White v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ( 2018 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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OLIVER WHITE, )
)
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Plaintiff, )
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v. ) Civil Action No. 17-cv-0735 (TSC)
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WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN )
AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY )
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and )
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METRO TRANSIT POLICE )
DEPARTMENT )
)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Oliver White alleges that Defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) and Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (“ADAAA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”). (ECF No. 1-1). Defendants have
moved for dismissal of all claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), alleging that Defendant
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”) is entitled to sovereign immunity
and that Defendant Metro Transit Police Department (“MTPD”) is merely a department within
WMATA, not a separate legal entity. Plaintiff has also filed a motion for leave to amend his
complaint to add claims for hostile work environment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), which WMATA opposes. For the reasons stated below,
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend his complaint is GRANTED. Defendants’ motion to dismiss
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for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is also GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claims under the
ADA/ADAAA, the DCHRA, and § 1983.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff has been employed as an officer at MTPD since 2005. Plaintiff suffers from a
medical condition characterized by low blood circulation and impotence. He takes prescription
medication—including injectable medication—for his ailment. (Compl. ¶¶10–13, 18 ECF No. 1-
1). On October 25, 2015, MTPD placed Plaintiff under investigation following an allegation of
steroid use. (ECF No. 1-1 ¶14). Plaintiff denied the allegation at an interview with representatives
of MTPD’s Office of Professional Responsibilities and Inspections, informing them that he only
used a prescribed injectable medication. (ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶15–18). After the interview, MTPD
required Plaintiff to undergo a fitness for duty and psychological evaluation and to meet with a
counselor. (ECF No. 1-1 ¶23). On December 19, 2015, Plaintiff was required to undergo a random
urinalysis, and on December 28, 2015, he was cleared of the allegation of steroid use. (ECF No.
1-1 ¶¶25–26). He did however receive a 15-day suspension for failing to report his use of
prescription drugs, as required by MTPD policy. (ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶27–28). Plaintiff alleges that he
suffered from esophagitis caused by stress during this period. (ECF No. 1-1 ¶31).
Upon Plaintiff’s return to work on January 26, 2016, MTPD required him to undergo a
random urinalysis, and another on May 14, 2016. (ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶32, 36). Plaintiff further alleges
that his supervisor acknowledged receipt of a discrimination charge from the EEOC on March 30,
2016. (ECF No. 1-1 ¶35). He also alleges that on one occasion his supervisors told him that they
were going to “fuck with [him] bad.” (ECF No. 1-1 ¶34). Plaintiff filed the original complaint in
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the Superior Court of the District Columbia on March 8, 2017. (ECF No. 1 at 1). The case was
removed to federal court. (ECF No. 4).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) “presents a threshold
challenge to the court’s jurisdiction.” Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The
court “presume[s] that a cause lies outside [its] limited jurisdiction,” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994), and accordingly, “the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
the court’s jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Morrow v. United States, 723 F.
Supp. 2d 71, 76 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Moore v. Bush, 535 F. Supp. 2d 46, 47 (D.D.C. 2008)).
While a court is not limited to the factual allegations in the complaint when ruling upon a motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, see Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402
F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005), it must accept those allegations as true. Attias v. Carefirst, Inc.,
865 F.3d 620, 627 (2017) (noting that consideration of a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss “start[s] with
the familiar principle that the factual allegations in the complaint are assumed to be true”).
III. DISCUSSION
The amendment of pleadings is governed by Rule 15(a), which provides that “[t]he court
should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), and
instructs district courts “to determine the propriety of amendment on a case by case basis.” Harris
v. Sec’y, United States Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 126 F.3d 339, 344 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Justifications
for denial of leave may include undue delay, bad faith, repeated failure to cure deficiencies in a
pleading, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment. Id. at 344 (citing
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). The non-movant typically bears the burden of
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persuading the court to deny leave to amend. Nwachukwu v. Karl, 222 F.R.D. 208, 211 (D.D.C.
2004). Here, WMATA has not (1) identified any evidence of bad faith, or (2) provided any specific
contentions to support their claim that amendment would be futile. Moreover, since the court will
afford WMATA the opportunity to fully brief the newly added claims via an additional motion to
dismiss, there is also no showing of prejudice at this early procedural stage. Accordingly, the court
grants Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the complaint.
