Melton Ex Rel. J.R. v. District of Columbia , 46 F. Supp. 3d 22 ( 2014 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
____________________________________
)
EDWIN L. MELTON, for himself and )
as next friend of his minor child, J.R., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 14-686 (RMC)
)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, )
et al., )
)
Defendants. )
____________________________________)
OPINION
Plaintiff Edwin Melton, proceeding pro se, is currently incarcerated at the
Pocahontas State Correction Center in Pocahontas, Virginia. He brings this civil action on his
own behalf and on behalf of J.R., his minor child. Compl. [Dkt. 1] at 1; see id. ¶ 4. J.R. is in
foster care, in the custody of the D.C. Child and Family Services Agency (CFSA). CFSA has
instituted adoption proceedings for the permanent placement of J.R. with an adoptive parent.
Generally, Mr. Melton challenges the Defendants’ actions regarding the adoption of J.R. See
generally id. ¶¶ 104-09. In this Court, Mr. Melton has filed a motion for a temporary restraining
order and a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the adoption proceedings in D.C. Superior
Court and to require Defendants to provide “reunification services” to him. See Mot. for Inj.
[Dkt. 5]. The motion will be denied because this Court must abstain from interfering with an
ongoing proceeding in D.C. Superior Court under the doctrine established by the Supreme Court
in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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J.R. was born on February 6, 2012. Both he and his mother tested positive for
cocaine. Compl. ¶ 13. At the time of J.R.’s birth, Mr. Melton was incarcerated. Id. ¶¶ 13, 23.
J.R.’s mother failed to participate in court-ordered drug treatment and abandoned J.R. Id. ¶¶ 13,
20, 24. J.R. currently lives with a foster parent, Mr. Melton’s relative, Zanielle Young. Id. ¶ 38.
Mr. Melton alleges that CFSA intends to place J.R. permanently with an adoptive parent, id.
¶¶ 52, 57, 61, 63, 72, 101, and that Ms. Young filed for permanent adoption against Mr. Melton’s
wishes, id. ¶ 85. Because Mr. Melton hopes to be rejoined with his child when he is released
from prison, see id. ¶ 49, he objects to the pending adoption. Mr. Melton anticipates being
released on September 2, 2014. See Mot. for Inj., Proposed Order.
On April 14, 2014, Mr. Melton filed suit here claiming, inter alia, that
(1) Defendants have violated the Adoption and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (ACWA), codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628 and 670-679a; (2) that they have conspired to deprive him of his liberty
interest as a parent, resulting in a substantive due process violation under the Fifth Amendment;
and (3) that they have conspired to deny him equal protection, also a violation of the Fifth
Amendment. See Compl. ¶¶ 104-109. Defendants are CFSA; CFSA managers and employees
Pamela Soncini, Vanessa Williams-Campbell, Kelly Friedman, Whitney Bellinger, Rhydell
Ngoh, and Elise Hartung; foster parent Zanielle Young; and attorney David Stein. 1 The
Complaint seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages. See id., Relief Requested.
On May 21, 2014, Mr. Melton moved to enjoin the adoption proceeding in D.C.
Superior Court and to require Defendants to provide “reunification services.” See Mot. for Inj.
He asserts that the adoption case is assigned case numbers TPR-109-12 and A-146-13 and that
1
Mr. Stein was appointed to represent Mr. Melton in asserting his parental rights regarding the
placement of J.R. Compl. ¶ 18. Pursuant to Mr. Melton’s request, Andrew Murane was
substituted as counsel as of January 2, 2014. Id. ¶ 91.
2
the “pretrial dates” were May 12-16, 2014. Id. at 1. The record does not reflect the current
status of the adoption proceedings, but Mr. Melton does not allege that his parental rights have
been terminated at this time.
To obtain a preliminary injunction, the movant must establish that: he is likely to
succeed on the merits; he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief;
the balance of equities tips in his favor; and an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v.
NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The D.C. Circuit has further instructed that “the movant has
the burden to show that all four factors . . . weigh in favor of the injunction.” Davis v. Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The same showing must be made in
order to obtain a temporary restraining order. See Council of American-Islamic Relations v.
