Little v. Fenty ( 2010 )


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  •                             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    JOYCE A. LITTLE,
    Plaintiff,
    v.                                                    Civil No. 09-2308 (CKK)
    ADRIAN FENTY, D.C. Mayor, et al.,
    Defendants.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    (March 2, 2010)
    Plaintiff, Joyce A. Little, representing herself pro se, has brought suit against Defendants
    District of Columbia Mayor Adrian Fenty and 11 Members of the Council of the District of
    Columbia (“Council Defendants”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff’s lawsuit is principally
    directed at challenging the legitimacy of (a) the Jury and Marriage Amendment Act of 2009
    (“JAMA”), which amended District law to provide that legal, same-sex marriages entered into in
    other jurisdictions will be legally recognized in the District, and (b) the Religious Freedom and
    Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act of 2009, Bill 18-482 (“Bill 18-482”), which was
    recently submitted to Congress for the required passive review period and is intended to expand
    the definition of marriage in the District to include same-sex couples. As set forth in Plaintiff’s
    Amended Complaint, she contends that both JAMA and Bill 18-482 are in violation of the
    District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act (“Home Rule
    Act”) as well as the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”). Plaintiff also alleges that the
    legislation violates her rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). Based on
    these asserted causes of action, Plaintiff seeks an order from the Court permanently enjoining
    Defendants from enacting any further legislation permitting same-sex marriages in the District,
    repealing JAMA, declaring Bill 18-482 unlawful, and opening an ethics and corruption
    investigation into the conduct of Mayor Fenty and the Council.
    This matter presently comes before the Court on two motions to dismiss filed by the
    Council Defendants and Mayor Fenty respectively. See Council Defs.’ MTD, Docket No. [32];
    Def. Mayor’s MTD, Docket No. [33]. Plaintiff opposes those motions and also seeks leave to
    amend her complaint for a second time. See Pl.’s Opp’n/Mot. to Amend, Docket No. [34]. After
    a thorough review of the parties’ submissions, applicable case law, the relevant statutory
    authority, and the record of this case as a whole, the Court shall GRANT both the Council
    Defendants’ [32] and Mayor Fenty’s [33] Motions to Dismiss insofar as they each move to
    dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for
    lack of standing and shall DENY Plaintiff’s [34] Motion for Leave to Amend as futile, for the
    reasons set forth below. Accordingly, as this case is dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction, the
    Court emphasizes that it does not reach the merits of Plaintiff’s claims or of the underlying
    legislation at issue.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A.      Statutory and Legislative Background
    1.      JAMA
    On May 5, 2009, the Council of the District of Columbia (the “Council”) approved the
    Jury and Marriage Amendment Act of 2009, referred to herein as “JAMA,” by a vote of 12 to 1.
    See D.C. Act. 18-70; 
    56 D.C. Reg. 3797
     (May 15, 2009). As indicated above, the measure
    amended District law to provide that legal, same-sex marriages entered into in another
    2
    jurisdiction will be legally recognized in the District of Columbia. The Act was signed by the
    Mayor on May 6, 2009, transmitted to Congress, and became law on July 6, 2009. See 
    D.C. Code § 46-405.01
     (2009).
    2.      Bill 18-482
    On December 1, 2009, the Council passed the Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage
    Equality Amendment Act of 2009, Bill 18-482, referred to herein as “Bill 18-482,” by a vote of
    11 to 2.1 The legislation expressly expanded the definition of marriage in the District to include
    same-sex couples. A second and final vote occurred on December 15, 2009, passing by the same
    margin. See 
    id.
     The Mayor signed the legislation on December 18, 2009, and the legislation was
    subsequently submitted to Congress for the required passive review period. See 
    id.
     As of the
    filing of this Memorandum Opinion, the legislation remained pending before Congress.
    B.      Factual Background
    Plaintiff, representing herself pro se, filed the above-captioned lawsuit on December 7,
    2009. See Compl., Docket No. [1]. As indicated above, Plaintiff alleges that both JAMA and
    Bill 18-482 are ultra vires and violate the Home Rule Act and the Defense of Marriage Act. Id.
    at 3. Plaintiff later amended her Complaint on December 14, 2009, to add a claim under RFRA.
    See Am. Compl., Docket No. [31]. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that she owns and operates a
    private tax consulting and preparation business in the District and engages in insurance and
    annuity underwriting services as well, and that “[t]his legislation would force [her] to provide
    services [to] same-sex couples therefore running counter to [her] own religious beliefs” in
    1
    The text of the legislation as well as related voting and hearing information is available
    online at the Council’s website, located at: http://www.dccouncil.washington.dc.us (last viewed
    on 3/1/10).
    3
    violation of RFRA. Id. at 7.2 As relief, Plaintiff requests that the Court permanently enjoin the
    District from enacting any further legislation permitting same-sex marriages, repeal JAMA and
