Crawford v. District of Columbia ( 2012 )


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  •                        UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    ____________________________________
    )
    ISABELL CRAWFORD,                   )
    Plaintiff,         )
    v.                           )
    )  Civil Action No. 11-174 (AK)
    DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,               )
    Defendant.         )
    ____________________________________)
    AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION
    This matter is pending before this Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Fees and Costs (“Fee
    Motion”) and Memorandum in support thereof (“Memorandum”) [10]; Defendant’s opposition
    to the Motion (“Opposition”) [11]; and Plaintiff’s reply to the Opposition (“Reply”) [12].1
    Plaintiff Isabell Crawford (“Plaintiff’) has requested $1,820.55 in legal fees and costs, a portion
    of which is contested by Defendant District of Columbia (“Defendant” or “the District”) on
    grounds that the hourly rate charged by Plaintiff’s counsel is excessive and some of counsel’s
    billing entries are “remote” in time. (Opposition, Exh. 1 [Defendant’s chart of proposed
    allowable fees and reasons for fee reductions].)
    I. BACKGROUND
    Plaintiff is the parent of a minor child who prevailed in an administrative action brought
    pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and the Individuals with Disabilities
    in Education Improvement Act ( collectively “IDEA”), 
    20 U.S.C. § 1400
     et seq. Pursuant to 
    20 U.S.C. §1415
    (i)(3)(B), a court may award attorney’s fees to a parent who prevails in an IDEA
    1
    This same Fee Motion is filed in multiple cases involving claims for attorneys’ fees and
    costs; the Plaintiff is this action is Isabell Crawford.
    proceeding. Prior to filing this civil action, the Plaintiff participated in December 18, 2007 due
    process hearing wherein the Hearing Officer considered whether or not the District of Columbia
    Public Schools (“DCPS”) denied the student a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) by
    failing to convene a compensatory education meeting to discuss and determine warranted
    compensatory education. (December 24, 2007 Hearing Officer Decision and Order (“HOD”) [1]
    at 1.) The Hearing Officer concluded in his HOD that it was not necessary for Plaintiff to
    submit a “selection card” to set up a compensatory education meeting and that the District
    should have accepted Plaintiff’s letter as a valid legal election for a compensatory education
    meeting. (December 24, 2007 HOD [1] at 2-3.) The District does not dispute Plaintiff’s
    prevailing party status in this case.
    Plaintiff originally filed her complaint for legal fees and costs with the Small Claims and
    Conciliation Branch of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Defendant removed this
    and other simultaneously filed cases to this Court and the parties subsequently consented to the
    referral of all such cases to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for all purposes. The parties were
    directed to brief the issues in these cases in the form of motions for legal fees and responses
    thereto.
    II. LEGAL STANDARD
    The IDEA gives courts authority to award reasonable attorney’s fees to the parents of a
    child with a disability who is the prevailing party. 
    20 U.S.C. §1415
    (i)(3)(B). An action or
    proceeding under IDEA includes both civil litigation in federal court and administrative
    litigation before hearing officers. Smith v. Roher, 
    954 F. Supp. 359
    , 362 (D.D.C. 1997); Moore
    v. District of Columbia, 
    907 F.2d 165
    , 176 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
    498 U.S. 998
     (1990).
    2
    The plaintiff has the burden of establishing the reasonableness of any fee requests. See
    In re North, 
    59 F.3d 184
    , 189 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Covington v. District of Columbia, 
    57 F.3d 1101
    ,
    1107 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[A] fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an
    award, documenting the appropriate hours, and justifying the reasonableness of the rates.”) “An
    award of attorneys’ fees is calculated by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of
    hours reasonably expended on the case.” Smith, 
    954 F. Supp. at
    364 (citing Hensley v.
    Eckerhard, 
    461 U.S. 424
    , 433 (1983)); Blum v. Stenson, 
    465 U.S. 886
    , 888 (1984). The result of
    this calculation is the “lodestar” amount. Smith, 
    954 F. Supp. at 364
    .
    
