing the student for which they
began the observation. The Defendant relies on the language of the statute itself, and while the
statute does foreclose some litigation, it does not imply that all litigation against the LEA is
needless or that the observer would not be able to participate in any litigation. While the report
does discuss preventing “frivolous” lawsuits, the report discusses sanctions on the attorneys and
capping witness fees as deterrence, not restricting the observer’s abilities to participate in future
due process hearings. D.C. Council Comm. Rep. on B 20-723 (D.C. 2014) at 6-7. Considering
both the plain language and the legislative intent, the undersigned finds that subsection (E)
prevents an observer from seeking or engaging new clients while observing the student they have
been retained to observe, but it does not prevent them from testifying about their observation
during due process hearings for the child they observed.
C. The Defendant’s interpretation of the statute would lead to absurd results.
Finally, “[w]hen possible, statutes should be interpreted to avoid “untenable distinctions,”
unreasonable results,” or “unjust or absurd outcomes.”” Kaseman v. District of Columbia, 444
F.3d 637, 642 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The undersigned finds that the defendant’s rule would result in
unreasonable results given the legislative intent of the Student Rights Act. The statute was meant
to empower the parents and reduce the information gap between parents and schools, and the
Defendant’s reading would further neither of these goals.
5
Def.’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 18.
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Woodson et al. v. District of Columbia
Under the defendant’s interpretation, a parent may have a designee observe the student
and then participate in the IEP, but if that parent disagrees with the IEP and begins a due process
claim against the school, the designee would not be able to testify at that hearing.6 Far from
being a “meaningful observation,” this observation would only help to the extent it would inform
the parent at the initial IEP meeting. If the parent disagreed with the school after the IEP
meeting, she would need to instigate a due process hearing, where the school would be able to
bring in the employees who had developed the IEP. Under the Defendant’s reading, the parent
would either be forbidden from bringing in her own expert who had evaluated the adequacy of
the student’s education or could bring them in if they did not testify about the observation they
conducted. This would create an additional burden on a parent rather than put them on the same
playing field as the LEA. This result is inconsistent with the plain language and legislative intent
of the statute, and is therefore not consistent with the Act.
VI. CONCLUSION
With respect to the IDEA claim first raised by the Plaintiff in her memorandum in
support of her motion for summary judgment, the undersigned concludes, based on the full
extent of the findings articulated herein, that the HOD impermissibly allowed the Defendant to
place a condition on the Plaintiff’s observer that forbid him from testifying on D.W.’s behalf at
due process hearings.
6
See Def.’s Cross Motion at 26. This reading of the defendant’s arguments is seemingly contradicted by certain
statements of the defendant: “[n]othing in the HOD in the instant case stands for the proposition that Plaintiff’s
expert could not use the result of his observations to testify in relation to a due process hearing for D.W., if he
complied with the HOD’s terms and signed the non-disclosure agreement with the school.” Id. at 26-27. This
observation is at odds with the HOD’s Conclusions of Law, which stated in part, “DCPS may require Witness A to
sign a document under oath that he will not use the information obtained through the observation: 1) in any
subsequent special education litigation against DCPS, involving this Student or any other student; and 2) in an
effort to retain additional clients so that they can engage in special education litigation against DCPS.” AR at 12
(emphasis added).
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Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, it is, this 15th day of July, 2019,
RECOMMENDED that the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 12) be
GRANTED and the Defendant’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 14) be
DENIED.
.
DEBORAH A. ROBINSON
United States Magistrate Judge
Within fourteen days, either party may file written objections to this report and
recommendation. The objections shall specifically identify the portions of the findings and
recommendations to which objection is made and the basis of each objection. In the
absence of timely objections, further review of issues addressed may be deemed waived.
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