    declare Bill 18-482 unlawful. Id. at 8. Finally, she asks the Court to “open an ethics and
    corruption investigation into the mayor and the council” for alleged violations of “the legal
    boundaries of the Home Rule Charter.” Id. at 9.
    Along with the filing of her complaint on December 7, 2009, Plaintiff simultaneously
    filed a [2] Motion for Preliminary Injunction Staying the Final Vote on D.C. Bill 19-482
    “Religious Freedom of Marriage Equality Act of 2009.” See Pl.’s Mot. for P.I., Docket No. [2].
    Plaintiff’s motion principally focused on the then-pending second vote by the Council regarding
    Bill 18-482, and requested the Court issue an emergency order enjoining the Council from voting
    on the legislation. The Court ordered expedited briefing on Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary
    injunction and subsequently denied the motion on the morning of December 15, 2009, finding
    that Plaintiff had failed to show any likelihood of irreparable harm and was unlikely to succeed
    on the merits. See Dec. 15, 2009 Mem. Op., Docket No. [26]. As is indicated above, the second
    vote by the Council took place later that day, and the legislation passed. See supra at p. 3.
    The Court subsequently held an on-the-record telephone conference call with all parties,
    at which time the Court set a briefing schedule permitting Defendants to file a motion to dismiss
    that addressed any jurisdictional arguments previously raised in their briefing regarding
    Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction as well as any other dispositive grounds. See Dec.
    15, 2009 Order, Docket No. [30]. Pursuant to that schedule, Council Defendants and Mayor
    2
    All citations to the Amended Complaint are to the relevant page numbers of the
    document, as it appears on the public docket.
    4
    Fenty filed their respective motions to dismiss on January 8, 2010. See Council Defs.’ MTD,
    Docket No. [32]; Def. Mayor’s MTD, Docket No. [33]. On January 15, 2010, Plaintiff filed a
    combined opposition to Defendants’ motions as well as a motion for leave to amend the
    complaint. See Pl.’s Opp’n/Mot. to Amend, Docket Nos. [34] & [35]. Council Defendants and
    Mayor Fenty each timely filed a reply in support of their respective motions to dismiss and
    opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend. See Council Defs.’ Reply/Opp’n Docket
    Nos. [36] & [38]; Def. Mayor’s Reply/Opp’n, Docket Nos. [37] & [39]. Plaintiff declined to file
    a reply in support of her motion for leave to amend. Accordingly, the parties’ motions are now
    fully briefed and the matter is ripe for the Court’s review and resolution.
    II. LEGAL STANDARD
    A.      Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)
    Defendants’ motions to dismiss assert, in relevant part, that Plaintiff’s Amended
    Complaint should be dismissed for lack of standing pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    12(b)(1).3 Under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has
    jurisdiction. Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 
    185 F. Supp. 2d 9
    , 13
    (D.D.C. 2001) (a court has an “affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope
    of its jurisdictional authority”); see also Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
    27 F. Supp. 2d 3
    While Defendants do not clearly indicate that they move for dismissal of Plaintiff’s
    claims for lack of standing pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), it is well established that motions to
    dismiss for lack of standing are properly considered as challenging the Court’s subject matter
    jurisdiction and should be reviewed under Rule 12(b)(1). See Haase v. Sessions, 
    835 F.2d 902
    ,
    906 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (explaining that “the defect of standing is a defect in subject matter
    jurisdiction”); see also City of Harper Woods Employees’ Retirement Sys. v. Olver, 
    577 F. Supp. 2d 124
    , 128 (D.D.C. 2008) (“In this jurisdiction, a motion to dismiss for lack of standing is
    treated as a challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, and is properly analyzed
    under Rule 12(b)(1).”), aff’d 
    589 F.3d 1292
     (D.C. Cir. 2009).
    5
    15, 19 (D.D.C. 1998). A court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in the
    complaint when reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), and the plaintiff should
    receive the benefit of all favorable inferences that can be drawn from the alleged facts. See
    Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 
    507 U.S. 163
    , 164
    (1993); Koutny v. Martin, 
    530 F. Supp. 2d 84
     (D.D.C. 2007) (“[A] court accepts as true all of the
    factual allegations contained in the complaint and may also consider ‘undisputed facts evidenced
    in the record.’”) (internal citations omitted). However, “‘plaintiff’s factual allegations in the
    complaint . . . will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion’ than in resolving a
    12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.” Grand Lodge, 
    185 F. Supp. 2d at 13-14
     (quoting 5A
    Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350).
    Where, as here, an action is brought by a pro se plaintiff, the Court must take particular
    care to construe the plaintiff’s filings liberally for such complaints are held “to less stringent
    standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520-21;
    see also Richardson v. United States, 
    193 F.3d 545
    , 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999). “Courts of this Circuit