Gaubatz, 667 F. Supp. 2d 67, 74 (D.D.C. 2009) (citations omitted) (applying same standard to
both temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction). The Court presumes without
deciding that Mr. Melton has made the required showing.
However, Mr. Melton asserts that adoption proceedings were scheduled for May
12, 13, 14, 15, and 16, 2014 in D.C. Superior Court and this Court cannot stay proceedings that
already have occurred. Moreover, this Court must abstain from interfering in ongoing D.C. court
proceedings under the Younger abstention doctrine. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 45 (“[T]he normal
thing to do when federal courts are asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state courts is not to
issue such injunctions.”); see also District Properties Assocs. v. District of Columbia, 743 F.2d
21, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[B]ased on principles of equity . . . the doctrine of Younger . . . and its
progeny restrains federal courts from interfering in ongoing state judicial proceedings.”). In
Younger, the Supreme Court held that:
[E]xcept in extraordinary circumstances, a federal court should not
enjoin a pending state proceeding (including an administrative
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proceeding) that is judicial in nature and involves important state
interests.
401 U.S. at 41. The Younger doctrine rests both on equitable principles and on concerns for
comity and federalism. Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619,
627-28 (1986); Worldwide Moving & Storage, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 445 F.3d 422, 425
(D.C. Cir. 2006). Younger precludes federal adjudication when three criteria are met: (1) there
are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate
important state interests; and (3) the proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the
federal claims. Bridges v. Kelly, 84 F.3d 470, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1996). “[T]he general
considerations of comity described in the Younger line of cases apply with full force to the
District of Columbia.” JMM Corp. v. District of Columbia, 378 F.3d 1117, 1125 (D.C. Cir.
2004). Further, the Younger principle applies to pending state administrative proceedings. Id. at
1127.
Child dependency proceedings constitute “ongoing state proceedings” for the
purpose of a Younger analysis. 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1275 (11th Cir.
2003). Further, “[f]amily relations are a traditional area of state concern.” Moore v. Sims, 442
U.S. 415, 435 (1979). Thus, when applying Younger, courts have determined that a State’s
interest in child custody is important and vital. See, e.g., id.; Peterson v. Fox, 488 F. Supp. 2d
14, 20 (D.N.H. 2007). 2 Also, a litigant in a District of Columbia proceeding has an opportunity
to raise constitutional claims. “Where the proceedings begin in Superior Court, the [litigant] can
raise any constitutional claims in that court, appeal an adverse decision to the District of
2
Under Younger, courts similarly abstain from interfering in ongoing child support proceedings.
See, e.g., Agustin v. Cty. of Alameda, 234 F. App’x 521, 522 (9th Cir. 2007); Dixon v. Kuhn, 257
F. App’x. 553, 555-56 (3d Cir. 2007); Tindall v. Wayne Cty. Friend of Court, 269 F.3d 533, 538-
40 (6th Cir. 2001).
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Columbia Court of Appeals, and if still dissatisfied seek review in the United States Supreme
Court.” See JMM Corp., 378 F.3d at 1121.
This suit meets the three criteria for Younger abstention. The record does not
indicate precisely where the permanent adoption proceedings stand, but they appear to be
ongoing. 3 The District’s interest in the issue of child custody is vital. Further, Mr. Melton can
assert his constitutional rights in any D.C. Superior Court proceeding regarding child custody
and adoption. Although Mr. Melton seeks to enjoin the pending adoption of J.R. and require
Defendants to provide reunification services, Younger requires this Court to abstain from
interfering with ongoing D.C. Superior Court proceedings regarding the custody of J.R. Mr.
Melton’s motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction [Dkt. 5] will be
denied. A memorializing Order accompanies this Opinion.
Date: May 30, 2014 /s/
ROSEMARY M. COLLYER
United States District Judge
3
When the D.C. Superior Court issues a final ruling on the adoption, the matter may be appealed
to the D.C. Court of Appeals but not to this Court. This Court is not a reviewing court, see 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (general jurisdictional provisions); Richardson v. District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, 83 F.3d 1513, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and it lacks authority to review
collaterally state court judgments under Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see Fleming v. United States,
847 F. Supp. 170, 172 (D.D.C. 1994) (citing doctrine named for Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983)).
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