Hanson v. District of Columbia , 257 F.R.D. 19 ( 2009 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
TRACEY HANSON et al., :
:
Plaintiffs, : Civil Action No.: 09-0454 (RMU)
:
v. : Document Nos.: 7, 12
:
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE AND
DENYING AS MOOT THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STAY PENDING BRIEFING
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the court on the defendants’ motion to consolidate. The plaintiffs,
residents of the District of Columbia (“the District”), challenge the constitutionality of the rule
prohibiting certain handguns from being manufactured, sold, given, loaned, exposed for sale,
transferred or imported into the District. The defendants enacted the rule in the wake of the
Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (“Heller I”).
The defendants ask the court to order that the instant action be consolidated with Heller v.
District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 08-1289 (“Heller II”). The plaintiffs oppose the motion.
Because the court determines that the relevant factors weigh in favor of consolidating the two
cases, it grants the defendants’ motion. As a result, the court denies as moot the defendants’
motion to stay the proceedings pending briefing on the motion to consolidate.
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Heller I and the District’s Response
In Heller I, released on June 26, 2008, the Supreme Court held that “the District’s ban on
handgun possession in the home violates the Second Amendment, as does its prohibition against
rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense.”
128 S. Ct. at 2821-22. Following the release of the Heller I decision, the District enacted the
Firearms Control Emergency Amendment Act of 2008 (“the Firearms Control Act”), 55 D.C.
REG . 8237-39 (Aug. 1, 2008), the Inoperable Pistol Emergency Amendment Act of 2008 (“the
Inoperable Pistol Act”), 56 D.C. REG . 927-30 (Jan. 30, 2009), and the Firearms Registration
Amendment Act of 2008 (“the Firearms Registration Act”), 56 D.C. REG . 1365-80 (Feb. 13,
2009). Section 504 of the Firearms Registration Act, approved on January 28, 2009, established
that with a few exceptions,
beginning January 1, 2009, a pistol that is not on the California Roster of Handguns
Certified for Sale, (also known as the California Roster of Handguns Determined Not
to be Unsafe), pursuant to California Penal Code § 12131, as of January 1, 2009, may
not be manufactured, sold, given, loaned, exposed for sale, transferred, or imported
into the District of Columbia.
Id. at 1377.
B. Heller II
The plaintiffs in Heller II brought suit on July 28, 2008, see Compl., Heller II (D.D.C.
July 28, 2008), and filed a First Amended Complaint on July 29, 2008, see Am. Compl., Heller II
(D.D.C. July 29, 2008), and a Second Amended Complaint on March 25, 2009, see 2d Am.
Compl., Heller II (Mar. 25, 2009). The Second Amended Complaint alleges, inter alia, that Ҥ
504 of the [Firearms Registration Act], which prohibits pistols not on the California Roster, and
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D.C. Code § 7-2502.02(5), which prohibits registration of such pistols,” infringe on the
plaintiffs’ Second Amendment right to bear arms. Id. ¶ 76.
C. The Instant Action
The plaintiffs in the instant action filed suit on March 9, 2009. Like the plaintiffs in
Heller II, they challenge the use of the California Roster in the Firearms Registration Act as
unconstitutional. See generally Compl. On March 30, 2009, the defendants moved to
consolidate this action with Heller II. See generally Defs.’ Mot. The plaintiffs oppose the
motion. See generally Pls.’ Opp’n. The court turns now to the parties’ arguments.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard for Consolidation Under Rule 42(a)
Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[i]f actions before the
court involve a common question of law or fact, the court may . . . consolidate the actions.” FED .
R. CIV . P. 42(a). Consolidation of actions under Rule 42(a) is “a valuable and important tool of
judicial administration.” Devlin, 175 F.3d at 130 (internal quotations omitted). It helps to
“relieve[] the parties and the [c]ourt of the burden of duplicative pleadings and [c]ourt orders.”
New York v. Microsoft Corp., 209 F. Supp. 2d 132, 148 (D.D.C. 2002). To determine whether
consolidation is appropriate, a court should consider both equity and judicial economy. Devlin,
175 F.3d at 130. If “savings of expense and gains of efficiency can be accomplished without
sacrifice of justice,” a court may find the actions merit consolidation. Id. (internal quotations
omitted).
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Actions that involve the same parties are apt candidates for consolidation. 9 FED . PRAC.
& PROC. CIV . 3D § 2384. Moreover, consolidation is particularly appropriate when the actions
are likely to involve substantially the same witnesses and arise from the same series of events or
facts. Davis v. Buffalo Psychiatric Ctr., 1988 WL 47355, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. May 10, 1988). If the
parties at issue, the procedural posture and the allegations in each case are different, however,
consolidation is not appropriate. Stewart v. O’Neill, 225 F. Supp. 2d 16, 21 (D.D.C. 2002). In
short, “courts weigh considerations of convenience and economy against considerations of
confusion and prejudice.” Chang v. United States, 217 F.R.D. 262, 265 (D.D.C. 2003).
