Shao v. Roberts ( 2019 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
YI TAI SHAO, :
:
Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 18-1233 (RC)
:
v. : Re Document Nos.: 31, 45, 58, 65, 75,
: 80, 81, 84, 117,
: 142
JOHN G. ROBERTS, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY AND FOR CHANGE OF VENUE, GRANTING
MOTIONS TO DISMISS, SUA SPONTE DISMISSING ALL CLAIMS AGAINST ALL REMAINING
DEFENDANTS, AND DENYING ALL OTHER PENDING MOTIONS AS MOOT
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Yi Tai Shao, a California resident, has brought this suit against a wide variety of
defendants in connection with a California child custody case that has been ongoing since 2005.
In her amended complaint, Shao includes fourteen claims against sixty-seven named and forty-
six unnamed defendants, including parties, attorneys, court clerks, judges, and third parties, all
linked in some way to the child custody case or to the multiple legal proceedings Shao has
instituted in connection with it over the past eight years. After the Court denied a motion to
disqualify, Shao has now filed a renewed motion to disqualify and for change of venue. Many of
the defendants have also moved to dismiss for lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction and
for failure to state a claim. For the same reasons it denied the initial motion to disqualify, the
Court denies Shao’s renewed motion to disqualify and for change of venue. And because it finds
that it lacks personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction over all of Shao’s claims, the
Court dismisses this case.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1. The Underlying Custody Case and Initial Custody Determination
In 2005, Shao filed for divorce from her now ex-husband, Tsan-Kuen Wang, in the
Superior Court of California, Santa Clara County. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 8, ECF No. 16; In re
the Marriage of: Linda Shao and Tsan-Kuen Wang, No. 1-05-FL126882 (Cal. Sup. Ct.). 1 Shao
and Wang initially agreed to split custody of their daughter 50/50. Id. ¶ 87. However, Shao’s
daughter began complaining about sexual abuse while in Wang’s care in early 2010, id., and the
County of Santa Clara investigated the claims, see id. ¶¶ 57–58. B.J. Fadem, a California
attorney, was appointed as guardian ad litem for Shao’s daughter in May 2010. See id. ¶ 58.
After county workers allegedly conspired to keep Shao’s child away from her with Superior
Court employees; Wang’s attorney, David Sussman; and the judge assigned to her case, Judge
Edward Davila, 2 see id. ¶¶ 43, 54–57, 71, Judge Davila issued an expedited custody order
depriving Shao of custody of her daughter on August 5, 2010, see id. ¶¶ 88–92.
On August 20, 2010, Shao hired attorneys James McManis, Michael Reedy, and
McManis Faulkner, LLP (“the McManis Defendants”) to challenge the expedited custody order.
See id. ¶¶ 98. However, Shao fired the McManis Defendants within a year after allegedly
realizing that they were engaged in a conspiracy with Sussman and Judge Davila to deprive her
of custody. See id. ¶ 99–104. According to Shao, the conspiracy was facilitated by Judge Davila
and the McManis Defendants’ common membership in a chapter of the American Inns of Court,
1
The Court takes judicial notice of the dockets and published opinions for Shao’s related
state and federal lawsuits. See, e.g., Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, 35 F. Supp. 3d 56, 67 (D.D.C. 2014)
(“A court may take judicial notice of facts contained in public records of other proceedings.”
(citing Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atlantic Co., 407 F.3d 1220, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2005))).
2
Judge Davila now sits on the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California,
following his appointment to the position in 2011.
2
id. ¶ 98, an organization that she alleges provides a nationwide platform to facilitate private ex
parte communications and judicial corruption, see id. ¶¶ 23, 335–36. Over the next three years,
several other Superior Court judges issued a variety of decisions in Shao’s custody case. See,
e.g., id. ¶¶ 103–105. Shao alleges that these judges, too, were involved in conspiracies to
deprive her of custody with Sussman or with some or all of the McManis Defendants. See, e.g.,
id. ¶¶ 102–103, 105. Shao alleges that a final custody order depriving her of the custody of her
daughter was eventually entered in November 2013. See id. ¶¶ 122.
At various points during the litigation, Shao appealed orders of the Superior Court. E.g.
id. ¶¶ 109–13, 128–29, 138. Shao’s appeals went first to the California Sixth District Court of
Appeal, then to the California Supreme Court, and for some to the United States Supreme Court.
E.g. id. ¶¶ 128–29. Shao attributes the denial of her appeals at all appellate levels to a
conspiracy between the McManis Defendants and the judges and justices involved, again
facilitated by the platform for corruption offered by the American Inns of Court. E.g. id.
¶ 109–13.
2. Malpractice Suit Against the McManis Defendants and Prefiling Injunction
After Shao fired the McManis Defendants, she brought suit against them for malpractice
in 2012. Id. ¶ 141. The case was dismissed, and Shao refiled a malpractice suit against the
McManis Defendants in federal court in 2014. Id. ¶ 142. Judge Lucy Koh dismissed the federal
suit and the dismissal was affirmed on appeal. Id. ¶ 145. As with previous judicial decisions
going against her, Shao alleges that the judges involved all conspired with the McManis
Defendants to ensure she would not succeed, “through the influence [the McManis Defendants]
wield through their powerful giant social club The American Inns of Court.” Id. Following the
dismissal of her federal case, Shao moved to set aside the dismissal of her state malpractice suit.
3
Id. ¶ 146. The McManis Defendants responded by moving to declare Shao a vexatious litigant
under California law, and by asking for a prefiling injunction to issue against her. See id. ¶ 147.
The Superior Court granted the motion and issued a pre-filing injunction against Shao. See id.
3. Continued Litigation in the Custody Case and Alleged Hacking
In the past five years, Shao has extensively litigated her custody case. See generally id.
¶¶ 156–256. Shao alleges that the McManis Defendants have continued to conspire to deprive
her of the custody of her daughter, in a scheme involving the judges issuing decisions in her
cases, third parties connected to the litigation, and Wang and his attorney. See id. Shao places
the McManis Defendants at the center of the conspiracy, allegedly using their various
relationships and the connections they made through the American Inns of Court to “ensure that
SHAO not regain custody of her child . . . [and] maintain[] their no causation defense to
malpractice.” Id. ¶¶ 159–160. She alleges that various California judicial defendants
“knowingly misused the vexatious litigant order” fraudulently obtained by the McManis
Defendants to block motions in her custody case. E.g. id. ¶ 219. She believes that the many
judges involved in her case have engaged in a wide range of improprieties, including issuing
secret ex parte communications and court orders, illegally altering case dockets, and failing to
docket or maliciously dismissing her motions without review. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 159–208. And
she alleges that the McManis Defendants organized “the same scheme of illegal notice, alteration
of docket and deterrence” in the United States Supreme Court, again through secret, corrupt
connections they made there through the American Inns of Court. See id. ¶¶ 257–58.
At some point in 2018, Shao “started posting on Youtube several radio show videos . . .
about the judicial corruption going on in her cases.” Id. ¶ 305. In response, Shao alleges that
Google and Youtube conspired with the McManis Defendants and Chief Justice Roberts to
4
harass her, see id. ¶¶ 305–14, including by deleting comments on her Youtube videos, id. ¶ 306,
suspending her Google e-mail accounts, id. ¶ 307, having vehicles follow her, id. ¶ 308, putting
her under electronic surveillance, id. ¶ 313, and hacking her computer, cell phone, and office
phone, id. ¶¶ 310–12. Shao attributes Google’s decision to conspire with Chief Justice Roberts
to a favorable decision he purportedly issued in a pending case Google had before the Supreme
Court. See id. ¶ 314. Aside from their conspiracy with Google, Youtube, and Chief Justice
Roberts, Shao also alleges that the McManis Defendants arranged for hackers to infiltrate her
computer and alter or destroy files relating to her pending cases. See id. ¶¶ 315–19.
4. Procedural History of This Case
Shao brought the instant case on May 21, 2018. See Compl. at ¶ 1, ECF No. 1. In her
amended complaint, filed on June 29, 2018, Shao brings claims against sixty-seven named
defendants: the McManis Defendants; the American Inns of Court, the Honorable William A.
Ingram American Inn of Court, and the San Francisco Bay Area American Inn of Court (the
“American Inn Defendants”); the McManis Defendants’ attorney in the malpractice action, Janet
Everson; United States Supreme Court Justices and clerks (the “Supreme Court Defendants”); 3
judges and employees of the United States Judiciary (the “Federal Judicial Defendants”); 4
members of Congress and several Congressional entities (the “Congressional Defendants”); 5
3
The Supreme Court Defendants include the United States Supreme Court; Chief Justice
John G. Roberts; Justice Clarence Thomas; Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg; Justice Stephen
Breyer; Justice Samuel Alito; Justice Sonia Sotomayor; Justice Elena Kagan; and Supreme Court
clerks Jordan Bickell and Jeff Atkins.
4
The Federal Judiciary Defendants include Judge Koh; Judge Clifford J. Wallace; Judge
Rudolph Contreras; and Jackie Francis, a clerk at the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia.
5
The Congressional Defendants include the U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the U.S.
