Simon v. Mitchell ( 2016 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
GEARY S. SIMON, et al., :
:
Plaintiffs, : Civil Action No.: 16-1405 (RC)
:
v. : Re Document No.: 4
:
BRANDON MITCHELL, :
:
Defendant. :
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
REMANDING TO THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA;
DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO REMAND AS MOOT
Plaintiffs Geary S. Simon and Summer Simon filed this action in the Superior Court for
the District of Columbia on May 20, 2016, seeking a temporary restraining order and a
permanent injunction against Defendant Brandon Mitchell. 1 See Compl. ¶ 2. 2 In brief, Plaintiffs
allege that Mr. Mitchell engaged in harassing behavior and they filed suit seeking a temporary
restraining order. Id. Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not include any federal causes of action and
states that jurisdiction in the Superior Court is founded on D.C. Code § 11–921. Id. ¶ 2. The
Superior Court granted Plaintiffs’ request for a temporary restraining order on May 27, 2016, see
Superior Court Record at 36–37, and issued a permanent injunction on June 10, 2016, see id. at
21. During the course of the Superior Court litigation, Defendant Mr. Mitchell also filed a
motion seeking a permanent injunction against Mr. Simon. Id. at 14. On July 6, 2016, Plaintiffs
1
Plaintiffs’ Complaint states that Mr. Mitchell is also known as Brandon M. Feliciano.
2
The Complaint is included in the Superior Court record transmitted to this Court. See
Superior Court Record at 44, ECF No. 2-1.
removed the case to this Court, asserting that this Court has diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1332. See Notice of Removal ¶ 1, ECF No. 1.
On July 21, 2016, this Court issued an order identifying several potential obstacles to this
Court’s exercise of jurisdiction and directing Plaintiffs to show cause why this action should not
be remanded to the Superior Court. See Order to Show Cause, ECF No. 3. The order directed
Plaintiffs to respond by August 5, 2016. Id. Plaintiffs failed to respond to the order. 3 The Court
acknowledges that Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, but even pro se litigants “must comply with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987).
Plaintiffs have been given the opportunity to supplement their arguments in support of this
Court’s jurisdiction, but they have failed to do so. The Court finds that, because Plaintiffs have
failed to respond to the order to show cause, Plaintiffs have waived their right to any argument
contesting this Court’s remand to the Superior Court. Nevertheless, the Court considers the
questions presented and finds that remand would be required even if Plaintiffs had not conceded
the issue.
Generally, a defendant in a civil action brought in a state court may remove the action to
a federal district court if the action is one over which the federal district courts have original
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The Superior Court of the District of Columbia is
considered a state court for this purpose. See 28 U.S.C. § 1451(1). The D.C. Circuit has
explained, however, that “[w]hen it appears that a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over a case that has been removed from a state court, the district court must remand the case.”
3
After the Court issued its order, Defendant moved to remand the case, arguing that the
parties are not diverse. See Def.’s Mot. to Remand at 1, ECF No. 4. At this time, Plaintiffs have
not responded to the motion. Because the Court will remand sua sponte, Defendant’s motion
will be denied as moot.
2
Republic of Venezuela v. Philip Morris Inc., 287 F.3d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c)) (emphasis added). Because removal implicates federalism concerns, the court
“strictly construes the scope of its removal jurisdiction.” Downey v. Ambassador Devel., LLC,
568 F. Supp. 2d 28, 30 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100,
107–09 (1941)) (other citations omitted). “The party seeking removal of an action bears the
burden of proving that jurisdiction exists in federal court.” Id. at 30 (citing Mulcahey v.
Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994) (other citations omitted); see
also Reed v. AlliedBarton Sec. Servs., LLC, 583 F. Supp. 2d 92, 93 (D.D.C. 2008). Because
either a party or a district court, acting sua sponte, may raise the court’s lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, a court may also issue a remand order on its own initiative. See Ellenburg v.