B. The Court Grants the Defendants’ Motion to Consolidate
The defendants assert that the instant action should be consolidated with Heller II
because “both sets of plaintiffs challenge the District’s gun-control regime under both the Second
Amendment and the Supreme Court’s decision in [Heller I], under similar theories, and seek the
same relief.” Defs.’ Mot. at 3. Furthermore, the defendants observe that both suits are in their
nascent stages and share a common defendant. Id. As a result, the defendants claim that
consolidation of the two actions would maximize judicial economy. Id.The plaintiffs disagree. They point out that the instant action constitutes a narrow
challenge to the constitutionality of the District’s adoption of the California Roster, whereas the
Heller II plaintiffs not only raise the same challenge, but also take issue with a host of other
aspects of the District’s gun laws. Pls.’ Opp’n at 1-2. As a result, the plaintiffs predict it will
take more time and resources to resolve the Heller II plaintiffs’ claims than to resolve their
claims. Id. Further, the plaintiffs declare that in contrast to their “narrower, considered
approach,” the litigants in Heller II will have “less space in which to more fully develop
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arguments with respect to each particular theory.” Id. at 2. In sum, the plaintiffs maintain, “this
case can be resolved much quicker and more easily than Heller II.” Id. at 3.
In determining whether to exercise its discretion to order consolidation of the instant case
and Heller II, the court weighs the time and effort that consolidation would conserve against any
inconvenience, delay or expense that consolidation would cause for the parties or for the court.
Am. Postal Workers Union v. U.S. Postal Svc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 240, 245 (D.D.C. 2006); see also
9 FED . PRAC. & PROC. CIV . 3D § 2383. The two actions proposed for consolidation share the
same defendant;1 in addition, the plaintiffs in both actions, though not the same, are all residents
of the District of Columbia who seek to possess firearms.2 Compl. ¶¶ 1-3; 2d Am. Compl.,
Heller II (Mar. 25, 2009) ¶¶ 2-6. Moreover, both actions present an identical question of law,
namely, the constitutionality of the District’s adoption of the California Roster. Thus,
consolidation would save time and effort for the court and for the defendants by resolving this
issue in one proceeding rather than two. See, e.g., Utah v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 45 F. Supp. 2d
1279, 1281 (D. Utah 1999) (ordering consolidation of cases brought by different plaintiffs
against the same defendant because they presented the same issues of law and fact).
On the other hand, it is possible that consolidation would delay resolution of the issue for
the plaintiffs in the instant action, given that it might take longer to resolve the host of claims the
Heller II plaintiffs have raised than it would to resolve the plaintiffs’ comparatively narrow
1
Both actions name the District as a defendant. Compl ¶ 5; 2d Am. Compl., Heller II (Mar. 25,
2009) ¶ 7. In addition, the plaintiffs in the instant action name as a defendant the District’s Chief
of Police, Cathy Lanier, see Compl. ¶ 6, and the Heller II plaintiffs name as a defendant the
District’s Mayor, Adrian M. Fenty, see 2d Am. Compl., Heller II (Mar. 25, 2009) ¶ 8. The same
defense counsel is representing all three defendants in both actions.
2
The Second Amendment Foundation is also named as a plaintiff in the instant action. Compl. ¶
4.
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claims here. But any delay caused to the plaintiffs would not be significant, as both cases are still
in their nascent stages. Cf. Mills v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 886 F.2d 758, 761-62 (5th Cir. 1989)
(holding that consolidation was improper because the two actions were filed more than two years
apart and the parties in the earlier-filed action were ready for trial, whereas the plaintiffs in the
later-filed action still sought to designate experts and depose witnesses). And in any event, it is
the court’s duty to consider not only the delay that consolidating the cases might cause for the
plaintiffs, but also the delay that not consolidating the cases would cause for the defendants and
for the court. See, e.g., Devlin, 175 F.3d at 130 (recognizing that consolidation is “a valuable and
important tool of judicial administration” (quoting Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., 72 F.3d
1003, 1006 (2d Cir. 1995))). Finally, the court rejects the plaintiffs’ suggestion that they will
have “less space in which to more fully develop [their] arguments” if the matters are
consolidated. The parties are fully able to brief – and the court is capable of rendering a well-
reasoned judgment on – multiple issues within the context of one unified civil action. On
balance, the court concludes that the factors militate in favor of consolidation.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the defendants’ motion to consolidate and
denies as moot the defendants’ motion to stay the action pending briefing on the motion to
consolidate. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and
contemporaneously issued this 7th day of May, 2009.
RICARDO M. URBINA
United States District Judge
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