Nyambal v. Allied Barton Security Services, LLC ( 2018 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
EUGENE NYAMBAL, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
) Civil Action No. 14-1904 (EGS)
ALLIEDBARTON SECURITY )
SERVICES,LLC )
)
Defendant. )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
On January 26, 2016, the Court dismissed plaintiff Eugene
Nyambal’s (“Mr. Nyambal”) suit against defendant AlliedBarton
Security Services, LLC (“AlliedBarton”) for damages related to
the company’s alleged role in facilitating his removal from the
International Monetary Fund’s (“IMF”) and the World Bank’s
Washington, D.C. locations. See Nyambal v. AlliedBarton Security
Servs., LLC, 153 F. Supp. 3d 309 (D.D.C. 2016). Shortly
thereafter, Mr. Nyambal filed a motion for reconsideration,
arguing that the Court clearly erred when it dismissed his
defamation claim. See Recons. Mot., ECF No. 17. Mr. Nyambal also
filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental memorandum in
light of newly discovered evidence in support of his motion for
reconsideration. See Mot. to Suppl., ECF No. 36. Having
considered both motions, the responses and replies thereto, and
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the applicable law, the Court DENIES Mr. Nyambal’s motion to
file a supplemental memorandum in support of his motion for
reconsideration and GRANTS his motion for reconsideration. The
Court finds that Mr. Nyambal stated a defamation claim.
II. Background
The factual background of this case is thoroughly set out
in the Court’s prior Opinion and will not be repeated in full.
See Nyambal, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 312-13. To provide context,
however, the Court summarizes the case’s procedural history and
the facts relevant to Mr. Nyambal’s defamation claim.
A. Procedural History
Mr. Nyambal filed suit against AlliedBarton in the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia on October 9, 2014. Compl.,
ECF No. 1-3. AlliedBarton removed the case to the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia and filed a motion to
dismiss. Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.; Am. Mot. to Dismiss, ECF
No. 7. On January 26, 2016, the Court dismissed Mr. Nyambal’s
complaint, finding that he failed to state a claim against
AlliedBarton for: (1) tortious interference with business
relationships; (2) defamation; (3) intentional infliction of
emotional distress; and (4) civil conspiracy. See Nyambal, 153
F. Supp. 3d at 315-19.
On February 23, 2016, Mr. Nyambal filed a motion for
reconsideration, arguing that the Court wrongly dismissed his
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defamation claim. See Recons. Mot., ECF No. 17. On October 26,
2017, Mr. Nyambal filed a motion for leave to file a
supplemental memorandum in support of his motion for
reconsideration in light of newly discovered evidence. See Mot.
to Suppl., ECF No. 36. Both motions are opposed. 1
B. Relevant Facts
Defendant AlliedBarton provides security services to the
IMF and the World Bank, international organizations that promote
global economic development. Compl., ECF No. 1-3 ¶¶ 2-4.
Plaintiff Mr. Nyambal is a “distinguished economist,” who served
as a senior advisor at the IMF until he was fired in June 2009,
purportedly in retaliation for raising “serious concerns” about
the lack of transparency and potential corruption in a Cameroon
mining project. Id. ¶¶ 1, 6-7. In order to “silence and punish”
Mr. Nyambal for whistleblowing, the IMF and AlliedBarton
allegedly conspired to “blacklist [him] by posting his name and
picture on the World Bank’s ‘No Admit List.’” Id. ¶ 10. Based on
the information within an IMF “blacklisting memo,” AlliedBarton
“place[d] his name and picture on the World Bank’s ‘No Admit’
list, which . . . prevent[s] individuals deemed a security
1 Mr. Nyambal also filed a motion for leave to file an amended
complaint and a motion to alter or amend judgment. See ECF Nos.
26, 28. The Court denied both motions, given Mr. Nyambal’s
motion for reconsideration was fully briefed and pending
resolution. See May 17, 2017 Minute Orders.