    have interpreted the Supreme Court’s instruction in Haines as encompassing all filings submitted
    by pro se litigants, not just their pleadings.” Lindsey v. United States, 
    448 F. Supp. 2d 37
    , 44
    (D.D.C. 2006) (internal citations omitted). The District of Columbia Circuit has further
    instructed that lower courts may use supplemental materials to clarify a pro se plaintiff’s claims
    without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. See Greenhill v.
    Spellings, 
    482 F.3d 569
    , 572 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (explaining that lower courts may “consider
    supplemental material filed by a pro se litigant in order to clarify the precise claims being
    urged”) (citing Anyanwutaku v. Moore, 
    151 F.3d 1053
    , 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
    6
    B.      Motion to Amend Pursuant to Rule 15
    Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1), a party may amend its pleadings
    only once as a matter of course. Where, as here, a party seeks to amend its pleadings for a
    second time, they may do so only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.
    FED . R. CIV . P. 15(a)(2). The decision whether to grant leave to amend a complaint is within the
    discretion of the district court, but leave “should be freely given unless there is a good reason,
    such as futility, to the contrary.” Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 
    100 F.3d 999
    , 1003
    (D.C. Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted); see also Foman v. Davis, 
    371 U.S. 178
    , 182 (1962)
    (“If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of
    relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of
    any apparent or declared reason — such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part
    of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue
    prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment,
    etc. — the leave sought should, as the rules require, be ‘freely given.’”).
    III. DISCUSSION
    A.      Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss
    As indicated above, Defendants have moved for dismissal of Plaintiff’s Amended
    Complaint arguing, inter alia, that Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed for lack of standing
    pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). See generally Council Defs.’ MTD at 5-10; Def. Mayor’s MTD at 4-
    6. Because the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff lacks standing in the instant action to
    assert a claim under RFRA or to challenge either JAMA or Bill 18-482 for allegedly violating the
    Home Rule Act and DOMA, the Court need not reach Defendants’ alternative arguments and
    7
    shall dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for a lack of standing pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).
    Specifically, Defendants assert that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring any of the asserted
    claims in her Amended Complaint because her allegations do not state any legally cognizable
    injury in fact. Council Defs.’ MTD at 5-10; Def. Mayor’s MTD at 4-6. “No principle is more
    fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the constitutional
    limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.” Raines v. Byrd, 
    521 U.S. 811
    , 818 (1997) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 
    426 U.S. 26
    , 37 (1976)). A
    core element of Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement is that a plaintiff must establish that
    he or she has standing to sue. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
    504 U.S. 555
    , 561 (1992). To
    satisfy this burden of establishing standing, “[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly
    traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the
    requested relief.” Allen v. Wright, 
    468 U.S. 737
    , 751 (1984); see also Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v.
    Hodel, 
    839 F.2d 694
    , 704 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The party invoking federal jurisdiction “bears the
    burden of establishing these elements.” Lujan, 
    504 U.S. at 561
    . Indeed, the Supreme Court has
    “consistently stressed that a plaintiff’s complaint must establish that he has a ‘personal stake’ in
    the alleged dispute, and that the alleged injury is particularized as to him.” Raines, 
    521 U.S. at 819
    .
    For that reason, the Supreme Court has observed that where, as here, “the plaintiff is not
    h[er]self the object of the government action or inaction [s]he challenges,” standing is
    “‘substantially more difficult’ to establish.” Lujan, 
    504 U.S. at 562
     (quoting Allen, 
    468 U.S. at 758
    ). The individual seeking to challenge government action “must be adversely affected by that
    action.” Dimond v. District of Columbia, 
    792 F.2d 179
    , 190 (D.C. Cir. 1986). “Injury consisting
    8
    solely of a government’s alleged failure to act in accordance with law” does not “amount to [a]
    judicially cognizable injury in fact for purposes of Article III standing.” Id.; see also Allen, 
    468 U.S. at 754
     (“This Court has repeatedly held that an asserted right to have the Government act in
    accordance with the law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on a federal
    court.”). Nor is an assertion of a “generalized grievance” sufficient to confer standing where the
    alleged harm is “not only widely shared, but is also of an abstract and indefinite nature — for
    example, harm to the ‘common concern for obedience to law.’” Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins,
    
