Bennett v. District of Columbia Public Schools ( 2011 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________
)
EMYRTLE BENNETT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 10-1680 (RWR)
)
KAYA HENDERSON et al., )
)
Defendants. )
______________________________)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Plaintiff Emyrtle Bennett brings claims of discrimination
and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”), codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., and the District
of Columbia Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”), D.C. Code §§ 2-1401.01 et
seq. Bennett has moved for leave to file a second amended
complaint, and the defendants, the Chancellor of the District of
Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”) and the Attorney General of the
District of Columbia,1 have moved under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint.
A plaintiff may amend her complaint for a second time “only
with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.
The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The decision to grant or deny leave to
1
Kaya Henderson and Irvin B. Nathan are substituted for
Michelle Rhee and Peter Nickles under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
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amend is committed to the sound discretion of the district court.
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); James Madison Ltd. v.
Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Undue prejudice to
the opposing party may counsel against granting leave to amend.
Atchinson v. Dist. of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 425 (D.C. Cir.
1996).
The only proposed changes in Bennett’s proposed second
amended complaint clarify that she is suing the defendants in
their official capacities. Since the defendants acknowledge that
Bennett’s first amended complaint named the defendants in their
official capacities (Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Defs.’
Mot. to Dismiss at 5), granting leave to amend will not unduly
prejudice the defendants, and Bennett’s motion for leave to amend
will be granted.2
The defendants argue that because the complaint alleges
claims against the District of Columbia, they are not proper
defendants. (Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Defs.’ Reply to
Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 2.) An agency or department
head is a proper defendant in ADEA and DCHRA suits involving
allegations of discrimination within those agencies or
departments. See Wilson v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Civil Action
No. 10-490 (RMC), 2011 WL 11500, at *9 (D.D.C. Jan. 4, 2011)
2
The defendants’ motion to dismiss will be directed at the
second amended complaint.
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(ADEA); Mitchell v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 407 F. Supp. 2d
213, 240-41 (D.D.C. 2005) (DCHRA). A suit against an officer in
his official capacity is “‘another way of pleading an action
against an entity of which [that] officer is an agent.’”
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (quoting Monell v.
N.Y. City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)).
Since the complaint does not allege discrimination within the
Attorney General’s office, nor does it provide any other basis
for asserting a claim against the Attorney General, the Attorney
General is not a proper defendant and will be dismissed.
Although the complaint alleges discrimination within DCPS,
defendant Henderson is not a proper defendant because DCPS may
not be sued as a separate entity. See United States ex rel.
Davis v. Dist. of Columbia, 591 F. Supp. 2d 30, 40 (D.D.C. 2008).
The defendants’ motion to dismiss therefore will be construed in
part as one to substitute the District of Columbia for the
Chancellor.3 See Henneghan v. DCPS, 597 F. Supp. 2d 34, 37
(D.D.C. 2009) (substituting the District of Columbia for DCPS);
Azabdaftari v. Mayer, Civil Action No. 09-2166 (RWR), 2010 WL
3386395, at *1 n.1 (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 2010) (construing motion to
dismiss in part as one to substitute the United States as the
3
Because the plaintiff served the District of Columbia
Attorney General, the District of Columbia will be deemed to have
sufficient notice of this action. See Henderson v. Williams,
Civil Action No. 05-1966 (RWR), 2007 WL 778937, at *3 & n.6
(D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2007).
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proper party defendant where complaint alleged claims that could
be raised against only the United States). Accordingly, it is
hereby
ORDERED that the plaintiff’s second motion [10] to amend the
complaint be, and hereby is, GRANTED. The Clerk’s Office is
directed to docket as plaintiff’s second amended complaint the
second attachment to the plaintiff’s second motion to amend the
complaint. It is further
ORDERED that the defendants’ motion [5] to dismiss, be, and
hereby is, GRANTED in part. Defendant Irvin B. Nathan is
dismissed, and the District of Columbia is substituted for
defendant Kaya Henderson. It is further
ORDERED that defendant District of Columbia respond to the
complaint by February 18, 2011.
SIGNED this 28th day of January, 2011.
__________/s/_______________
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
United States District Judge