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threat from entering the premises.” Id. ¶¶ 16, 20. As a result,
Mr. Nyambal was denied access to the World Bank in July 2013 2 and
October 2013. Id. ¶¶ 11, 13.
On October 9, 2013, Mr. Nyambal sought to enter the World
Bank with a colleague to attend the World Bank’s Annual Meeting
to “meet with government officials and secure contracts.” Id. ¶
13. Despite having a three-day pass, Mr. Nyambal was denied
access, which “publicly humiliated [him] in the presence of
former colleagues, professional acquaintances, and government
officials.” Id. At least one potential client was “advised” that
Mr. Nyambal was on the World Bank’s and the IMF’s Do Not Admit
lists. Id. ¶ 15. Mr. Nyambal’s contract negotiations “have come
to a halt” as a result of this alleged blacklisting. Id.
On June 5, 2014, Mr. Nyambal met with representatives from
the World Bank and AlliedBarton. Id. ¶ 17. The World Bank
“declined” any responsibility for Mr. Nyambal’s inclusion on the
Do Not Admit list. Id. ¶ 16. The World Bank also sent him a
redacted version of the IMF’s “blacklisting memo,” which
confirmed that his name was included on the Do Not Admit list.
Id. According to Mr. Nyambal, AlliedBarton allegedly
“acknowledged that Nyambal’s blacklisting [in October 2013] was
2 The Court found that Mr. Nyambal’s claims were subject to a
one-year statute of limitations. Nyambal, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 314-
15. Therefore, it only considered the encounters that occurred
in October 2013 and thereafter.
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triggered by the information provided by the IMF to the World
Bank through AlliedBarton.” Id. ¶ 17.
III. Mr. Nyambal’s Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental
Memorandum in Support of his Motion for Reconsideration
Mr. Nyambal moves to file a supplemental memorandum in
support of his motion for reconsideration “pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) and 15(d). . . .” See Mot. to
Suppl., ECF No. 36-2 at 1. However, neither Rule 15(a) nor Rule
15(d) allow Mr. Nyambal to file a supplemental memorandum in
support of a motion. Rule 15(a)(2) provides that “a party may
amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written
consent or the court's leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(emphasis
added). Rule 15(d) provides that “the court may, on just terms,
permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any
. . . event that happened after the date of the pleading to be
supplemented.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d)(emphasis added). Plainly,
Rule 15 allows a party to amend or supplement pleadings;
however, motions are not considered pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 7(a) (defining pleadings); Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)
(distinguishing a motion from a pleading); see also Sokos v.
Hilton Hotels Corp., 283 F. Supp. 2d 42, 54 n.7 (D.D.C. 2003)
(“Rule 15(a) applies to the amendment of ‘pleadings,’ which are
specifically defined by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(a) and
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this definition does not apply to . . . motions or oppositions
thereto.”).
Nonetheless, the Court has “the discretion to allow parties
to supplement the record of a case.” Marsh v. Johnson, 263 F.
Supp. 2d 49, 53-54 (D.D.C. 2003)(citations omitted). Mr. Nyambal
argues that leave to supplement is warranted because his
supplemental memorandum addresses “newly discovered evidence”
that “goes to the basis of why the Court dismissed his claim . .
. [because] it shows the level of knowledge and control the
Defendant has concerning security and blacklisting . . . .” Mot.
to Suppl., ECF No. 36 at 3. The evidence includes an IMF
administrative order outlining the procedural steps the
organization must take before imposing sanctions on employees,
see Exs. 1-3, ECF No. 36-2; the IMF’s public description of its
Security Services team, Ex. 4, ECF No. 36-2; and AlliedBarton’s
public job description of its IMF security officer position, Ex.
5, ECF No. 36-2. Mr. Nyambal argues that this evidence “probably
would have changed the outcome” of his defamation claim. Mot. to
Suppl., ECF No. 36-2 at 8.