    524 U.S. 11
    , 23 (1998). “The abstract nature of the harm — for example, injury to the interest in
    seeing that the law is obeyed — deprives the case of the concrete specificity” necessary to
    demonstrate standing; in such cases, “the political process, rather than the judicial process, may
    provide the more appropriate remedy for a widely shared grievance.” 
    Id.
    With these principles in mind, it is readily apparent that Plaintiff has not pled any harm or
    personal injury sufficient to confer standing as to any claims in this action. Plaintiff is a self-
    described “Christian and a District voter against gay marriage, corruption, and lawlessness in the
    District of Columbia” and is also the owner of “a tax preparation and life insurance practice in
    the District of Columbia.” Am. Compl. at 2, 3. She avers that “[a]s a Christian, a voter, and a
    concerned citizen, [she is] appalled at the high level of outright immorality, corruption, and
    blatant lawlessness in the government of the District of Columbia” — in particular, the
    Defendants’ decision to promulgate the legislation currently at issue, which Plaintiff asserts is in
    violation of the Home Rule Act and DOMA as well as her rights under RFRA. Id. at 2. As is
    made clear above, however, “[i]njury consisting solely of a government’s alleged failure to act in
    accordance with the law” does not “amount to [a] judicially cognizable injury in fact for purposes
    9
    of Article III standing.” Dimond, 
    792 F.2d at 190
    . “‘[A] plaintiff raising only a generally
    available grievance about government — claiming only harm to [her] and every citizen’s interest
    in proper application of the [] laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits
    [her] than it does the public at large — does not state an Article III case or controversy.’” Hein v.
    Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 
    551 U.S. 587
    , 601 (2007) (quoting Lujan, 
    504 U.S. at
    573-
    74). As such, Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants have violated federal and District law is, by
    itself, insufficient to confer standing under RFRA or to challenge the legislation as allegedly in
    violation of the Home Rule Act and DOMA
    Plaintiff nonetheless asserts that she has standing — at least as to her claim under RFRA
    — because the legislation at issue “will cause [her] irreparable economic harm.” Pl.’s
    Opp’n/Mot. to Amend at 7. While Plaintiff appears to dispute Defendants’ assertions that she
    lacks standing only as to her claim under RFRA and does not address Defendants’ arguments that
    she also lacks standing to bring claims based upon alleged violations of DOMA and the Home
    Rule Act, see id. at 4, it is readily apparent that Plaintiff’s arguments — even if construed as
    asserting standing as to all claims in her Amended Complaint — are without merit. Accordingly,
    the Court finds that Plaintiff lacks standing to assert any of the alleged claims set forth in her
    Amended Complaint.4
    4
    Alternatively, the Court finds that Plaintiff has conceded that she lacks standing as to
    her non-RFRA claims because she had the opportunity to respond to the Defendants’ arguments
    but did not do so. As previously noted, Plaintiff’s opposition briefing addresses only her
    standing under RFRA and does not address Defendants’ argument that she lacks standing to
    bring claims based upon alleged violations of DOMA and the Home Rule Act. See Pl.’s
    Opp’n/Mot. to Amend at 4. “It is well understood in this Circuit that when a plaintiff files an
    opposition to a dispositive motion and addresses only certain arguments raised by the defendant,
    a court may treat those arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.” Hopkins v.
    Women’s Div., General Bd. of Global Ministries, 
    284 F. Supp. 2d 15
    , 25 (D.D.C. 2003), aff’d 98
    10
    As set forth in her Amended Complaint, “Plaintiff owns and operates a private tax
    consulting and preparation business in the District of Columbia, [and] plaintiff also underwrites
    insurance and annuities.” Am. Compl. at 7. Plaintiff avers that the pending Bill 18-482, if
    passed, “would have a negative economic impact on [her] business forcing her to prepare tax
    returns, life insurance and annuity contracts for same-sex married couples or risk litigation which
    would force [her] out of business.” Id. at 2; see also id. at 7 (“This legislation would force me to
    provide services to same-sex couples therefore running counter to my religious beliefs.”).
    Plaintiff thus argues that the Defendants’ alleged actions with respect to Bill 18-482 “will cause
    [her] irreparable economic harm.” Pl.’s Opp’n/Mot. to Amend at 7. According to Plaintiff, the
    pending legislation will leave her with “no legal ability to refuse service to anyone[,] leaving
    [her] three choices: (1) consciously violate [her] faith, (2) endure endless legal suits of
    discrimination ending in economic collapse or (3) voluntarily get[] out of business, clos[e] [her]
    doors and set[] up shop in another city.” Id.
    In other words, Plaintiff alleges that if Bill 18-482 is enacted into law, she may be asked