Senate Judiciary Committee; Representative Eric Swalwell; and Senator Diane Feinstein.
5
former California Superior Court Judge Edward Davila and a large number of other judges and
employees of the California judicial system (together, the “California Judicial Defendants”); 6
retired Justice of the California Sixth District Court of Appeal Conrad Rushing; the County of
Santa Clara and several of its employees (the “Santa Clara Defendants”); 7 Google and Youtube
(the “Google Defendants”); and Wang, Sussman, Fadem, and several third parties who were at
some point or another involved in the custody action. 8
Most of the defendants have now moved to dismiss, including the McManis Defendants;
Everson; the American Inn Defendants; the California Judicial Defendants; the Santa Clara
Defendants; the Google Defendants; custody evaluator John Orlando; psychologist Carol Tait-
Starnes; alleged hacker Esther Chung; Fadem; and Fadem’s replacement as guardian ad litem for
Shao’s daughter, Elise Mitchell. See Docket, Shao v. Roberts, No. 18-cv-1233-RC (D.D.C.).
Shao has separately moved to strike a large number of motions and for judicial notice of a wide
variety of facts. See id.
6
The California Judiciary Defendants include the Supreme Court of California and its
Chief Justice Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye; the California Sixth District Court of Appeal and several
of its justices, Justice Mary J. Greenwood, Justice Patricia Bamattre-Maoukian, Justice Franklin
Elia, Justice Adrienne M. Grover, Justice Eugene Premo; the Clerk’s Office of the California
Sixth District Court of Appeal; the Superior Court of California, Santa Clara County and several
of its judges, Judge Maureen Folan, Judge Mary Ann Grilli, Judge Peter Kirwan, Judge Patricia
Lucas, Judge Beth McGowen, Judge Rise Pichon, Judge Joshua Weinstein, Judge Theodore
Zayner, and former Judge Edward Davila; Gregory Salvidar, Commissioner of the Superior
Court of California, Santa Clara County; and several employees of the Superior Court of
California, Santa Clara County, Rebecca Delgado, Lisa Herrick, Jill Sardeson, Sarah Scofield,
Susan Walker, and David Yamasaki.
7
The Santa Clara Defendants include the County of Santa Clara (named in the Complaint
through its Department of Family and Children’s Services and Department of Child Support
Services) and employees Misook Oh, Darryl Leong, and Mary L. Murphy.
8
Additional defendants include John Orlando, a custody evaluator appointed by the
Superior Court after the 2010 expedited custody order; Carole Tait-Starnes, Wang and Shao’s
minor daughter’s psychologist; Elise Mary Mitchell, the guardian ad litem for Shao’s daughter
after Fadem withdrew; and two alleged hackers, Kevin L. Warnock and Esther Chung.
6
Shao also moved to disqualify this Court and for a change of venue on July 6, 2018,
followed by a motion to stay these proceedings on August 5, 2018. See Pl.’s First Mot.
Disqualify at 1, ECF No. 19; Pl.’s Mot. Stay at 1, ECF No. 42. The Court denied both motions
on August 8, 2018. See Shao v. Roberts, No. 18-cv-1233-RC, ECF No. 48, slip op. at 1 (D.D.C.
Aug. 8, 2018). On December 4, 2018, Shao filed a renewed motion to disqualify this Court and
for change of venue. See Pl.’s Second Mot. Disqualify at 1, ECF No. 142.
All motions to dismiss and the renewed motion for disqualification are now ripe for
review.
III. ANALYSIS
The Court first reviews Shao’s renewed motion to disqualify and to change venue, before
addressing the pending motions to dismiss and the remaining claims against the non-moving
defendants. Because it restates much of the same arguments as her first motion, the Court denies
the renewed motion to disqualify and to change venue. And because the Court finds that all of
Shao’s claims should be dismissed on the basis of either personal jurisdiction or subject matter
jurisdiction, the Court grants the motions to dismiss, sua sponte dismisses all remaining claims,
and denies all other pending motions as moot.
A. Motion to Disqualify and for Change of Venue
Before reviewing the pending motions to dismiss, the Court briefly addresses Shao’s
renewed motion to disqualify and for change of venue. Shao brings her renewed motion
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455. See Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Second Mot. Disqualify
at 20, ECF No. 142-1. Because Shao’s motion reasserts much of the same arguments brought in
her first motion, the Court denies the renewed motion.
7
First, Shao’s motion to disqualify this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 fails to comply
with the requirements of § 144, and thus must be denied. Section 144 provides that “[w]henever
a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that
the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him
or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge
shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 144. As the Court explained in its
opinion denying Shao’s motion to stay, “submitting an affidavit to the Court under this provision
does not yield automatic recusal of the judge on the matter,” Williams v. New York City Housing
Auth., 287 F. Supp. 2d 247, 248 (S.D.N.Y 2003). Rather, the Court may deny the motion if the
affidavit or the motion itself are procedurally deficient. See Shao, No. 18-cv-1233-RC, slip op.
at 11.
Shao’s § 144 motion is deficient in a number of ways. As an initial matter, this is Shao’s
second such motion, when 28 U.S.C. § 144 clearly indicates that “[a] party may file only one
such affidavit in any case.” Id. Shao’s § 144 motion should be denied on this basis alone. In
addition, as with her motion to stay, Shao’s affidavit is not “accompanied by a certificate of
counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith.” 28 U.S.C. § 144. The Court explained in
its August 5, 2018 opinion that pro se parties are not excused from filing an attorney certification
in support of a § 144 motion and affidavit. See Shao, No. 18-cv-1233-RC, slip op. at 12. In this
renewed motion, Shao argues that several courts have considered § 144 motions made by pro se
plaintiffs despite the lack of a certification of good faith by counsel of record, see Pl.’s Mem.
Supp. Second Mot. Disqualify (“Pl.’s Second Mem. Supp.”), ECF No. 142-1, at 21 (citing
Williams, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 249; Melvin v. Social Sec. Admin., No. 5:09-cv-235-FL, 2010 WL
3743543, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 14, 2010)), or with certification only by “any member of the
8
bar,” when she is a member of the California Bar, see id. (citing United States v. Rankin, 1 F.
Supp. 2d 445, 450 (E.D. Pa. 1998)). Shao’s arguments are unavailing. First, these decisions are
from outside this circuit and not binding on this Court, and most courts to have addressed the
issue have required the certification by counsel of record for pro se § 144 motions. See Shao,
No. 18-cv-1233-RC, slip op. at 12. Second, Rankin is inapplicable to Shao’s situation because
the court there accepted the certification of “any member of the bar of the court.” Rankin, 1 F.
Supp. 2d at 450 (emphasis added). Shao is not a member of the bar of this Court. And finally,
the Williams court emphasized that the plaintiff’s affidavit, “submitted pro se and without a
certificate of counsel of record, fail[ed] on this threshold matter.” Williams, 287 F. Supp. 2d at
249. 9
Shao’s renewed motion for disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455 fares no better. To the
extent Shao’s § 144 affidavit sets forth the factual allegations forming the basis for that motion,
it alleges much of the same type of behavior the Court already determined not to warrant recusal
9
The court in Melvin proceeded to review the arguments made in a deficient affidavit “in
the spirit of the liberality afforded to pro se litigants.” Melvin, 2010 WL 3743543, at *2. Even
were this Court to do so here, Shao’s affidavit would still be procedurally deficient as untimely
and inadequately supported by facts. “Courts ‘have required the affidavit to be filed at the
earliest moment,’” and the D.C. Circuit has explained that “the timeliness requirement is
‘[c]rucial to the integrity of the judicial process,’ as it ‘ensures that a party may not wait and
decide whether to file based on whether he likes subsequent treatment that he receives.’”
Klayman v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 278 F. Supp. 3d 252, 256 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting S.E.C. v.
Loving Spirit Found., Inc., 392 F.3d 486, 492 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). Shao’s re-filing of a motion and
affidavit almost four months after this Court found the first motion to be deficient is thus
untimely. And while the Court must accept the factual allegations in a § 144 affidavit as true,
“the affidavit ‘must state facts as opposed to conclusions, and while the information and belief of
the affiant as to the truth of the allegations are sufficient, mere rumors and gossip are not
enough.’” Id. at 257 (quoting United States v. Hanrahan, 248 F. Supp. 471, 475 (D.C. Cir.
1965)). Because Shao’s allegations of corruption are all based on speculation and legal
conclusions derived from regularly conducted administration of this case’s docket, see Pl.’s
Second Mem. Supp. at. 22–29, her affidavit does not set forth a legally sufficient basis for
disqualification.
9
in its August 5, 2018 opinion. As discussed in that opinion, a judge is required to “disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(a). In reviewing a § 455(a) challenge, the Court must objectively analyze whether a
“reasonable and informed observer would question the judge’s impartiality.” United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 114 (D.C. Cir. 2001). “[T]he mere appearance of bias is sufficient
to mandate recusal—whether there is actual bias is irrelevant.” Philip Morris USA, Inc. v.
