Teltschik v. Williams & Jensen, Pllc ( 2012 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
TELTSCHIK,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 08-089 (BJR)
WILLIAMS & JENSEN, PLLC, et al.,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendants.
This matter comes before the court upon Plaintiff Teltschik’s motion for reconsideration
of the Court’s August 28, 2012 Memorandum Order. 1 In its Order, the Court held that Plaintiff
would not be allowed to recover reputation damages for his remaining claims of negligence and
breach of fiduciary duty because those claims were subsumed by his defamation claim – a claim
that had already been dismissed. The Court declined to reach Defendant’s broader argument that
reputation damages were never available in an ordinary negligence action. The Court did hold,
however, that “[a] plaintiff should not be permitted to recover damages for the loss of his
reputation in a negligence action, when the alleged damage to his reputation was caused by a
defendant’s published communication and that communication was the basis of a failed
defamation claim.” Mem. Order at 3.
Plaintiff immediately moved for reconsideration of the Court’s August 28, 2012 Order.
The following day, on August 29, 2012, the Court held an interim pretrial conference, during
which the parties agreed that the Court’s August 28, 2012 ruling essentially dismisses this action
because Plaintiff only sought reputation damages. Because trial is scheduled to begin on
1
The factual background of this case has been discussed in the Court’s August 28, 2012
Memorandum Order and, in even greater detail, Judge Kennedy’s February 21, 2010
Memorandum Opinion, and is incorporated here.
September 14, 2012, the Court ordered an expedited briefing schedule as to Plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration. With that motion now ripe for consideration, the court turns to consider the
parties’ arguments. 2
Plaintiff argues that he was in a fiduciary relationship with Defendants and that it was
reasonably foreseeable that the Conciliation Agreement “would damage Mr. Teltschik’s
reputation.” Pl.’s Mot. at 4-6. The Court’s August 2012 Order, however, does not call into
question whether a fiduciary relationship existed between the parties or whether the reputation
damages were foreseeable. Instead, the Court’s August 2012 Order held that the reputation
damages in this case (the only damages asserted at this point) stem from Defendant’s publication
of the Conciliation Agreement to a third party, and therefore the action sounds in defamation and
is not properly brought as a negligence or breach of fiduciary duty. The Court further observed
that Judge Kennedy had already dismissed Plaintiff’s defamation claim, and that allowing
Plaintiff to proceed on a theory of negligence or breach of fiduciary duty at this point would
undermine the strictures of defamation law. See Mem. Order at 3 (“Simply put, a plaintiff
should not be allowed to circumvent the parameters of defamation law by recasting his
defamation claim as a negligence claim.”).
Plaintiff further points out that an individual has a property interest in his or her
reputation, and argues that the monetary value associated with one’s reputation should be
recoverable as reputation damages, even if such damages are difficult to calculate. Pl.’s Reply at
2. The Court did not and does not, however, hold that Plaintiff’s reputation damages are not
2
Some of Plaintiff’s arguments implicitly ask this court to reconsider whether Judge Kennedy was
correct in dismissing his defamation claims in the first place. See Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. at 4.
The Court declines to revisit Judge Kennedy’s 2010 ruling on this matter.
2
recoverable because they are difficult to calculate. Although the Court did express doubt at the
interim pretrial conference that Plaintiff would be able to successfully demonstrate damage to his
reputation at trial, the Court’s dismissal of the case does not rest on this issue. See generally
Mem. Order. (barring Plaintiff from presenting evidence or reputation damages because the
“gist” of his claim was defamation and the defamation claim had already been dismissed). To be
clear, the Court expresses no opinion as to whether or not Plaintiff could establish specific
damages to his reputation.
Next, Plaintiff asserts that reputation damages are recoverable in a negligence action.
This argument too is of no moment. The Court previously declined to reach Defendant’s
argument that reputation damages are not recoverable in a negligence or breach of fiduciary duty
claim. See Mem. Order at 3 n.2. The Court’s August 2012 Order assumed, without deciding,
that reputation damages are allowed in an ordinary negligence claim. But even if reputation
damages are allowed in an ordinary negligence claim, the Court held that it was inappropriate to
allow Plaintiff to recover reputation damages where Plaintiff was labeling his claim as
“negligence” or “breach of fiduciary duty” when, in fact, the claims were nothing more than a
reincarnation of his defamation claims. See Jorgensen v. Mass. Port Auth., 905 F.2d 515, 520
(1st Cir. 1990) (holding that reputation damages may be sought in an ordinary negligence action,
but not in a negligence action where claim sounds in defamation).
Lastly, Plaintiff argues that “when an attorney enters an appearance without authority, the
attorney is liable to the party for whom he entered his appearance for all damages occasioned
thereby.” Pl.’s Mot. at 6. In other words, Plaintiff seeks to fashion some sort of strict liability
rule for attorneys who enter into settlements without authorization by their clients. His attempt
to do so, however, is undercut by the lack of case law supporting such a proposition. See id.3
(citing as support an isolated, out of context sentence from an 19th century case, Fields v. Gibbs,
9 Fed. Cas. 15 (C.C.D.N.J. 1815)). Instead, Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants entered into a
Conciliation Agreement without his permission are properly analyzed as a legal malpractice suit,
with the negligence standards applicable to legal malpractice claims required in the District of
Columbia. See Macktal v. Garde, 111 F. Supp. 2d 18, 21 (D.D.C. 2000) (noting in a case
involving an alleged faulty settlement that “the plaintiff must prove three things in order to
recover [in a legal malpractice suit]: (1) the attorney’s employment; (2) his neglect of a
reasonable duty; and (3) that such negligence resulted in and was the proximate cause of loss to
the client.”).
Accordingly, after thoughtful consideration of Plaintiff’s motion and the related filings
thereto, the Court adheres to its previous Order. 3 As a matter of law, Plaintiff’s negligence and
breach of fiduciary duty claims are subsumed by his defamation claim, a claim that has
previously been dismissed by the Court. Because Plaintiff has recognized that such a ruling is
fatal to his action as presently before the Court, the Court hereby vacates the September 11, 2012
pretrial conference and scheduled trial, and dismisses the Complaint.
September 10, 2012
BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
3
The Court incorporates its August 28, 2012 Order herein.
4