Potts v. Howard University Hospital ( 2010 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ROSSI M. POTTS, :
:
Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 08-0706 (RMU)
:
v. : Re Document No.: 31
:
HOWARD UNIVERSITY et al., :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DENYING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the court on the motion for a more definite statement filed by
the defendants, Howard University and Howard University Hospital.1 The plaintiff, proceeding
pro se at the time,2 brought suit in April 2008, alleging that the defendants discriminated against
him on the basis of his gender and military service obligations in violation of the District of
Columbia Code, §§ 2-1401.01 et seq., and the Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”), 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301 et seq. The court previously
dismissed the claims brought under the D.C. Code, but denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss
the plaintiff’s USERRA claim. The defendants must now answer the plaintiff’s second amended
complaint, but assert that an answer is impossible without a more definite statement of the claim
1
The defendants note that Howard University Hospital is an “unincorporated unit of the
University” and therefore refers to Howard University as the sole defendant. See generally Defs.’
Mot. The plaintiff refers to the defendant as Howard University Hospital. See generally Pl.’s
Opp’n. Because the case caption includes both entities, this Memorandum Opinion will refer to
Howard University and Howard University Hospital collectively as “the defendants.”
2
The plaintiff retained counsel in September 2008.
from the plaintiff. Because the plaintiff’s second amended complaint satisfies the liberal
pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, and because the defendants
may seek more specific information about the plaintiff’s USERRA claim during discovery, the
court denies the defendants’ motion for a more definite statement.
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The court discussed the factual background of this case in a memorandum opinion dated
February 20, 2009, and will only briefly summarize it here. See Mem. Op. (Feb. 20, 2009) at 2-
3. The plaintiff filed a complaint in this court on April 24, 2008, see generally Compl., and filed
a first amended complaint on May 2, 2008, see generally 1st Am. Compl. The defendants
answered the plaintiff’s first amended complaint on May 29, 2008. See Answer. The plaintiff
again amended his complaint on June 26, 2008.3 See generally 2d Am. Compl. Shortly
thereafter, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint, which the
court granted in part and denied in part, leaving the plaintiff’s USERRA claim as the only
remaining claim. See generally Mem. Op. (Feb. 20, 2009).
Instead of answering the second amended complaint, the defendants filed a motion for
leave to file a motion for a more definite statement. See Defs.’ Mot. for Leave to File. The court
granted as conceded the motion for leave to file, and the underlying motion for a more definite
statement was deemed filed on January 14, 2010. See Minute Order (Jan. 14, 2010). With this
motion now fully submitted, the court turns to the applicable legal standard and the parties’
arguments.
3
The first amended complaint, to which the defendants filed an answer, appears to be identical to
the second amended complaint. Compare 1st Am. Compl. with 2d Am. Compl.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard for a Motion for a More Definite Statement
Under Rule 12(e), “[a] party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading . . .
which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(e); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (stating that “[i]f a
pleading fails to specify the allegations in a manner that provides sufficient notice, a defendant
can move for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e)”); see also Hodgson v. Va. Baptist
Hosp., Inc., 482 F.2d 821, 823 (4th Cir. 1973) (stating that Rule 12(e) must be read in
conjunction with Rule 8(a)). “[W]hen a defendant is unclear about the meaning of a particular
allegation in the complaint, the proper course of action is not to move to dismiss but to move for
a more definite statement.” Am. Nurses’ Ass’n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 725 (7th Cir. 1986)
(citing United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass’n, 347 U.S. 186, 189 (1954)).
Given the liberal nature of the federal pleading requirements, courts are reluctant to
compel a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e) out of fear that such action will become
a substitute for discovery. Fraternal Order of Police Library of Cong. Labor Comm. v. Library
of Cong., 692 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Hilska v. Jones, 217 F.R.D. 16, 25 (D.D.C.
