Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. U.S. Department of Education ( 2009 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY :
AND ETHICS IN WASHINGTON, :
:
Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 07-0963 (RMU)
:
v. : Document Nos.: 25, 27
:
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF :
EDUCATION, :
:
Defendant. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT; GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. The
plaintiff, Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington (“CREW”), moves for summary
judgment contending that the defendant, the U.S. Department of Education (“Education”),
improperly denied its request for a fee waiver under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”).
The plaintiff requests information concerning the extent of the White House’s and commercial
publishers’ involvement in the defendant’s administration of the Reading First program, a
scientifically based reading research initiative of the No Child Left Behind Act. Claiming that
there is public uncertainty about Reading First, the plaintiff argues that it is entitled to a waiver
of all fees associated with the processing of its FOIA request. In response, the defendant has
filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, declaring that one of the plaintiff’s document
requests is moot and that the remaining two requests fail to demonstrate a significant
contribution to the public’s understanding of government operations or activities under FOIA.
Because one of the plaintiff’s requests is moot, and the remaining requests satisfy FOIA fee
waiver standards, the court grants in part and denies in part the plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment and grants in part and denies in part the defendant’s cross-motion for summary
judgment.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History
The plaintiff is a non-profit organization “committed to protecting the rights of citizens to
be informed about the activities of government officials[,] . . . ensuring the integrity of
government officials . . . and empowering citizens to have an influential voice in . . . the
governmental decision-making process.” Am. Compl. ¶ 7. In pursuit of this mission, on March
28, 2007, the plaintiff requested from the defendant, under FOIA, documents and records dating
from January 20, 2001 to the present in several categories, which the plaintiff narrowed in a May
21, 2007 e-mail 1 as follows:
1. All communications of [fourteen enumerated Department of Education] offices
to, from, or referencing any member of the White House staff, including, but not
limited to, then-Domestic Policy Advisor Margaret Spellings or Margaret
LaMontagne, that mention or relate to Reading First, Early Reading First,
“Scientifically Based Reading Research”/”Science Based Reading
Research”/“SBRR” or DIBELS.
2. All communications of the above-listed offices, including calendar references
and meeting notes, with the executives, employees, consultants, or contractors of
the following educational publishers: Houghton Mifflin (including, but not limited
to, Maureen DiMarco), SRA/McGraw Hill, Pearson Scott Foresman, Voyager
(including, but not limited to, Randy Best), Cambium Learning, Sopris West, and
Intellitools.
1
The plaintiff’s modified request and subsequent appeals did not include its March 28, 2007
request for a fourth category of documents – “all documents previously disclosed under FOIA to
Andrew Brownstein, Travis Hicks, and/or the Title I Monitor” – because the defendant complied
with this request on April 16, 2007. Am. Compl., Ex. B.
2
3. All communications of the above-listed offices, including calendar references
and meeting notes, that mention or relate to contacts with the executives,
employees, consultants, or contractors of the following educational publishers:
Houghton Mifflin (including, but not limited to, Maureen DiMarco),
SRA/McGraw Hill, Pearson Scott Foresman, Voyager (including, but not limited,
to Randy Best), Cambium Learning, Sopris West, and Intellitools.
Id., Exs. A at 1, E. The plaintiff also requested a waiver of fees for the processing of its request,
explaining that “the [requested] disclosures . . . are likely to contribute to the public’s
understanding of the extent of White House involvement in the administration of the Reading
First program, an issue on which the public record is unclear.” Id., Ex. A at 3, Attach. 1 at 1; Id.,
Ex. G, Attachs. G-J (detailing accusations in the media that White House officials improperly
influenced the defendant’s administration of Reading First). Finally, the plaintiff stated that its
request was primarily for non-commercial purposes and explained its plan to “analyze the
information responsive to [its] request, . . . share its analysis with the public, either through
memoranda, reports or press releases . . . [and] disseminate any documents it acquires from this
request to the public.” Am. Compl., Ex. A at 3.