    20 U.S.C. §1415
    (i)(3)(C) states that “[f]ees awarded under this paragraph shall be based
    on rates prevailing in the community in which the action or proceeding arose for the kind and
    quality of services furnished.” 
    20 U.S.C. §1415
    (i)(3)(C). To demonstrate a reasonable hourly
    rate, the fee applicant must show: an attorney’s usual billing practices; counsel’s skill,
    experience and reputation; as well as the prevailing market rates in the community. Covington,
    
    57 F.3d at 1107
    . The determination of a “market rate for the services of the lawyer is inherently
    difficult” and is decided by the court in its discretion. Blum, 
    465 U.S. at
    896 n.11. “To inform
    and assist the court in the exercise of its discretion, the burden is on the fee applicant to produce
    satisfactory evidence . . . that the requested [hourly] rates are in line with those prevailing in the
    community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and
    reputation.” 
    Id.
     An attorney’s usual billing rate may be considered the “reasonable rate” if it
    accords with the rates prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers possessing
    similar skill, experience and reputation. Kattan by Thomas v. District of Columbia, 
    995 F.2d 274
    , 278 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (emphasis added).
    3
    A party moving for summary judgment on legal fees accordingly must demonstrate
    prevailing party status and the reasonableness of the fees requested in terms of hours spent and
    hourly rate. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (a), summary judgment shall be granted if the movant
    shows that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a
    judgment as a matter of law.” Accord Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 247
    (1986). Summary judgment should be granted against a party “who fails to make a showing
    sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that
    party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 322 (1986).
    The court is required to draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor and
    to accept the nonmoving party’s evidence as true. Anderson, 
    477 U.S. at 255
    . The nonmoving
    party must establish more than “the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of its
    position. 
    Id. at 252
    . Nor may the non-moving party rely on allegations or conclusory
    statements; instead, the non-moving party is obliged to present specific facts that would enable a
    reasonable jury to find it its favor. Greene v Dalton, 
    164 F.3d 671
    , 675 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
    III. ANALYSIS
    A. Reasonableness of Hourly Rates
    Plaintiff seeks fees for the services of three lawyers, two law clerks, and one paralegal, to
    be paid at the following rates: $475 per hour for Douglas Tyrka, an attorney with approximately
    10 years experience during the relevant time period; $268 per hour for Zachary Nahass, an
    attorney with approximately 1-2 years experience during the relevant time period; $255 per hour
    for Keith Coyle, an attorney with approximately 1-2 years experience during the relevant time
    period; and $139/$146/150 per hour for Yanet Scott, Patrick Meehan, and Michael Tchorni, who
    4
    were paralegals/law clerks with the firm Tyrka & Associates during that same period of time.1
    (Plaintiff’s Itemization of Fees/Expenses [1]; Fee Motion [10], Exh. 2 [Verified Statement of
    Douglas Tyrka (“Tyrka”)] ¶¶ 8-12, 15, 16, 18.) According to Tykra’s Verified Statement
    (“Verified Statement”), “[t]he hourly rates in the itemization are the rates Tyrka & Associates
    has customarily charged.” (Exh. 2 ¶4.)
    Tyrka further asserts that “clients have retained Tyrka & Associates with the
    understanding and agreement that the client would retain full responsibility for all fees regardless
    of what was reimbursed by third parties, at rates consistent with ‘the Laffey [M]atrix’ as adjusted
    per the finding in Salazar v. District of Columbia, 
    123 F. Supp. 2d 8
    , 14-15 (D.D.C. 2000), and
    other cases.” (Exh. 2 ¶4.)2 Plaintiff relies upon the rates set forth in the “enhanced” Laffey
    Matrix in her request for attorney’s fees but Tyrka’s Verified Statement does not indicate how
    1
    The law firm’s hourly rate for paralegal/law clerk charges occurring after May 31, 2007
    increased from $139/hour to $146/hour, matching the “enhanced” Laffey Matrix rate increase
    during that same time. However, the law firm’s hourly rate for paralegal/law clerk charges
    occurring after May 31, 2008 increased from $146/hour to $150/hour, even though the
    “enhanced” Laffey Matrix rates increased from $146/hour to $152/hour during that same time.
    2
    The Laffey Matrix is “a schedule of charges based on years of experience” developed in
    Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 
    572 F. Supp. 354
     (D.D.C. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 
    746 F.2d 4
     (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 
    472 U.S. 1021
     (1985), as modified by Save Our
    Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 
    857 F.2d 1516
    , 1524 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The Laffey Matrix
    was first developed based upon information about the prevailing rates charged for complex
    federal litigation in the District of Columbia, and it is maintained by the United States Attorney’s
    Office for the District of Columbia and is updated annually to reflect increases in the local
    Consumer Price Index. See Laffey Matrix - 2003-2012, n.3, available at:
    htttp://www.justice.gov/usao/dc/divisions/civil_Laffey_Matrix_2003-2012.pdf.
    The “enhanced” Laffey Matrix is a schedule of fees based on the original Laffey Matrix, with
