Russell v. Corrections Corporation of America ( 2019 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MAXINE RUSSELL
Plaintiff,
v. Civ. No. 17-313 (EGS)
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA,
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Maxine Russell brings this suit against
Corrections Corporation of America (“CCA”) and the District of
Columbia (“the District”) seeking compensation for alleged
injuries she suffered when she was a pretrial inmate at the
Correctional Treatment Facility (“CTF”) after she fell in her
dark cell. She has since been released, and brings several
claims against the defendants alleging violations of state and
federal law in a seven-count complaint.
The Court previously dismissed one count of her complaint.
Pending before the Court is defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on the remaining six counts. Ms. Russell has failed to
oppose the motion or file any response. Upon consideration of
the motion, the relevant case law, and the entire record, the
Court GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
I. Background
The following facts are undisputed. Ms. Maxine Russell was
incarcerated at the Correctional Treatment Facility (“CTF”), a
correctional facility then-operated by Corrections Corporation
of America 1 in Washington, D.C. pursuant to a correctional
services agreement with the District. Defs.’ Statement of Facts
(“SOF”), ECF No. 64-1 at ¶ 1–3. 2 Ms. Russell was at CTF from
January 28, 2014 through March 4, 2014. Id. ¶ 1.
At CTF, Ms. Russell was in Unit E-2-A, Cell #9 from January
28 until February 20, 2014, the date of her accident. Id. ¶¶ 1,
5. This cell was equipped with one set of bunk beds, one light
fixture on the ceiling equipped with two bulbs, and a light
switch that inmates could control. Id. ¶ 6. The light switch was
located near the door of the cell, which was out of the reach of
the bunk beds. Id. ¶ 8. The cell had two windows that allowed
light from the outside, and one window in the cell door that
allowed in light from the hallway so that security personnel
could see into the cell to conduct security checks at night. Id.
¶¶ 12-14. Security lights and parking lot lights illuminated the
cell at night, as well as 24-hour lighting from the hallway and
dayroom. Id. ¶ 15.
1 Corrections Corporation of America has since changed its name
to CoreCivic.
2 Ms. Russell has failed to dispute the defendants’ statement of
facts, or any of the documents provided to support those facts.
2
Ms. Russell alleges that shortly after she was
incarcerated, the light bulb in her cell began to flicker. Id. ¶
20. Sometime thereafter, the light stopped working. Compl., ECF
No. 1-1 ¶ 10. Additionally, she claims that her windows were
covered with film. SOF, ECF No. 64-1 ¶ 19. Ms. Russell claims
she told CTF staff about the lighting problem, and they said
that it would be fixed. Id. ¶ 21. On February 13, 2014, a week
prior to the accident, a CTF employee submitted a work order to
fix the lightbulb. Id. ¶ 22.
On February 20, 2014, Ms. Russell was seen by a Unity
Health provider in the medical unit for reasons independent of
her accident which would happen later in the day. Id. ¶ 23.
There, she stated she could not sleep in the dark and that being
“locked up” was “getting to her.” Id. Ms. Russell also stated
she was suffering emotional distress from the recent death of a
close family member. Id. Ms. Russell returned to her cell from
the medical unit at approximately 9:10 p.m. Id. ¶ 24. At
approximately 10:45 p.m., the inmates were told to return to
their cells from the dayroom and the TV room for a formal count,
which was conducted at 11:00 p.m. Id. ¶¶ 25-26. The housing unit
officer completed the count by 11:12 p.m. Id. ¶ 27.
At 11:24 p.m., the housing unit officer was notified that
Ms. Russell needed medical assistance because she fell from her
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top bunk and hit her head and back on the wall. Id. ¶ 28–29. 3 The
housing unit officer medical staff responded and entered the
unit at approximately 11:38 p.m. Id. ¶ 30. Medical staff and
security personnel then escorted Ms. Russell to the medical
unit. Id. ¶ 31. Unity Health provider notes indicate she was
able to move and walk with minimal assistance. Id. ¶ 32. Ms.
Russell was returned to her unit and transferred to the bottom
bunk of a different cell at 1:50 a.m. on February 21, 2014. Id.
¶ 33. Ms. Russell visited the medical unit for follow-up visits
seven more times before being released from CTF on March 4,
2014. Id. ¶ 34.
Ms. Russell filed her complaint against defendants alleging
that she suffered physical and emotional injuries resulting from
being kept in a small, dark, and dingy cell. See Compl., ECF No.