United States FDA, 156 F. Supp. 3d 36, 49 (D.D.C. 2016). In addition, pursuant to § 455(b)(1),
a judge must also recuse himself “[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party,
or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.S. §
455(b)(1). Unlike § 455(a), recusal under § 455(b)(1) requires the movant to “demonstrate
actual bias or prejudice based upon an extrajudicial source.” Cobell v. Norton, 237 F. Supp. 2d
71, 98 (D.D.C. 2003). And finally under § 455(b)(5)(i), a judge can be disqualified for being a
party to the proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(i).
Neither § 455(a) nor § 455(b)(1) warrant recusal based on the allegations Shao brings in
this renewed motion because, as this Court noted in its August 8, 2018 opinion, Shao only offers
“bald allegations of a conspiracy,” Shao, No. 18-cv-1233-RC, slip op. at 8, that neither create the
appearance of partiality nor provide evidence of actual bias. Shao reasserts many of the
allegations in her initial motion, including that the Court purposefully interfered with filing,
docketing, and the issuance of summonses and default judgment, see Pl.’s Second Mem. Supp. at
27–29, engaged in improper ex parte communications with some of the parties, id. at 25, and
improperly named the case Shao v. Kennedy instead of Shao v. Roberts, purportedly to shield
Justice Roberts from public exposure, see id. at 28. Shao also makes additional allegations of
interference with filing, docketing, and the general administration of her case since the Court’s
10
August 8, 2018 opinion. See generally id. at 25–29. As the Court explained in that opinion,
Shao provides “no factual matter to form a basis for those allegations,” and instead “bases her
allegations on purely speculative conspiracy.” Shao, No. 18-cv-1233-RC, slip op. at 8. Shao
reads the clerical discrepancies between court documents and her communications with the
Court, and supposedly irregular timing of the issuance of summonses and clerk’s defaults, to
imply a broader conspiracy this Court is a part of to deny her justice. These allegations do not
create an appearance of impropriety under § 455(a) because they offer “no facts that would fairly
convince a sane and reasonable mind to question this Court’s impartiality.” Walsh v. Comey,
110 F. Supp. 3d 73, 77 (D.D.C. 2015). Because they offer no evidence of bias, the allegations
also do not require recusal under § 455(b)(1).
Similarly, § 455(b)(5)(i) does not warrant this Court’s recusal. As the Court noted in its
August 5, 2018 opinion, multiple courts have “made clear that disqualification is patently
unwarranted” in the circumstances where a plaintiff amends a complaint to add the assigned
judge as a defendant in an attempt at judge-shopping. See Shao, No. 18-cv-1233-RC, slip op. at
9–10 (citing cases). And the Court also noted that Shao’s amendment adding claims against this
judge were “very clearly an attempt at judge-shopping.” Id. at 9. In this renewed motion, Shao
again argues that her claims against this judge, and the threat of default they pose, warrant
recusal. See Pl.’s Second Mem. at 22–25. For reasons already elaborated on in the August 5,
2018 opinion, the Court rejects that argument.
Finally, Shao renews her request to disqualify the D.C. Circuit, the Third Circuit, and the
U.S. District Courts in Delaware, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and New Jersey because this judge has
professional and personal ties to those jurisdictions, and to transfer her case to New York. See
id. at 25; Shao, No. 18-cv-1233-RC, slip op. at 10. The Court denies that request for the same
11
reasons it denied the request in Shao’s first motion to change venue. “Shao’s conspiratorial
allegations are . . . an attempt to judge-shop and a vehicle to express her dissatisfaction with the
timeliness of this action,” and are “insufficient . . . to transfer her case to New York.” Shao, No.
18-cv-1233-RC, slip op. at 10.
B. Personal Jurisdiction
Next, several defendants have moved to dismiss Shao’s claims against them for lack of
personal jurisdiction. After briefly going over the legal standards on a motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction, the Court analyzes in turn motions to dismiss by the California Judicial
Defendants, the McManis Defendants, the Santa Clara Defendants, Janet Everson, Esther Chung,
and Carole Tait-Starnes.
1. Legal Standard
Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure directs a court to dismiss an action
when the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). The
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that a court has personal jurisdiction. See FC Inv. Grp.
LC v. IFX Mkts., Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Factual discrepancies must be
resolved in favor of the plaintiff, but the court is not required to accept a plaintiff’s “conclusory
statements” or “bare allegations” regarding the defendant’s actions in a selected forum. GTE
New Media Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
There are two types of personal jurisdiction: general (sometimes called “all-purpose”)
jurisdiction and specific (sometimes called “action-linked”) jurisdiction. Both types are
independently sufficient for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a party. See Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017). “For an individual, the
paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a
12
corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.”
Id. (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011)). A
court with general jurisdiction over a defendant “may hear any claim against that defendant, even
if all the incidents occurred in a different State.” Id. (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919).
By contrast, specific jurisdiction requires that the suit “arise out of or relate to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (internal citations
omitted). To exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a non-resident, the court must engage in
a two-step analysis to determine (1) whether jurisdiction is appropriate under the state’s long-
arm statute and (2) whether notions of due process are satisfied by exercising jurisdiction over
the non-resident. GTE New Media Servs., 199 F.3d at 1347. The D.C. long-arm statute, in
pertinent part, provides that the District of Columbia may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
person for claims for relief for “causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia,” including
“causing tortious injury . . . by an act or omission outside the District Columbia if [the person]
regularly does or solicits business, [or] engages in any other persistent course of conduct” in the
District of Columbia. D.C. Code § 13-423(a).
Due process requires a plaintiff to demonstrate “minimum contacts with [the forum state]
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). These contacts must be grounded in “some act by which
the defendant purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privileges of conducting activities within the
forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws.” Asahi Metal Indus. v. Super.
Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987) (quoting Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475
(1985)). That is, “the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State [must be] such
13
that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). It is “essential in each case that there be some act
by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Creighton Ltd. v. Gov. of
the State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 253 (1958)).
2. Application to Shao’s Complaint
In response to motions to dismiss by the moving defendants, Shao argues that the Court
has specific jurisdiction over each because all of the California-based defendants engaged in a
common conspiracy with D.C.-based defendants. As detailed below for each moving defendant,
the Court disagrees. Conspiracy jurisdiction is “a form of long-arm jurisdiction in which the
defendant’s ‘contact’ with the forum consists of the acts of the defendant’s co-conspirators
within the forum.” Youming Jin v. Ministry of State Sec., 335 F. Supp. 2d 72, 78 (D.D.C. 2004).
However, the minimum requirements of due process cannot be “sidestepped under the guise of
conspiracy jurisdiction.” Id. at 80 n.5. Accordingly, ‘“[b]ald speculation’ or a ‘conclusory
statement’ that individuals are co-conspirators is insufficient to establish jurisdiction under a
conspiracy theory.” Jungquist v. Shelkh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan, 115 F.3d 1020, 1031
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Naatex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 799, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
Even when personal jurisdiction is based on a conspiracy theory, purposeful availment is still
required. Youming Jin, 335 F. Supp. 2d at 80. To meet this requirement, the plaintiff must assert
with particularity “the conspiracy as well as the overt acts within the forum taken in furtherance
of the conspiracy.” Jungquiist, 115 F.3d at 1031 (quoting Dooley v. United Techs. Corp., 786 F.
Supp. 65, 78 (D.D.C. 1992)). Here, Shao has failed to allege specific facts beyond “bare
14
assertions” to meet her burden of establishing that each of the moving defendants purposefully
availed themselves of the District of Columbia by conspiring with D.C.-based defendants, and
the Court thus cannot properly exercise personal jurisdiction over the moving defendants.
a. The California Judicial Defendants
Shao’s claims against the California Judicial Defendants are barred for lack of personal
jurisdiction. In their motion, the California Judicial Defendants argue that they are all residents
of California alleged to have acted wrongfully through California state court decisions, and that
Shao has not pointed to any act committed within the District of Columbia that would warrant
the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See California Judicial Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at
4–5, ECF No. 31. Shao does not contest that the California Judicial Defendants are residents of
California. See generally Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5–85. She likewise does not contest that all the
alleged actions relating to them were acts in California courts by California judicial officers or
judicial employees of the state of California. See generally id. ¶¶ 86–320 . Shao argues that
personal jurisdiction should nonetheless be extended to the California Judicial Defendants
because of their alleged conspiracy with defendants who are subject to personal jurisdiction in
the District of Columbia. See Pl.’s Opp’n California Judicial Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.’s
California Judicial Defs. Opp’n) at 14–20, ECF No. 43. Because Shao offers no more than bare
assertions that the California Judicial Defendants are engaged in a conspiracy, the Court
dismisses her claims against those defendants.
Shao argues for jurisdiction over the California Judicial Defendants because the injuries
she suffered were “anticipated by the California defendants to be within the jurisdiction as part
of the common scheme of conspiracies.” Pl.’s California Judicial Defs. Opp’n at 14. She argues
that the California Judicial Defendants had minimum contacts through a “common scheme” of
conspiracies with, inter alia, the McManis Defendants and the Supreme Court Defendants, and
15
thus that they are subject to personal jurisdiction in the District of Columbia because “many
defendants worked in D.C.” Id. at 14–15. And she contends that the California Judicial
Defendants were on notice of a potential suit because they received mailed notice that the United
States Supreme Court denied her requests for review of California judicial decisions. See id. at
14. This argument is unpersuasive and ignores the purposeful availment requirement of personal
jurisdiction.
