United States of America v. Verizon Communications, Inc. , 959 F. Supp. 2d 55 ( 2013 )


Menu:
  •                         UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    __________________________________
    )
    UNITED STATES, et al.,              )
    )
    Plaintiffs,             )
    )
    v.                          )    Civil Action No. 12-1354 (RMC)
    )
    VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS, INC., )
    et al.,                             )
    )
    Defendants.             )
    _________________________________   )
    OPINION
    After following the appropriate procedures under the Antitrust Procedures and
    Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 16(b)-(h) (commonly known as the APPA or Tunney Act), the
    Government moves for entry of final judgment in this antitrust case. Mot. for Final J. [Dkt. 27].
    As stated below, the motion will be granted.
    I. FACTS
    In December 2011, Verizon Communications, Inc. (Verizon) and Cellco
    Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless 1 entered into certain Commercial Agreements with Comcast
    Corporation, Time Warner Cable Inc., Bright House Networks LLC, and Cox Communications,
    Inc. (Cable Defendants). The Commercial Agreements allow the sale of bundled services such
    as Verizon Wireless services together with Cable Defendants’ residential wireline voice, video,
    and broadband services. They also entered into a joint venture (a Joint Operating Entity or JOE)
    to develop integrated wireline and wireless technologies through research and development. The
    Government investigated and found that the Commercial Agreements would have certain
    1
    Verizon Wireless is a joint venture by Verizon and Vodafone Group PLC and is operated and
    managed by Verizon.
    1
    anticompetitive effects in the marketplace. As a result, the Government filed this antitrust case
    against Verizon, Verizon Wireless, and the Cable Defendants (collectively, Defendants). 2 The
    Government alleges that Commercial Agreements between Defendants unreasonably restrain
    trade in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. Compl. [Dkt. 1] ¶¶ 45-47.
    At the same time it filed the Complaint, the Government filed a Competitive
    Impact Statement (CIS) [Dkt. 3]; a proposed Final Judgment [Dkt. 2-1; refiled at Dkt. 27-1]; and
    a Stipulation and Order [Dkt. 2] whereby the parties agreed to entry of the Final Judgment after
    compliance with the Tunney Act requirements. The proposed Final Judgment is intended to
    remedy the anticompetitive effects of the Commercial Agreements between Defendants by
    preserving competition in numerous local markets for broadband, video, and wireless services.
    In some areas, Verizon offers fiber-based voice, video, and broadband services
    under the trade name “FiOS.” FiOS is offered in various areas in which the Cable Defendants
    also offer cable services. The Commercial Agreements would have resulted in Verizon retail
    stores selling two competing “quad play” (i.e., video, broadband, telephone, and mobile wireless
    services) packages: (1) Verizon Wireless and a Cable Defendant’s services or (2) Verizon
    Wireless and Verizon FiOS services.        The Government determined that the Commercial
    Agreements and the JOE would have diminished Verizon’s incentives and ability to compete
    vigorously against the Cable Defendants with its FiOS services and that the JOE created a
    product development partnership with unlimited duration, which would decrease competition
    and innovation in the long term in a fast changing field. The Government negotiated a consent
    decree (i.e., the proposed Final Judgment) with Defendants to remedy the anticompetitive effects
    of the Commercial Agreements.
    2
    The State of New York joined the United States as a plaintiff in this case. This Opinion refers
    to Plaintiffs jointly as the Government.
    2
    To satisfy the Tunney Act requirement for public notice and comment, the
    Government published the proposed Final Judgment and CIS in the Federal Register on August
    23, 2012, see Fed. Reg. 51048, and placed a summary for these documents in the Washington
    Post on August 18-24, 2012. As a result, the Government received and responded to comments
    from four entities: RCN Telecom Services LLC (RCN), a cable over-builder (i.e., a facilities-
    based provider of wireline services); Communications Workers of America (CWA), a trade
    union representing workers in the telecom industry; Montgomery County, Maryland; and the
    City of Boston, Massachusetts (collectively, Objectors). See Gov’t Resp. to Public Comments
    [Dkt. 26].
    Asserting that the proposed Final Judgment provides an effective and appropriate
    remedy for the antitrust violations alleged in the Complaint, the Government now seeks entry of
    Final Judgment. RCN was granted leave to participate in this case, and it filed a Reply brief
    objecting to entry of the proposed Final Judgment and asserting the same concerns that it set
    forth during the comment period. See RCN Reply [Dkt. 31]; RCN Comments [Dkt. 26-3].
    II. LEGAL STANDARD
    Entry of final judgment in antitrust cases is governed by a statute that requires that
    the Court determine whether entry of judgment is in the public interest:
    (e) Public interest determination
    (1) Before entering any consent judgment proposed by the United
    States under this section, the court shall determine that the entry of
    such judgment is in the public interest. For the purpose of such
    determination, the court shall consider—
    (A) the competitive impact of such judgment, including
    termination of alleged violations, provisions for
    enforcement and modification, duration of relief sought,
    anticipated effects of alternative remedies actually
    considered, whether its terms are ambiguous, and any other
    competitive considerations bearing upon the adequacy of
    3
    such judgment that the court deems necessary to a
    determination of whether the consent judgment is in the
    public interest; and
    (B) the impact of entry of such judgment upon competition
    in the relevant market or markets, upon the public generally
    and individuals alleging specific injury from the violations
    set forth in the complaint including consideration of the
    public benefit, if any, to be derived from a determination of
    the issues at trial.
    (2) Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the court to
    conduct an evidentiary hearing or to require the court to permit
    anyone to intervene.
    15 U.S.C. § 16(e).    A court must engage in an independent determination of whether the
    proposed consent judgment is in the public interest. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 
    56 F.3d 1448
    , 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Even so, a court’s inquiry is limited, as the Government is entitled
    to “broad discretion to settle with the defendant within the reaches of public interest.” 
    Id. at 1461.
    “[A] district court is not permitted to reject the proposed remedies merely because the
    court believes other remedies are preferable.” United States v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 489 F.
    Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D.D.C. 2007) (citation omitted). 3 A court must determine “whether there is a
    factual foundation for the government’s decisions such that its conclusions regarding the
    proposed settlement are reasonable.” 
    Id. at 15-16.
    Further, a court’s proper role is to review the
    proposed consent decree in light of the allegations made in the complaint; a court may not
    “construct [its] own hypothetical case and then evaluate the decree against that case.” 
    Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1459
    .
    3
    A court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing or to permit any intervenors. SBC
    
    Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 10
    . A court can make its public interest determination based on
    the competitive impact statement and response to public comments alone. United States v.
    Enova Corp., 
    107 F. Supp. 2d 10
    , 17 (D.D.C. 2000).
    4
    III. ANALYSIS
    Applying this standard, the Court finds that there is a reasonable factual basis for
    the proposed Final Judgment; that the proposed Final Judgment sufficiently remedies the
    anticompetitive impact of the Defendants’ Commercial Agreements; and that entry of the
    proposed Final Judgment is in the public interest. The objections do not convince the Court
    otherwise.
    The proposed Final Judgment (1) forbids Verizon from selling the Cable
    Defendants’ wireline services in areas where Verizon offers FiOS or is likely to offer FiOS in the
    foreseeable future; and (2) forbids Verizon from selling cable services after December 2016 to
    customers in areas where Verizon now sells Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) services. The
    Objectors argue that the geographic area where Verizon is forbidden to sell cable services should
    be defined more broadly in order to give Verizon the incentive to expand FiOS services. The
    Government reasonably considered and rejected this objection. While Verizon is required to
    build FiOS to millions of new households in the next few years due to existing franchise
    obligations, it also had determined, before entering the Commercial Agreements, not to build
    FiOS within its entire wireline footprint. Because it is unlikely that Verizon would have
    expanded FiOS beyond those areas required by franchise agreements, competitive harm in those
    areas is unlikely.
    CWA and RCN argue that the proposed Final Judgment undermines the
    prohibition on Verizon’s sale of cable services by permitting national and regional advertising,
    thereby resulting in Verizon’s marketing of cable services within its FiOS footprint. The
    provision of the Final Judgment that permits advertising does not nullify the prohibition on the
    sale of cable services. See Proposed Final J. § V.C. Even if customers within the FiOS sales
    5
    area receive advertising for cable services, Verizon is still prohibited from selling them cable
    services.
    CWA and RCN also contend that Verizon’s ability to volunteer information
    regarding cable services without compensation also undercuts the prohibition on Verizon’s sale
    of cable services. The proposed Final Judgment is designed to preserve competition between the
    sale of services by the Cable Defendants and the sale of FiOS by Verizon. Permitting Verizon to
    provide free information regarding cable services does not impinge on Verizon’s incentive to sell
    FiOS, which was the competitive harm alleged in the complaint.
    CWA also objects to § V.C of the proposed Final Judgment, which allows
    Verizon Wireless to provide service and support to Verizon Wireless equipment sold by a Cable
    Defendant. Retail stores operated by Cable Defendants are not widespread; Cable Defendants
    make most of their sales via telephone, internet, or door-to-door. Customers that purchase
    Verizon Wireless equipment might obtain their devices, or seek help setting up service, at a
    Verizon Wireless store, and the proposed Final Judgment permits Verizon Wireless to provide
    such service at stores within its FiOS footprint or to customers who live within the FiOS
    footprint. This service does not undermine the marketing advantage of FiOS within the FiOS
    footprint and does not vitiate the prohibition on Verizon Wireless from selling cable services in
    the FiOS footprint.
    CWA objects to (1) § V.I, which prohibits Verizon from entering into agreements
    with Cable Defendants regarding the sale of Verizon wireline services, Verizon Wireless
    services, cable services, or the joint development of technology or services without prior
    Government approval; and (2) § V.J, which prohibits agreements between Cable Defendants and
    Verizon wireline services regarding the price, terms, and availability of cable and wireline
    6
    services. These sections include exceptions for certain types of agreements. CWA complains
    that the exceptions are loopholes that will allow Defendants to collude on price. But the
    exceptions cover categories of agreements that do not pose anticompetitive concerns, such as
    agreements regarding video content, intellectual property licenses, the purchase of advertising,
    the lease of real estate in the ordinary course, and interconnection agreements between the Cable