The Court dismissed Mr. Nyambal’s defamation claim based on
his failure to state a claim, not because of insufficient
evidence. Nyambal, 153 F. Supp. 3d 309 at 317-18. In so doing,
the Court evaluated the “legal sufficiency” of the complaint
itself, not the “truth of what is asserted” or “whether a
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plaintiff has any evidence to back up what is in the complaint.”
Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir.
2002)(quotations and citations omitted). Therefore, even if
these exhibits had been included, the Court would not have
considered them. As discussed below, the Court grants Mr.
Nyambal’s motion for reconsideration based only on the
allegations within his complaint.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Mr. Nyambal’s motion for
leave to file a supplemental memorandum.
IV. Mr. Nyambal’s Motion for Reconsideration
Mr. Nyambal moves for reconsideration pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), arguing that the Court clearly
erred when it dismissed his defamation claim. Recons. Mot., ECF
No. 17 at 2, 4-14. Mr. Nyambal argues that the Court should have
found that AlliedBarton plausibly published false and defamatory
statements about him when it included his name and picture on
the World Bank’s Do Not Admit list. See id.
A motion to alter or amend a judgment under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59(e) “is discretionary and need not be granted
unless the district court finds that there is an intervening
change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or
the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest
injustice.” Messina v. Krakower, 439 F.3d 755, 758 (D.C. Cir.
2006)(quotations and citations omitted). “In this Circuit, it is
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well-established that motions for reconsideration cannot be used
as an opportunity to reargue facts and theories upon which a
court has already ruled, nor as a vehicle for presenting
theories or arguments that could have been advanced
earlier.” Estate of Gaither ex rel. Gaither v. District of
Columbia, 771 F. Supp. 2d 5, 10 (D.D.C. 2011)(quotations and
citations omitted). A district court's denial of a request for
this extraordinary relief is reviewed only for abuse of
discretion. See Messina, 439 F.3d at 759.
In dismissing Mr. Nyambal’s defamation claim, the Court
found that he had not pled the third element of defamation: that
AlliedBarton acted negligently. Instead, the Court determined
that Mr. Nyambal had insufficiently imputed liability through a
theory of civil conspiracy. Nyambal, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 317. The
Court pointed to the paragraphs of the complaint in which Mr.
Nyambal alleged that the defamatory information was “provided by
the IMF to the World Bank through AlliedBarton.” Id. (quoting
Compl., ECF No. 1-3 ¶¶ 17, 20)(emphasis in Opinion). On that
basis, the Court concluded that the IMF was the “only entity”
alleged to have the power to decide which names were included on
the Do Not Admit list. Id. at 318. Therefore, the Court
determined that “AlliedBarton cannot be found negligent for
publishing Mr. Nyambal's name on the Do Not Admit List because
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it is not alleged that AlliedBarton published his name on the
list.” Id.
Mr. Nyambal argues that the Court misread his complaint and
conflated the “blacklisting memo” with the “Do Not Admit list”
when it concluded that the IMF was the only entity that
published his name on the Do Not Admit list. Recons. Mot., ECF
No. 17 at 6-7. Mr. Nyambal contends that a “closer read” of the
complaint shows that he “distinguished” the blacklisting memo
from the Do Not Admit list, attributing “the source of the
former to the IMF and the latter to the Defendant.” Id. at 7.
Therefore, the Court “should have decided that Plaintiff
sufficiently alleged multiple distinct writings [attributable to
AlliedBarton] which communicated defamatory statements (DNA
list) about him.” Id. To support this argument, he points to
several paragraphs in his complaint in which he “repeatedly
asserts that AlliedBarton was either independently or jointly
responsible for the publication of the defamatory Do Not Admit
list.” Id. at 9-12 (citing Compl., ECF No. 1-3 ¶¶ 10, 13, 16,
17, 20, 21). Mr. Nyambal alternatively argues that even if the
IMF was the only entity who published the Do Not Admit list,
AlliedBarton is still liable because it republished the list
when it sent it to the World Bank. Id. at 11-12 (citing Ingber
v. Ross, 497 A.2d 1256, 1269 (D.C. 1984) for the proposition
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that “each publication of a defamatory statement, including
republication, is a separate tort.”).
