Lammers Kurtz v. USA ( 2011 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________
)
JAMES D. LAMMERS KURTZ, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 10-1270 (RWR)
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
et al., )
)
Defendants. )
______________________________)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Pro se plaintiff James D. Lammers Kurtz filed a complaint
naming at least twenty-seven defendants concerning property
located in Wisconsin and harms occurring in Wisconsin and in
courts in the Seventh Circuit. Most of the defendants have moved
to dismiss.1 Because the plaintiff has made no showing that this
court has personal jurisdiction over any of the moving
defendants, their motions to dismiss will be granted.2
1
The plaintiff has filed a motion to reconsider an order
granting as conceded the motions to dismiss filed by defendants
Janet C. Lammers, Lammers Little Lambs, LLC, and Arthur R.
Lammers. Plaintiff’s motion will be granted, and Janet C.
Lammers, Lammers Little Lambs, LLC, and Arthur R. Lammers’
motions to dismiss will be addressed on the merits.
2
Defendant Gust Lammers also requests sanctions against the
plaintiff under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c). Although
such sanctions may be imposed against pro se plaintiffs, see
Hamrick v. Gottlieb, 416 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 n.3 (D.D.C. 2005), “the
district court is accorded wide discretion” in determining
whether sanctions are appropriate. Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc.,
770 F.2d 1168, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Although the movants’
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“It is plaintiff’s burden to make a prima facie showing that
the Court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants.”
Ballard v. Holinka, 601 F. Supp. 2d 110, 117 (D.D.C. 2009); see
also First Chicago Int’l v. United Exch. Co., Ltd., 836 F.2d
1375, 1378-79 (D.C. Cir. 1988). A plaintiff must plead specific
facts providing a basis for personal jurisdiction. Moore v.
Motz, 437 F. Supp. 2d 88, 91 (D.D.C. 2006). “Pro se plaintiffs
are not freed from the requirement to plead an adequate
jurisdictional basis for their claims.” Gomez v. Aragon, 705 F.
Supp. 2d 21, 23 (D.D.C. 2010).
Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 4(k)(1) and
81(d)(2), personal jurisdiction “must be determined by reference
to District of Columbia law.” United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d
825, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1995). District of Columbia law provides
that “[a] District of Columbia court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a person domiciled in, . . . or maintaining his
. . . principal place of business in, the District of Columbia as
to any claim for relief.” D.C. Code § 13-422. If the plaintiff
does not plead that a District of Columbia court has personal
jurisdiction over a defendant based on his domicile or place of
business, a court engages in a two-part inquiry to determine if
it has personal jurisdiction over the defendants. First, a court
motions have merit, I will exercise my discretion against
imposing sanctions against the pro se plaintiff at this stage.
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must determine whether there is a basis for personal jurisdiction
under the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute. See GTE New
Media Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1347 (D.C.
Cir. 2000). The long-arm statute allows a court in the District
of Columbia to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant with regard to a claim arising from the defendant's
conduct in:
(1) transacting any business in the District of
Columbia;
(2) contracting to supply services in the District of
Columbia;
(3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia
by an act or omission in the District of Columbia;
(4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia
by an act or omission outside the District of Columbia
if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in
any other persistent course of conduct, or derives
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or
services rendered, in the District of Columbia;
(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real
property in the District of Columbia[.]
D.C. Code § 13-423(a).3 Second, a court must determine whether
the exercise of personal jurisdiction would comport with the
requirements of due process. See GTE New Media Servs., Inc., 199
F.3d at 1347. This portion of the analysis turns on whether a
defendant's “minimum contacts” with the District of Columbia
establish that “the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int'l
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal
3
The alternative bases set forth under the long-arm statute
are inapplicable.
