Garmon v. Administrative Remedy Coordinator ( 2012 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
David G. Garmon, :
:
Plaintiff, :
v. : Civil Action No. 11-0828 (CKK)
:
Administrative Remedy :
Coordinator et al., :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this prisoner action filed pro se, plaintiff alleges that while incarcerated at the Federal
Correctional Institution in Edgefield, South Carolina (“FCI Edgefield”), he was prevented from
exhausting his administrative remedies with regard to a charge of possessing a cellular phone.
See David G. Garmon’s Second Am. Compl. (“Am. Compl.”) [Dkt. # 30] at 1, 3. Plaintiff names
as defendants a unit manager, a case manager coordinator, and a hearing officer all at FCI
Edgefield, and purports also to sue the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), its “Deputy Regional
Counsel” and its “National Inmate Appeal Coordinator,” id. ¶¶ 2-7, whom defendants have since
identified as Craig Simmons and Harrell Watts, respectively. See Defs.’ Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n to
Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. (“Reply”) at 1. Claiming that defendants
violated his “rights as guaranteed by the first and fourtee[n]th amendment[s] to the constitution
of the United States,” plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment and monetary damages.1 Id. at 22.
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The Court recognizes that the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to plaintiff’s
claims against federal officials but assumes under the liberal reading accorded pro se pleadings
that plaintiff is asserting a claim under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Defendants argue for dismissal of the second amended complaint on several grounds
including that of improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See Mem. of P. & A. in Support of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s Am. Compl. at 16-17; Reply at
7-8. Plaintiff states that this venue is proper “because a substantial part of the omissions giving
rise to these claims occured [sic] in this district,” Am. Compl. at 3, but the only potentially viable
federal claim gleaned from the allegations arises out of the “SIS investigation . . . completed” at
FCI Edgefield on August 10, 2010, “concluding that plaintiff be charged with possession of a
hazardes [sic] tool (celluler [sic] phone),” id., and the ensuing grievance initiated at that facility.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has instructed
this Court to “examine challenges to personal jurisdiction and venue carefully to guard against
the danger that a plaintiff might manufacture venue in the District of Columbia.” Cameron v
Thornburgh, 983 F.2d 253, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1993). This venue is not proper for litigating
plaintiff’s constitutional claim for monetary damages, which must be brought against the
individual wrongdoers in South Carolina under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); cf. with Gonzalez v. Holder, 763 F. Supp. 2d 145, 153
(D.D.C. 2011) (“[A] prison official's decision on an inmate grievance with respect to an alleged
constitutional violation does not itself render him personally liable under Bivens.”) (citing cases).
Moreover, “ ‘the availability of [declaratory] relief presupposes the existence of a judicially
remediable right,’ ” Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2011), quoting C & E Servs.,
Inc. of Washington v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 310 F.3d 197, 201 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (other
citations omitted) (bracket in original), which the court entertaining plaintiff’s Bivens claim must
decide.
2
Rather than dismiss this case, the Court finds it in the interest of justice to transfer it to
the appropriate court, which presumably may exercise personal jurisdiction over the individuals
directly involved in the alleged unconstitutional conduct. See Gonzalez, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 153(“Transfer is appropriate ‘when procedural obstacles [such as lack of personal jurisdiction,
improper venue, and statute-of-limitations bars] impede an expeditious and orderly adjudication
on the merits.’ . . . Generally, the interests of justice require transferring a case to the appropriate
judicial district rather than dismissing it.”) (quoting Sinclair v. Kleindienst, 711 F.2d 291,
293–94 (D.C. Cir. 1983)) (brackets in original) (other citation omitted). A separate order
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
__________s/s__________________
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
United States District Judge
DATE: April 16, 2012
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