Even construing Shao’s assertions liberally, her argument merely presents conclusory
statements about the alleged conspiracy without alleging any specific facts. For example, Shao
alleges that the “Santa Clara County Court, California Sixth District Court of Appeal and
California Supreme Court and the named justices/judges . . . plotted to stall Plaintiff’s access to
the courts and access to appeals.” Pl.’s California Judicial Defs. Opp’n at 15. She similarly
states in the amended complaint that the California Defendants engaged in a “scheme of illegal
notice, alteration of docket and deterrence” in coordination with the United States Supreme
Court. Am. Compl. ¶ 257. But beyond these conclusory assertions purporting to explain the
wrongful denials of her various appeals, Shao does not allege any concrete facts to show that the
California Judicial Defendants were engaged in a wide-ranging conspiracy, much less one
involving individuals in the District of Columbia. Shao’s amended complaint simply goes
through the procedural history of her various cases and concludes from the many decisions she
disagrees with that the California Judicial Defendants must have conspired with defendants
based in D.C.—the Supreme Court Defendants, Congressional Defendants, this Court, and
Francis—to continue denying her custody of her child. Shao summarily asserts that “any
reasonable attorney or member of the public . . . would believe that there was a conspiracy.” Id.
¶ 184; see also id. ¶¶ 296–97 (concluding from Supreme Court Justices’ failure to recuse
16
themselves from ruling on her cases that they must have “conspired in one accord not to perform
their Constitutionally imposed duty to decide on the . . . Requests for Recusal”). Accordingly,
Shao’s conspiracy argument presents nothing more than bald speculation that must be rejected
by this Court. See Jungquist, 115 F.3d at 1031. The California Judicial Defendants’ motion to
dismiss is granted.
b. The McManis Defendants
Next, the McManis Defendants also move to dismiss Shao’s complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction. See generally McManis Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 65. In response,
Shao seeks to strike the motion to dismiss for failure to respond to the Amended Complaint
within the required twenty-one-day deadline specified by Fed R. Civ. P. 12. See Pl.’s Mot.
Strike McManis Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 81. Because Shao has failed to meet her burden
of proving proper service, the Court denies her motion to strike. And because Shao does not
allege facts that show sufficient minimum contacts with the District of Columbia, the Court
grants the McManis Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
i. Motion to Strike
In her motion to strike, Shao argues that the McManis Defendants’ motion to dismiss
should be stricken as untimely because it was not filed within the 21 days required under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12, or by August 10, 2018, and instead was filed on August 24, 2018. See Pl.’s Mem.
Supp. Mot. Strike, ECF No. 81-1. The McManis Defendants retort that the motion to dismiss
was timely because Shao never properly served her amended complaint. McManis Defs.’ Opp’n
Mot. Strike, ECF No. 98. The Court agrees.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant must respond to a complaint
within 21 days. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i). However, this twenty-one-day period does not
17
begin until the defendant is properly served. See Mann v. Castiel, 681 F.3d 368, 373 (D.C. Cir.
2012). The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the defendant has been sufficiently
served. See Roland v. Branch Banking & Tr. Corp., 149 F. Supp. 3d 61, 64 (D.D.C. 2015).
“[T]o do so, [s]he must demonstrate that the procedure employed satisfied the requirements of
the relevant portions of Rule 4 and any other applicable provision of law.” Id. at 64–65 (quoting
Light v. Wolf, 816 F.2d 746, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). If the summons is not delivered personally
or to an individual’s usual place of abode, Rule 4 requires that it be served by “delivering a copy
of [the summons] to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (2). A signed return of service “constitutes prima facie evidence of valid
service, which can be overcome only by strong and convincing evidence.” Gates v. Syrian Arab
Republic, 646 F. Supp. 2d 79, 85-86 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing O’Brien v. R.J. O’Brien Assocs., Inc.,
998 F.2d 1394, 1398 (7th Cir. 1993)).
Here, the McManis Defendants present “strong and convincing evidence” that Shao has
failed to properly serve the complaint. Shao asserts that her agent properly served the McManis
Defendants, citing the proof of service filed with the court. See Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Strike at
3. The proof of service notes that the summonses were left with two McManis Faulkner
employees, “[a] lady who is slander [sic] with golden hair” and “another male, less than 5’ 6”
with black hair wearing glasses,” both of whom allegedly claimed to be authorized to accept
service. Return of Service at 1, ECF No. 74. However, the name of these individuals or their
signature are not included. See id. Rather, the proof of service is signed by Shao’s agent,
Peychen Young, because both individuals “refused to sign receipt nor giving out [sic] their
names.” Id.
18
This admission alone suggests that Shao has failed her burden to establish sufficient
service of process on the McManis Defendants. The employees in question deny that they ever
told Shao’s agent they were authorized to accept service, Declaration of Manuel Carvajal ¶¶ 4–6,
McManis Defs.’ Opp’n Mot Strike Ex. 1, ECF No. 98-1; Declaration of William Faulkner ¶¶ 3–
4, McManis Defs.’ Opp’n Mot Strike Ex. 2, ECF No. 98-2, and the fact that they refused to sign
receipt of the complaint further casts doubt on Shao’s agent’s assertion that they claimed to be
authorized to accept service. In any event, “claims by an agent of having authority to receive
process or the fact that an agent actually accepts process is not enough to satisfy the service
requirements of Rule 4(e)(2).” Fenwick v. United States, 691 F. Supp. 2d 108, 113 (D.D.C.
2010) (internal citations omitted); see also Schwarz v. Thomas, 222 F.2d 305, 308 (D.C. Cir.
1955) (finding that statements of alleged agents are not sufficient evidence of authority to accept
process). Rather, if the summons is left with an agent, that agent must be “authorized by
appointment or by law to receive service of process.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2). Here, both the
McManis Defendants and the employees involved deny that the employees were authorized to
accept service of process. See McManis Defs.’ Opp’n Mot Strike at 3. Thus, the Court finds that
Shao has failed to make proper service upon the McManis Defendants, and the motion to quash
is denied. 10
10
Even if it found that the McManis Defendants’ motion to dismiss was untimely, the
Court would still grant leave to file the motion nunc pro tunc because of the strong preference
for resolving disputes on the merits rather than on purely procedural grounds. See, e.g., Hawkins
v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth., 311 F. Supp. 3d 94, 102 (D.D.C. 2018) (noting
“the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s ‘clear preference to resolve disputes on their merits’”
(quoting Cohen v. Bd. Of Trustees of the Univ. of Dist. of Columbia, 819 F.3d 476, 482–83 (D.C.
Cir. 2016))); Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 658 F. Supp. 2d 124, 128 (D.D.C. 2009) (“[B]ecause
there is a strong preference for resolving disputes on the merits, district courts may, in
appropriate circumstances, exercise their discretion against denying a motion on purely
procedural grounds.” (citing cases)).
19
ii. Personal Jurisdiction
Similarly to the California Judicial Defendants, the Court cannot exercise personal
jurisdiction over the McManis Defendants because Shao has failed to show that they have
sufficient minimum contacts with the District of Columbia. Shao acknowledges that the
McManis Defendants are residents of California for the purposes of personal jurisdiction. See
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 27–29. Likewise, the Amended Complaint makes clear that her claims against
the McManis Defendants arise out of a custody dispute and malpractice suit which occurred in
state and federal court in California. See generally Am. Compl. However, while Shao did not
file an opposition to the McManis Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the amended complaint also
makes clear that, as with the California Judicial Defendants, she believes the McManis
Defendants engaged in a conspiracy with D.C.-based defendants over whom this Court does
have personal jurisdiction. Shao alleges in the Amended Complaint that McManis “aided and
abetted the . . . irregularities that took place in the US Supreme Court” with respect to her cases
and “likely . . . was influencing Judge Contreras to deter SHAO from suing his judicial friends.”
Id. ⁋ 27. She similarly alleges that all three McManis Defendants conspired with Chief Justice
Roberts to harass her. Id. ¶¶ 304–05.
As with the California Judicial Defendants, Shao fails to assert any facts beyond
conclusory assertions to support her allegations of conspiracy. Shao does not point to any
evidence that could link the McManis Defendants to D.C.-based defendants, and instead
summarily concludes that they “appeared to conspire,” id., from the various legal decisions
adverse to her over the past eight years. Without more, Shao has not demonstrated the required
purposeful availment and this Court does not have personal jurisdiction over the McManis
20
Defendants. Accordingly, the McManis Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction is granted.
c. The Santa Clara Defendants
The Court also does not have personal jurisdiction over the Santa Clara Defendants. The
Amended Complaint acknowledges that Leong, Murphy, and Oh are employees in Santa Clara
County, and that the Santa Clara Defendants are California residents who allegedly caused her
injuries through legal proceedings in California state court. See Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 56–57; 61–63.