In addition to the two new claims under Title VII, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges
six claims against WMATA: two (Counts IV and VI) under the DCHRA; three (Count I for
declaratory judgment, Count III for money damages, and Count V for money damages) under the
ADA/ADAAA; and one (Count II) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 For the reasons set forth below, the
court finds that WMATA is (1) not subject to claims brought pursuant to state law, (2) immune
from claims brought under the ADA/ADAAA, and (3) not a “person” within the meaning of §
1983 and therefore ineligible to be sued under that statute. The court also finds that since MTPD
is a department within WMATA and not a separate entity, it cannot be sued separately. Cf. Fields
v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 789 F. Supp. 20, 22 (D.D.C. 1992) (“It is well established, however, that
agencies and departments within the District of Columbia government are not suable as separate
entities.”) (citing Byrd v. District of Columbia, 1991 WL 336038, 119 U.S. LEXIS 12775 at *7
(D.D.C. Sept. 12, 1991); Roberson v. District of Columbia Board of Higher Education, 359 A.2d
28, 31 n.4 (D.C. 1976)); see also Brown v. Metro Transit Police Dep’t, 87 F. Supp. 3d 145, 146
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Plaintiff’s filings regarding his Amended Complaint appear to equivocate as to whether he
maintains a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or asserts a new claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Compare
(ECF No. 8-4 at 6) with (ECF No. 8-2 at 6). This opinion therefore addresses claims brought under
either statute.
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(D.D.C.), aff’d, 637 F. App’x 3 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (construing suit against MTPD as suit against
WMATA). Accordingly, all claims against MTPD are dismissed as a matter of law.
A. DCHRA CLAIMS
WMATA is the creation of an interstate compact (“the Compact”) signed by Maryland,
Virginia, and the District of Columbia. It is therefore an instrumentality of those jurisdictions.
Ndzerre v. Wash. Metro Area Transit Auth., 174 F. Supp. 3d 58, 64 (D.D.C. 2016); see also
Sanders v. Wash. Metro Area Transit Auth., 819 F.2d 1151, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1987). As other courts
in this district have noted, the Compact itself clarifies that “one signatory may not impose its
legislative enactment upon the entity created by it without the express consent of the other
signatories and the Congress of the United States.” Lucero-Nelson v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit
Auth., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1998) (citing OPIEU, Local 2 v. WMATA, 724 133, 139 (D.C.
Cir. 1983)); see also D.C. Code § 9–1107.01 (2017) (noting that WMATA is “exempt from all
laws, rules, regulations and orders of the signatories” in relation to transit services rendered).
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint contains no indication that Maryland and Virginia have consented
to suit under the DCHRA. Taylor v. WMATA, 109 F. Supp. 2d 11, 18 (D.D.C. 2000) (“It is well
established that WMATA is not subject to the DCHRA because WMATA is an interstate compact
agency and instrumentality of three separate jurisdictions.”); Sampson v. WMATA, No. Civ. A. No.
04-1767, 2005 WL 3276277, at *3 (D.D.C. 2005) (“Because there is no indication that Virginia
and Maryland have consented to the application of District of Columbia law… [it] does not apply
to WMATA.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s DCHRA claims are dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
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B. ADA CLAIMS
1. Money Damages
The D.C. Circuit has consistently held that WMATA is immune from suit under the
Eleventh Amendment because the Compact signatories conferred their respective immunities upon
it. Barbour v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 374 F.3d 1161, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“WMATA,
a mass transit system for the District of Columbia and surrounding suburban areas, was created by
an interstate compact among Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia, and enjoys the
Eleventh Amendment immunity of the two signatory states.”); Jones v. Wash. Metro Area Transit
Auth., 205 F.3d 428, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“We have consistently recognized that in signing the
WMATA Compact, Virginia and Maryland each conferred its immunity upon WMATA, which
therefore enjoys, to the same extent as each state, immunity from suit in federal court based on its
performance of governmental functions.”); Morris v. WMATA, 781 F.2d 218, 219–20 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (“WMATA’s sovereign immunity exists because the signatories have successfully conferred
their respective sovereign immunities upon it.”).