In an April 16, 2007 letter, the defendant denied the plaintiff’s fee waiver request,
explaining that it did not demonstrate a significant contribution to the public’s understanding of
government operations or activities. 2 Id., Ex. B at 4. Furthermore, the defendant determined
2
Both parties refer to this element in their fee waiver analyses as the fourth factor of the
Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) fee waiver regulation at 28 C.F.R. § 16.11(k)(2)(iv), which the
DOJ has promulgated under FOIA. See Judicial Watch v. Dep’t of Justice, 365 F.3d 1108, 1126
(D.C. Cir. 2004). This factor is nearly identical to the second factor of the defendant’s fee waiver
regulation, see 34 C.F.R. § 5.64(b)(2), as well as to the FOIA public-interest prong of the fee
waiver provision, see 5 U.SC. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii). Accordingly, the court does not deem
improper the parties’ application of the DOJ regulation. Jarvik v. CIA, 495 F. Supp. 2d 67, 71 n.2
(D.D.C. 2007) (quoting Tax Analysts v. Internal Revenue Serv., 117 F.3d 607, 613 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (observing that “the meaning of FOIA should be the same no matter which agency is asked
to produce records”)).
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that the “information regarding [the extent of White House involvement in the administration of
Reading First] already exists in the public domain.” Id.On May 11, 2007, the plaintiff informally appealed the defendant’s April 16 denial of its
fee waiver request to the defendant. Id., Ex. D. The plaintiff argued that the first request would
clarify the significant inconsistencies between Secretary Spellings’ description of her
involvement in Reading First and others’ observations of her involvement. Id. With respect to
the second and third requests, the plaintiff contended that the large amount of congressional,
media and public attention paid to Reading First, as well as the public’s limited knowledge about
the defendant’s contacts with educational publishers, indicated that the disclosures would
significantly contribute to the public’s understanding. Id., Ex. G, Attachs. G-J (explaining that
although federal rules prohibit the defendant from endorsing any curriculum for Reading First,
public records have suggested that the defendant’s officers and contractors, on whom the
defendant relied to advise states on Reading First, “steered” many states toward specific reading
programs and testing instruments to which they had commercial ties).
On June 8, 2007, the defendant denied the plaintiff’s May 11, 2007 appeal, stating that
the plaintiff still had not demonstrated that the requested disclosure would significantly
contribute to the public’s understanding of government operations or activities. Am. Compl., Ex.
F at 2. The defendant maintained that many of the documents responsive to the plaintiff’s
requests “could in no way enhance public understanding of the defendant’s administration of
[Reading First]” because the language in the plaintiff’s requests and appeal was too broad. Id.(noting that the request sought “voluminous records concerning a wide range of [Education]
contacts and/or communications with the White House [and] the publishers” and documents
concerning subjects beyond the scope of Reading First). Furthermore, the defendant asserted
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that the plaintiff failed to specify the “inconsistencies” it mentioned in its May 11 appeal and to
explain how the requested disclosures would likely inform the public’s understanding. Id. at 3.
The defendant also provided three website links to challenge the plaintiff’s contention that little
was known about the defendant’s contacts with the publishers. Id.
In response to the defendant’s denial of the plaintiff’s May 11 appeal, the plaintiff filed a
second appeal with the defendant on June 21, 2007. Id., Ex. G. Compliance with the first
request, the plaintiff argued, would “go beyond the ‘he-said, she-said’ that makes up the current
public record on [White House involvement in the operation of Reading First] by illuminating
the actual level of . . . Spellings’ involvement.” Id. at 6. And the plaintiff argued that the records
sought in the second and third requests would contribute significantly to the public’s
understanding of the extent to which publishers were in contact with the defendant and
administration personnel during the Reading First development and grant process. Id. The
plaintiff also argued that its requests would “amplify” information about Reading First’s
development and operation already in the public domain and “help answer the remaining
questions raised by” previously released sources concerning Spellings’ involvement in Reading
First. Id. at 7. Finally, the plaintiff critiqued the defendant’s reliance on the three websites
because the first link was no longer available, and the second and third links focused only on the
financial interests of Reading First Technical Assistance Center employees and their ties to
publishers. Id at 6.