1 ¶¶ 11-12. Defendants moved to dismiss Count Seven, a Monell
claim for municipal liability based on several theories of
liability, which the Court granted on June 17, 2019. See Mem.
Op., ECF No. 62. Six claims now remain against defendants:
Negligence (Count One); Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress (“IIED”) (Count Two); Negligent Infliction of Emotional
3 In her Complaint, Ms. Russell claims she tripped and fell in
her cell. Compl., ECF No. 1–1 ¶ 12. However, in her deposition,
she stated that she slipped off of the ladder while climbing to
her bed, but does not remember exactly how she fell. SOF, ECF
No. 64-1 ¶ 35.
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Distress (Count Three); Negligent Training or Supervision (Count
Four); Failure to Protect (Count Five); and Inadequate Medical
Care (Count Six). See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.
Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all remaining
counts in Ms. Russell’s complaint. See generally Defs.’ Mot. for
Summ. J., ECF No. 64. Ms. Russell has failed to oppose, or in
any way respond to, defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
Subsequently, defendants filed a motion for summary disposition.
Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. Disposition, ECF No. 66. Ms. Russell did
not oppose or respond to the motion for summary disposition.
Defendants’ motions are ripe for adjudication.
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment should be granted if “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Under Rule 56, summary judgment is appropriate if the
“pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions
on file, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of
material fact.” Carter v. Greenspan, 304 F. Supp. 2d 13, 20
(D.D.C. 2004). Indeed, “[a] moving party is ‘entitled to
judgment as a matter of law’ against ‘a party who fails to make
a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial.’” Waterhouse v. District of
5
Columbia, 298 F.3d 989, 992 (D.C. Cir. 2002)(quoting Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 332 (1986)). The non-moving
party is required to provide evidence that would permit a
reasonable jury to find in its favor. Laningham v. United States
Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Even when there is no opposition filed, the burden is
always on the movant to demonstrate why summary judgment is
warranted. Grimes v. D.C., 794 F.3d 83, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2015). “If
a party . . . fails to properly address another party's
assertion of fact . . . the court may . . . grant summary
judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the
facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to
it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3). Accordingly, a “district court
must always determine for itself whether the record and any
undisputed material facts justify granting summary judgment.”
Grimes, 794 F.3d at 97.
III. Analysis
In Ms. Russell’s complaint she alleges violations of
various state and federal laws. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1–
1. The Court discusses each count in turn.
A. Tort Law Claims
1. Count One: Negligence
Ms. Russell alleges that defendants were negligent because
they “knew or ought to have known that keeping an inmate in a
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dark and dingy cell . . . could lead to severe mental and/or
physical injuries.” Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 15. She also alleges
that as “a direct and proximate consequence of the negligence of
the defendants, directly or indirectly [,she] sustained
injuries.” Id. ¶ 16. A plaintiff bringing a negligence claim
must establish: (1) the standard of care; and (2) that a
violation of the standard was the proximate cause of the injury.
Jones v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 314 A.2d 459, 460 (D.C. 1974).
Furthermore, “[i]n the District of Columbia, in order to make
out a prima facie case of liability based on the existence of a
dangerous condition, a plaintiff must show that the defendant
‘had actual notice of the dangerous condition or that the
condition had existed for such length of time that, in the
exercise of reasonable care, its existence should have become
known and corrected.’” Hickey v. WMATA, 360 F. Supp. 2d 60, 62
(D.D.C. 2004).
Under District of Columbia law, expert testimony is
generally required to prove a deviation occurred from the
applicable standard of care in a negligence action. Edwards v.
Okie Dokie, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 31, 45 (D.D.C. 2007). If “the
subject in question is so distinctly related to some science,
profession or occupation as to be beyond the ken of the average
layperson,” the plaintiff must present expert testimony to
establish the applicable standard of care. Id. When expert
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testimony is necessary to establish such a standard, a
plaintiff’s failure to name an expert constitutes grounds for
dismissal. Id.
