Gallo-Rodriguez v. Supreme Court of the United States ( 2009 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________
)
MARCO ANTONIO GALLO-RODRIGUEZ,)
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 08-1890 (RWR)
)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED )
STATES, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
______________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se plaintiff Marco Gallo-Rodriguez has sued the Supreme
Court of the United States, the United States Courts of Appeals
for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, and the United States
District Courts for the Southern District of Florida and the
Eastern District of Texas, alleging that these courts have
“refused to hear plaintiff’s underlying constitutional claims
that were brought to their attention through a habeas corpus
petition.” (Compl. at 2.) The complaint seeks five hundred
million dollars in damages. (Id.) The defendants have moved to
dismiss the complaint. Because this court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to review actions of other federal district and
appellate courts, and judges are immune from damage suits
-2-
stemming from their official acts, the defendants’ motion to
dismiss will be granted.1
A district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review
a decision of the Supreme Court. In re Marin, 956 F.2d 339, 340
(D.C. Cir. 1992); Griffin v. Higgins, Civil Action No. 99-1576
(GK), 1999 WL 1029177, at *1 (D.D.C. June 18, 1999). A district
court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review the
actions of another lower federal court. Jackson v. Camilletti,
Civil Action No. 09-1110 (RJL), 2009 WL 1708802, at *1 (D.D.C.
June 17, 2009) (concluding that the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia could not review proceedings that
occurred in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia); Flemming v. United States, 847 F.
Supp. 170, 172 (D.D.C. 1994) (stating that the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia has no jurisdiction
to review a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit). Thus, there is no subject matter
jurisdiction over a claim seeking review of actions taken by the
Supreme Court of the United States, the Courts of Appeals for the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, and the District Courts for the
Southern District of Florida and the Eastern District of Texas.
1
The defendants also move to strike a surreply filed by the
plaintiff regarding the defendants’ motion to dismiss. In light
of the disposition of the motion to dismiss, the motion to strike
will be denied as moot.
-3-
Even if Gallo-Rodriguez’s claim is interpreted as one for
damages against judicial officers, it still would not entitle him
to relief. Judicial officers “enjoy absolute judicial immunity
from suits for money damages for all actions taken in the judge’s
judicial capacity, unless these actions are taken in the complete
absence of all jurisdiction.” Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459,
1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9
(1991) (stating that “[a] long line of this Court’s precedents
acknowledges that, generally, a judge is immune from a suit for
money damages”)). The complaint alleges that the defendants
“refused to hear” claims Gallo-Rodriguez raised in his habeas
corpus petition. (Compl. at 2.) These alleged actions were
taken within the defendants’ official capacities, and the
defendants are therefore immune from this suit.
Under even a liberal construction of his pro se complaint,
Howerton v. Ogletree, 466 F. Supp. 2d 182, 183 (D.D.C. 2006),
Gallo-Rodriguez is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, the
complaint will be dismissed. An appropriate order accompanies
this memorandum opinion.
SIGNED this 19th day of November, 2009.
/s/
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
United States District Judge