    to prepare tax services or life insurance/annuity contracts for same-sex married couples and that
    if she refuses to do so, the individuals may bring a lawsuit against her (although on what legal
    basis Plaintiff does not say), which in turn may result in economic harm to her business. Such
    Fed. Appx. 8 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also Franklin v. Potter, 
    600 F. Supp. 2d 38
    , 60 (D.D.C. 2009)
    (treating defendant’s argument in motion for summary judgment as conceded where plaintiff
    failed to address it in his response). The Court previously advised Plaintiff that her failure to
    respond to the Defendants’ motions may result in the Court treating the motions as conceded.
    See 12/15/09 Order, Docket No. [30] at 2. Accordingly, while the Court ultimately concludes
    that Plaintiff lacks standing as to all claims asserted in her Amended Complaint, it finds in the
    alternative that Plaintiff’s failure to address Defendants’ arguments may be treated as a
    concession that she lacks standing on her non-RFRA claims.
    11
    allegations are entirely speculative and wholly insufficient to establish standing. Plaintiff does
    not allege that she has any present clients who would become same-sex marriage partners.
    Moreover, she provides no indication of how she is presently being harmed by JAMA, of which
    Plaintiff also complains. As indicated above, JAMA has been in effect since July 6, 2009 and
    provides that legal, same-sex marriages entered into in another jurisdiction will be legally
    recognized in the District of Columbia. See supra at pp. 2-3. Yet Plaintiff does not identify a
    single instance since July 6, 2009, when she has been “forced” to provide tax or insurance
    services — or had to refuse to provide such services — to same-sex couples whose marriage is
    recognized in the District under JAMA. Indeed, such a situation may never occur. Similarly, as
    Defendants point out, the District has permitted domestic partners to file joint tax returns since
    2007.5 See 
    D.C. Code § 47-1805.01
    (f) (“Domestic partners may file either a joint return or
    separate returns on a combined form prescribed by the Mayor as if the federal government
    recognized the right of domestic partners to file jointly.”). Notwithstanding the fact that same-
    sex domestic partners have been able to avail themselves of her services for several years and
    that Plaintiff herself represents in her opposition briefing that she currently has “some
    homosexual clients,” Pl.’s Opp’n/Mot. to Amend at 5, Plaintiff does not proffer any facts
    indicating that she has previously been confronted with same-sex couples seeking her help to
    prepare tax returns, life insurance contracts and/or annuities for domestic partners.
    It is well settled that to establish standing sufficient to bring this action, Plaintiff must
    5
    While the Mayor’s briefing states that section 47-1805.01(f) has been in effect since
    2006, see Def. Mayor’s MTD at 5, the statute’s legislative history indicates that the relevant
    provision, although approved on December 28, 2006, did not become effective until March 14,
    2007. See 2006 D.C. Sess. Law. 16-292, 1 (2006).
    12
    allege that she has “suffered an injury in fact — an invasion of a legally protected interest which
    is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”
    Lujan, 
    504 U.S. at 560
     (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This she has not done.
    As such, she lacks standing in the instant action to assert a claim under RFRA or to seek an order
    repealing either JAMA or Bill 18-482 for allegedly violating the Home Rule Act and DOMA. In
    addition, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s request for a permanent injunction to “prohibit[] the vote
    to be taken by the D.C. City Council scheduled for December 15, 2009 regarding [Bill 18-482]”
    is now moot. Lacking subject matter jurisdiction, the Court is also without authority to “[t]o
    open an ethics and corruption investigation into the mayor and the council” or to cause the
    removal of any elected officials from office, as requested by Plaintiff. The Court shall therefore
    GRANT both the Council Defendants’ [32] and Mayor Fenty’s [33] Motions to Dismiss
    Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for lack of standing pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    12(b)(1).
    B.      Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend
    Pending before the Court as well is Plaintiff’s [34] Motion for Leave to Amend, which
    was filed simultaneously with her opposition briefing to Defendants’ motions to dismiss.
    Plaintiff seeks leave to amend her complaint for a second time to add: (1) a claim under RFRA
    that passage of the legislation at issue violates her religious beliefs; and (2) a claim under the
    Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Fifteenth Amendment and the Home Rule Act based upon
    allegations that she was denied the right to vote in a referendum and/or initiative on same-sex
    marriage within the District. See Pl.’s Opp’n/Mot. to Amend at 3. Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s
    motion for leave, urging that the proposed amendments should be denied as futile. The Court
