Bromfield v. Myers ( 2009 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DAMION BROMFIELD, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 08-1639 (RMC)
)
JULIE MYERS , et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Damion Bromfield filed this action for injunctive relief while detained at the
Department of Homeland Security’s Northwest Detention Center (“NWDC”) in Tacoma,
Washington. He challenges the policies of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) that
allegedly prohibit detainees from possessing pens in their cells and receiving newspaper or magazine
subscriptions. Mr. Bromfield names as defendants five high-level ICE officials and former DHS
Secretary Michael Chertoff. The defendants have moved collectively to dismiss the complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) as moot [Dkt. No. 11]. Upon consideration of the parties’
submissions, the Court will grant the Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Under Rule 12(b)(1), a court has “an affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting
within the scope of its jurisdictional authority.” Jones v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp.2d 1, 5 (D.D.C.
2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because Article III of the U.S. Constitution
limits federal courts to deciding “actual, ongoing controversies,” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317,
108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988), a court must refrain from deciding a case if events have
transpired such that the decision will neither “presently affect the parties' rights nor have a
more-than-speculative chance of affecting them in the future.” Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d 699,
701 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A case is moot if a defendant
can demonstrate that two conditions have been met: (1) interim relief or events have completely and
irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation; and (2) there is no reasonable expectation
that the alleged wrong(s) will be repeated. Doe v. Harris, 696 F.2d 109, 111 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citing
County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979)). When
both conditions are satisfied, the case is moot because neither party has a legally cognizable interest
in the final determination of the underlying facts and law. See id. While a defendant's voluntary
cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of jurisdiction, Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000),
“[t]he case may nevertheless be moot if the defendant can demonstrate that ‘there is no reasonable
expectation that the wrong will be repeated.’ ” United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633,
73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953) (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,
448 (2d Cir. 1945)).
The Defendants assert that the case is moot because Mr. Bromfield has been released
on bail and therefore is no longer at NWDC. Moreover, they have shown that even if Mr. Bromfield
were returned to the facility, the alleged deprivations are not capable of repetition because detainees
at NWDC are allowed to possess pens and to subscribe to publications subject to reasonable
guidelines. Def.’s Ex. B, Declaration of Thomas P. Giles ¶¶ 4-5. Accordingly, the defendants’ Rule
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is granted. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: February 13, 2009 /s/
ROSEMARY M. COLLYER
United States District Judge