Tolbert-Smith v. Bodman ( 2013 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________________________
MARILYN TOLBERT-SMITH,
Plaintiff,
v. 1:06-CV-1216
(FJS/JMF)
STEVEN CHU, Secretary, U.S. Department
of Energy,
Defendant.
______________________________________________
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
LAW OFFICES OF GARY M. KEVIN LEE OWEN, ESQ.
GILBERT & ASSOCIATES LINDA A. KINCAID, ESQ.
The Colonnade at Station Square ARI M. WILKENFELD, ESQ.
110 Wayne Avenue, Suite 900
Silver Spring, Maryland 20910
Attorneys for Plaintiff
OFFICE OF THE UNITED DARRELL C. VALDEZ, AUSA
STATES ATTORNEY
Judiciary Center Building
555 Fourth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530
Attorneys for Defendant
SCULLIN, Senior Judge
ORDER
Currently before the Court are Defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to
Plaintiff's Title VII and Rehabilitation Act claims, see Dkt. No. 67, and Defendant's motion for
summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's Privacy Act claim, see Dkt. No. 83. Plaintiff
opposes these motions.
Plaintiff, an employee in the Legacy Management Department of the United States
Department of Energy, asserts claims under the Rehabilitation Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, and the Privacy Act against Defendant, alleging discrimination, hostile work
environment and improper disclosure of information regarding her medical condition.1
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is "no genuine disputes as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine
issue of material fact exists if "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "Credibility determinations, the
weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions, not those of a judge." Id. at 255. When faced with a summary judgment motion, the
court must remember that "summary judgment is a drastic remedy, [and therefore] courts should
grant it with caution so that no person will be deprived of his or her day in court to prove a
disputed material factual issue." Greenberg v. Food & Drug Admin., 803 F.2d 1213, 1216 (D.C.
Cir. 1986). Thus, summary judgment is not appropriate where "the evidence presented on a
dispositive issue is subject to conflicting interpretations, or reasonable persons might differ as to
its significance . . . ." Id. (citations omitted). Furthermore, when reviewing the evidence, the
court must draw "all inferences . . . in favor of the nonmoving party[.]" Coward v. ADT Sec.
Sys., Inc., 194 F.3d 155, 158 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
Having reviewed the parties' submissions in light of these well-established principles, as
1
Specifically, Plaintiff's second amended complaint contains the following causes of
action: (1) Count One - Disability discrimination - failure to accommodate Plaintiff's disability in
violation of the Rehabilitation Act; (2) Count Two - Discriminatory treatment, hostile work
environment, in violation of Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act; (3) Count Three - Retaliation
for participation in equal opportunity activity in violation of Title VII; and (4) Count Four -
Violation of the Privacy Act by posting Plaintiff's confidential records on a widely accessible
computer server and other acts. See generally Dkt. No. 63, Second Amended Complaint.
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well as the applicable law with regard to each of Plaintiff's claims, the Court concludes that
genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to Plaintiff's failure-to-accommodate claim
under the Rehabilitation Act, thereby precluding summary judgment on that claim. To the
contrary, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence to raise any
material issues of fact with respect to her retaliation and discriminatory treatment, hostile work
environment claims under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act or with respect to her Privacy Act
claim. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate with respect to those claims.
Accordingly, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's
Privacy Act claim, see Dkt. No. 83, is GRANTED; and the Court further
ORDERS that Defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's Title
VII and Rehabilitation Act claims, see Dkt. No. 67, is GRANTED with respect to her retaliation
and discriminatory treatment, hostile work environment claims and DENIED with respect to her
failure-to-accommodate claim.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 24, 2013
Syracuse, New York
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