Cobar v. U.S. Department of Justice , 953 F. Supp. 2d 1 ( 2013 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
___________________________________
)
RENE OSWALD COBAR, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 12-1222 (ESH)
)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, )
)
Defendant. )
___________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Rene Oswald Cobar has sued the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”),
alleging that it has violated the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq. (“FOIA”).
(Compl., Aug. 13, 2012 [ECF No. 12].) Before the Court is defendant’s motion for summary
judgment (Def. Mot., Nov. 26, 2012 [ECF No. 22]), plaintiff’s opposition (Pl. Opp., Jan. 2, 2013
[ECF No. 24]), and defendant’s reply (Def. Reply, Jan. 14, 2013 [ECF No. 25].) For the reasons
discussed below, defendant’s motion will be denied.
BACKGROUND
In October 2011, plaintiff submitted a request under the FOIA to the Drug Enforcement
Administration (“DEA”) seeking information about a third party, Carlos Javier Aguilar-Alvarez,
whom plaintiff identified as a DEA “confidential informant.” (Compl. at 2; id., Ex. A (“FOIA
Request”), at 1.) Plaintiff’s request sought “full disclosure and release of records and
information contained in the files of your Agency concerning . . . Carlos Javier Aguilar-
Alvarez,” specifically, but not limited to, his “criminal records,” his “activation” in October 2003
and his “deactivation” in February 2009 as a “confidential informant (“CI”)” “(# CS-01-
102375),” his “signed” “DEA-CI cooperation contract (DEA-473),” and records of a “prior
deactivation on or about December 2003.” (FOIA Request at 1.) Attached to the FOIA request
was a copy of a sworn affidavit from DEA Special Agent Anthony J. Casullo, Jr., dated October
13, 2010, and a DEA Report of Investigation from Agent Casullo dated January 22, 2004. (Id.,
Ex. A (“Casullo Aff.”) & Ex. B (“Casullo Rep.”.) Casullo’s affidavit states (1) that his “duties as
a Special Agent with DEA include[d] the investigation of Rene COBAR and other members of
his drug trafficking and money laundering organization,” (2) that in “October of 2003, [he]
debriefed an individual by the name of Carlos AGUILAR-ALVAREZ . . . regarding the illicit
drug trafficking activities of COBAR and his associates” and “[s[hortly thereafter, AGUILAR-
ALVAREZ was activated as a Confidential Source (CS) by the DEA and [Casullo] became his
controlling agent,” (3) that “[f]rom October of 2003 until on or about October of 2009, [Casullo]
conducted numerous investigations based on information and assistance provided by AGUILAR-
ALVAREZ,” (4) that “[o]n February 4, 2010, AGUILAR-ALVAREZ was deactivated by the
DEA for providing untruthful information during an investigation initiated in October of 2009,”
specifically about a “debriefing on December 8, 2009,” (5) that “AGUILAR-ALVAREZ was
subsequently polygraphed regarding this information and ‘failed miserably’ according to the
polygrapher” and “admitted during the interview with the polygrapher that he had made false
statements to the controlling agents regarding the target of the investigation and debriefing on
December 8, 2009,” and (7) that “[o]n December 29, 2009, an undercover officer purchased
three ounces of heroin which an investigation revealed had been supplied to the seller by
AGUILAR-ALVAREZ,” after which “AGUIILAR-ALVAREZ was determined to be unreliable
and untruthful and deactivated as a CS.” (Casullo Aff. ¶¶ 3-7.) Casullo’s Report of
Investigation from January 2004 does not mention Aguilar-Alvarez by name, but refers to the
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debriefing of a deactivated confidential source on December 11, 2003, who is identified as CS-
01-102375. (Casullo Rep. at 1.)
The DEA’s response to plaintiff’s FOIA request, dated October 26, 2011, states that
“DEA neither confirms nor denies the existence of records relating to Carlos Javier Aguilar-
Alvarez, being a confidential source/informant or that he provided information that assisted this
agency in any investigation matter.” (Compl., Ex. B (“FOIA Response”), at 1.) The DEA
justified its response, known as a Glomar response, by claiming that the existence of the records
sought by plaintiff would be exempt from release pursuant to FOIA Exemption 7(D) (id.), which
protects from disclosure “law enforcement records” that “could reasonably be expected to
disclose the identity of a confidential source [or] . . . information furnished by a confidential
source.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D).