2003)); see also Mitchell v. E-Z Way Towers, Inc., 269 F.2d 126, 132 (5th Cir. 1959)
(determining that the information sought was an issue for discovery rather than the pleadings).
Moreover, “[w]hen the complaint conforms to Rule 8(a) and it is neither so vague nor so
ambiguous that the defendant cannot reasonably be required to answer, the district court should
deny a motion for a more definite statement and require the defendant to bring the case to issue
by filing a response within the time provided by the rules.” Hodgson, 482 F.2d at 824 (citing
Mitchell, 269 F.2d at 132).
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Mindful that all litigants are entitled to proper notice pleading under Rule 8(a), however,
the court will grant relief pursuant to Rule 12(e) where the pleading is “so vague or ambiguous
that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a respons[e].” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e); see also
Dorsey v. Am. Express Co., 499 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2007) (granting a Rule 12(e) motion
where the pro se plaintiff’s complaint was not detailed enough to provide fair notice); Bower v.
Weisman, 639 F. Supp. 532, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (granting a Rule 12(e) motion because the
plaintiff’s claims lacked clarity and the defendant therefore could not effectively respond to the
complaint); Hilska, 217 F.R.D. at 25 (concluding that “Rule 12(e) is the most suitable remedy . .
. when taking into account the pro se status of the plaintiff and the fact that the parties are unable
to engage in discovery until they are capable of identifying the claims at issue”); Saad v. Burns
Int’l Sec. Servs. Inc., 456 F. Supp. 33, 36 (D.D.C. 1978) (finding that the mere allegations do not
suffice to state a claim and ordering the plaintiff to file a more definite statement).
B. The Court Denies the Defendants’ Motion for a More Definite Statement
The defendants claim that it “would be nearly impossible” to respond to the plaintiff’s
second amended complaint because it is prolix, contains only one paragraph and is “very
difficult to understand and to a large extent does no more than recite legal jargon and statute
citations.” Defs.’ Mot. at 3. As such, the defendants claim that the plaintiff’s second amended
complaint does not comply with Rule 8(a)(2), which requires a pleading to contain a “short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 4. The
defendants assert that after filing the complaint pro se, the plaintiff retained counsel, who
“should be able to easily prepare a pleading that complies with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.” Id. at 6.
The plaintiff asserts that granting the motion would allow the defendants a second
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opportunity to file a motion to dismiss, thus further protracting the resolution of this case and
prejudicing the plaintiff. Pl.’s Opp’n at 3. The plaintiff adds that because the defendants
previously filed both a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint and an answer to the
first amended complaint, the second amended complaint cannot be too vague to require a more
definite statement. Id. at 4. Finally, the plaintiff argues that if the court understood the
USERRA claim well enough to allow it to survive the defendants’ motion to dismiss, then the
second amended complaint is sufficiently clear to allow the defendants to file an answer. Id. at
5.
Rule 12(e) should not frustrate the “liberality” of the notice pleading requirement by
requiring a plaintiff to amend a complaint that would be sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
Mitchell, 269 F.2d at 130, 132; see also Rahman, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 19 (holding that a more
definite statement was not necessary because the plaintiff had provided a sufficient description
of factual allegations and those allegations were “readily understandable”). Nevertheless, “a pro
se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Abou-Hussein v. Gates, 657 F. Supp. 2d 77, 80 (D.D.C. 2009)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
In this case, the second amended complaint has already partially withstood a motion to
dismiss. See Mem. Op. (Feb. 20, 2009) at 5 (denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss the
plaintiff’s USERRA claim). Although the court agrees with the defendants that the second
amended complaint is far from a model of clarity, it provides the defendants with sufficient
notice of the plaintiff’s USERRA claim and the facts supporting it under on the lenient standard
of Rule 8. Cf. Haghkerdar v. Husson Coll., 226 F.R.D. 12, 14 (D. Me. 2005) (denying a motion
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for a more definite statement when the complaint “commingle[d]” claims under various statutes
in one count because the factual allegations were “detailed and specific” and each claim related
to the same “series of events leading up to her eventual employment termination”); United Ins.
