Alejandro v. State of California ( 2022 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
OMAR MEDINA ALEJANDRO, 1 )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 22-cv-00899 (UNA)
)
)
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on its initial review of plaintiff’s pro se complaint
(“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (also “IFP”), ECF No.
2, and motion for emergency relief (“Mot.”), ECF No. 3. Pro se litigants must comply with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987).
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires complaints to contain “(1) a
short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir.
2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted
so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the
doctrine of res judicata applies, and assists courts in, among other purposes, determining whether
it has jurisdiction over the subject matter, whether it has proper venue, and whether is can exercise
1
Plaintiff has filed numerous cases in this Court in this name and also as Omar Alejandro
Medina.
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personal jurisdiction over the defendants. See Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C.
1977).
More, “[a] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint that lacks “an arguable basis
either in law or in fact” is frivolous, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), and a
“complaint plainly abusive of the judicial process is properly typed malicious,” Crisafi v. Holland,
655 F.2d 1305, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
The Court cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a frivolous complaint. Hagans
v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (“Over the years, this Court has repeatedly held that the
federal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are
‘so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.’ ”) (quoting Newburyport
Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579 (1904)); Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1010
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (examining cases dismissed “for patent insubstantiality,” including where the
plaintiff allegedly “was subjected to a campaign of surveillance and harassment deriving from
uncertain origins.”). A court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous “when the facts alleged rise to
the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible,” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992),
or “postulat[e] events and circumstances of a wholly fanciful kind,” Crisafi, 655 F.2d at 1307-08.
Plaintiff, a resident of San Pedro, California, has submitted a cryptically worded complaint,
consisting of random statements and conclusory assertions. See generally, Compl. The content is
largely incomprehensible and thus provides no notice of a claim and no basis for this Court’s
jurisdiction, venue, or any entitlement to relief. See id. Plaintiff sues the State of California, and
though defendant’s connection, if any, to the allegations are unclear, he contends that he has been
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harassed at his home by unknown persons in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. See id. at
2, 3–4. More specifically, he alleges that he was “harassed at [his] home by what [he] think[s] this
time, are homosexuals.” Id. at 4. He believes that he heard male voices telling him to “ ‘stop
eating food, you are going to look fat in the shower.’ ” Id. As a result of this incident, plaintiff
maintains that he experienced stroke-like symptoms and he demands $150 million in damages,
with “110 Million dollars upfront direct deposited in [his] bank account with chase. If [he] gets
raped as a result of doing legal business here in the United States [he will] . . . charge 8 trillion
dollars.” Id.
His motion for emergency relief is equally implausible and unintelligible. As far as it can
be understood, he appears to demand that the Court expedite this case because he has difficulty
viewing it on PACER and “costs money to look up cases,” and because “does not have enough
[money] to buy a weapon.” See Mot. at 1.
Plaintiff is no stranger to this Court, having filed an influx of cases, many of which are
substantially similar to the instant matter, 2 and all of which have been dismissed for inadequate
2
At the time of the entry of this order, plaintiff also has numerous substantially similar cases
pending before the Court for review. See, e.g., Alejandro v. United States Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit, No. 22-cv-01161 (UNA) (D.D.C. filed Apr. 25, 2022); Alejandro v. State of
California, No. 22-cv-01040 (UNA) (D.D.C. filed Apr. 11, 2022); Alejandro v. State of California,
No. 22-cv-01020 (UNA) (D.D.C. filed Apr. 11, 2022); Alejandro v. Biden, No. 22-cv-01003
(UNA) (D.D.C. filed Apr. 8, 2022); Alejandro v. FBI, No. 22-cv-01002 (UNA) (D.D.C. filed Apr.
8, 2022); Alejandro v. United States Court of Federal Claims, No. 22-cv-00971 (UNA) (D.D.C.
filed Apr. 7, 2022); Alejandro v. State of California, No. 22-cv-00970 (UNA) (D.D.C. filed Apr.
7, 2022); Alejandro v. State of California, No. 22-cv-00824 (UNA) (D.D.C. filed Mar. 24, 2022);
Alejandro v. United Nations, No. 22-cv-00793 (UNA) (D.D.C. filed Mar. 21, 2022); Alejandro v.
State of California, No. 22-cv-00637 (UNA) (D.D.C. filed Mar. 7, 2022); Alejandro v. Biden, No.
