Sibley v. Obama ( 2012 )


Menu:
  •                             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    MONTGOMERY BLAIR SIBLEY,
    Plaintiff,
    v.                                         Civil Action No. 11-919 (JDB)
    BARACK OBAMA, et al.,
    Defendants.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
    Plaintiff is a prospective participant in the District of Columbia’s nascent medical
    marijuana program. Plaintiff asserts a claim against defendants Vincent Gray, the Mayor of the
    District of Columbia, and the District’s Department of Health (collectively, “the District” or “the
    District defendants”). The Court has previously denied plaintiff’s motions for a temporary
    restraining order and a preliminary injunction restraining the District from requiring applicants
    to the medical marijuana program to sign an acknowledgment and attestation of federal laws
    governing marijuana. Plaintiff also asserted claims against defendants President Barack Obama
    and Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. (collectively, the “federal defendants”) regarding
    President Obama’s campaign statements addressing the treatment of medical marijuana by his
    administration and the Department of Justice’s criminal prosecution of medical marijuana
    distributors. The Court previously dismissed these claims for lack of standing.
    Now before the Court are motions filed by both plaintiff and the District defendants. The
    District has filed a motion to dismiss the remaining claim, Count VII of plaintiff’s amended
    complaint. Plaintiff has filed two motions for reconsideration and/or clarification of the
    1
    Memorandum Opinion and Order filed October 21, 2011 [Docket Entry 47]. For the reasons
    described below, the Court will grant the District defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Court will
    also deny plaintiff’s motions for reconsideration.
    I. Background
    The District of Columbia is in the process of starting a medical marijuana program. See
    D.C.Code § 7–1671.01, et seq. (2011); Emergency and Fourth Proposed Rulemaking to
    Implement the Legalization of Marijuana for Medical Treatment Initiative of 1999, Rule
    22–C100, D.C. Reg. Vol. 58, No. 32 (Aug. 12, 2011). Plaintiff has “publicly expressed his intent
    . . . to become a licensed medical marijuana cultivator” and to operate a dispensary under that
    program. First Am. Compl. at 3. In order to become licensed to do so, District regulations
    require the plaintiff “to execute an affidavit” recognizing that “[g]rowing, distributing, and
    possessing marijuana in any capacity . . . is a violation of federal laws” and that the “law
    authorizing the District's medical marijuana program will not excuse any registrant from any
    violation of the federal laws governing marijuana.” First Am. Compl., Ex. E.
    II. Motion to Dismiss
    The District defendants have filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that
    the plaintiff’s claim against them is now moot. The Court will grant this motion, as the claim
    against the District has been rendered moot by the plaintiff’s subsequent actions.
    Before reaching the merits of a plaintiff’s claim, this Court must first establish that it has
    jurisdiction over the matter. Article III of the Constitution requires that the court review only
    “cases and controversies.” See DeFunis v. Odengaard, 
    416 U.S. 312
    , 316 (1974); North Carolina
    v. Rice, 
    404 U.S. 244
    , 246 (1971). When a decision on a matter is merely advisory, and if a
    2
    decision “cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before [the court],” a case is moot and
    cannot be heard. Rice, 
    404 U.S. at 246
    .
    Here, plaintiff has brought suit against defendants involved in administering the
    District’s medical marijuana program. He seeks declaratory relief on the grounds that by
    complying with the District’s rules and signing the affidavit in question, he would “expose
    [himself] to a real and appreciable risk of self-incrimination.” First Am. Compl. at 18. However,
    after his motions for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction were denied,
    plaintiff signed the affidavit in question and applied to the program. See Defs.’s Supplement to
    their Submission in Opp'n to Pl.’s Second Mot. for a Prelim. Inj., Ex. 1 [Docket Entry 41].
    According to the federal defendants, plaintiff was also recently denied the license. See Notice to
    the Court [Docket Entry 52] at 2. A ruling on whether the affidavit causes plaintiff to incriminate
    himself would have no effect at this point, as he has already signed the affidavit. No action he
    might yet take would be affected by a ruling of this Court on this issue.
    It might be suggested that this case presents a situation that is “capable of repetition, yet
    evading review,” and as such can be heard despite the lack of a current controversy. See S. Pac.
    Terminal Co. v. ICC, 
    219 U.S. 498
    , 515 (1911); Roe v. Wade, 
    410 U.S. 113
    , 125 (1973). While
    plaintiff may choose to apply for distribution and cultivation permits again, thus making these
    circumstances “capable of repetition,” there is no reason to believe that they would evade review
    in a future dispute. If plaintiff is presented with a similar affidavit in the future, he may
    challenge it at that juncture.
    Because any decision of this court would not change the outcome of a case or
    controversy, plaintiff’s claim against the District defendants is moot. Therefore, the Court will
    grant the District's motion to dismiss.