Co. of Am. v. B. W. Rudy, Inc., 42 F.R.D. 398, 403 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (stating that Rule 12(e)
“contemplates a major ambiguity or omission” that renders a complaint unanswerable). For
example, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants typically employed objective criteria for
seniority decisions, but deviated from that practice when they denied the plaintiff a promotion
because of his obligations to the Air Force Reserves. 2d Am. Compl. at 5-7. The plaintiff
references specific dates and conduct in support of this claim, including a conversation during
which the plaintiff alleges that his supervisor requested that the plaintiff choose between his
service commitments and his obligations to his employer. Id. at 6. According to the plaintiff,
the defendants continued to harass him regarding his service obligations, ultimately resulting in
his termination. Id. In short, the plaintiff’s pleading is sufficient to put the defendants on notice
of his USERRA claim.
Indeed, a review of the defendants’ submissions establishes that the defendants
understand the crux of the plaintiff’s USERRA claim. See Defs.’ Mot. at 1-3 (summarizing the
plaintiff’s claim by stating that the plaintiff alleges that “he should have been entitled to a
promotion because of the vacancy created by [another employee’s] death” that occurred while
the plaintiff was on leave to fulfill his obligations to the Air Force Reserves); Defs.’ Mot. to
Dismiss (Aug. 22, 2008) at 2-3 (summarizing that the plaintiff alleges “that the Hospital
discriminated against him in 1999 by hiring a female to do his job that he had been hired to do
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while he was on military duty . . . and retaliated against him by terminating his employment”
for bringing complaints against the defendants); cf. Prudhomme v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 800
F. Supp. 390, 396 (E.D. La. 1992) (concluding that the fact that the defendant filed a motion to
dismiss and a reply proved that the complaint could be responded to). Whether the purpose of
the defendants’ motion is to receive more specific information about the plaintiff’s USERRA
claim, as the defendants’ proposed order suggests, see Defs.’ Proposed Order Granting Mot. for
a More Definite Statement, or simply to receive a “short[er] and plain[er]” statement of that
claim, as the defendants’ motion suggests, see Defs.’ Mot. at 6, discovery is the proper and
more efficient means to achieve either end. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also Haghkerdar,
226 F.R.D. at 14 (noting that the “liberal discovery rules” would help the defendant “delineate
and hone the facts” underlying the plaintiff’s theory); Pleasants v. Allbaugh, 208 F.R.D. 7, 11
(D.D.C. 2002) (stating that “the very purpose of discovery is to ‘define or clarify issues’”
(quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978))).
The court further notes that Rule 12(e) motions are disfavored for their dilatory effect on
the progress of litigation. Covington v. City of New York, 1999 WL 739910, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 22, 1999). Requiring the plaintiff in this case to again amend his complaint would delay
the prompt resolution of this case. Indeed, it would effectively restart the litigation clock by
allowing the defendants to move to dismiss for a second time. See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig.,
421 F. Supp. 2d 703, 713 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (explaining that an amended complaint “supercedes”
the original and “entitles a defendant to raise substantive arguments” in a new responsive
pleading, even if those arguments were not raised in response to the original complaint); Chase
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v. Peay, 286 F. Supp. 2d 523, 531 (D. Md. 2003) (stating that an amended complaint “opens the
door for defendants to raise new and previously unmentioned affirmative defenses” (quoting
Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 735 (7th Cir. 1999))). Therefore, the court concludes that
ordering the plaintiff to amend his complaint is unnecessary because the plaintiff has complied
with the liberal pleading standards and because discovery will elucidate the plaintiff’s USERRA
claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the defendants’ motion for a more definite
statement. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and
contemporaneously issued this 12th day of August, 2010.
RICARDO M. URBINA
United States District Judge
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