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quotation marks omitted). These minimum contacts must arise from
“‘some act by which the defendant purposefully avails [himself]
of the privilege of conducting activities with the forum State,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’” Asahi
Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Solano Cty., 480
U.S. 102, 109 (1987) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). In other words, “the defendant's conduct
and connection with the forum State are such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
The plaintiff pleads no facts in his complaint that provide
a basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over the moving
defendants in the District of Columbia. None of the defendants
appears to be domiciled in the District of Columbia, nor does the
complaint allege that the District of Columbia is the principal
place of business of any of the defendants. Moreover, the
plaintiff has not pled an adequate basis to assert specific
personal jurisdiction over the named defendants under the
District of Columbia long-arm statute. The complaint does not
allege that any of the defendants have contacts with the District
of Columbia.4 There are also no allegations in the complaint
4
While the plaintiff alleges that the United States is
wrongfully holding hundreds of thousands of dollars in
Washington, D.C. that rightfully belong to the plaintiff (Compl.
at 3), that allegation as to the United States provides no basis
for asserting personal jurisdiction over any of the moving
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that the harms of which the plaintiff complains arose from the
defendants’ conduct in transacting business or contracting to
supply services in the District of Columbia, nor are there
allegations of a tortious injury in the District of Columbia.
Rather, all of the harms of which the plaintiff complains appear
to have taken place either in Wisconsin or in courts in the
Seventh Circuit, and the real property at issue is located in
Wisconsin. The plaintiff’s assertion that venue ––
mischaracterized as jurisdiction –– in this district is proper
because he was denied access to the courts in the Seventh Circuit
(Compl. at 3, 21) is not sufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction in this district. See Gomez, 705 F. Supp. 2d at 24(holding that an assertion in the plaintiffs’ complaint that
venue is proper “‘in the District of Columbia in the interest of
justice because no other court of law is available to the
Plaintiffs’” is not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction
over the defendants).
Likewise, none of the arguments the plaintiff makes in his
oppositions to the motions to dismiss provides a basis for
asserting personal jurisdiction over the moving defendants. The
plaintiff’s argument that by filing motions to dismiss, the
moving defendants have created sufficient contacts with this
district to establish personal jurisdiction (Pl.’s Opp’n to Gust
defendants.
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Lammers Mot. to Dismiss the Compl. ¶ 4(C)) is foreclosed by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12. See Chase v. Pan-Pac.
Broad., Inc., 750 F.2d 131, 133 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“It was a
central purpose of Rule 12(b) to do away with the necessity for a
‘special appearance’ by a defendant who sought to present a
personal jurisdiction challenge.”). Even if the plaintiff’s
unsubstantiated assertion that the Department of Justice is
engaged in a conspiracy in Washington, D.C. to conceal facts
about him (Pl.’s Opp’n to Sheboygan & Wisconsin Defs.’ Mot. to
Dismiss at 2 ¶ 5) could provide a basis for haling the United
States into court in this district, it provides no basis for
asserting personal jurisdiction over any of the moving
defendants. The plaintiff presents no authority that his
confusing and unsubstantiated claim that the defendants issued
court orders that caused “obstruction of process in the US
Supreme Court” (id. at 5 ¶ 6(B); Pl.’s Opp’n to Fed. Judicial
Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 9) is a sufficient contact with the
District of Columbia to provide a basis for asserting personal
jurisdiction over any of the moving defendants. Finally, the
plaintiff’s allegation that the defendants’ actions are causing
him a financial injury in the District of Columbia by preventing
him from selling a toilet he designed (Pl.’s Opp’n to Sheboygan &
Wisconsin Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 6(C); Pl.’s Opp’n to Fed.
Judicial Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 10) does not satisfy the long-
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arm statute because the plaintiff has not alleged that the
defendants caused this injury by an act or omission in the
District of Columbia or that the defendants regularly do or
solicit business, engage in any persistent course of conduct, or
derive substantial revenue from the District of Columbia. See
D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(3), (4).
Thus, under even a liberal construction of his pro se
complaint, see Howerton v. Ogletree, 466 F. Supp. 2d 182, 183
(D.D.C. 2006), the plaintiff has not alleged an adequate basis
for asserting personal jurisdiction over the moving defendants,
and the defendants’ motions to dismiss will be granted.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion [37] for reconsideration
be, and hereby is, GRANTED. The order granting the motions to
dismiss of Janet C. Lammers, Lammers Little Lambs, LLC, and
Arthur R. Lammers is vacated. It is further
ORDERED that the defendants’ motions [4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 38] to
dismiss be, and hereby are, GRANTED. The complaint is dismissed
as to all moving defendants.
SIGNED this 26th day of April, 2011.
__________/s/_______________
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
United States District Judge