    3
    III. Motions for Reconsideration
    Plaintiff has filed two motions for reconsideration and/or clarification of the Court’s
    October 21, 2011 Order [Docket Entry 46] and accompanying Memorandum Opinion [Docket
    Entry 47] granting the federal defendants' motion to dismiss and denying plaintiff’s motion for a
    preliminary injunction against the District defendants.
    Although there is no Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that expressly addresses motions
    for reconsideration, see Lance v. United Mine Workers of Am. 1974 Pension Trust, 
    400 F. Supp. 2d 29
    , 31 (D.D.C. 2005), because the Court's opinion did not fully adjudicate all of plaintiff’s
    claims, his motion is properly characterized as a motion pursuant to Rule 54(b). See Fed. R. Civ.
    P. 54(b) (where court resolves “fewer than all the claims,” it may revise “its opinion at any time
    before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and
    liabilities”). “The Court has broad discretion to hear a motion for reconsideration brought under
    Rule 54(b),” Isse v. Am. Univ., 
    544 F. Supp. 2d 25
    , 29 (D.D.C. 2008), and reconsideration is
    appropriate “as justice requires.” Cobell v. Norton, 
    355 F.Supp.2d 531
    , 540 (D.D.C. 2005).
    “Considerations a court may take into account under the ‘as justice requires' standard include
    whether the court ‘patently’ misunderstood the parties, made a decision beyond the adversarial
    issues presented, made an error in failing to consider controlling decisions or data, or whether a
    controlling or significant change in the law has occurred.” Williams v. Johanns, 
    555 F. Supp. 2d 162
    , 164 (D.D.C. 2008). Review under Rule 54(b) “amounts to determining, within the Court's
    discretion, whether reconsideration is necessary under the relevant circumstances.” Cobell, 
    355 F. Supp. 2d at 540
    .
    In plaintiff’s first motion for reconsideration, he alleges that the Court failed to follow a
    controlling decision. Plaintiff alleges that the Court ignored Babbit v. United Farm Workers
    4
    Nat’l Union, 
    442 U.S. 289
     (1979), and claims that this precedent requires plaintiff to plead only
    that prosecution under the statute he challenges is “remotely possible.” However, Babbit must be
    read in light of later precedent from this Circuit. See Seegars v. Gonzales, 
    396 F.3d 1248
     (D.C.
    Cir. 2005); Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 
    103 F.3d 994
     (D.C. Cir. 1997). Because plaintiff
    presented a “non-First Amendment challenge to a criminal statute that has not reached the court
    through agency proceedings,” Seegars, 
    396 F.3d at 1254
    , this Court correctly applied the
    analysis framed in Navegar. Therefore, the Court will deny this motion.1
    In plaintiff’s second motion for reconsideration, he claims he has new evidence that
    could cure his defect of standing. Plaintiff states that after this Court filed its October 21, 2011
    opinion he received notice from his bank terminating the checking account of his company, the
    Medicinal Marijuana Company of America. Plaintiff suggests that this account was closed due to
    Drug Enforcement Administration pressure on banks not to do business with medical marijuana
    companies. But this alleged injury, while related to plaintiff's pursuit of a license to distribute
    marijuana, is not related to the prosecution his complaint suggested might occur in this case. The
    evidence also does not show that his account was closed pursuant to any federal statute.
    Furthermore, plaintiff has not shown that the federal or District defendants had any role in his
    bank’s decision to close his account. Navegar requires that a plaintiff show he “faces a threat of
    prosecution under the statute which is credible and immediate, not merely abstract or
    speculative.” Navegar, 
    103 F.3d at 998
    . This action by his bank does not increase the threat that
    1
    To the extent that plaintiff’s other claims implicate his prospective participation in the
    D.C. Medical Marijuana Act, they may have also been rendered moot. According to the federal
    defendants, plaintiff’s company was not selected for the cultivation or distribution program. See
    Notice to the Court at 2. Plaintiff’s claims against the federal defendants concerning his possible
    prosecution could not come to pass if he has been refused a license to operate a cultivation center
    and dispensary.
    5
    plaintiff will be prosecuted under the statute he challenges. The Court will therefore deny this
    motion.
    IV. Conclusion
    Accordingly, it is hereby
    ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for reconsideration [Docket Entry 48] is DENIED; it
    is further
    ORDERED that plaintiff’s second motion for reconsideration [Docket Entry 49] is
    DENIED; it is further
    ORDERED that defendants Gray and the Department of Health’s motion to dismiss
    plaintiff’s amended complaint [Docket Entry 37] is GRANTED and defendants Gray and the
    Department of Health are dismissed from this case. Each of the claims in plaintiff's complaint
    has now been dismissed.
    SO ORDERED.
    /s/
    JOHN D. BATES
    United States District Judge
    Dated: February 2, 2012
    6