Ms. Russell has not established that the defendants had a
duty to change the flickering light in her cell because they
were on notice it was a dangerous condition and failed to remedy
it in a reasonable time. See id. The evidence in the record
establishes that a week before Ms. Russell fell, a CTF employee
submitted a work order to fix a light bulb in her cell. SOF, ECF
No. 64-1 ¶ 22. Ms. Russell has not provided expert testimony
establishing that a week was not a reasonable time for prison
maintenance to be completed under the circumstances in this
case. The reasonable amount of time that prison maintenance
employees should complete certain tasks, like replacing a
flickering light bulb in a cell that has other sources of light,
is a subject distinctly related to the correction profession
such that it would require correctional expert testimony. Cosio
v. D.C., 940 A.2d 1009, 1010 (D.C. 2008)(stating that matters
such as “appropriate inspection and maintenance schedules for
prison facilities” would require expert testimony to establish
the standard of care).
Similarly, Ms. Russell failed to provide expert testimony
to show that the flickering light was a dangerous condition. The
undisputed evidence shows that there were other light sources
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that illuminated the cell. SOF, ECF No. 64-1 ¶ 15 (stating cell
was lit by lights in parking lot and lights in hallway). The
amount of light needed to safely move through a prison cell at
night, when the cell has other sources of light, is also outside
of the ken of a regular person, and therefore expert testimony
is required to demonstrate that the lighting in Ms. Russell’s
cell fell below the standard of care. See Briggs v. WMATA, 481
F.3d 839, 845–46 (D.C. Cir. 2007)( stating that although “lay
persons can certainly distinguish between illumination and
complete darkness, there is nothing to indicate that common
knowledge includes a universal standard of ‘adequate’
lighting”). Without expert testimony, there is insufficient
evidence to prove that a deviation from the applicable standard
of care occurred in this case. Therefore, Ms. Russell cannot
establish that defendants breached a duty owed to her.
Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count
One is GRANTED.
2. Count Two: IIED
Ms. Russell alleges that defendants intentionally inflicted
emotional distress on her, arguing defendants’ “conduct was
extreme, outrageous, and contrary to basic concepts of human
decency.” Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 18. To maintain a cause of
action for IIED, District of Columbia law “requires the
plaintiff to show (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the
9
defendant which (2) intentionally or recklessly (3) cause[d] the
plaintiff severe emotional distress.” Ben-Kotel v. Howard Univ.,
156 F. Supp. 2d 8, 14 (D.D.C. 2001)(quotations and citations
omitted). “Liability will be imposed only for conduct so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”
Thompson v. Jasas Corp., 212 F. Supp. 2d 21, 27-28 (D.D.C.
2002)(citing Homan v. Goyal, 711 A.2d 812, 818 (D.C.
1998))(internal quotation marks omitted).
The conduct alleged by Ms. Russell does not rise to the
level of “atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community.” Id. The undisputed evidence shows that a work order
for the light bulb was placed after she complained about the
lighting issues in her cell. SOF, ECF No-64-1 ¶ 22. Moreover,
after she fell, Ms. Russell was seen by medical staff at least
seven times, id. ¶ 34, and she has not provided any evidence
that an employee engaged in any behavior that could be
classified as extreme. The defendants’ actions in this case
“[do] not approach the high extreme and outrageous” conduct
required to support an IIED claim. See Hollis v. Rosa Mexicano
DC, LLC, 582 F. Supp. 2d 22, 23 (D.D.C. 2008). Accordingly,
defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count Two is GRANTED.
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3. Count Three: Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress
Ms. Russell alleges that defendants negligently inflicted
emotional distress on her, arguing that their “conduct was
grossly negligent and defendants ought to know or knew that such
conduct would provoke extreme emotional distress.” Compl., ECF
No. 1-1 ¶ 23. To prevail on a claim of negligent infliction of
emotional distress, a plaintiff must establish, among other
things, that defendants acted negligently. Wright v. U.S., 963
F. Supp. 7, 18 (D.D.C. 1997). Furthermore, “[i]n a negligent
infliction case, there can be recovery for mental and emotional
distress only if the plaintiff's injuries are ‘serious and
verifiable.’” Bahura v. S.E.W. Investors, 754 A.2d 928, 937
(D.C. 2000)(citation omitted).