22-cv-00636 (UNA) (D.D.C. filed Mar. 7, 2022); Alejandro v. Dep’t of Defense, No. 22-cv-00528
(UNA) (D.D.C. filed Feb. 22, 2022); Alejandro v. State of California, No. 22-cv-00524 (UNA)
(D.D.C. filed Feb. 22, 2022); Alejandro v. Newsom, No. 22-cv-00523 (UNA) (D.D.C. filed Feb.
22, 2022).
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pleading under Rule 8(a), for failure to state a claim, as frivolous, for want of jurisdiction, or some
combination of those grounds. See, e.g., Alejandro v. Biden, No. 22-cv-00399 (UNA) (D.D.C.
Apr. 19, 2022) (dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)); Medina v. Dep’t
of Defense, No. 22-cv-00691 (UNA) (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 2022) (dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)); Alejandro v. Moss, No. 22-cv-00623 (UNA) (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2022) (dismissed as
frivolous); Alejandro v. Biden, No. 22-cv-00544 (UNA) (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2022) (dismissed as
frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)); Alejandro v. Biden, No. 22-cv-00529 (UNA)
(D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2022) (dismissed as frivolous); Alejandro v. Dep’t of Defense, No. 22-cv-00622
(UNA) (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2022) (dismissed as frivolous); Alejandro v. FBI, No. 22-cv-00550
(UNA) (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2022) (dismissed as frivolous); Alejandro v. Newsom, No. 22-cv-00526
(UNA) (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2022) (dismissed as frivolous); Alejandro v. U.S. Government, No. 22-
cv-00589 (UNA) (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2022) (dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i)); Alejandro v. United States, No. 22-cv-00546 (UNA) (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2022)
(dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)); Alejandro v.
Biden, No. 22-cv-00405 (UNA) (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2022) (dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a));
Alejandro v. Biden, No. 22-cv-00436 (UNA) (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2022) (dismissed for want of subject
matter jurisdiction and as frivolous); Alejandro v. State of California, No. 22-cv-00341 (UNA)
(D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2022) (dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)); Alejandro v. United States
President, No. 22-cv-00392 (UNA) (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2022) (dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a) and for want of subject matter jurisdiction); Medina v. United States Government, No. 22-cv-
00314 (UNA) (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2022) (dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)); Medina v. Bonta,
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No. 22-cv-00263 (UNA) (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2022) (dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a));
Alejandro v. United States Government, No. 21-cv-00262 (UNA) (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 2022) (dismissed
as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)); Medina v. United States, No. 19-cv-2487
(RDM) (D.D.C. July 23, 2020) (dismissed pursuant to Fed. Rs. Civ. P. 8(a) and 12(b)(6)); Medina
v. United States Attorneys Office Dist. of Columbia, No. 20-cv-00896 (TSC) (D.D.C. Apr. 28,
2020) (dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)); Medina v. United States, No. 20-cv-00327
(TJK) (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2020) (dismissed for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a) and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction).
Still plaintiff persists. In addition to dismissing the instant complaint, and denying
plaintiff’s motion for emergency relief, the Court will now order plaintiff to show cause why he
should not be barred from filing civil actions in forma pauperis.
1. Legal Standard
An individual’s right to access to the courts “is neither absolute nor unconditional.” In re
Green, 669 F.2d 779, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam). Furthermore, “[a]n in forma pauperis
litigant’s access to the courts is a matter of privilege, not of right, and should not be used to abuse
the process of the courts.” Williams v. McKenzie, 8 34 F.2d 152, 154 (8th Cir. 1987). The Court
“has an obligation to protect and preserve the sound and orderly administration of justice.” Urban
v. United Nations, 768 F.2d 1497, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quoting In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d
1254, 1262 (2d Cir. 1984)). To that end, the Court “may employ injunctive remedies to protect
the integrity of the courts and the orderly and expeditious administration of justice,” Urban, 768
F.2d at 1500, such as denying “prospectively” one’s privilege to proceed in forma pauperis. Hurt
v. Social Security Admin., 544 F.3d 308, 310 (D.C. Cir. 2008). In determining whether to issue an
injunction, the Court must make substantive findings as to the frivolous or harassing nature of the
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litigant’s actions and as to any pattern constituting harassment. In re Powell, 851 F.2d 427, 431
(D.C. Cir. 1988). Similarly, before revoking the privilege to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court
must consider “the number, content, frequency, and disposition of [the litigant’s] previous filings
to determine if there is a pattern of abusing the IFP privilege in his litigation history.” Butler v.