The defendant issued its final response to the plaintiff on September 6, 2007, again
denying the plaintiff’s fee waiver request for failure to demonstrate the requested disclosures’
significant contribution to the public’s understanding of government operations or activities. Id.,
Ex. I at 3, 6-7. The defendant concluded that the plaintiff’s request was overbroad because many
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of the search terms in the requested items did not relate to the defendant’s administration of
Reading First and the responsive time frame for all requested items – beginning January 20, 2001
– preceded the creation of Reading First by a year. Id. at 5-6. In addition, according to the
defendant, the plaintiff’s contention that any requested documents beyond the scope of Reading
First would shed light on the operations of the federal government was not specific enough to
demonstrate a public interest within the meaning of the FOIA fee waiver provision. Id. at 6.
Finally, the defendant informed the plaintiff that it had exhausted its administrative remedies and
had a right to judicial review of the defendant’s denial of its fee waiver request. Id. at 7.
B. Procedural History
The plaintiff filed this suit on May 23, 2007, under the Federal Records Act (“FRA”), 44
U.S.C. §§ 2901 et seq., §§ 3101 et seq., §§ 3301 et seq., and FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552. See Compl.
The plaintiff alleged five claims, the first four of which this court dismissed because the plaintiff
lacked standing. Id.; Mem. Op. (Mar. 10, 2008). The only remaining claim is that the
defendant’s denial of the plaintiff’s fee waiver request violated FOIA. Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at
2. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on this claim on April 24, 2008, maintaining that
there is no genuine issue of material fact as to its entitlement to a fee waiver. Id. at 2, 14. In
turn, the defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on May 8, 2008, arguing that
there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the validity of the defendant’s denial of the
plaintiff’s fee waiver request. See Def.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. The court now turns to the
parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard for Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986); Diamond v. Atwood, 43 F.3d 1538, 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1995). To determine which facts are
“material,” a court must look to the substantive law on which each claim rests. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A “genuine issue” is one whose resolution could
establish an element of a claim or defense and, therefore, affect the outcome of the action.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all justifiable
inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor and accept the nonmoving party’s evidence as true.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. A nonmoving party, however, must establish more than “the mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of its position. Id. at 252. To prevail on a motion
for summary judgment, the moving party must show that the nonmoving party “fail[ed] to make
a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. By pointing to
the absence of evidence proffered by the nonmoving party, a moving party may succeed on
summary judgment. Id.The nonmoving party may defeat summary judgment through factual representations
made in a sworn affidavit if he “support[s] his allegations . . . with facts in the record,” Greene v.
Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 154 (D.C. Cir.
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1993)), or provides “direct testimonial evidence,” Arrington v. United States, 473 F.3d 329, 338
(D.C. Cir. 2006). Indeed, for the court to accept anything less “would defeat the central purpose
of the summary judgment device, which is to weed out those cases insufficiently meritorious to
warrant the expense of a jury trial.” Greene, 164 F.3d at 675.
B. Legal Standard for Review of an Agency Denial of a FOIA Fee Waiver Request
Congress requires federal agencies under FOIA to furnish requested documents free of
charge if disclosure of the requested information is (1) “in the public interest because it is likely
to contribute significantly to the public understanding of the operations or activities of the
government” and (2) “not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester.” 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(4)(A)(iii). This is in keeping with the statute’s purpose, which is “to remove the
roadblocks and technicalities which have been used by . . . agencies to deny waivers.”
McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Carlucci, 835 F.2d 1282, 1284 (9th Cir. 1987)
(quoting 132 Cong. Rec. S16496 (Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Sen. Leahy)).
A court must review de novo requests for FOIA fee waivers pursuant to § 552, limiting
its judgment to the administrative record before the federal agency at the time of its decision. 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(vii); see also Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Griffin, 811 F.2d 644,
648 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that a requester could not, at the district court level, cure its failure
to demonstrate a public interest before the agency). The requesting party alone bears the burden
of showing, based on the administrative record, that its request satisfies the public interest prong.
Larson v. CIA, 843 F.2d 1481, 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In so doing, the requester must “clear
away any inferences that could cast doubt on his eligibility” for a fee waiver by describing with
“reasonable specificity” how the requested disclosure will contribute significantly to the public’s
understanding. Jarvik v. CIA, 495 F. Supp. 2d 67, 71-72 (D.D.C. 2007) (internal citations
8
omitted) (explaining that a requester “must pinpoint the type of government activity he is
investigating”).