Spartan Motors Chassis, Inc., 519 F.3d 192, 196–97 (4th Cir. 2008); see also Sloan v. Soul
Circus, Inc., No. 15-1389, 2015 WL 9272838, at *4 n.4 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 2015). 4
Plaintiffs removed the case to this Court alleging that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, better known as diversity jurisdiction. 5 Plaintiffs contend that the “amount
in controversy exceeds $75,000.00” and that there “is complete diversity of citizenship” between
the parties. See Notice of Removal ¶ 1. The Court finds that it must remand this case for at least
two distinct reasons.
4
An action may also be remanded because of procedural defects with the removal, but a
court can only order a remand on procedural grounds following a motion by a party. See
Ellenburg, 519 F.3d at 198–99 (collecting cases and finding that “all of the circuit courts that
have considered the question have concluded that a district court is prohibited from remanding a
case sua sponte based on a procedural defect absent a motion”). The Court previously noted
potential procedural defects with the removal in this case, see Order to Show Cause at 4–5, but it
does not need to reach those issues here.
5
The relevant portion of the statute states: “The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States. . . .” 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
3
First, the record does not appear to support Plaintiffs’ claims with regard to the amount in
controversy. The brief Complaint seeks only injunctive relief, and makes no mention of money
damages. See generally Compl. The Court’s review of the Superior Court record reveals no
request for monetary damages, much less any request in excess of $75,000. The only references
to monetary damages are found in the Notice of Removal, see Notice of Removal ¶ 1, and the
Civil Cover Sheet attached to the Notice of Removal, see Civil Cover Sheet at 2, ECF No. 1-2.
Both demand exactly $75,000. Plaintiffs provide no documentation or argument in support of
this figure in their Complaint. Plaintiffs have also failed to provide any supplementary evidence
in response to the Court’s order to show cause. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed
to meet their burden of proving that the amount in controversy in this case satisfies the statutory
diversity jurisdiction requirement. See Reed, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 94 (“The Court finds that
AlliedBarton’s unsubstantiated allegation that Plaintiff ‘made a demand well in excess of
$75,000,’ without more, does not sufficiently prove the amount in controversy.”).
Second, Plaintiffs also claim that there “is complete diversity of citizenship in that
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant is an individual with a domicile in the District of Columbia and
Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff is an individual with a domicile in the State of New York.” See
Notice of Removal ¶ 1. Plaintiffs’ Notice of Removal lists a New York state address for Mr.
Mitchell. Id. at 1. The Court’s review of the Superior Court record, however, reveals that
Plaintiffs’ May 20, 2016 Complaint listed a District of Columbia address for Mr. Mitchell. See
Compl. at 1. Further, Mr. Mitchell was served with the Complaint at another District of
Columbia address. See Superior Court Record at 39. Mr. Mitchell listed the same District of
Columbia address found in the Complaint in his own motion before the Superior Court, and the
injunctive relief he sought would have protected that address as well. See id. at 14–17. Finally,
4
Mr. Mitchell filed a motion to remand before this Court, which states that he is “a resident of the
District of Columbia” and that he has “not lived in New York City since 2014.” Def.’s Mot. to
Remand at 1. Aside from their unsupported allegations, Plaintiffs have provided no evidence to
the contrary. Nor have Plaintiffs provided any evidence or argument in response to the Court’s
order to show cause. Based on the record available, the Court finds that Mr. Mitchell is a
resident of the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of proving that
the citizenship of the parties satisfies the statutory diversity jurisdiction requirement, and the
Court must remand this case to the Superior Court. See Republic of Venezuela, 287 F.3d at 196;
see also Collier v. District of Columbia, 46 F. Supp. 3d 6, 18 (D.D.C. 2014) (remanding a
severed claim sua sponte because both parties were residents of Maryland).
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is REMANDED to the District of
Columbia Superior Court. And it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to remand (ECF No. 5) is DENIED
AS MOOT.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 10, 2016 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
United States District Judge
5