Shao nonetheless claims that this Court has personal jurisdiction over the Santa Clara Defendants
because they were “co-conspirators in the common scheme of permanent parental [deprival]”
involving D.C.-based defendants. Pl.’s Opp’n to Santa Clara Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.’s Santa
Clara Opp’n”) at 5, ECF No. 135. But, as the Santa Clara Defendants point out in their reply,
“Shao must allege specific, plausible facts connecting the [Santa Clara] Defendants to a
conspiracy to establish personal jurisdiction over them.” Santa Clara Defs.’ Reply at 2, ECF No.
139 (emphasis added). Shao has not done so here when, aside from summarily concluding that
the Santa Clara Defendants were part of a “common scheme to rob away Plaintiff’s child custody
illegally,” Pl.’s Santa Clara Opp’n at 8, she does not point to any facts that would indicate the
Santa Clara Defendants’ involvement in a conspiracy involving defendants based in D.C.
Accordingly, the Court must grant the Santa Clara Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction.
d. Janet Everson
Likewise, Shao’s claims against Janet Everson are barred by lack of personal jurisdiction.
Everson argues that the Amended Complaint makes “no allegations connecting [her] to the
District of Columbia.” Everson Mot. Dismiss at 3, ECF No. 45. In response, Shao again asserts
21
personal jurisdiction over Everson based on a conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction. See
Pl.’s Opp’n Everson Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.’s Everson Opp’n”) at 3–9, ECF No. 88. However, Shao
fails to allege any specific facts beyond conclusory assertions to indicate that Everson should be
subject to personal jurisdiction in the District of Columbia. The Amended Complaint recognizes
that Everson is a resident of California and that the asserted claims against her arise out of a legal
dispute in state and federal courts located in California. See generally Am. Compl. Shao’s basis
for extending personal jurisdiction over Everson is her alleged “active participation of [sic] the
common scheme to continuously rob away Plaintiff’s child custody illegally,” Pl.’s Everson
Opp’n at 6, when the conspiracy involves “a group of defendants . . . in California and a group of
defendants . . . in the District of Columbia,” id. at 8. But as with the California Judicial
Defendants, Shao alleges no specific facts to support her conclusion that Everson conspired with
D.C.-based defendants, and the argument must thus be rejected by this court. Accordingly, all
claims against Everson are dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.
e. Esther Chung
Shao’s claims against Esther Chung are also barred by lack of personal jurisdiction. In
the Amended Complaint, Shao only indicates that Chung is a California resident, Am. Compl. ¶
69, who “severely hacked” into her files, id. ¶ 315. Accordingly, Chung argues in her motion to
dismiss that Shao “does not plead any facts showing that [Chung] . . . has any contacts with the
District of Columbia,” and thus that the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over her.
Chung Mot. Dismiss at 4, ECF No. 80. Shao again asserts conspiracy jurisdiction to claim
personal jurisdiction over Chung, arguing that “[t]here is undoubtedly substantial connection of
this forum to the complained conspiracies based on [Chung]’s active participation of [sic] the
22
common scheme [of parental deprival].” Pl.’s Opp’n to Chung Mot. Dismiss at 11, ECF No.
104.
However, as with the other moving defendants, Shao has failed to allege specific facts
that support her allegations of a conspiracy. Shao alleges in the Amended Complaint that “3,000
files on three laptops of hers had been severely hacked by three specific individuals,” including
Chung, based on the fact that “the authors’ names for these files were altered from SHAO’s
names to those individuals’ names.” Am. Compl. ¶ 315. Setting aside Shao’s preposterous
contention that a different author name for documents located on her computer necessarily
indicates she was hacked—when any shared document modified by anyone could have resulted
in a change to the author name field—Shao does not allege any facts to support a connection
between Chung and the D.C.-based Defendants. Instead, she alleges that one of the so-called
“hackers” “works closely with Intel Corp.,” and that “Intel Corp. is closely connected with James
McManis,” thus creating the tie to the overall conspiracy. Id. at ¶ 316. Even viewing Shao’s
claims liberally, without more specific facts the Court cannot accept these “bald speculations” as
the basis to find a conspiracy and to exercise personal jurisdiction over Chung. Accordingly, the
Court grants Chung’s motion to dismiss.
f. Carol Tait-Starnes
Finally, Shao’s claims against Carol Tait-Starnes are barred for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The Amended Complaint is very sparse on allegations relating to Tait-Starnes, who is only
alleged to have improperly participated in Shao’s custody case as a psychologist for her child.
See Am. Compl. ¶ 126. Again, the Amended Complaint acknowledges that Tait-Starnes is a
California resident, id. ¶ 60, whose allegedly improper actions were taken in a California legal
proceeding. Tait-Starnes argues in her motion to dismiss that the Court does not have personal
23
jurisdiction over her because all claims against her are based on actions that occurred in
California, see Tait-Starnes Mot. Dismiss at 2, ECF No. 75-1, and Shao has not filed an
opposition. The Court agrees with Tait-Starnes. To the extent Shao would have argued that
Tait-Starnes is part of the same broader conspiracy Defendants are all alleged to have been a part
of, the complete lack of facts relating to Tait-Starnes in the Amended Complaint—let alone to
any connection she may have had to defendants based in D.C.—defeats that argument.
C. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Next, the Court dismisses Shao’s remaining claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and the law presumes that ‘a cause lies outside
this limited jurisdiction.’” Morris v. United States Sentencing Comm’n, 62 F. Supp. 3d 67, 72
(D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)).
Subject matter jurisdiction is a requirement that can never be waived. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565
U.S. 134, 141 (2012). Accordingly, “[w]hen a requirement goes to subject-matter jurisdiction,
the courts are obligated to consider sua sponte issues that the parties have disclaimed or have not
presented.” Gonzalez, 565 U.S. at 141 (citing United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630
(2002)). Because Shao has proceeded pro se, the allegations in her complaint must be construed
liberally. E.g., Erikson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is ‘to be
liberally construed’” (citations omitted)). However, “even a pro se plaintiff must meet his
burden of proving that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims, including when
the court raises the issue sua sponte.” Fontaine v. JPMorgan Chase, N.A., 42 F. Supp. 3d 102,
106 (D.D.C. 2014). Despite the requirement to liberally construe a pro se complaint, this
“benefit is not [] a license to ignore the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Sturdza v. United
Arab Emirates, 658 F. Supp. 2d 135, 137 (D.D.C. 2009).
24
Here, the Court sua sponte dismisses all claims against all remaining defendants for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. First, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims
for money damages against Judge Rushing and Francis on the basis of absolute judicial
immunity. Next, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over all remaining claims against
the Supreme Court Defendants, the Federal Judicial Defendants, the Congressional Defendants,
and Judge Rushing for lack of standing. The Court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
claims against the American Inn Defendants, the Google Defendants, and Warnock because
those claims are patently insubstantiable. And finally, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over the aiding and abetting claims against Orlando, Fadem, Mitchell, Sussman, and Wang
because these claims do not involve a federal question.
1. Absolute Judicial Immunity
Judge Rushing and Francis, who are sued for money damages, have not filed motions to
dismiss. The Court dismisses the claims for money damages against these defendants sua sponte
under the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity.
a. Legal Standard
It is well established that courts must dismiss complaints in a civil action in which a party
“seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such a relief.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(2); see also id. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). “Judges are absolutely immune from suits for
money damages for ‘all actions taken in the judge’s judicial capacity, unless these actions are
taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction.’” Thomas v. Wilkins, 61 F. Supp. 3d 13, 17
(D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). “[T]he scope
of the judge’s jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the
judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). Additionally, “a judge will not be
25
deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in
excess of authority.” Id. In determining whether a judge was acting in his judicial capacity,
courts should look to the “nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally
performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e. whether they dealt with the
judge in his judicial capacity.” Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991) (quoting Stump, 435
U.S. at 362).
In addition, “[c]lerks, like judges, are immune from damage suits for performance of
tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process.” Thomas, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 19 (quoting
Sindram, 986 F.2d at 1460); see also Roth v. King, 449 F.3d 1272, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“It is
well established that judicial immunity ‘extends to other officers of government whose duties are
related to the judicial process’” (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569 (D.D.C. 1959))).
Tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process include a court administrator’s “receipt and
processing of a litigant’s filings.” Sibley v. U.S. Supreme Court, 786 F. Supp. 2d 338, 344
(D.D.C. 2011) (finding that the “receipt and processing of a litigant’s filings are part and parcel
of the process of adjudicating cases”).
b. Claims for Money Damages Against Judge Rushing and Francis
Shao brings claims for money damages against Judge Rushing and Francis. Because
these claims involve acts solely taken in their judicial capacity, both benefit from absolute
immunity, and the Court must accordingly dismiss Shao’s claims for money damages against
these two defendants.