AlliedBarton opposes, arguing that Mr. Nyambal continues to
rely on a theory of civil conspiracy and did not plead that
AlliedBarton had the authority to publish any defamatory
statements. Opp’n Recons. Mot., ECF No. 18 at 4-6. Because Mr.
Nyambal makes “no effort” to explain how an “independent vendor
providing security” had any reason to know of Mr. Nyambal’s
whistleblowing activity, AlliedBarton contends that the “only
reasonable inference is that AlliedBarton did not act on its
own, and therefore, could not have acted negligently.” Id. at 5.
To state a defamation claim under District of Columbia law,
one must allege: (1) the defendant made a false and defamatory
statement about the plaintiff; (2) the defendant published the
statement without privilege to a third party; (3) the
defendant's fault in publishing the statement amounted to at
least negligence; and (4) the statement was actionable as a
matter of law. Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 948 (D.C.
2009). The Court found that Mr. Nyambal had not alleged the
third element: that AlliedBarton was negligent in publishing the
defamatory statement. See Nyambal, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 317-18.
To satisfy this third “fault” element, a plaintiff must
allege that the defendant was at least negligent in publishing
the alleged defamatory statement. Therefore, the plaintiff must
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allege “a failure to observe an ordinary degree of care in
ascertaining the truth of an assertion before publishing it to
others, i.e., a failure to make a reasonable investigation as to
truth.” Kendrick v. Fox Tel., 659 A.2d 814, 822 (D.C.
1995) (quoting Moss v. Stockard, 580 A.2d 1011, 1025 (D.C.
1990)). This determination is fact-intensive; “courts consider
the circumstances surrounding a defendant’s publication of an
allegedly defamatory statement.” Parnigoni v. St. Columbia’s
Nursery Sch., 681 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16 (D.D.C. 2010)(citing Mandel
v. Boston Phoenix, Inc., 456 F.3d 198, 209 (1st Cir.
2006) (deferring to the jury's factual determination that a
reporter published a defamatory statement negligently by failing
to read “pertinent documents available to her,” failing to
contact several individuals who might have “opposing views,”
“incorrectly characterizing [a] report [and] misrepresenting its
findings and the identity of the party for whom it was
prepared,” and “guess[ing]” about the contents of a file)).
The Court originally concluded that AlliedBarton could not
have been negligent as a matter of law because the IMF was the
only entity alleged to have published Mr. Nyambal’s name on the
Do Not Admit list. Nyambal, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 318. However,
upon careful consideration, the Court agrees with Mr. Nyambal
that he did allege that AlliedBarton “place[d] his name and
picture on the World Bank’s ‘No Admit List’”. Compl., ECF No. 1-
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3 ¶ 20. Mr. Nyambal also alleged that AlliedBarton sent the
IMF’s blacklisting memo to the World Bank. Id. ¶¶ 10, 17
(“Nyambal’s blacklisting . . . was triggered by the information
provided by the IMF to the World Bank through AlliedBarton”)
(emphasis added).
That notwithstanding, AlliedBarton argues that Mr. Nyambal
failed to allege that AlliedBarton had the authority to publish
the defamatory statements independent of its relationship with
the IMF. Opp’n Recons. Mot., ECF No. 18 at 3-4. However, at this
stage of the litigation, the Court cannot assess AlliedBarton’s
degree of authority, autonomy, or culpability. Accepting Mr.