    adjustments to reflect increases in the national Legal Services Index, prepared by the United
    States Bureau of Labor Statistics. (Fees Motion, Exh.3.)
    5
    frequently Plaintiff’s counsel is paid at these “enhanced” Laffey rates.3 Nor has counsel
    presented affidavits attesting to the actual billing rates of lawyers who do similar IDEA work.
    Furthermore, the Plaintiff has not provided specific information about the nature or complexity
    of the IDEA administrative work performed in this case.
    Plaintiff asserts that in order to demonstrate prevailing market rates, she may “point to
    such evidence as an updated [enhanced] version of the Laffey Matrix or the U.S. Attorney’s
    Office [“USAO”] Matrix, or [her] own survey of prevailing market rates in the community.”
    (Memorandum in support of Fees Motion (“Memorandum”) at 8 (citing Covington, 
    57 F.3d at 1109
     (additional citation omitted))). In the Covington case, which involved allegations of civil
    rights violations, the Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit did look to Laffey rates for prevailing
    market rates but the relevant market therein was “complex federal litigation,” 
    57 F.3d at 1110
    .
    In contrast, this case involves IDEA litigation, which is not complex federal litigation because
    most if not all of the attorney’s fees in question are the result of counsel’s preparation for
    attendance at routine administrative hearings. Accordingly, the Laffey Matrix rates are
    inapplicable as prevailing market rates.
    Plaintiff additionally relies upon Rooths v District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 09-
    0492, Report and Recommendation of March 31, 2011, and Friendship Edison Pub. Charter
    Sch. v. Suggs, Civil Action No. 06-1284, Motion for Attorneys’ Fees of July 10, 2008 and
    3
    See generally MacClarence v. Johnson, 
    539 F. Supp. 2d 155
    , 160 (D.D.C.
    2008)(expressing concern that “standardized hourly rates overcompensate lawyers whose
    practices are contingent fee based and therefore compensated at an hourly rate they never charge
    and none of their clients could pay”).
    6
    Memorandum Opinion of March 30, 2009 at 5-8. (Fee Motion, Exhs. 5-7).4 According to
    Plaintiff, in these two IDEA cases litigated in this United States District Court, the firm’s clients
    received an award of fees “based on rates exactly in line with those presented here, . . . ”
    (Memorandum at 8.)
    As a preliminary matter, this Court notes that the mere showing that a high hourly rate
    was approved in another case does not in and of itself establish a new market rate or prove that
    the new rate is reasonable. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s reliance on Rooths v District of Columbia,
    Civil Action No. 09-0492, Report and Recommendation of March 31, 2011 at 10-11 (Fee
    Motion, Exh. 5), is misplaced because the trial court ultimately rejected the application of
    enhanced Laffey rates, applied Laffey Matrix rates as a starting point, and then reduced those
    rates by 25%. Rooths v District of Columbia, 
    802 F. Supp. 2d 56
    , 62-63 (D.D.C. 2011).
    In Rooths, the Honorable Paul L. Friedman noted that “[i]n this circuit, the rates
    contained in the Laffey Matrix are typically treated as the highest rates that will be presumed to
    be reasonable when a court reviews a petition for statutory attorneys’ fees.” 802 F. Supp. 2d at
    61. The trial court declined “to approve as reasonable the inflated rates contained in a proposed
    alternative fee matrix.” Id. at 61-62; see Blackman v. District of Columbia, 
    677 F. Supp. 2d 169
    ,
    176 (D.D.C. 2010) (in determining prevailing market rates, the court declined to apply enhanced
    Laffey rates). The Rooths court further refused to apply enhanced Laffey rates, in part because it
    found that the “[enhanced Laffey] matrix was generated using national statistics rather than
    4
    Plaintiff relies on Friendship Edison Pub. Charter Sch. v. Suggs, Civil Action No. 06-
    1284, Motion for Attorneys’ Fees of July 10, 2008 and Memorandum Opinion of March 30,
    2009 at 5-8, but this case is inapposite because there was no challenge to the reasonableness of
    the hours expended by counsel or the hourly rates in that case.
    7
    measurements particular to the District of Columbia area.” Rooths at 62 (emphasis in original);
    see also DL v. District of Columbia, 
    256 F.R.D. 239
    , 243 (D.D.C. 2009) (because the USAO
    [Laffey] Matrix accounts for price inflation within the local community, it more aptly focuses on
    the relevant community than the [enhanced] Laffey Matrix based on the legal services index).
    The Rooths court commented that “[w]hile it is doubtless true that some sectors of the legal
    services industry have experienced rapid fee inflation in recent years, [it was] unconvinced that
    fees associated with IDEA litigation in the District of Columbia have increased at the same rate.”
    Rooths at 62.
    Recognizing the difficulty courts encounter in determining what are reasonable legal
    fees, this Court agrees with the rationale set forth in Rooths, and finds that the Plaintiff’s reliance
    on an enhanced Laffey Matrix is unsupported because such Matrix does not provide an accurate
    representation of District of Columbia legal fees applicable to IDEA cases. Nor has Plaintiff
    demonstrated that IDEA litigation involving administrative hearings is the type of “complex
    federal litigation” encompassed by the Laffey rates. See McClam v. District of Columbia, Civil
    Action No. 11-381 (RMC), September 6, 2011 Memorandum Opinion at 8 (declining to apply
    Laffey rates in part on grounds that “IDEA cases are generally not complex [and in that case,]
    Plaintiffs . . . pointed to no novel issue or other complexity that turned this, particular IDEA
    case into a complicated piece of litigation.”)5