First, Shao alleges in the Amended Complaint that Judge Rushing created a false docket
entry in one of her cases, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31, 377, causing Shao to file “multiple motions in
order to avoid her appeal[s] . . . to be dismissed [sic],” id. ¶ 377. Shao seeks $20,000 in damages
26
for attorney’s fees and costs relating to those motions. Id. The court need not reach the merits of
her allegations because a judge acting in his judicial capacity “will not be deprived of immunity
because the action he took was done in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his
authority.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 356. Here, Shao’s allegations against Judge Rushing are all in
connection with previous California state appellate litigation over which Judge Rushing was
presiding. Thus, even read liberally, Shao’s allegations involve “action[s] [Rushing] took . . . in
error, . . . maliciously, or . . . in excess of his authority” in his official judicial capacity, Stump,
435 U.S. at 356, and Shao’s claims for money damages are barred by absolute judicial immunity.
The Court accordingly dismisses all claims for money damages against Judge Rushing for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.
Likewise, Shao seeks money damages against an employee of the Clerk’s Office at the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Jackie Francis, for “deterring filing and creating
false docket [sic],” in violation of Shao’s First Amendment rights. Am. Compl. ¶ 426. Shao
alleges that these acts were not committed in an official capacity, and thus are not protected by
judicial immunity. See id. However, even reading Shao’s complaint liberally, Francis’s alleged
filing deterrence and creation of false docket entries qualify as “receipt and processing of a
litigant’s filing,” and thus fall under the scope of actions that are an integral part of the judicial
process. See, e.g., Reddy v. O'Connor, 520 F. Supp. 2d 124, 130 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding that a
“deputy clerk's alleged refusal to file documents [the] plaintiff submitted” was an action
“quintessentially ‘judicial’ in nature because [it was] an integral part of the judicial
process”). Accordingly, the allegations against Francis involve acts within her judicial capacity,
and she is entitled to the protection of absolute judicial immunity on claims for money damages.
27
The Court dismisses all claims for money damages against Francis for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
2. Standing
The Supreme Court Defendants, Federal Judicial Defendants, Congressional Defendants,
and Judge Rushing have not filed motions to dismiss. However, this Court lacks the power to
give Shao the relief she seeks on all remaining claims against these Defendants, and Shao thus
fails the redressability requirement of standing. Because Shao lacks standing to bring her claims,
the Court sua sponte dismisses all remaining claims against the Supreme Court Defendants, the
Federal Judicial Defendants, the Congressional Defendants, and Judge Rushing for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
a. Legal Standard
Standing “is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of
Article III.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); see also, e.g., Weaver’s Cove
Energy, LLC v. R.I. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., 524 F.3d 1330, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (dismissing
action sua sponte for lack of standing); Dorsey v. District of Columbia, 747 F. Supp. 2d 22, 27
(D.D.C. 2010) (same). The party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court bears the
burden of establishing the elements of standing. Huron v. Cobert, 809 F.3d 1274, 1279 (D. C.
Cir. 2016). First, the injured party “must have suffered an ‘injury in fact.’” Lujan, 504 U.S. at
560. (citations omitted). An “injury in fact,” requires the plaintiff to show “an invasion of a
legally protected interest.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (quoting Lujan,
504 U.S. at 560). The invasion must be both “concrete and particularized,” Lujan, 504 U.S. at
560, and ‘“actual or imminent,’ not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Id. (citing Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). Second, the injured party must show “a causal connection
28
between the injury and the conduct complained of.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. That is, the injured
party must show that the injury is “fairly …trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant”
and not the result of “the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Id.
Finally, standing requires a showing of redressability—“a likelihood that the requested relief will
redress the alleged injury.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998).
Failing to establish any one of these three elements is sufficient to defeat the standing of an
injured party. US Ecology, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 231 F.3d 20, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
When reviewing whether an injured party has standing, the court must “analyze these elements
as if the plaintiffs were to be successful in their claim” rather than assessing the merits of the
claim. McNeil v. Brown, No. 17-cv-2602, 2018 WL 4623057, at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2018)
(citing In re Navy Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d 756, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).
b. Application to Shao’s Claims
Shao lacks standing to bring her remaining claims against the Supreme Court Defendants,
Federal Judicial Defendants, Congressional Defendants, and Judge Rushing because this Court is
not capable of granting the relief she seeks. Because redressability evaluates whether the relief
requested is “likely [to] alleviate the particularized injury alleged,” West v. Lynch, 845 F.3d
1228, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 663-64 (D.C.
Cir. 1996)), it “requires that the court be able to afford relief through the exercise of its power,”
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 825 (1992). Correspondingly, a plaintiff “must show
in the first instance that the court is capable of granting the relief they seek.” McNeil, 2018 WL
4623057 at *6 (citing Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F.3d 1002, 1010-11 (D.C. Cir. 2000)); see also
Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d 973, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (explaining that redressability includes
consideration of “whether a federal court has the power to grant . . . relief”); Lozansky v. Obama,
29
841 F. Supp. 2d 124, 132 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding that plaintiffs’ lacked standing because the
court lacked authority to redress plaintiff’s injury through requested relief for a writ of
mandamus).
Even assuming that Shao were to be successful in establishing an injury-in-fact that is
fairly traceable to the Supreme Court Defendants, Federal Judicial Defendants, Congressional
Defendants, and Judge Rushing, this Court does not have the power to issue the remedy Shao
seeks. The Court addresses in turn the claims against the Supreme Court Defendants, Federal
Judicial Defendants, Congressional Defendants, and Judge Rushing.
i. Supreme Court Defendants
Because Shao’s requested relief asks this Court to exercise powers over the Supreme
Court that it plainly does not have, the claims against the Supreme Court Defendants fail the
redressability requirement of standing and cannot go forward.
First, Shao requests injunctive relief over the eight named Supreme Court Justices,
including that they be ordered to disclose various potential conflicts of interests “on the Supreme
Court website[;]” that they be ordered to disclose any gifts, scholarships, honoraria, and favors
they may have received in connection with their relationship to the American Inn Defendants;
and that they be enjoined from reviewing her appeals. Am. Compl. ¶ 350. Shao also requests
that all Supreme Court Justices be impeached. Id. ¶ 348.
It is well established that a lower court does not have jurisdiction to compel the U.S.
Supreme Court or its staff to review a case—or to take any action at all. See, e.g., In re Marin,
956 F.2d 339, 340 (D.C Cir. 1992) (“[I]t seems axiomatic that a lower court may not order the
judges or officers of a higher court to take any action.” (quoting Panko v. Rodak, 606 F.2d 168,
171 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1992))); Reddy, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 132 (“[T]he [lower court] plainly lacks
30
jurisdiction to compel official action by the U.S. Supreme Court justices or their staff.”).
Likewise, this Court also does not have the power to impeach a Supreme Court Justice. See
generally U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (delegating the “sole Power of Impeachment” to the House
of Representatives). Because this Court lacks the power to issue the relief requested, both of
Shao’s requests for relief through injunction and impeachment will not be “likely [to] alleviate
the particularized injury alleged.” West, 845 F.3d at 1235 (quoting Fla. Audubon Soc’y, 94 F.3d
at 663-64). Shao’s requests for relief thus fail the redressability requirement of standing and her
claims against the Supreme Court Justices must be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Likewise, this Court does not have the power to impeach clerks of the Supreme Court, or
to compel the Supreme Court to take any action toward its employees. Shao requests that clerks
Bickell and Atkins be impeached for allegedly altering docket entries and conspiring to “disrupt
or obstruct the normal function of the government unit, the Clerk’s Office of the US Supreme
Court.” Am. Compl. ⁋ 348. This Court cannot give Shao the relief she seeks because it plainly
does not have the power of impeachment. See generally U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. And even if
this Court could declare impeachment, clerks of court are not appointed positions, and thus their
removal would be an employment decision rather than an issue of impeachment. As is well
established, the Supreme Court “has inherent supervisory authority over its Clerk.” Marin, 956
F.2d at 340. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has the sole right “to correct the irregularities of its
officer[s] and compel [them] to perform [their] duty,” id. (quoting Griffin v. Thompson, 43 U.S.
(2 How.) 244, 257 (1844)), and retains the sole power to remove Bickell or Atkins. See also
Reddy, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 132 (“[T]he [lower court] plainly lacks jurisdiction to compel official
31
action by the U.S. Supreme Court justices or their staff.”). Shao’s claims against Bickell and
Atkins also fail the redressability requirement of standing and cannot move forward.
ii. Federal Judicial Defendants
Next, this Court also does not have the power to grant Shao’s requested relief against the
Federal Judicial Defendants. Shao requests that this Court reverse the decisions, and declare the
impeachment, of Judge Wallace, Am. Compl. ¶ 363, and Judge Koh, id. ¶ 359. She further
requests that this Court declare its own impeachment and impeach Francis. Id. ¶ 426. As
discussed above, this Court does not have the power of impeachment. See generally U.S. Const.
art I, § 2, cl. 5. Thus, even if the Court declared the impeachment of Judge Wallace and Judge
Koh, that declaration would have no meaningful value and would not redress Shao’s alleged
injury. Likewise, this Court does not have the authority to impeach itself or its clerks, and
declaring the Court’s own impeachment would have no value. And finally, as to Shao’s request
that the Court invalidate Judge Wallace and Judge Koh’s decisions in her cases, it is also well
established that federal district courts do not have jurisdiction to reconsider decisions of other
federal courts. See, e.g., Atchison v. U.S. District Courts, 190 F. Supp. 3d 78, 88 (D.D.C. 2016);
Fleming v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 170, 172 (D.D.C. 1994). Because they fail the
redressability requirement of standing, Shao’s claims against Judge Wallace, Judge Koh, Judge
Contreras, and Jackie Francis cannot go forward.