Dep’t of Justice, 492 F.3d 440, 446 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
2. Plaintiff’s Litigation History
As indicated above, most of plaintiff’s complaints are repetitive and largely incoherent,
and many filed against the same or similar defendants. A search and review of this Court’s civil
docket indicates that, in the past two plus years, plaintiff has filed 3 at least 32 cases in this Court
alone, including the instant matter. See listing, supra, at pp. 3–5, p. 3 n.2. Of those 32 cases, every
case that has been screened has been dismissed sua sponte; the pending cases only survive because
they have not yet been screened, see id.
A search and review of PACER reveals that plaintiff has filed several recent matters in
other federal courts, and similarly, most of them have also failed to survive the screening process.
See, e.g., Alejandro v. USA, No. 22-cv-00302 (DAT) (Ct. Fed. Cl. Mar. 29, 2022) (dismissing case
for want of subject matter jurisdiction and as frivolous, noting plaintiff’s “record of filing frivolous
complaints” and “history of vexatious and duplicative litigation,” collecting cases, directing the
Clerk to reject any future submissions in the matter unless the filings comply with this Court’s
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Three more of plaintiff’s cases were removed from the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia to this Court, and plaintiff was also proceeding IFP in all of those cases. See Medina,
No. 19-cv-2487 (RDM); Medina, No. 20-cv-00896 (TSC); Medina, No. 20-cv-00327 (TJK).
Including those matters in plaintiff’s case-count brings the total to 35 matters. See listing, supra,
at pp. 3–5, p. 3 n.2. As noted, two of the removed matters were dismissed sua sponte in screening,
see id. at Medina, No. 20-cv-00896 (TSC); Medina, No. 20-cv-00327 (TJK), and the third was
dismissed when the Court granted defendant’s preliminary motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. Rs.
Civ. P. 8(a) and 12(b)(6), see id. at Medina, No. 19-cv-02487 (RDM).
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rules, and finding that any appeal from would not be taken in good faith); Medina v. United States
of America, No. 19-cv-00474 (PA) (FFM) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2019) (denying plaintiff’s IFP
application and dismissing claims “against the United States and/or President for “sound wave
harassment” as “delusional” and “legally and/or factually patently frivolous”); Medina v. United
States of America, No. 18-cv-10546 (MWF) (PLA) (C.D. Cal. Dec. 26, 2018) (denying plaintiff’s
IFP application and dismissing as “fanciful” and “legally and/or factually patently frivolous”);
Medina v. United States of America, No. 18-cv-09993 (GW) (FFM) (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2018)
(denying plaintiff’s IFP application and dismissing as “legally and/or factually patently
frivolous”).
3. Plaintiff’s Abuse of the IFP Privilege
The “inquiry” is whether plaintiff “has abused a special privilege of the court to such an
extent that that privilege should not again be extended to him here.” Butler, 492 F.3d at 446. The
Court finds that plaintiff has reached that point. This District has been more than tolerant in
liberally construing plaintiff’s complaints, allowing him to proceed in forma pauperis, and
expending significant staff time and resources to process, review, and resolve his cases. The Court
finds that plaintiff has a history of filing frequent and repetitive lawsuits, and that these relentless
filings are harassing to the Court. Cf. with Butler, 492 F.3d at 446–47 (finding an abuse of the in
forma pauperis privilege from, inter alia, plaintiff’s “pattern” of filing repetitive FOIA actions
where “[a]ll but one [of 15 such cases] were dismissed on either summary judgment, a motion to
dismiss, or for failure to respond.”); see id. at 445–46 (examining Supreme Court cases finding
abuse of IFP privilege); see also Hurt, 544 F.3d at 310 (concluding that “‘the number, content,
frequency, and disposition’ of [Hurt’s] filings shows an especially abusive pattern, aimed at taking
advantage of the IFP privilege.”). Like the plaintiff in Butler, “it appears that filing [civil] actions
is a ‘pastime’ for [plaintiff].” Butler, 492 F.3d at 447.
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4. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that plaintiff has abused the privilege of
proceeding IFP and proposes to issue an order barring him from filing any new civil actions in this
district without payment of the applicable filing fee. See Hurt, 544 F.3d at 311 (revoking IFP
privilege, dismissing all appeals, and directing the Clerk “to refuse to accept any more of Hurt's
civil appeals that are not accompanied by the appropriate filing fees.”). Before the Court issues
such an order, it must allow plaintiff an opportunity to respond. See In re Powell, 851 F.2d at 431.
A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.
TREVOR N. McFADDEN
Dated: May 6, 2022 United States District Judge
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