    13
    agrees, for the reasons set forth below.
    First, Plaintiff’s proposed claim under RFRA is indistinguishable from Plaintiff’s existing
    RFRA claim, as set forth in her Amended Complaint, which the Court dismisses herein for lack
    of standing. See Am. Compl. at 2 (asserting claim under RFRA); see also id. at 7 (“This
    legislation would force me to provide services [to] same-sex couples therefore running counter to
    my religious beliefs . . . . Plaintiff believes this requirement is in violation of her rights under
    [RFRA].”). She alleges no new factual allegations to support this claim. As such, the proposed
    claim suffers from the same flaws as the RFRA claim previously set forth in the Amended
    Complaint — namely, that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring such a claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
    [34] Motion for Leave to Amend is DENIED as futile, insofar as she seeks leave to amend her
    complaint again to add an identical claim under RFRA.
    Plaintiff’s request for leave to add a claim under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the
    Fifteenth Amendment and the Home Rule Act is equally futile. Plaintiff’s proposed claim
    appears to be based on allegations that Councilmember Phil Mendelson, one of the named
    Defendants in this action, wrote two letters to the D.C. Board of Elections and Ethics in June and
    October of 2009, in which he “petition[ed] the Board to deny any petition for referendum or
    initiative relating to recognizing marriage being between one man and one woman citing the DC
    Human Rights Act as the legal basis for the denial of the referendum or initiative.” Pl.’s
    Opp’n/Mot. to Amend at 2-3 & Ex. 1 (proposed Second Amended Complaint) at p. 16-19 (copies
    of October 16, 2009 Letter and June 9, 2009 Letter from Councilmember Mendelson to Mr.
    Kenneth J. McGhie, General Counsel of the D.C. Board of Elections and Ethics). Plaintiff
    alleges that in so doing, Councilmember Mendelson “illegally petitioned the independent agency
    14
    of the Board of Elections to deny Plaintiff as a voter the right to referendum or initiative,” and
    therefore acted in violation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Fifteenth Amendment and the
    Home Rule Act. Id. at 8. Similarly, Plaintiff alleges that Councilmember Jack Evans, who is
    also a named Defendant in this action, “engaged in voter intimidations during the October 26,
    2009 public hearing regarding Bill 18-482” when he allegedly made the following statement
    indicating that he was not in favor of any attempts to appeal to Congress to prevent Bill 18-482
    from going into effect: “I tell everyone to be wary of that course of action. I do not look at that
    in a positive light, to say the least . . . . So to circumvent the government of the District of
    Columbia because you think you may get a better deal on the Hill, I will not look kindly upon, in
    any way, shape or form. So I just want to put that admonishment out there. Do with it as you
    may; do with it as you may.” Id. at 12. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff seeks to amend her
    complaint to add a claim that Defendants have denied Plaintiff, an African American woman, the
    right to vote in violation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Fifteenth Amendment and the
    Home Rule Act. As relief, Plaintiff requests that the Court “grant Plaintiff [the] right of an
    Initiative which Plaintiff filed on December 23, 2009 with the Board of Elections.” Id. Ex. 1
    (proposed Second Amended Complaint) at p. 3.
    The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations do no support a viable claim under either the
    Voting Rights Act of 1965 or the Fifteenth Amendment. Plaintiff has failed to proffer any facts
    supporting a claim that her right to vote was “denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color, or
    previous condition of servitude,” U.S. CONST ., amend XV, § 1, or that Defendants imposed a
    “voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure . . . in a manner
    which results in a denial or abridgement of the right . . . to vote on account of race or color or
    15
    [membership in a language minority group],” 
    42 U.S.C. § 1973
    . Rather, at heart, Plaintiff
    complains about the D.C. Board of Elections and Ethics’ decision denying the proposed initiative
    petition, arguing that this decision effectively denied her the right to vote in a referendum and/or
    initiative on same-sex marriage within the District. Quite plainly, neither the Voting Rights Act
    of 1965 nor the Fifteenth Amendment grant Plaintiff an affirmative right to the requested local
    referendum, a question which is governed by local District law. See 
    D.C. Code § 1-1001.16
    (establishing initiative and referendum procedures).6 Accordingly, as Plaintiff asserts no viable
    federal claims, Plaintiff’s sole remaining claim at issue is asserted under the Home Rule Act.
    The Court therefore would have jurisdiction over this claim, if at all, only under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1367
    . See Decatur Liquors, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 
    478 F.3d 360
