Gomez v. Aragon ( 2010 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________
)
KENNETH GOMEZ et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 09-2010 (RWR)
)
ROBERT ARAGON et al., )
)
Defendants. )
______________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se plaintiffs Kenneth and Lynette Gomez and pro se
plaintiff-intervenor Richard Tast bring claims for damages and
injunctive relief against six named and five unnamed New Mexico
citizens, alleging that the defendants are “engaged in an
insurrection against” the constitutions of the state of New
Mexico and the United States because the defendants are
discharging their duties as state and federal officials without a
penal bond, which the plaintiffs assert that the New Mexico state
constitution and federal law require.1 The named defendants have
1
The plaintiffs have also filed a motion for a preliminary
injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a). To
obtain preliminary injunctive relief, the moving party must show
that “he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,
that the balance of the equities tips in his favor, and that an
injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008). Because the
plaintiffs do not address, yet alone make a sufficient showing
on, any of these factors, their motion will be denied.
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moved to dismiss the complaint.2 Because the plaintiffs have
made no showing that this Court has personal jurisdiction over
any of the named defendants, their motions to dismiss will be
granted.3
“It is plaintiff’s burden to make a prima facie showing that
the Court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants.”
Ballard v. Holinka, 601 F. Supp. 2d 110, 117 (D.D.C. 2009); see
also First Chicago Int’l v. United Exch. Co., Ltd., 836 F.2d
1375, 1378-79 (D.C. Cir. 1988). A plaintiff must plead specific
facts providing a basis for personal jurisdiction. Moore v.
2
Defendant F. Douglas Moeller also moves for the imposition
of sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c).
Although such sanctions may be imposed against pro se plaintiffs,
see Hamrick v. Gottlieb, 416 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 n.3 (D.D.C. 2005),
“the district court is accorded wide discretion” in determining
whether sanctions are appropriate. Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc.,
770 F.2d 1168, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Moeller has not
established that the plaintiffs are presenting their claims for
“any improper purpose[,]” nor has he shown that their pro se
legal claims are sufficiently frivolous to warrant sanctions.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1).
3
Defendants Robert Aragon, Sandra Price, Daniel A. Sanchez,
and Rebecca Vigil-Giron have moved for a protective order staying
non-jurisdictional discovery, defendant Moeller has moved for a
protective order staying discovery, and defendant Richardson has
moved to hold in abeyance his response deadline to plaintiffs’
motion for a declaratory judgment. These motions all will be
denied as moot.
The plaintiffs have filed a motion for leave to file a
surreply to defendant Richardson’s reply. The motion will be
denied. The plaintiffs also have filed a motion for a court
order regarding certain New Mexico Statutes. The motion will be
denied without prejudice to the plaintiffs refiling it after they
serve all unnamed defendants.
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Motz, 437 F. Supp. 2d 88, 91 (D.D.C. 2006). Pro se plaintiffs
are not freed from the requirement to plead an adequate
jurisdictional basis for their claims. See Briggs v. State Dep’t
Fed. Credit Union, Civil Action No. 05-1344 (GK), 2006 WL
1444009, at *2 (May 25, 2006).
“A District of Columbia court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a person domiciled in . . . or maintaining his
. . . principal place of business in[] the District of Columbia
as to any claim for relief.” D.C. Code § 13-422. If the
plaintiff does not plead that a District of Columbia court has
personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on his domicile or
place of business, a court engages in a two-part inquiry to
determine if it has personal jurisdiction over the defendants.
First, a court must determine whether there is a basis for
personal jurisdiction under the District of Columbia’s long-arm
statute. See GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199
F.3d 1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The District of Columbia
long-arm statute allows a court in the District of Columbia to
exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant with
regard to a claim arising from the defendant's conduct in:
(1) transacting business in the District of Columbia;
(2) contracting to supply services in the District of
Columbia;
(3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia
by an act or omission in the District of Columbia;
(4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia
by an act or omission outside the District of Columbia
if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in
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any other persistent course of conduct, or derives
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or
services rendered, in the District of Columbia[.]
D.C. Code § 13-423(a).4 Second, a court must determine whether
the exercise of personal jurisdiction would comport with the
requirements of due process. See GTE New Media Servs., Inc., 199
F.3d at 1347. This portion of the analysis turns on whether a
defendant's “minimum contacts” with the District of Columbia
establish that “the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int'l
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal
quotation marks omitted). These minimum contacts must arise from
“some act by which the defendant purposefully avails [himself] of
the privilege of conducting activities with the forum state, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Asahi Metal
Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U.S.
102, 109 (1987) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 474 (1985)). In other words, “the defendant's conduct and
connection with the forum State are such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
The plaintiffs have not pled an adequate basis for asserting
personal jurisdiction over any of the named defendants. There is
4
The alternative bases set forth under the long-arm statute
are inapplicable.
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no personal jurisdiction over the defendants in the District of
Columbia based on their domicile, as they are all “citizens of
the State of New Mexico.” (Compl. at 1.) There is also no
allegation in the complaint that the District of Columbia is the
principal place of business of any of the defendants. Moreover,
the plaintiffs have not pled an adequate basis to assert specific
personal jurisdiction over the named defendants under the
District of Columbia long-arm statute. There is no allegation in
the complaint that any of the acts constituting the
“insurrection” occurred anywhere other than in New Mexico. The
plaintiffs do not claim that the insurrection arose from the
defendants’ conduct in transacting business or contracting to
supply services in the District of Columbia, nor do they claim
the existence of a tortious injury in the District of Columbia.
Instead, the plaintiffs assert that jurisdiction is proper “in
the District of Columbia in the interest of justice because no
other court of law is available to the Plaintiffs[.]” (Id. ¶ 2.)
This allegation is insufficient to provide any basis to assert
personal jurisdiction over the defendants.
Thus, under even a liberal construction of their pro se
complaint, see Howerton v. Ogletree, 466 F. Supp. 2d 182, 183
(D.D.C. 2006), the plaintiffs have not alleged an adequate basis
for asserting personal jurisdiction over the defendants, and the
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defendants’ motions to dismiss will be granted. Accordingly, it
is hereby
ORDERED that defendants’ motions [18, 24] to dismiss be, and
hereby are, GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that defendant Moeller’s motion [19] to dismiss and
for sanctions be, and hereby is, GRANTED with respect to the
motion to dismiss and DENIED with respect to the motion for
sanctions. It is further
ORDERED that defendants’ motions [25, 39] for protective
orders be, and hereby are, DENIED as moot. It is further
ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion [37] for a court order
regarding certain New Mexico Statutes be, and hereby is, DENIED
without prejudice to refiling it after all unnamed defendants
have been served. It is further
ORDERED that defendant Richardson’s motion [40] to hold in
abeyance the plaintiff’s motion for a court order regarding
certain New Mexico Statutes be, and hereby is, DENIED as moot.
It is further
ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion [45] for leave to file a
surreply and motion [48] for a preliminary injunction be, and
hereby are, DENIED.
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SIGNED this 15th day of April, 2010.
_________/s/________________
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
United States District Judge