It is “difficult to discern a basis for the [requester’s] assertions of a public interest [in
cases in which] [a]ny benefit to the general public that might flow from furnishing the requested
information is less than obvious.” Griffin, 811 F.2d at 647. Hence, when a requester asserts a
public interest, yet does so without reasonable specificity, an “agency may infer a lack of
substantial public interest” and deny the requester’s fee waiver request. Larson, 843 F.2d at
1483 (quoting McClellan, 835 F.2d at 1285); see also Jarvik, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 72 (stating that
“‘a modest showing’ of a public interest will not suffice’” (quoting McClellan, 835 F.2d at
1287)).
C. The Court Grants in Part and Denies in Part the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment and Grants in Part and Denies in Part the Defendant’s
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
1. The Plaintiff’s Fee Waiver Request for the First Category of Documents is Moot
Before reviewing the merits of the defendant’s denial of the plaintiff’s fee waiver request,
the court must address the defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s fee waiver request for the first
set of documents is moot. In this request, the plaintiff seeks a fee waiver for the production of
communications between the defendant’s offices and the White House staff that mention or
relate to Reading First, Early Reading First and other initiatives of the defendant. See Am.
Compl., Ex. E. The defendant, however, argues that its decision to include the search for these
9
communications in a FOIA search in another case between the same parties 3 moots any dispute
as to the defendant’s denial of the plaintiff’s fee waiver request in this case. Def.’s Cross-Mot.
for Summ. J. at 7 & n.2; see also id. at Attach. (“Cueva Decl.”), Exs. I, J at 2.
The plaintiff, on the other hand, focuses on the fact that the defendant never granted the
plaintiff a fee waiver for the first set of documents, despite agreeing to include such documents
in its search in Civil Action No. 07-2055. Pl.’s Reply to Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J.
and Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Reply”) at 2. Moreover, the plaintiff
declares that the defendant’s grant of a fee waiver to the plaintiff in that case underscores the
defendant’s “arbitrary approach” in failing to grant the plaintiff’s fee waiver request in this case.
Id.
The court determines that the plaintiff’s arguments are unfounded, because the plaintiff
has “‘obtained everything that [it] could recover . . . by a judgment of this court in [its] favor.’”
Hall v. CIA, 437 F.3d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Better Gov’t Ass’n v. Dep’t of State, 780
F.2d 86, 91 (D.C. Cir. 1981)); see also Cueva Decl., Ex., J; Def.’s Reply at 2 (stating that the
plaintiff “knows [that the defendant] is already processing [the request], and [plans to produce]
any responsive documents yielded by that search . . . at no cost to Plaintiff”). “‘[A]n agency’s
decision to release documents to a FOIA requester without seeking payment from him moots the
requester’s arguments that a denial of a fee waiver was substantively incorrect.’” Schoenman v.
3
Civil Action No. 07-2055 is a FOIA action currently pending before another judge in this district.
Pursuant to a joint status report filed by the parties on April 2, 2008 in Civil Action No. 07-2055,
the defendant agreed to search the records of relevant personnel for documents from January 21,
2001, to the present, in several of its offices, including the offices of which Early Reading First is
a part. Jt. Status Report, Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Dep’t of Educ., No. 07-
2055 (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 2008); see also Def.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J., Attach., Ex. I ¶ 3. The
report explained that these offices employed staff members responsible for the implementation of
the No Child Left Behind Act and/or the Early Reading First and Early Childhood Educator
Professional Development programs. Id. The defendant also agreed that it would grant the
plaintiff a public interest fee waiver for the stipulated search. Id. ¶ 5.
10
FBI, 2008 WL 4053457, at *11 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 2008) (quoting Hall, 437 F.3d at 99). By
granting the plaintiff a fee waiver request for the search stipulated in the joint status report in
Civil Action No. 07-2055, and then including in that search the request for the documents at
issue here, the defendant effectively granted the plaintiff a fee waiver for the request. See Def.’s
Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. at 7; Cueva Decl., Ex. J. Accordingly, the court holds that the
plaintiff’s fee waiver request for the first set of documents is moot and grants the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment with respect to that request.