    Defendant’s argument against imposition of Laffey rates primarily focuses on the Rooths
    and McClam decisions, supra. but the Defendant also asserts that “Plaintiffs have made no
    5
    The McClam court acknowledged that “[f]ederal district courts in this circuit disagree
    whether Laffey rates should be applied in IDEA cases.” McClam Memorandum Opinion at 6
    (citations omitted).
    8
    serious attempt to show that rates under the Laffey Matrix are appropriate in this case or, more
    specifically, that Laffey rates were necessary to attract competent counsel in the underlying,
    special education matters.” (Opposition at 13.)6 Defendant further argues that there is no
    “inherent right to Laffey rates.” (Opposition at 13 (citation omitted)); see Lively v Flexible
    Packaging Assoc., 
    930 A.2d 984
    , 990 (D.C. 2007) (accepting the Laffey Matrix as one legitimate
    means of calculating attorney’s fees and using it as a starting point instead of an automatic
    application). Federal courts do not automatically have to award Laffey rates but instead they can
    look at the complexity of the case and use their discretion to determine whether such rates are
    warranted. See Muldrow v. Re-Direct, Inc., 
    397 F. Supp. 2d 1
    , 4-5 (D.D.C. 2005) (awarding fees
    at a rate 25% less than Laffey in a “relatively straightforward negligence suit”).
    This Court follows the reasoning of the Rooths case and other cases declining to apply
    enhanced Laffey rates. Considering that this is a straightforward case seeking IDEA legal fees,
    this Court concludes that the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the hourly rates set by her
    counsel, which are based on enhanced Laffey rates, are reasonable.7 Such enhanced rates do not
    reflect what the local legal market will bear in terms of legal fees for IDEA litigation. Using the
    [USAO] Laffey Matrix as a starting point for determination of a reasonable hourly rate, this
    Court determines that the hourly rate for Douglas Tyrka [attorney with 10 years experience]
    6
    See Kenny A. v. Perdue, 
    130 S. Ct. 1662
    , 1672 (2010) “a ‘reasonable’ fee is a fee that is
    sufficient to induce a capable attorney to undertake the representation of a meritorious civil
    rights case”); see also Lively v. Flexible Packaging Association, 
    930 A.2d 984
    , 990 (D.C. 2007)
    (cautioning that the goal of fee-shifting provisions is not to provide counsel with a windfall but
    to attract competent counsel).
    7
    By statute the Court determines the reasonableness of the hourly rate. The negotiated
    legal fee hourly rate between the attorney and his client may be more or less than the hourly rate
    set by the Court.
    9
    would be $315 instead of $475; the hourly rate for Zachary Nahass [attorney with 1-2 years
    experience] would be $215, instead of $268, the hourly rate for Keith Coyle [attorney with 1-2
    years experience] would be $205, instead of $255, while the rate for a paralegal/law clerk [Yanet
    Scott, Patrick Meehan, and Michael Tchorni] would be $120/125/130 instead of $139/146/150.
    The Laffey Matrix rates are the presumed maximum rates appropriate for “complex
    federal litigation.” Covington v. District of Columbia, 
    57 F.3d at 1103
    . Because IDEA litigation
    generally does not fall within that category, the Laffey rates should be further reduced. The case
    at issue is no exception to that general rule insofar as it involves a routine administrative
    proceeding summarized in the Hearing Officer’s Decision dated December 24, 2007 (HOD [1])
    and the time spent in preparation for the hearing was nominal. (Itemization of Fees/Expenses.)
    In such a case, an hourly rate below the Laffey Matrix rates is appropriate. See Wilson v. District
    of Columbia, Civil Action No. 09-2258, 
    2011 WL 1428090
    , at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 14, 2011) (Laffey
    Matrix is “not generally applicable to IDEA cases because they are not usually complex”); A.C.
    ex rel. Clark v. District of Columbia, 
    674 F. Supp. 2d 149
    , 155 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding the
    USAO Laffey inapplicable in an IDEA case where “almost all of the attorney’s fees in question
    are the result of counsel’s preparation for attendance at routine administrative hearing”); Agapito
    v. District of Columbia, 
    525 F. Supp. 2d 150
    , 155 (D.D.C. 2007) (adjusting attorney fee award
    and declining to rely on the Laffey Matrix for these “relatively simple and straightforward IDEIA
    cases”). The Court will therefore award fees at an hourly rate equal to three-quarters of the
    USAO Laffey Matrix rate, which is $236 for Tyrka, $161 for Nahass, $154 for Coyle, and
    10
    $90/94/98 for Scott, Meehan, and Tchorni.8
    B. Challenges to Time Charges
    Defendant claims that some of the hours billed by Plaintiff’s counsel [valued at $274.10]
    should not be compensated because they are too remote in time as to “preclude a meaningful
    relationship with the hearing.” (Opposition at 16, citing Czarniewy v. District of Columbia, 
    2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5161
    , at *11 (D.D.C. March 25, 2005)). See also Role Models America, Inc. v.
    Brownlee, 
    353 F.3d 962
    , 973 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (where administrative fee charges have no
    temporal proximity to the proceeding on which the right to fees is based but instead appear to be
    administrative matters between counsel and his client, these charges are not appropriate for
    reimbursement). Defendant asserts that “[t]he statute does not contemplate an undefined form of
    ongoing representation of students [but instead] [i]t quantifies the activities for which school
    districts are obliged to reimburse legal representation to the administrative process described in
    