There are two circumstances in which a private individual can sue a state despite Eleventh
Amendment immunity: (1) where a state consents to suit, thus waiving its immunity; or (2) where
Congress abrogates the immunity by exercising its enforcement power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999) (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Clark v. Barnard,
108 U.S. 436, 447–48 (1883)). There is no indication of waiver in this case. Moreover, the
Supreme Court ruled in Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) that Congress’s attempt
to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity in Title I of the ADA exceeded Congress’s authority under
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Section 5. Id. at 368, 374 & n.9. Thus, private individuals may not recover money damages from
a state in federal court under Title I of the ADA. See id.; Barbour 374 F.3d at 1176 (noting that
while the Court in Tennessee v. Lane upheld the abrogation in Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the Court’s prior decision in Garrett, “that Congress exceeded its enforcement
power under Title I of the ADA by subjecting states to suits for money damages for disability
discrimination in employment,” remained in effect).
Title I of the ADA addresses discrimination against the disabled in employment, while
Title II addresses discrimination against the disabled in public services, programs, and activities.
Barbour, 374 F.3d at 1176. While Plaintiff does not specify the Title under which he seeks relief,
the substance of the allegations makes clear that the ADA claim concerns Title I’s prohibition on
disability discrimination in employment. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s suit for money damages under
the ADA is barred by WMATA’s Eleventh Amendment immunity, id., and is therefore dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
2. Declaratory Relief
While suits against state officials seeking prospective relief for violations of federal law
may be permissible in federal court, see Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–57 (1908); Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664–68 (1974) (distinguishing between prospective and retroactive relief
in determining whether suit nominally against individual officials is in fact against the state);
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n. 9, suits against a state (or an arm thereof) in its own right are barred,
regardless of the type of relief sought. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58
(1996) (“[W]e have often made it clear that the relief sought by a plaintiff suing a State is irrelevant
to the question whether the suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”) (citing Cory v. White,
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457 U.S. 85, 90 (1982) (“It would be a novel proposition indeed that the Eleventh Amendment
does not bar a suit to enjoin the State itself simply because no money judgment is sought.”)).
WMATA is an arm of the state, and Plaintiff has sued WMATA in its own right, naming no
individual officials. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for a declaratory judgment under the ADA is
barred by WMATA’s Eleventh Amendment immunity, and is therefore dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
C. § 1983 CLAIM
It is well established that neither states nor official state actors qualify as “persons” within
the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
Since WMATA is an arm of the state, it does not qualify as a “person” within the meaning of §
1983, and cannot be sued under that statute. See Disability Rights Council of Greater Washington
v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 239 F.R.D. 9, 20 (D.D.C. 2006) (dismissing § 1983
count because WMATA is not a “person” within meaning of the statute); Lucero-Nelson v.
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1998) (“[T]he Court is
persuaded that as an arm of the state WMATA is not a ‘person’ within the meaning of the statute.”);
see also Cutchin v. D.C., 174 F. Supp. 3d 427, 430 (D.D.C. 2016) (same); Tapp v. Washington
Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 15-CV-0768 (KBJ), 2016 WL 7441719, at *7 (D.D.C. Sept. 30,
2016) (same). Furthermore, to the extent that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint replaces or
supplements his claim under § 1983 with a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, that claim is precluded
for the same reasons. Thompson v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 01-7026, 2001 WL
1154420, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2001) (affirming dismissal of § 1981 claims against WMATA
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due to Eleventh Amendment immunity) (citing Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561 (6th
Cir.), cert denied, 121 S. Ct. 561 (2000)).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint (ECF No. 8) is hereby
GRANTED. Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is also
GRANTED as to all claims arising under the DCHRA, Title I of the ADA/ADAAA, and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and/or § 1981. Defendants will have the opportunity to file and brief an additional motion
to dismiss Plaintiff’s newly added claims under Title VII.
Date: March 31, 2018
Tanya S. Chutkan
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
United States District Judge
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