    , 363 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
    (finding that “the district court could not have entertained plaintiffs’ claim under the Home Rule
    Act unless the court had supplemental jurisdiction over the claim”). Section 1367 in turn
    provides that “in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the
    district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to
    claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
    controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 1367
    (a). As set
    forth above, Plaintiff’s original federal claims have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as
    Plaintiff does not have standing to bring any of her asserted federal law claims. Because the
    6
    The Court notes that the relevant D.C. statutory provisions themselves afford an
    individual an avenue to appeal a decision by the Board of Elections and Ethics’ denying his or
    her request for an initiative or referendum. See 
    D.C. Code § 1-1001.16
    (b)(3) (“If the Board
    refuses to accept any initiative or referendum measure submitted to it, the person or persons
    submitting such measure may apply, within 10 days after the Board’s refusal to accept such
    measure, to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for a writ in the nature of mandamus
    to compel the Board to accept such measure.”).
    16
    Court lacked original jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s action, it cannot exercise its supplemental
    jurisdiction and would therefore lack jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiff’s state law claim. See
    Saksenasingh v. Sec’y of Educ., 
    126 F.3d 347
    , 351 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“If the District Court had
    original jurisdiction, but dismissed for non-jurisdictional reasons, then it could maintain
    supplemental jurisdiction at its discretion. If it dismissed the underlying claim on jurisdictional
    grounds, then it could not exercise supplemental jurisdiction.”); Decatur Liquors, 
    478 F.3d at 363
     (“In light of the insubstantiality of plaintiffs’ federal claims, we conclude that the district
    court lacked federal-question jurisdiction over those claims and thus supplemental jurisdiction
    over the Home Rule Act claim.”).7 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s [34] Motion for Leave to Amend is
    DENIED as futile, insofar as she seeks leave to amend her complaint to add a claim under the
    Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Fifteenth Amendment and the Home Rule Act, because Plaintiff
    has failed to state a viable claim under either the Voting Rights Act of 1965 or the Fifteenth
    Amendment and the Court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim
    brought pursuant to the Home Rule Act.
    Finally, the Court notes that although Plaintiff has asserted at various points in her
    Amended Complaint that she “is petitioning the Court for an extension of time to confer with and
    7
    Alternatively, the Court notes that 
    28 U.S.C. § 1367
    (c) provides that a district court may
    decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it has dismissed all claims over which it has
    original jurisdiction. 
    28 U.S.C. § 1367
    (c)(3). Indeed, “in the usual case in which all federal-law
    claims are dismissed before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent
    jurisdiction doctrine-judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity-will point toward
    declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Shekoyan v. Siblely
    Intern., 
    409 F.3d 414
    , 424 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 
    484 U.S. 343
    , 350 n. 7 (1988)). As this case is in its earliest stages and Plaintiff’s remaining claim under
    the Home Rule Act implicates the validity of the District’s statutory provisions governing the
    initiative and referendum process, the Court would alternatively decline to exercise its
    supplemental jurisdictional in this case.
    17
    obtain professional legal counsel,” see, e.g., Am. Compl. at 2, 7, Plaintiff did not make that
    request during the Court’s on-the-record telephone conference call with the parties to discuss a
    briefing schedule for this matter. Indeed, Plaintiff has at no time communicated to the Court —
    either in writing or orally — that an extension of time or stay of this case was warranted. To the
    contrary, Plaintiff explicitly agreed to the briefing schedule set forth by this Court during its on-
    the-record discussion with the parties on December 15, 2009. See Dec. 15, 2009 Order, Docket
    No. [30].
    IV. CONCLUSION
    For the reasons set forth above, the Court shall GRANT both the Council Defendants’
    [32] and Mayor Fenty’s [33] Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    12(b)(1) for lack of standing and shall DENY Plaintiff’s [34] Motion for Leave to Amend as
    futile. This case is hereby DISMISSED in its entirety. An appropriate Order accompanies this
    Memorandum Opinion.
    Date: March 2, 2010
    /s/
    COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
    United States District Judge
    18
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2009-2308