    20 U.S.C. §1415
    . . . .” (Opposition at 16.)
    A review of the time sheets submitted by Plaintiff shows that the time charges noted by
    counsel have sufficient temporal proximity to the date of the HOD. Some of the time entries
    pre-date and include the due process hearing, reflecting preparation for and attendance at the
    hearing; several time entries note the hearing and counsel’s actions taken in response to the
    Hearing Officer’s Determination; and finally, some time entries following the HOD reflect
    8
    Defendant notes that a 25% reduction in Laffey Matrix rates brings these fees in line
    with its DCPS Fee Guidelines (Opposition at 15); however, it is not the intent of this Court to
    mirror the DCPS Fee Guidelines but instead to apply a percentage reduction that represents the
    fact that most IDEA litigation [involving administrative proceedings] is not complex federal
    litigation warranting the application of Laffey Matrix rates.
    11
    follow-up by counsel, including time spent ensuring HOD compliance. This Court will not
    further reduce time charges based on Defendant’s claim that some charges are remote.
    C. Costs
    Plaintiff seeks costs in the amount of $0.80 for expenses arising from copying. These
    costs are not contested by the Defendant. Plaintiff also seeks an award of costs for fees charged
    by Sharon Millis, a special education advocate with over 20 years experience, whose time is
    billed at $200 per hour.9 These costs relating to the services of a non-attorney educational
    consultant will be denied on grounds that they are not authorized under the IDEA. See Arlington
    Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 
    548 U.S. 291
    , 300 (2006) (“[T]he terms of the IDEA
    overwhelmingly support the conclusion that prevailing parents may not recover the costs of
    experts or consultants.”)
    D. Fees and Costs Awarded
    The amount of fees and costs requested by Plaintiff is $1,820.55, which can be broken
    down into $1,819.75 for legal fees and $0.80 for costs. Defendant has not contested the costs.
    The legal fees claimed were based on 1 hour billed at $475/hour, 1.75 hours billed at $268/hour,
    0.25 hour billed at $255/hour, 1 hour billed at $139/hour, 1.75 hours billed at $146/hour, and 1
    9
    According to Plaintiff’s counsel, Ms. Millis “worked for parents full-time as an agent of
    Tyrka & Associates, primarily attending school meetings, at which she assisted parents and
    school officials in interpreting evaluations, developing individualized education programs,
    developing compensatory education plans, and related tasks.” (Verified Statement of Douglas
    Tyrka ¶17.) The Court notes that Millis billed time for a file review prior to a compensatory
    education meeting and attendance at an MDT meeting in January 2008.
    12
    hour billed at $150/hour.10 This Court has determined that hourly rates based on 75% of the
    Laffey Matrix rate are applicable, which means that 1 hour is billed at $236/hour, 1.75 hours are
    billed at $161/hour, 0.25 hour is billed at $154/hour, 1 hour is billed at $90/hour, 1.75 hours are
    billed at $94/hour, and 1 hour is billed at $98/hour. Total fees thus equal $908.44, and total costs
    equal $0.80, which together total $909.24.
    DATED: April 26, 2012,                        __________________/s/_______________
    nunc pro tunc April 18. 2012                  ALAN KAY
    UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
    10
    Applying the enhanced Laffey Matrix, the hourly rate for paralegals from June 1, 2008
    through May 31, 2009 was $152/hour. The Court is uncertain why Plaintiff used a rate of
    $150/hour post-June 1, 2008.
    13
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2011-0174