Plaintiff appealed the denial of his FOIA Request to DOJ’s Office of Information Policy.
(Compl., Ex. C, at 1 (“FOIA Appeal”).) Citing a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision,
Pickard v. Dep’t of Justice, 653 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 2011), plaintiff argued that a Glomar response
was unavailable because Aguilar-Alvarez’s “identity as a confidential source was revealed in
open court” when he testified against plaintiff at trial in February 2009. (FOIA Appeal at 1-2
(citing United States v. Cobar, No. 2:07-cr-0014 (D. Nev. Feb. 2009)).) Aguilar-Alvarez’s
testimony at Cobar’s criminal trial, which plaintiff did not attach to his FOIA appeal but has
since provided to the Court (see Pl. Opp., Ex. A (“Aguilar-Alvarez Test.”)), identified Casullo as
his “primary handler” and “supervis[or],” confirmed that he met with Casullo during the
investigation of Cobar, and confirmed that he “signed the federal DEA agreement in December
of 2003.” (Aguilar-Alvarez Test. at 1.)
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On May 22, 2012, the Office of Information Policy affirmed DEA’s Glomar response
“on partly modified grounds.” (Compl., Ex. D (“Appeal Decision”), at 1.) Instead of Exemption
7(D), the decision relied on Exemption 7(C), which exempts from disclosure “law enforcement
records” that “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). According to the decision, “to the extent that responsive
records exist, without consent, proof of death, official acknowledgement of an investigation, or
an overriding public interest, disclosure of law enforcement records concerning an individual
could be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” and “DEA was not
required to conduct a search for the requested records” as “any records responsive to [plaintiff’s]
request would be categorically exempt from disclosure.” (Id. at 1.)
Following the denial of his appeal, plaintiff filed the complaint that is now before the
Court, seeking an order directing defendant to produce the records described in his FOIA
request. (Compl. at 1.) Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by a
declaration from William C. Little, Jr. (“Little Decl.”), an attorney in the DEA’s Office of Chief
Counsel, Administrative Law Section. Defendant’s motion asserts that it is entitled to summary
judgment because its Glomar response was appropriate under Exemption 7(C) or, in the
alternative, under Exemption 7(D) or 7(F). Plaintiff argues in his opposition that “a Glomar
response is no longer appropriate,” because Aguilar-Alvarez’s status as a confidential informant
has been publicly acknowledged and officially confirmed by the Cassulo affidavit, Aguilar-
Alvarez’s trial testimony, and by the district judge in plaintiff’s criminal case when he ruled on
plaintiff’s motion for a new trial (Pl.’s Opp. at 6-9; id., Ex. C (Order, United States v. Cobar,
No. 2:07-cr-0014 (D. Nev. July 14, 2011) (“July 2011 Order”)).) In its July 2011 Order, the
Nevada district court stated that “Aguilar-Alvarez was working as a confidential source for the
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LVMPD in August of 2003” and that “[i]n October of 2003, the DEA activated Aguilar-Alvarez
in conjunction with its own investigation of [Cobar].” 1 (July 2011 Order, slip op. at 3.)
ANALYSIS
A Glomar response permits an agency to “‘refuse to confirm or deny the existence of
records,’ in limited circumstances.” American Civil Liberties Union v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422, 426
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). It is “‘an exception
to the general rule that agencies must acknowledge the existence of information responsive to a
FOIA request and provide specific, non-conclusory justifications for withholding that
information.’” Id. (quoting Roth v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 642 F.3d 1161, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Generally, a Glomar response is “permitted only when confirming or denying the existence of
records would itself ‘cause harm cognizable under a FOIA exception.’” Id. (quoting Roth, 642
F.3d at 1178); see Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 678 F.3d 926, 931 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (citing Wolf, 473 F.3d at 374). In addition, the FOIA expressly provides that when
“informant records maintained by a criminal law enforcement agency under an informant’s name
or personal identifier are requested by a third party according to the informant’s name or
personal identifier, the agency may treat the records as not subject to the requirements of
[FOIA], unless the informant’s status as an informant has been officially confirmed.” 5 U.S.C. §
552(c)(2); see also Benavides v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 968 F.2d 1243, 1246 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (describing § 552(c)(2) as “express legislative authorization for a Glomar response”).