2. The Plaintiff Has Met its Burden with Respect to the Fee Waiver Requests
For the Second and Third Categories of Documents
The court now turns to whether the plaintiff, under the two-pronged test for FOIA fee
waiver requests, has met its burden with respect to the second and third document requests. The
plaintiff asserts that these requests were not primarily for its commercial interest. Am. Compl.,
Exs. B, F, I at 5 n.4. By failing to address this point, the defendant concedes it. See Twelve John
Does v. District of Columbia, 117 F.3d 571, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that arguments not
addressed are treated as conceded); Physicians’ Comm., 480 F. Supp. 2d at 122 (determining that
“[t]he commercial interest prong will not be discussed here because [the agency] elected not to
pursue any argument under this prong of the analysis”). Because the commercial interest prong
of the fee waiver analysis is not at issue, the court turns to the public interest prong, which
requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the disclosure of the requested information “is likely to
contribute significantly to public understanding of [government] operations or activities.” 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii).
Driven by media accounts that accuse the defendant of operating the Reading First
program unethically, the plaintiff seeks to inform the public’s understanding of the nature of the
defendant’s and publishers’ roles in administering the program. Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 7-9;
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see also Am. Compl., Exs. E, G at 6. The disclosures, the plaintiff states, will heighten the
“public’s understanding of how [the defendant] has discharged its statutory duties.” Pl.’s Mot.
for Summ. J. at 9. Consequently, the plaintiff maintains that its aim to examine and inform the
public of the defendant’s possible mismanagement of Reading First represents a sufficiently
significant contribution to the public’s understanding of government operations or activities. See
Am. Compl., Exs. A at 3, D, G at 6-7.
The defendant, however, declares that none of the plaintiff’s submissions has described
with “reasonable specificity” the significant contribution the requested records would make to
the public’s understanding of government operations or activities. Def.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ.
J. at 9-14. The defendant deems the plaintiff’s stated public interest too broad to “identify a
subject about which the public’s understanding could be enhanced” and too conclusory to
explain a significant public contribution. Id. at 2, 9. More specifically, the defendant asserts that
the request for all responsive documents after January 20, 2001, including subjects beyond the
scope of the Reading First program, is overbroad. Id. at 10. Furthermore, the defendant argues
that the plaintiff fails to “adequately explain the connection between the records requested and a
significant contribution to the public’s understanding.” Def.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. at 12, 15
(arguing that the plaintiff cites to websites describing alleged associations between Reading First
and educational publishers for the first time in its motion); Def.’s Reply at 6. For the reasons
explained below, the court rejects the defendant’s arguments.
First, the defendant misinterprets the public interest prong of the FOIA fee waiver test as
requiring the requester to describe with reasonable specificity the underlying substantive terms of
its request instead of, or in addition to, the significant contribution that the request would have on
the public understanding of government operations or activities. The key inquiry with respect to
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a FOIA fee waiver request is whether “dissemination of the requested information is likely to
contribute significantly to citizens’ understanding of the workings of their government.”
Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 2000 WL 35538030, at *11 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2000);
see also McClellan, 835 F.2d at 1285. Thus, a requester satisfies its burden by describing with
reasonable specificity the link between the request and the enhancement of public awareness and
understanding of governmental activities. Id. Here, the plaintiff has satisfied its burden by
specifying, through reference to the administrative record alone, how disclosure of the requested
documents will significantly contribute to the public’s understanding of government operations.
See Am. Compl., Ex. G at 6 (explaining that “[t]he records CREW seeks in items 2 and 3 will
likely contribute significantly to the public’s understanding of the extent to which publishers
were in contact with [the defendant] . . . during the Reading First development and grant
process”); Id., Ex. A at 3 (stating that the plaintiff intends to “analyze the information responsive
to [its] request, . . . share its analysis with the public, either through memoranda, reports or press
releases . . . [and] disseminate any documents it acquires from this request to the public”).
Unlike the plaintiff in Jarvik, who failed to meet his burden by asserting generally that the
requested CIA reports would “help the public better evaluate the CIA,” 495 F. Supp. 2d at 73,
the plaintiff here has specifically described an identifiable subject of the requested disclosures –
the role of commercial publishers in the defendant’s operation of Reading First – that it intends
to research, analyze and disseminate to the public, see Am. Compl., Exs. A at 3, D, G at 6.