Judges: Magistrate Judge Alan Kay

Filed Date: 4/26/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014

Authorities (21)

Sarah Kattan, by Her Parents and Next Friends Susan J. ... , 995 F.2d 274 ( 1993 )

In Re Oliver L. North (Bush Fee Application) , 59 F.3d 184 ( 1995 )

Lani Moore v. District of Columbia , 907 F.2d 165 ( 1990 )

Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Donald P. Hodel, ... , 857 F.2d 1516 ( 1988 )

Role Models Amer Inc v. White, Thomas , 353 F.3d 962 ( 2004 )

darryl-covington-tracy-dew-bey-david-edwards-lee-roy-ferguson-raymond-gant , 57 F.3d 1101 ( 1995 )

Lively v. Flexible Packaging Ass'n , 930 A.2d 984 ( 2007 )

Smith v. Roher , 954 F. Supp. 359 ( 1997 )

Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. , 572 F. Supp. 354 ( 1983 )

Agapito v. District of Columbia , 525 F. Supp. 2d 150 ( 2007 )

MacClarence v. Johnson , 539 F. Supp. 2d 155 ( 2008 )

A.C. Ex Rel. Clark v. District of Columbia , 674 F. Supp. 2d 149 ( 2009 )

Muldrow v. Re-Direct, Inc. , 397 F. Supp. 2d 1 ( 2005 )

Blackman v. District of Columbia , 677 F. Supp. 2d 169 ( 2010 )

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 106 S. Ct. 2505 ( 1986 )

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, Administratrix of the Estate of ... , 106 S. Ct. 2548 ( 1986 )

Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. ... , 126 S. Ct. 2455 ( 2006 )

Perdue v. Kenny A. Ex Rel. Winn , 130 S. Ct. 1662 ( 2010 )

Hensley v. Eckerhart , 103 S. Ct. 1933 ( 1983 )

Salazar v. District of Columbia , 123 F. Supp. 2d 8 ( 2000 )

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