Judges: Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly

Filed Date: 3/2/2010

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014

Authorities (24)

Saksenasingh, Vimla v. Secy Educ , 126 F.3d 347 ( 1997 )

National Wildlife Federation v. Donald P. Hodel, Secretary ... , 839 F.2d 694 ( 1988 )

Edward Haase v. William S. Sessions, Director, F.B.I. , 835 F.2d 902 ( 1987 )

Richardson, Roy Dale v. United States , 193 F.3d 545 ( 1999 )

Greenhill, Frances v. Spellings, Margaret , 482 F.3d 569 ( 2007 )

City of Harper Woods Employees' Retirement System Ex Rel. ... , 589 F.3d 1292 ( 2009 )

Anyanwutaku, K. v. Moore, Margaret , 151 F.3d 1053 ( 1998 )

Shekoyan, Vladmir v. Sibley Intl , 409 F.3d 414 ( 2005 )

eileen-dimond-v-district-of-columbia-eileen-dimond-v-district-of , 792 F.2d 179 ( 1986 )

Decatur Liquors, Inc. v. District of Columbia , 478 F.3d 360 ( 2007 )

City of Harper Woods Employees' Retirement System Ex Rel. ... , 577 F. Supp. 2d 124 ( 2008 )

Franklin v. Potter , 600 F. Supp. 2d 38 ( 2009 )

Lindsey v. United States , 448 F. Supp. 2d 37 ( 2006 )

Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft , 185 F. Supp. 2d 9 ( 2001 )

Foman v. Davis , 83 S. Ct. 227 ( 1962 )

Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization , 96 S. Ct. 1917 ( 1976 )

Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill , 108 S. Ct. 614 ( 1988 )

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 112 S. Ct. 2130 ( 1992 )

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and ... , 113 S. Ct. 1160 ( 1993 )

Hopkins v. Women's Division, General Board of Global ... , 284 F. Supp. 2d 15 ( 2003 )

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