Nyambal’s allegations as true, it is plausible that AlliedBarton
had some degree of authority and some degree of responsibility
over the information it conveyed to the World Bank. See Compl.,
ECF No. 1-3 ¶¶ 10, 17, 20. As the IMF’s “security services
company,” it is at least plausible that AlliedBarton made some
determination about whether Mr. Nyambal was a security threat,
warranting placement on a Do Not Admit list. Id. ¶ 2. Without
the benefit of discovery, the Court has no information regarding
the efforts, if any, that AlliedBarton took to ascertain whether
Mr. Nyambal actually warranted inclusion on the World Bank’s Do
Not Admit list. See Parnigoni, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 17
(concluding, with the benefit of discovery, that a reasonable
jury could find that the defendant’s dissemination of defamatory
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letters was negligent because there was no evidence to suggest
that the letters were warranted under the circumstances).
Having concluded that Mr. Nyambal did plead the third
element of defamation, the Court must now evaluate whether he
pled the other elements of defamation: (1) that AlliedBarton
made a false and defamatory statement about him; (2) that
AlliedBarton published the statement without privilege to a
third party; and (4) that the defamatory statement was
actionable as a matter of law. See Solers, 977 A.2d at 948.
In its motion to dismiss, AlliedBarton argues that Mr.
Nyambal did not plead the first two elements of defamation. Am.
Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 7-1 at 9-11. First, it argues that Mr.
Nyambal's claim fails because he does not identify any statement
“made by AlliedBarton of which he was the subject,” let alone a
defamatory statement. Id. at 9-10. Additionally, AlliedBarton
argues that Mr. Nyambal fails to identify third parties who were
“exposed to his exclusion.” Id. at 10-11.
Mr. Nyambal contends that publishing his name and photo on
the Do Not Admit list constitutes a defamatory statement because
“anyone labeled a security threat by a leading international
organization . . . cannot plausibly continue a career in
international development.” Opp’n Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 9 at
6-7. Finally, he argues that the defamatory statements were
published to the public and his professional colleagues. Id.
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In evaluating a defamation claim, a court must first
determine whether a statement is capable of defamatory meaning,
a question of law. Weyrich v. New Republic, Inc., 235 F.3d 617,
627 (D.C. Cir. 2001). A statement is “‘defamatory’ if it tends
to injure the plaintiff in his trade, profession or community
standing, or lower him in the estimation of the community.” Moss
v. Stockard, 580 A.2d 1011, 1023 (D.C. 1990). The “allegedly
defamatory remark must be more than unpleasant or offensive; the
language must make the plaintiff appear ‘odious, infamous, or
ridiculous.’” Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 989 (D.C.
1984)(citations omitted). A court’s power to find that a
statement is not defamatory as a matter of law is limited; “[i]f
it appears that the statements are at least capable of a
defamatory meaning, [then] whether they were defamatory and
false are questions of fact to be resolved by the jury.” Moss,
580 A.2d at 1023 (emphasis added). “It is only when the court
can say that the publication is not reasonably capable of any
defamatory meaning and cannot be reasonably understood in any
defamatory sense that it can rule as a matter of law, that it
was not [defamatory].” White v. Frat. Order of Police, 909 F.2d
512, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting Levy v. Am. Mut. Ins.
Co., 196 A.2d 475, 476 (D.C. 1964)).
Mr. Nyambal’s inclusion on the Do Not Admit list may
reasonably be capable of a defamatory meaning because it calls
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into question his professionalism and “tends to lower [him] in
the estimation of a substantial, respectable group”: the
international development community. Afro-Am. Publ’g Co. v.
Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 654 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1966). In Houlahan v.
Freeman Wall Aiello, the plaintiff—an investigative journalist—
had alleged facts sufficient to infer that the defendant’s
statements were capable of defamatory meaning because the
statements “either explicitly or implicitly called into question
his professionalism as a journalist.” 15 F. Supp. 3d 77, 82
(D.D.C. 2014). Here, including Mr. Nyambal on the Do Not Admit
list reasonably could imply that Mr. Nyambal was dangerous and
not respectable because the list is “ordinarily maintained for
people deemed to represent a security threat to the World Bank
and its staff members.” Compl., ECF No. 1-3 ¶ 10. Thus, Mr.
