Woods v. Kurland ( 2014 )


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  •                             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    )
    TERRANCE WOODS,                                       )
    )
    Plaintiff,             )
    )
    v.                                    )      Civil Action No. 13-1525 (ESH)
    )
    STANFORD KURLAND, et al.                              )
    )
    Defendants.            )
    )
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    On December 9, 2013, defendants Stanford L. Kurland and David A. Spector (“the
    PennyMac defendants”) filed a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (2), (3), and (6) to
    dismiss the complaint. On December 10, 2013, the Court issued an order advising the pro se
    plaintiff to respond to the motion to dismiss no later than January 10, 2014, and informing him
    that if he did not timely respond, the motion could be deemed conceded and result in the
    dismissal of the complaint. (Order, Dec. 10, 2012 [ECF No. 4].) Plaintiff has neither responded
    nor sought an extension of time in which to respond. Accordingly, the PennyMac defendants’
    motion to dismiss will be granted as conceded. See Local Rule of Civ. P. 7(b).
    In the alternative, the Court will grant defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal
    jurisdiction.   Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), plaintiff bears the burden of
    establishing a factual basis for personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Rossmann v. Chase
    Home Finance, LLC, 
    772 F. Supp. 2d 169
    , 171 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Crane v. N.Y. Zoological
    Society, 
    894 F.2d 454
    , 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). The requirement for personal jurisdiction “must be
    met as to each defendant.” Rush v. Savchuk, 
    444 U.S. 320
    , 332 (1980). In order to meet this
    burden, a plaintiff must allege specific acts connecting the defendant with the forum state.
    Second Amend. Found. v. U.S. Conf. of Mayors, 
    274 F.3d 521
    , 524 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
    In this case, plaintiff has not made any allegations regarding the geographical contacts of
    these two defendants to this jurisdiction. To the contrary, plaintiff’s only geographic allegations
    regarding the PennyMac defendants are that their employer has a corporate headquarters in
    Moorpark, California (in the Central District of California) and that the property at issue in this
    case is in Grand Prairie, Texas, which is in the Northern District of Texas. (See Compl. at 3-4.)
    For this reason, even if plaintiff had timely filed a response, the Court would be required to
    dismiss his claim as to the PennyMac defendants pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).
    Accordingly, and for the reasons stated above, the motion to dismiss as to defendants
    Kurland and Spector will be GRANTED. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum
    Opinion.
    /s/
    ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE
    United States District Judge
    Date: January 23, 2014
    2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2013-1525

Judges: Judge Ellen S. Huvelle

Filed Date: 1/23/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014