iii. Congressional Defendants
Shao similarly lacks standing to bring a claim against the House Judiciary, the Senate
Judiciary, Senator Feinstein, and Representative Swalwell because her requested relief cannot be
redressed by this Court. Shao asks that this Court declare that the House Judiciary Committee
has a “duty to conduct a thorough investigation into crimes committed by [the] Supreme Court
32
Justices and Clerks and federal Court staffs.” Am. Compl. ¶ 348. Shao further requests that this
Court compel the House Judiciary Committee, the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator
Feinstein, and Representative Swalwell to impeach Judge Wallace, id. ¶ 362, and Judge Koh, see
id. ¶ 359. As discussed above, this Court plainly does not have the power of impeachment. See
generally U.S. Const. art I, § 2, cl. 5. Likewise, because that power is explicitly reserved for
Congress, see id., this Court does not have the power to compel Congress to impeach a sitting
federal judge, see, e.g., Keener v. Congress, 467 F.2d 952, 953 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam)
(finding no standing in action for writ of mandamus compelling Congress to act). If granted, the
declaratory relief Shao requests would have no value, and thus would not redress her alleged
injuries. As such, she lacks standing to bring her claims against the Congressional Defendants
and the claims cannot go forward.
iv. Judge Rushing
Finally, Shao lacks standing to assert her non-monetary claims against Judge Rushing
because she asks for relief the Court is not able to grant. In the Amended Complaint, Shao asks
that Judge Rushing “be declared impeachment [sic] pursuant to California Penal Code §98 for
severe obstruction of justice in violation of California Penal Code §96.5 and §182.” Am. Compl.
¶ 376(4). California Penal Code §98 provides that “[e]very officer convicted of any crime
defined in this Chapter, in addition to the punishment prescribed, forfeits his office and is forever
disqualified from holding any office in [California].” Cal. Penal Code § 98. The section does
not mention impeachment, so any declaration by this Court that a judicial officer is “impeached”
pursuant to § 98 would have no effect. And in any event, this Court does not have the power to
declare the guilt of an individual pursuant to a criminal statute, or to order the “impeachment”
(or removal) of a state official. The remaining claims against Judge Rushing cannot go forward.
33
3. Patent Insubstantiability
Next, the Court dismisses Shao’s claims against the American Inn Defendants, the
Google Defendants, and Kevin Warnock as patently insubstantiable. Shao alleges that the
American Inn Defendants aided and abetted the overall scheme of parental deprival by providing
a platform for the various parties involved to communicate, including for attorneys to engage in
ex parte communications with, and in the corruption of, state and federal judges. See Am.
Compl. ⁋⁋ 370, 381–83. Shao further alleges that the Google Defendants conspired with Chief
Justice Roberts and the McManis Defendants to hack into her computer, conduct various forms
of surveillance on her, and prevent her from accessing online services provided by the Google
Defendants. See Am. Compl. ⁋⁋ 305–14. Finally, Shao alleges that Kevin Warnock hacked into
her computer to delete files, as part of a conspiracy orchestrated by the McManis Defendants to
sabotage Shao’s pending legal proceedings. See Am. Compl. ⁋ 68. Because Shao’s claims
against these defendants are all “essentially fictitious,” Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537 (1974)), the claims against the American
Inn Defendants, the Google Defendants, and Warnock are dismissed as patently insubstantial.
After briefly reviewing the standard for patent insubstantiability, the Court reviews Shao’s
claims against each set of defendants in turn.
a. Legal Standard
In limited cases, a court may dismiss a case sua sponte for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction if a complaint is “‘patently insubstantial’” and thus “present[s] no federal question
suitable for decision.” Vasaturo v. Peterka, 203 F. Supp. 3d 42, 44 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Best,
39 F.3d at 330). Declining to hear a claim because it is patently insubstantial is “reserved for
complaints resting on truly fanciful factual allegations,” while “legally deficient complaints” are
34
still reserved for 12(b)(6) dismissals. Id. (quoting Best, 39 F.3d at 331 n.5). Thus, to meet this
standard, “claims [must] be flimsier than ‘doubtful or questionable’—they must be ‘essentially
fictitious.’” Id. (quoting Best, 39 F. 3d at 330). And “essentially fictitious” claims include
“bizarre conspiracy theories, any fantastic government manipulations of [the] will or mind, [and]
any sort of supernatural intervention.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Best, 39 F.3d 328 at
330).
b. American Inn Defendants
Because Shao’s claims against the American Inns of Court, William A. Ingram American
Inn of Court, and San Francisco Bay Area American Inn of Court are “essentially fictitious,”
they cannot move forward. Shao asserts that the “giant gang, American Inns of Court”
orchestrated “a series of multiple conspiracies . . . of judicial corruption with the common goal of
permanent parental deprival and harassment since August 4, 2010.” Am. Compl. ⁋ 5. She
further alleges that the American Inns of Court “started out as a social and professional
networking arena for many attorneys, judges, and justices, but has become an inappropriate
secret legal society in which financial interests and favors are traded behind the scenes, and
outcomes of cases are decided before trial or appeal.” Id. ⁋ 7. As the Court understands Shao’s
accusations, she appears to believe both 1) that the American Inn Defendants facilitated a series
of ex parte communications between the attorneys, clerks, and judges involved in Shao’s custody
litigation to predetermine the litigation’s outcome or otherwise harass Shao during the pendency
of the proceedings, and 2) that the American Inns of Court more generally is a dangerous
organization providing a secret forum for illegal ex parte communications and judicial
corruption.
35
On Shao’s alleged facts, her claims against the American Inn Defendants involve exactly
the type of “bizarre conspiracy theor[y]” that, even when viewed favorably toward Shao, is
“clearly fanciful.” Best, 39 F.3d at 330–31. Similar cases in this circuit have been dismissed as
“clearly fanciful” under the doctrine of patent insubstantiality, including claims that government
officials illegally wiretapped and facilitated “round-the-clock surveillance” of the plaintiff after
he made comments to a TSA agent about security concerns, Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d
1006, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 2009), that the plaintiff was subjected to a campaign of harassment and
surveillance by federal and state government officials originating from a string of unconnected
events, Curran v. Holder, 626 F. Supp. 2d 30, 31 (D.D.C. 2009), and that a United States Senator
hacked the plaintiff’s phones and computers, tracked him by helicopter, and intentionally caused
a city-wide power outage, Lewis v. Bayh, 577 F. Supp. 2d 47, 54-55 (D.D.C. 2008). The
common theme in each of these claims was that they were not merely factually unsubstantiated,
but factually fanciful to the point that they were “essentially fictitious,” Best, 39 F.3d at 330.
Shao’s allegations against American Inn are similarly “conclusory and unsupported by
factual details.” Curran, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 34. Shao asserts, with no plausible foundation, that
the American Inns of Court engaged in a conspiracy against her in order to predetermine the
outcome of her custody litigation through a series of secret exchanges. See Am. Compl. ⁋ 7. She
asserts that she lost prior cases because “the judges deciding her matters are all active members
of the club the American Inns of Court, which provides opportunities for ex parte
communications, favors, and gifts to flow between attorneys and judges.” Id. ⁋ 10. Shao further
alleges that American Inns of Court and the Supreme Court Justices have significant financial
ties to one another, through a variety of donations, scholarships, business transactions, and gifts
that lead to judicial corruption. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 23–24, 328–47. She believes that the Supreme
36
Court Justices, in refusing to recuse themselves and denying her various appeals, “further . . .
made unlawful agreements to cover each other’s financial interests with the American Inns of
Court,” id. ¶ 329, and more generally that the treatment of her cases by the Supreme Court
provides “[a] clear example of such money-oriented corruption of the Roberts Court,” id. ¶ 345.
Courts in this circuit have held that claims of a widespread conspiracy cannot go forward
when a plaintiff “offers only a ‘laundry list of wrongful acts and conclusory allegations to
support her theory of conspiracy.’” Curran, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 34 (quoting Richards v. Duke
Univ., 480 F. Supp. 2d 222, 233 (D.D.C. 2007). Shao provides no concrete factual support for
her allegations of a wide-ranging, national conspiracy that supposedly involves lawyers and
judges at all levels of the state and federal judiciary branches and is coordinated by the American
Inn Defendants as a dangerous and corrupt intermediary. And the “laundry list of wrongful acts”
she alleges, id. (quoting Richards, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 233), can simply be explained by a much
more innocuous turn of events: the successive courts to have reviewed her claims disagreed with
her arguments and found against her. Because Shao’s conspiracy allegations are patently
insubstantial, the Court dismisses all claims against the American Inn Defendants for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
c. The Google Defendants
Likewise, the Court finds that Shao’s allegations against the Google Defendants are
“essentially fictitious,” and thus it dismisses the claims against them for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under the doctrine of patent insubstantiality. Shao claims that the Google
Defendants conspired with the McManis Defendants and Chief Justice Roberts to harass her,
including by hacking her computer in violation of the Wiretap Act. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 305,
393. She asserts that Google “suspended services of Plaintiff’s gmails without any preceding
37
notice because of Plaintiff’s publication of the videos on the YouTube about the US Supreme
Court Justices’ financial interest with the Americans Inns of Court.” Id. ¶ 67. Shao further
alleges that emails she sent to various parties in her pending custody litigation were removed due
to “email hackings by Google, Inc., and YouTube, Inc.,” id. ¶ 247, and that comments on her
personal YouTube page “were all systematically deleted by YouTube, Inc. within a day of
SHAO having posted them,” id. ¶ 306. Shao claims that all of her email addresses were
subsequently suspended and that the Google Defendants escalated to conducting electronic
surveillance on her and having vehicles follow her. See id. ¶¶ 307–13.