Nyambal’s inclusion could certainly lower his professional
reputation at the World Bank, a key organization for those in
the international economic development field. See id. ¶ 15.
Accordingly, at this stage of the proceedings, the Court cannot
conclude that labeling Mr. Nyambal as a security threat “cannot
be reasonably understood in any defamatory sense” as a matter of
law. White, 909 F.2d at 518.
Mr. Nyambal also sufficiently pled that he was not a
security threat. “Falsity and defamatory meaning ‘are distinct
elements of ... defamation and are considered separately.’”
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Carpenter v. King, 792 F. Supp. 2d 29, 34 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting
White, 909 F.2d at 520). “The burden of proving falsity rests
squarely on the plaintiff . . . [who] must demonstrate either
that the statement is factual and untrue, or an opinion based
implicitly on facts that are untrue.” Lane v. Random House, 985
F. Supp. 141, 150 (D.D.C. 1995). Mr. Nyambal alleges that he
should not have been included as a security threat on the Do Not
Admit list and that his inclusion was in retaliation “for his
public denunciations of the IMF’s role in the Cameroon mining
project.” Compl., ECF No. 1-3 ¶¶ 10, 13.
The Court must also find that Mr. Nyambal pled the second
element of defamation: that AlliedBarton published the
defamatory statement to a third party. See Solers, 977 A.2d at
948. “Publication requires making a statement to at least one
other person.” Westfahl v. District of Columbia, 75 F. Supp. 3d
365, 375 (D.D.C. 2014) (citing Charlton v. Mond, 987 A.2d 436,
438 n.4 (D.C. 2010)); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts §
577(1) (1977)(“ Any act by which the defamatory matter is
intentionally or negligently communicated to a third person is a
publication . . . . it is necessary that the defamatory matter
be communicated to someone other than the person defamed.”). Mr.
Nyambal pled that AlliedBarton “place[ed] his name and picture
on the World Bank’s ‘No Admit’ list.” Compl., ECF No. 1-3 ¶ 20.
His blacklisting was allegedly “triggered by the information
16
provided by the IMF to the World Bank through AlliedBarton.” Id.
¶ 17 (emphasis added). It is therefore reasonable to conclude
that AlliedBarton plausibly published the defamatory statement
when it sent the list to the World Bank, a third party.
Finally, Mr. Nyambal pled the fourth element of defamation:
the defamatory statement is actionable irrespective of special
harm. “ One who publishes a slander that . . . would adversely
affect [a plaintiff’s] fitness for the proper conduct of his
lawful business, trade or profession . . . is subject to
liability without proof of special harm.” Ingber v. Ross, 479
A.2d 1256, 1268 (D.C. 1984)(citing Restatement (Second) Torts §
573 (1976)). As discussed above, including Mr. Nyambal’s name on
the Do Not Admit list tends to injure him in his profession. Mr.
Nyambal pled that his inclusion on the Do Not Admit List, and
subsequent exclusion from the World Bank, “seriously damaged”
his “employability in the development community and ability to
earn a living.” Compl., ECF No. 1-3 ¶ 14.
Therefore, because Mr. Nyambal stated a defamation claim,
the Court GRANTS his motion for reconsideration.
V. Conclusion
Upon careful consideration of Mr. Nyambal’s complaint and
the Court’s opinion in Nyambal v. AlliedBarton Security Servs.,
LLC, 153 F. Supp. 3d 309 (D.D.C. 2016), the Court agrees that it
erred in dismissing Mr. Nyambal’s defamation claim. Mr.
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Nyambal’s motion for reconsideration is therefore GRANTED.
Because Mr. Nyambal stated a claim for defamation, he may seek
discovery only for this claim. The Court also DENIES Mr.
Nyambal’s motion for leave to file a supplemental memorandum.
The parties are further directed to meet and confer as
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) and Local
Civil Rule 16.3. The parties shall file a meet and confer report
by no later than November 1, 2018.
A separate Order accompanies this Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
October 17, 2018
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