Because Ms. Russell’s negligence claims fail, her negligent
infliction of emotional distress claims also fail. See Wright,
963 F. Supp. at 18 (stating negligent infliction of emotional
distress claim may only proceed when there is sufficient
evidence that defendant acted negligently). Additionally, under
District of Columbia law, “[e]xpert testimony is necessary to
demonstrate a causal link between a defendant’s act and a
plaintiff’s harm ‘in cases presenting medically complicated
questions due to multiple and/or preexisting causes.’” Halcomb
v. Woods, 610 F. Supp. 2d 77, 85 (D.D.C. 2009)(requiring expert
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testimony where plaintiff’s emotional distress was potentially
traceable to at least three different sources and manifested
itself in a variety of ways). Ms. Russell failed to provide
expert testimony establishing the requisite causal link between
defendants’ alleged tortious conduct and her emotional distress.
Absent such an expert, or evidence sufficient to show that
defendants acted negligently, she cannot maintain a claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly,
defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count Three is
GRANTED.
4. Count Four: Negligent Failure to Train or Supervise
Ms. Russell alleges that defendants failed to adequately
“train, supervise and discipline its agents and employees.”
Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 25. She further alleges that as “a direct
and proximate consequence of the customs, policies and practices
[of defendants] [she] sustained injuries.” Id. ¶ 27. Under a
negligent supervision or training theory, a plaintiff must show
“that an employer knew or should have known its employee behaved
in a dangerous or otherwise incompetent manner, and that the
employer, armed with that actual or constructive knowledge,
failed to adequately supervise the employee.” Brown v.
Argenbright Sec., Inc., 782 A.2d 752, 760 (D.C. 2001). A
plaintiff claiming negligent supervision “bears the burden of
presenting evidence which establishes the applicable standard of
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care, demonstrates that this standard has been violated, and
develops a causal relationship between the violation and the
harm complained of.” Tarpeh–Doe v. United States, 28 F.3d 120,
123 (D.C. Cir. 1994)(quoting Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d
555, 560 (D.C. 1979)).
Ms. Russell has not provided any expert testimony that
would demonstrate the applicable standard of care under these
circumstances. Moreover, Ms. Russell has not provided any
evidence to show that there was a causal relationship between
her light flickering and her alleged injuries sustained during
the fall. Similarly, Ms. Russell has not provided any evidence
that would show that the defendants had “actual or constructive
knowledge,” that any of its employees behaved in a “dangerous or
otherwise incompetent manner.” See Brown, 782 A.2d at 760.
Because the plaintiff has not identified a standard of care,
presented any evidence of a deviation from that standard,
presented any evidence that the District knew about this
deviation, or that the deviation caused her injuries, summary
judgment is warranted on this theory of liability. See Smith v.
District of Columbia, 882 A.2d 778, 793 (D.C. 2005) (finding
directed verdict on negligence claim warranted where plaintiff
failed to introduce expert testimony as to the applicable
standard of care). Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on Count Four is GRANTED.
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B. Federal Law Claims
The final two counts of Ms. Russell’s complaints are
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of her
constitutional rights under a theory of municipal liability. See
Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 28–36. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, a court must conduct a two-step inquiry. Baker v. Dist.
of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003). First, a
court must determine whether the plaintiff establishes a
predicate constitutional or statutory violation. Id. If so, a
court then determines whether the complaint alleges that a
custom or policy of the municipality caused the violation. Id.;
see also Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Ms. Russell brings
two theories of liability under Section 1983: (1) defendants
failed to protect her against a violation of her constitutional
rights; and (2) she was provided inadequate medical care as a
result of defendants’ deliberate indifference of those rights.
The Court addresses each claim in turn. See Compl., ECF No. 1-1
¶¶ 28–36.
1. Count Five: Failure to Protect
Ms. Russell alleges that defendants knew of and acquiesced
in “the substantial risk of harm to [her] by their neglect.”
Compl., ECF No. 1–1 ¶¶ 30–32. She further alleges that
defendants “deliberate[ly] disregard[ed] . . . [her]
constitutional rights [by] fail[ing] to remove the threat [to
14
her] welfare . . . thereby knowingly exposing [her] to physical
and emotional harm.” Id. ¶ 30.
Ms. Russell has not provided any evidence to support her
claim under Section 1983. Her complaint is devoid of facts
sufficient to allege a policy or custom that amounts to a
“consistent” or “widespread” practice of failing adequately to
supervise and protect inmates. See Richardson v. District of
Columbia, 322 F. Supp. 3d 175, 186 (D.D.C. 2018)(stating that to
hold a municipality liable under Section 1983, a plaintiff must
establish that a custom or policy of the municipality caused the
violation). Although it is true that the failure to train,
supervise, or discipline city employees can constitute such a
policy or custom if it amounts to deliberate indifference
towards the constitutional rights of a plaintiff, see Daskalea
v. Dist. of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 441 (D.C. Cir. 2000), Ms.