In addition, the plaintiff’s aim to elucidate the ties between the defendant and commercial
publishers through its analysis and dissemination of the requested documents is particularly
significant given Congress’s intention to encourage “open and accountable government” under
the FOIA fee waiver provision. Gen. Servs. Admin., 2000 WL 35538030, at *11; see also
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Physicians’ Comm., 480 F. Supp. 2d at 124 (explaining that the plaintiff’s “description of a
specific problem . . . and its impact on [the defendant’s interagency group’s] ability to fulfill a
specific statutory mandate . . . satisfies the ‘reasonably specific’ standard, which is ‘all that FOIA
requires’” (quoting Judicial Watch v. Rossotti, 326 F.3d 1309, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). The
documents that the plaintiff plans to make publicly available, coupled with the plaintiff’s
analysis thereof, will allow the public to make a more informed assessment of the “ethical
propriety” and wisdom of the actions of the defendant’s officials who administer the Reading
First program. Cf. Gen. Servs. Admin., 2000 WL 35538030, at *11 (determining that
“[w]idespread dissemination will most likely illuminate in greater detail the relationships and
interactions between high elected officials, their campaign staff and their donors, as they may
relate to a decision to spend the taxpayers’ money”). Thus, as the plaintiff correctly states, the
disclosures likely will result in the expansion of, and therefore a significant contribution to, the
public’s understanding of the potential conflicts of interest in the defendant’s operation of
Reading First. In light of Congress’s intent that federal agencies “liberally construe[] [FOIA] in
favor of waivers for noncommercial requesters,” the court determines that the plaintiff has
squarely satisfied its burden with respect to the public interest prong. McClellan, 835 F.2d at
1284 (quoting 132 Cong. Rec. S14298 (Sept. 30, 1986) (statement of Sen. Leahy)).
Lastly, contrary to the defendant’s contention, the availability of information regarding
the connection between the defendant and commercial publishers in previously released media
sources 4 does not obviate the need for further dissemination by the plaintiff or undermine the
plaintiff’s satisfaction of the public interest prong. See Gen. Servs. Admin., 2000 WL 35538030,
at *10 (reasoning that “the fact that . . . some of the requested information has been released to
4
See Am. Compl., Ex. G, Attachs. G-J, L (articles from U.S.A. Today, N.Y. Times, Education
Week, and U.S. Fed News discussing conflicts-of-interest in the defendant’s administration of the
Reading First program).
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sources other than requestor, does not necessarily mean that it is readily available to the public”).
To the contrary, the plaintiff’s “capability to [analyze and] distribute the information it receives”
through memoranda, press releases, reports and its website, see Am. Compl., Exs. A at 3, D;
Pl.’s Reply at 6, will further enhance the public’s access to and understanding of commercial
publishers’ involvement in the defendant’s administration of Reading First, which is all that the
fee waiver provision requires, see, e.g., Judicial Watch, 326 F.3d at 1315.
The records may also serve to clarify the scope of previously disclosed relations between
the defendant and publishers. See Forest Guardians v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 416 F.3d 1173,
1181 (10th Cir. 2005) (determining that “[k]nowing that [an agency or agency program] permits
the use of [a practice] is not the same as knowing the [details of that practice and the identities of
specific persons involved]”). Even if some of the information concerning the defendant’s
operation of the Reading First program is already publicly available, the defendant’s disclosure
of the requested documents may supplement this information and thereby enhance the public’s
understanding of the issue. See Gen. Servs. Admin., 2000 WL 35538030, at *10 (citing Project
on Military Procurement v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 710 F. Supp. 362, 366 (D.D.C. 1989)); see
also Ctr. for Medicare Advocacy, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 2008 WL
4294283, at *15 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2008) (noting that an agency must evaluate a fee waiver
request “based on the potential contribution the requested information would have on the
public’s understanding, and not on the fact that some of the documents were publicly available”).
Accordingly, the court holds that the plaintiff has met its burden under the public interest prong
of the fee waiver test with respect to the second and third categories of requested documents and
concludes that the defendant improperly denied the plaintiff’s fee waiver requests for these
documents.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants in part and denies in part the plaintiff’s motion
for summary judgment and grants in part and denies in part the defendant’s cross-motion for
summary judgment. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and
contemporaneously issued this 23rd day of January, 2009.
RICARDO M. URBINA
United States District Judge
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