District of Columbia v. Masucci ( 2014 )


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  •                              UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    ____________________________________
    )
    DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,                    )
    )
    Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, )
    )
    v.                                 )              Civil Action No. 13-1008 (PLF)
    )
    GREGORY MASUCCI, et al.,                 )
    )
    Defendants/                  )
    Counter-Claimants.           )
    ___________________________________ )
    MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
    In this case, the District of Columbia brings an appeal under the Individuals with
    Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., of a hearing officer’s decision
    relating to M.M., a special needs child. Defendants Gregory Masucci and Maya Weschler, as
    parents and next friends of M.M., have filed a counter-claim. This matter is now before the
    Court on defendants’ motion for leave to submit additional evidence. For the reasons set forth
    below, the Court will grant the defendants’ motion. 1
    A party “aggrieved by” a hearing officer’s decision may seek review in either
    state or federal court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). During its review, the district court “shall
    1
    The papers reviewed in connection with the pending motion include the
    following: the complaint [Dkt. No. 1]; the administrative record (“AR”) [Dkt. No. 7-1 to 7-9];
    the hearing officer’s decision [Dkt. No. 7-6 at 898-933]; defendants’ motion for leave to file
    additional evidence [Dkt. No. 13]; the evaluation prepared by Dr. Annie McLaughlin [Dkt. No.
    13-1]; photographs and affidavits relating to an injury to M.M.’s arm [Dkt. No. 13-2]; letters
    relating to M.M.’s enrollment at Ivymount School [Dkt. No. 13-3]; the August 19, 2013 report
    relating to M.M.’s progress at Ivymount School [Dkt. No. 13-4]; the District’s opposition to
    defendants’ motion (“Opp’n”) [Dkt. No. 12]; and defendants’ reply [Dkt. No. 14].
    receive the records of the administrative proceedings . . . [and] shall hear additional evidence at
    the request of a party[.]” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C). Although the IDEA states that a reviewing
    court “shall” hear additional evidence, a court has broad discretion to accept or reject proffered
    additional evidence. Reid ex. rel. Reid v. District of Columbia, 
    401 F.3d 516
    , 521-22 (D.C. Cir.
    2005); see also Miller ex rel. S.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 
    565 F.3d 1232
    ,
    1241 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting that a federal court proceeding “must maintain the character of
    review and not rise to the level of a de novo trial”) (internal quotation omitted). In determining
    whether to consider additional evidence, “[t]he reasons for supplementation will vary; they might
    include gaps in the administrative transcript owing to mechanical failure, unavailability of a
    witness, an improper exclusion of evidence by the administrative agency, and evidence
    concerning relevant events occurring subsequent to the administrative hearing.” Town of
    Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ. for Commonwealth of Mass., 
    736 F.2d 773
    , 790 (1st Cir. 1984)
    aff’d sub nom., Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep’t of Educ. of Mass., 
    471 U.S. 359
    (1985).
    Defendants request that the Court consider the following additional evidence not
    reviewed by the hearing officer: (1) a July 15, 2013 independent educational evaluation of M.M.
    prepared by Annie McLaughlin, Ph.D.; (2) photographs of and affidavits relating to an injury to
    M.M.’s arm, allegedly sustained at Tyler Elementary School; (3) letters documenting M.M.’s
    admission to and enrollment at Ivymount School; and (4) an August 19, 2013 report pertaining to
    M.M.’s progress at Ivymount. All of these items either were unavailable during the
    administrative hearing or were excluded by the hearing officer.
    2
    The District opposes the introduction of this evidence on the ground that it is
    irrelevant to the issues on appeal. See Opp’n 8-10. The Court disagrees. Among the issues
    raised in the defendants’ due process complaint is the appropriateness of the individualized
    education programs (“IEPs”) designed for M.M. See HOD 5 (AR 902). Three pieces of
    evidence that defendants seek to introduce – the psychological evaluation completed after the
    due process hearing, the evidence of injury allegedly sustained by M.M. at Tyler Elementary
    School, and M.M.’s progress report from Ivymount – relate to this question of whether M.M.’s
    IEPs were appropriate and which educational placement is appropriate. 2 The fourth piece of
    evidence that the defendants seek to introduce – evidence of enrollment at Ivymount – is relevant
    to the Court’s evaluation of potential equitable relief and its consideration of M.M.’s placement
    during these proceedings.
    Moreover, the limited evidence offered by the defendants is “merely supplemental
    to the administrative record.” Miller ex rel. S.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. 
    Sch., 565 F.3d at 1241
    . Its consideration will not threaten “the character of review” or lead to “a de novo
    trial.” 
    Id. The Court
    therefore will consider the additional evidence to the extent that is
    necessary to resolve the issues in this case.
    2
    The hearing officer excluded evidence of injury to M.M. on the ground that it
    should instead be raised in another due process complaint. Order, AR 895-96 (“Any alleged
    events subsequent to the date the due process complaint was filed in this matter, that may be the
    basis of [a] due process hearing, can be asserted with [the] filing of another due process complaint,
    and will not be included as part of the current due process hearing.”). To the extent that this
    evidence is offered only for the purpose of determining whether M.M.’s IEPs were appropriate,
    the Court finds that it is relevant to the issues raised on appeal and properly considered here.
    The District suggests that consideration of this evidence would violate other rules, but provides
    no further argument. Opp’n 9-10. The Court will disregard this evidence to the extent that it
    finds that its consideration would be inconsistent with other evidentiary rules.
    3
    Accordingly, it is hereby
    ORDERED that [Dkt. No. 13] the motion of Gregory Masucci and Maya
    Weschler for leave to submit additional evidence is GRANTED.
    SO ORDERED.
    /s/____________________________
    PAUL L. FRIEDMAN
    DATE: January 30, 2014                       United States District Judge
    4