Russell alleges in a conclusory manner that “[t]he need for
training was so obvious that failure to address it was likely to
result in a constitutional violation.” Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 38.
She has not alleged any deficiencies with respect to the
training provided to employees at CTF, or connected any such
deficiencies in training with any violation of her
constitutional rights. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489
U.S. 378, 389 (1989)(“Only where a municipality's failure to
train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a
15
‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of its inhabitants can
such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city ‘policy or
custom” that is actionable under § 1983.”).
Ms. Russell alleges only legal conclusions such as that
defendants had a “deliberate disregard for the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights” and that defendants “callous and
deliberate disregard to the plaintiff’s safety and welfare”
resulted in her injury. See Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 30–31. She has
failed to provide any evidence in support of her allegations
that defendants “knew of and acquiesced in the substantial risk
of harm to the plaintiff”--the undisputed evidence establishes
that she did not file any written grievances related to her
light fixture until after she had fell. SOF, ECF No. 64-1 ¶ 37.
Because Ms. Russell has failed to support her claim with any
evidence, or to dispute any of the evidence provided by the
defendants, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count
Five is GRANTED.
2. Count Six: Inadequate Medical Care
Ms. Russell alleges that defendants should have known of
the excessive risk of leaving her in a dark and dingy cell and
disregarded that risk. Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 33–36. She further
alleges that as a direct and proximate consequence of these
failures, her “medical condition deteriorated as there was no
monitor[ing] and adequate care of her medical needs.” Id. ¶ 36.
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Defendants move for summary judgment on Ms. Russell’s claim on
the basis that all medical services in CTF are provided by an
independent contractor, Unity Health, not the defendants. Defs.’
Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 64 at 7–8. 4 In Ms. Russell’s
opposition to defendants’ partial motion for summary judgment,
she clarified that she has not brought a claim for “defect of
medical care provided or medical malpractice” but rather her
“allegations are that she was denied care by the defendants, due
to their indifference.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Partial Summ.
J., ECF No. 19 at 3. Ms. Russell contended that the District’s
policies barred her from receiving any medical treatment, and
that if there exists a factual dispute as to whether she
received treatment then summary judgment is inappropriate. Id.
at 3–4.
Ms. Russell’s arguments fail for several reasons. First,
there is no factual dispute as to whether Ms. Russell received
medical care after she was injured. Ms. Russell’s answers to the
District’s interrogatories unequivocally show that she received
treatment for her injuries. See Russell Interrrog., ECF No. 45-
4. In her answers to her interrogatories she stated that after
she fell “she [w]as treated at CCA clinic, and was taken to ER,
4 When citing electronic filings throughout this Memorandum
Opinion, the Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the
original page number of the filed document.
17
but [did] not recall which.” Id. at 5. She also stated that
“[f]or mental health, [she] went to see the psychiatrist and
mental care provider upstairs at the facility, [was] also seen
at the DC Department of Behavioral Health, then upon release
seen by [a] [t]herapist.” Id. Furthermore, Ms. Russell’s
deposition testimony confirms that she had no complaints about
the treatment she received, and the record shows that she saw
physicians at Unity Health Care at least seven times after her
fall. SOF ECF No. 64-1 ¶¶ 34–36. Accordingly, there is no
genuine factual dispute as to whether she received treatment,
rather, she concedes that she received both medical and mental
health treatment. See Carter, 304 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C.
2004)(summary judgment is appropriate if the “pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material
fact.”).
Second, to the extent Ms. Russell has clarified that Count
Six is a claim for a violation of 42 U.S.C § 1983 due to
deliberate indifference, she has failed to show either a
constitutional violation or that a custom or policy exists such
that the District can be liable for any such violation. See
Brown, 514 F.3d at 1283 (stating to hold the District liable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a plaintiff must establish a
constitutional violation and that a policy or custom of the
18
District caused that violation). Accordingly, defendants’ motion
for summary judgment on Count Six is GRANTED.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on all remaining counts in plaintiff’s
complaint is GRANTED. An appropriate Order accompanies this
Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
December 18, 2019
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