Shao asserts that Google and YouTube’s decision to conspire with Chief Justice Roberts
may have been motivated by a “special favor” the Chief Justice purportedly gave Google in an
unrelated case. Id. ¶ 314; see also Docket, Google, LLC v. Unwired Planet, LLC, No. 17-357.
Shao reads several routine steps in the certiorari process—including an extension of time
Google sought to file its cert petition and the eventual placement of the petition on a conference
list, which she characterizes as an improper “special conference”—as evidencing that “special
favor.” Am. Compl. ⁋ 314. She concludes that the special favor, an illustration of the “money-
oriented corruption of the Roberts Court,” Am. Compl. at ¶ 345, could “explain why YouTube
and Google might, without any notice, have been suspending all of SHAO’s emails and
YouTube services, and deleting all comments to SHAO’s YouTube postings,” id. ¶ 314.
As with Shao’s claims against the American Inn Defendants, her allegations against
Google and YouTube present “bizarre conspiracies” filled with “essentially fictitious facts.”
Best, 39 F.3d 328 at 330. Much like the plaintiffs in Tooley and Curran, who alleged that the
government had coordinated surveillance campaigns against them following perceived slights,
see Tooley, 586 F.3d 1007–08, Curran, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 34, Shao alleges that the Google
38
Defendants engaged in hacking, wiretapping, and physical surveillance as part of a conspiracy
with the Chief Justice, presumably to hinder her exposition of the corruption she allegedly
uncovered at the Supreme Court, see id. ¶¶ 305–14. These allegations of a “campaign of
surveillance and harassment deriving from uncertain origins . . . constitute the sort of patently
insubstantial claims” dismissed by courts in this Circuit. Tooley, 586 F.3d at 1010 (listing
cases). The Court therefore dismisses the claims against the Google Defendants for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. 11
d. Kevin Warnock
Finally, Shao’s claim against Warnock involve the same type of “bizarre conspirac[y]” she
alleges the Google Defendants are a part of, and because her allegations are “essentially
fictitious,” the Court dismisses the claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction as patently
insubstantial. Best, 39 F.3d 328 at 330. Shao alleges that on April 5, 2018, she “discovered that
about 3,000 files on three laptops of hers had been severely hacked by three specific
individuals.” Am. Compl. ¶ 315. According to Shao, she noticed the hack because “the authors’
names for [files relating to one of Shao’s cases] were altered from SHAO’s name[]” to the name
of other individuals on her computer. Id. Shao identifies Warnock as one such individual, and
11
The Google Defendants separately move to dismiss Shao’s claims for failure to state a
claim because Shao does not make any factual allegations about the interception of a wire, oral,
or electronic communication, when the interception of a communication is central to any Wiretap
Act claim. See Google Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at 6, ECF No. 84 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, 2511,
2520). The Court agrees. Shao bases her Wiretap Act claim solely on the Google Defendants’
alleged deletion of posts and content linked to her Youtube and Google Accounts, suspension of
those accounts, and interruption of other services provided by the Google Defendants. See Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 393–400. While summarily concluding that the Google Defendants conspired to
intercept electronic communications, Shao thus fails to provide any facts to support that
conclusion. Her amended complaint does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
39
alleges that following her discovery, Warnock “appeared to be angered . . . and started purging
files, disabled keyboard, and would like [sic] to force SHAO to use wireless internet to allow
them to continue monitoring SHAO’s activities.” Id. ¶ 318. Shao alleges that Warnock caused
the deletion of litigation files, id ¶ 402, the destruction of her law firm website,
shaolawgroup.com, id. ¶ 406, forced Shao to reformat her computer over ten times, id. ¶ 407, and
somehow “damaged internet units” three times, id. Warnock supposedly hacked Shao’s
computer in order to assist the “co-conspirators in this case,” including the McManis Defendants,
Sussman, Judge Zayner, and possibly the Google Defendants. See id. ¶¶ 308, 404. The
information purportedly gathered by Warnock was allegedly shared with this Court, in order to
further the conspiracy to deny Shao access to justice. See id. ¶ 404.
As with the American Inn and Google Defendants, Shao’s claims against Warnock
involve a “bizarre conspirac[y]” with no factual support. Best, 39 F.3d 328 at 330. Shao alleges
that some file names on her computer were changed and that other files or information was lost
over the past year, and concludes from these facts that she was the victim of a prolonged hacking
campaign, coordinated by members of the widespread, government-linked conspiracy against
her. As with the Google Defendants, she infers from otherwise innocuous incidents that
Warnock—who Shao does not know, aside from his name allegedly appearing on files on her
computer—coordinated with defendants more directly involved in the overall conspiracy to hack
into her accounts and interfere with her legal cases. Shao does nothing but provide a “laundry
list of wrongful acts and conclusory allegations to support her theory of conspiracy,” Curran,
626 F. Supp. 2d at 34 (quoting Richard, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 233), and the Court accordingly
dismisses the claim against Warnock for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of
patent insubstantiality.
40
4. Aiding and Abetting Liability
Finally, the Court dismisses Shao’s last remaining claims, against Orlando, Fadem,
Mitchell, Sussman, and Wang, because they do not state a valid federal cause of action. Shao
only brings one claim against each of these five defendants, aiding and abetting, and all five are
sued specifically for “aid[ing] and abett[ing] the common scheme of permanent parental
deprival.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 386, 387, 389, 390, 391. Because this suit is expressly premised on
federal question jurisdiction, id. ¶ 2, and all other claims have been dismissed, Shao must point
to a federal source of law her aiding and abetting claim can be brought under. “Congress has not
enacted a general civil aiding and abetting statute.” Owens, v. BNP Paribas, S.A., 897 F.3d 266,
277 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 182 (1994)). And Shao does not point to any federal source of law her
aiding and abetting claim arises under. Absent a source for federal question jurisdiction, Shao’s
aiding and abetting claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 12
12
Shao notes that Wang “aided and abetted the court crimes that violated 42 U.S.C. 1983
as stated in Count VI.” Am. Compl. ¶ 387. And while the complaint does not specify which
violations Orlando, Fadem, Mitchell, and Sussman aided and abetted, all four are also alleged to
have been involved in the effort to subvert Shao’s state custody case. See id. ¶¶ 386, 389–91.
To the extent Shao’s aiding and abetting claims against Wang—or Orlando, Fadem, Mitchell,
and Sussman—can be characterized as § 1983 claims, the Court dismisses them for failure to
state a claim. In Central Bank, the Supreme Court found that § 10(b) of the Securities Act did
not provide for aiding and abetting liability because the text of the statute clearly did not
contemplate such liability. 511 U.S. at 176–77. “The key takeaway from Central Bank is that
when Congress creates a private cause of action, aiding and abetting liability is not included in
that cause of action unless Congress speaks to it explicitly.” Owens v. BNP Paribas, S.A., 897
F.3d 266, 277 (D.C. Cir. 2018). Courts to have addressed the issue have found that because
Congress did not explicitly provide for aiding and abetting liability in the text of § 1983, § 1983
does not support aiding and abetting liability. See W. Daniels Land Ass’n v. Wasatch Cnty., No.
2:10-cv-558, 2011 WL 1584822, at *2 (D. Utah Apr. 26, 2011) (noting that, pursuant to Central
Bank, there is no aiding and abetting liability under § 1983); Theriot v. Woods, No. 2:09-cv-199,
2010 WL 623684, at *7 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 18, 2010) (same); see also Khulumani v. Barclay Nat.
Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 317 (2d Cir. 2007) (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“Because Congress has not enacted a comparable civil aiding-and-abetting statute, a
41
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Shao’s renewed motion to disqualify this Court and to change
venue (ECF No. 142) and motion to strike the McManis Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF
No. 81) are DENIED. The motions to dismiss by the California Judicial Defendants (ECF No.
31), Janet Everson (ECF No. 45), the American Inn Defendants (ECF No. 58), the McManis
Defendants (ECF No. 65), Carole Tait-Starnes (ECF No. 75-1), Esther Chung (ECF No. 80), the
Google Defendants (ECF No. 84), and the Santa Clara Defendants (ECF No. 117) are
GRANTED. All remaining claims against all other defendants are DENIED for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. And because this case has been dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the remainder of the pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT. An order
consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.
Dated: January 17, 2019 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
United States District Judge
private party could not be subject to such liability in a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”
(citing Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 181–82)).
42