Guy v. Vilsack ( 2013 )


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  •                             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    ROOSEVELT D. GUY,
    Plaintiff,
    v.                                     Civil Action No. 12-1557 (ESH)
    THOMAS J. VILSACK,
    Defendant.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Plaintiff Roosevelt Guy filed a pro se lawsuit against Thomas Vilsack in his official
    capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), alleging that the
    USDA denied his farm loan application based on his race, in violation of the Equal Credit
    Opportunity Act (“ECOA”), 
    15 U.S.C. § 1691
    . (Compl., Sept. 18, 2012 [ECF No. 1].) Plaintiff
    now moves for judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 
    5 U.S.C. §§ 500-706
    . (Motion for Judicial Review (“Mot.”), Aug. 26, 2013 [ECF No. 28].) For the reasons
    stated below, plaintiff’s motion will be denied.
    BACKGROUND
    I.     FACTS
    In 2010, plaintiff applied for a farm loan from the Farm Service Agency (“FSA”), an
    agency within the USDA. (See Compl. at 1.) In a letter, the FSA denied plaintiff’s loan
    application on the grounds that he failed to demonstrate an acceptable credit history and that he
    failed to show a feasible plan to pay both his expenses and all loan payments. (See Compl., Doc.
    E.) However, plaintiff believed that his loan application was actually denied because of his
    1
    race. (See Compl. at 2.) On September 18, 2012, he filed a complaint alleging unlawful
    discrimination under the ECOA. (See Compl. at 1-2, Doc. A.)
    Parties are presently in the discovery stage of litigation. The Court’s prior opinion
    discusses the significant discovery disputes that have plagued this case. (See Mem. Op., Aug. 19,
    2013 [ECF No. 24].) Plaintiff has persisted in his refusal to participate in an in-person
    deposition. Plaintiff alleges that his “anxiety has grown so severe that [he] cannot bring himself
    to return to Washington D.C.” (Mot. at 2.) At the request of the plaintiff, the Court held a
    telephonic status conference on August 21, 2013. During this status conference, plaintiff made
    clear that he does not intend to comply with the Court’s Order that he make himself available for
    an in-person deposition in Washington, D.C. (See Order, Aug. 21, 2013 [ECF No. 27].) Plaintiff
    also verbally moved for judicial review of the administrative decision denying his USDA loan
    application. (See id.) At the Court’s request, the parties briefed this motion, and the Court will
    now consider the merits of that motion.
    ANALYSIS
    Plaintiff’s motion seeks judicial review of the FSA’s decision to deny his loan application
    pursuant to the APA. Though the precise contours of plaintiff’s APA claim are not entirely
    clear, the Court must construe a pro se plaintiff’s motion broadly and look to the relief sought to
    infer the claims made wherever possible. Bradley v. Smith, 
    235 F.R.D. 125
    , 127 (D.D.C. 2006)
    (“[P]leadings filed by pro se litigants are liberally construed, and are held to less stringent
    standards than are applied to pleadings prepared by attorneys.”). Liberally construing plaintiff’s
    motion and reply, the Court understands his motion to seek judicial review of his discrimination
    claim (brought under ECOA) by virtue of his rights under the APA. Plaintiff views judicial
    review under the APA as an alternative means for adjudicating his ECOA claim without
    2
    participating in an in-person deposition in Washington, D.C. (See Reply to Opp’n at 2, Sept. 6,
    2013 [ECF No. 30]) (“[This] alternative . . . allows both parties the opportunity to submit a brief
    on the merits which will allow the government the opportunity to dispute whatever they claim to
    vigorously dispute.”).)
    Yet, plaintiff’s motion misconstrues the relief available under the APA. Plaintiff
    affirmatively states in his reply brief that he is “not bringing a claim under [the] APA” and “does
    not wish to amend his complaint to bring claims under [the] APA.” (Id.) Instead, he is “simply
    using [the] APA as a discovery tool . . . .” (Id.) The APA is, however, not a discovery tool. The
    APA only provides for “any applicable form of legal action including actions for declaratory
    judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus . . . .” 
    5 U.S.C. § 703
    (emphasis added). Taking plaintiff at his word, he does not seek to undertake any legal action
    under the APA. Rather, he merely seeks to have the Court consider his discrimination claim
    under ECOA as an administrative matter on the record without the need for further discovery.
    (See Reply at 2.) Because the APA does not provide this procedural remedy, plaintiff’s motion
    must be dismissed.
    In addition, despite plaintiff’s repeated assertions to the contrary, one can broadly
    construe plaintiff’s motion as a request for permission to bring an APA claim. The Court infers
    this request from plaintiff’s statement that he “has made the presentation to the court that there is
    an administrative record and a report of investigation in regards to the above caption [sic] subject
    matter in which Plaintiff moves this court to provide judicial review thereof.” (See id.) However,
    even construing plaintiff’s motion as a request for review under the APA, it must be denied.
    ECOA creates a private right of action against a creditor who “discriminate[s] against any
    applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction . . . on the basis of race . . . .” 15
    
    3 U.S.C. § 1691
    (a). Under the APA, a court only has jurisdiction over “[a]gency action made
    reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a
    court.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton, 
    415 F.3d 8
    , 13 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting 
    5 U.S.C. § 704
    ) (emphasis altered) (brackets in original). Where Congress provides for a “special
    and adequate review procedure,” APA review is not permitted. See Garcia v. Vilsack, 
    563 F.3d 519
    , 522 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Bowen v. Massachusetts, 
    487 U.S. 879
    , 904 (1988)). Because
    an alternative remedy already exists under the ECOA—a point which plaintiff concedes in his
    reply brief 1— he may not bring an APA claim as well. See Love v. Connor, 
    525 F. Supp. 2d 155
    , 160 (D.D.C. 2007) (“The rule that emerges from this unbroken line of [D.C.] circuit
    decisions is that, where a victim of discrimination can sue directly to remedy her injury, no
    action will lie under the APA for failure to adequately investigate, monitor, or police that
    discrimination”); see also Cottrell v. Vilsack, 
    915 F. Supp. 2d 81
    , 90 n. 9 (D.D.C. 2013);
    Williams v. Connor, 
    522 F. Supp. 2d 92
    , 102-03 (D.D.C. 2007).
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion is denied. A separate Order accompanies
    this Memorandum Opinion.
    /s/
    ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE
    United States District Judge
    Date: September 12, 2013
    1
    In his reply, plaintiff states “[t]he government is correct in that [the] ECOA provides adequate remedy
    for Plaintiff’s discrimination claims.” (Reply at 2.)
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2012-1557

Judges: Judge Ellen S. Huvelle

Filed Date: 9/12/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014