    Defendants and Verizon. Moreover, to ensure that the proposed Final Judgment does not
    condone anticompetitive agreements, it contains a savings clause that states “in no event shall a
    Defendant participate in, encourage, or facilitate any agreement or understanding between
    [Verizon entities offering wireline services] and a Cable Defendant that violates the antitrust
    laws of the United States.” Proposed Final J. § V.J.
    RCN opines that the technology developed by the JOE will quickly become the
    industry standard due to the large size of the JOE participants. In order to maintain competition,
    RCN seeks a requirement that the products developed by the JOE shall be made available to
    other wired broadband providers on a reasonable and nondiscriminatory basis. The proposed
    Final Judgment does not address this issue because this concern was not raised in the Complaint.
    The Court’s role is to review the proposed Final Judgment in light of the allegations made in the
    complaint. See 
    Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1459
    . The Complaint alleges that the JOE may
    unreasonably restrict its members from innovating outside the joint venture. Compl. ¶ 40. To
    rectify this problem, the proposed Final Judgment limits the duration of the JOE and provides
    that when any participant leaves the JOE, it will have a non-exclusive license to use and
    7
    sublicense all of the JOE’s technology. Thus, the proposed Final Judgment addresses the issues
    raised in the Complaint. 4
    RCN further claims that the “FiOS Footprint” as defined in the proposed Final
    Judgment is ambiguous since it is unclear whether Verizon’s franchise to provide service in the
    District of Columbia is a “statewide” or a “non-statewide” franchise. 5 RCN errs in claiming an
    ambiguity with regard to the District. Verizon’s franchise with the District of Columbia requires
    it to offer video services to residential areas throughout the District by 2018. In other words, the
    entire District is within the definition of the FiOS Footprint.
    Montgomery County asks that the Court require Defendants to build out their
    services to every residential unit in the County without limitation. The proposed Final Judgment
    does not include this requirement because the proposed Final Judgment is tailored to the harms
    identified in the Complaint. The purpose of the proposed Final Judgment is to ensure that
    Defendants have the same incentive to compete as they did before they entered into the
    Commercial Agreements. The requirement sought by Montgomery County is outside the scope
    of this litigation.
    The County also claims broadly that the proposed Final Judgment is not in the
    public interest because it permits cooperation among Defendants and will lead to the allocation
    4
    RCN also complains that, under the Commercial Agreements, Verizon Wireless must give the
    Cable Defendants preference when Verizon Wireless purchases “backhaul services,” the services
    whereby data is carried from wireless cell sites to wireline networks. The proposed Final
    Judgment does not address this issue because it was not raised in the Complaint.
    5
    The FiOS Footprint is “any territory in which Verizon at the date of entry of this Final
    Judgment or at any time in the future: (i) has built out the capability to deliver FiOS Services,
    (ii) has a legally binding commitment in effect to build out the capability to deliver FiOS
    Services, (iii) has a non-statewide franchise agreement or similar grant in effect authorizing
    Verizon to build out the capability to deliver FiOS Services pursuant to a statewide franchise
    agreement.” Proposed Final J. § II.M.
    8
    of markets. The Government does not foresee the allocation of markets. Moreover, there are
    possible benefits to competition and consumers through new products created by the JOE. Again,
    the proposed Final Judgment remedies the anticompetitive effects of the Commercial
    Agreements that were identified in the Complaint.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that the proposed Final
    Judgment is in the public interest. The Government’s motion for entry of final judgment [Dkt.
    27] will be granted, and Final Judgment will be entered as proposed. A memorializing Order
    accompanies this Opinion.
    DATE: August 9, 2013
    /s/
    ROSEMARY M. COLLYER
    United States District Judge
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2012-1354

Citation Numbers: 959 F. Supp. 2d 55

Judges: Judge Rosemary M. Collyer

Filed Date: 8/13/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/31/2023