Conversely, “when an informant’s status has been officially confirmed, the requirements of
1
On December 27, 2011, the court vacated the July 2011 Order and filed an amended
order, but the same language appears in both orders.
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FOIA govern, and the agency must acknowledge the existence of any records it holds.”
Benavides, 964 F.2d at 1243.
“Under the FOIA, the burden is on the agency to sustain its action.” ACLU v. CIA, 710
F.3d at 427. According to defendant, DEA provides a Glomar response “to requests for
investigative information related to third-parties where no release authorization or proof of death
is provided in order to protect the [third parties’] privacy interests.” (Little Decl. ¶ 57.) The
DEA takes the “position that merely confirming that any individual is mentioned in a DEA
investigative record system or that DEA is in possession of records is a disclosure . . . in and of
itself [and] would constitute an unwarranted invasion of an individual’s personal privacy” for
purposes of Exemption 7(C). (Id.) According to defendant, if DEA did conduct a search and
refuse to release any responsive records, “DEA would effectively acknowledge the status of any
individual[] that is a source of information” (id. ¶ 61), while if it were to offer a “no records”
response, the requester would be left with the impression that agency staff had searched for but
had not located responsive records. (Id. ¶ 58.) A Glomar response thus serves to protect
individuals’ privacy interests while preventing a requester from reaching an erroneous
conclusion. (Id. ¶¶ 58, 61.)
In a typical confidential informant case, defendant’s justifications for a Glomar response
relying on Exemption 7(C) may make perfect sense. But where the identity of a confidential
informant has been officially confirmed, the reasons justifying a Glomar response no longer
apply. See, e.g., Boyd v. Criminal Division of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 475 F.3d 381, 389 (D.C.
Cir. 2007) (“Where an informant’s status has been officially confirmed, a Glomar response is
unavailable, and the agency must acknowledge the existence of any responsive records it
holds.”) (citing Benavides v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 968 F.2d 1243, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1992));
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Pickard v. Dep’t of Justice, 653 F.3d 782, 788 (9th Cir. 2011) (Glomar response unavailable
with respect to individual’s “status as a confidential informant” where government had
“previously officially confirmed . . . status as an informant”); Memphis Publishing Co. v.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2012) (same); North v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 810 F. Supp. 2d 205, 209 (D.D.C. 2011) (same); Hidalgo v. FBI, No. 04-cv-0562, 2005
WL 6133690, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2005) (same). Here, there can be no question that the
identity of the confidential informant has been officially confirmed in light of Casullo’s sworn
affidavit, the content of Aguilar-Alvarez’s public testimony at Cobar’s criminal trial, and the
district judge’s opinion in July 2011 denying Cobar’s motion for a new trial. Accordingly, a
Glomar response is not available and defendant is not entitled to summary judgment.
The unavailability of a Glomar response as to the existence of responsive records does
not mean that DEA is required to disclose the content of any particular record. See ACLU v.
CIA, 710 F.3d at 432 (“‘whether the contents–as distinguished from existence–of the officially
acknowledged records may be protected from disclosure’” raises a distinct question (quoting
Wolf, 473 F.3d at 380)). Rather, defendant must “proceed to the filing of a Vaughn index or
other description of the kind of documents the [agency] possesses, followed by litigation
regarding whether the exemptions apply to those documents.” Id.; see also Pickard, 653 F.3d at
788 (after failure of Glomar response, government must “take the next step” and “raise whatever
exemptions might be appropriate as to the contents of those records, and let the district court
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determine whether the contents, as distinguished from the existence, of the officially confirmed
records may be protected from disclosure under the DEA’s claimed exceptions”).2
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, and for the reasons stated above, defendant’s motion for summary judgment
is denied. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
/s/
ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE
United States District Judge
Date:
2
Having concluded that defendant’s motion for summary judgment must be denied
because a Glomar response is not permitted, plaintiff’s other arguments in opposition to
defendant’s motion are not addressed.
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