Roberson v. Federal Bureau of Investigation ( 2022 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ANTHONY ROBERSON,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-02431 (CJN)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Anthony Roberson, a Texas state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, sued
the Federal Bureau of Investigation under the Freedom of Information Act to compel the
production of records related to his criminal prosecution. The FBI now seeks dismissal or in the
alternative summary judgment, contending that Roberson has failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies and that res judicata bars his FOIA claim. Because the FBI has not established that
Roberson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and because the dismissal of Roberson’s
previous FOIA action does not have preclusive effect, the Court denies the FBI’s motion.
Background
In recent years, Roberson has submitted at least two FOIA requests for documents from
the FBI. The first of those requests was the subject of the district court’s opinion in Roberson v.
FBI, No. 18-1593, 2019 WL 5892219 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2019). To briefly summarize, the FBI
received Roberson’s request at issue in that case on May 23, 2018. Id. at *2. The request consisted
of 27 parts, which the FBI determined concerned “three distinct subjects”: (1) “the genetic loci
showing the number of loci required to prove identity”; (2) “records of a third party”; and (3)
1
“records pertaining to a laboratory file.” Id. at *1 (quotations omitted). Three business days after
receiving the request, the FBI responded with two letters informing Roberson that responsive
records about the first subject were available on the FBI’s public website and citing exemptions to
justify its nondisclosure of documents related to the second subject. Id. And 19 business days
after receiving the request, the FBI released 123 pages of responsive documents pertaining to the
third subject. Id. When Roberson sued to compel the production of additional records, the district
court concluded that he had not exhausted his administrative remedies and therefore granted the
FBI’s motion to dismiss. Id. at *2–3. By separate order, the district court dismissed the case
without prejudice. Order, Roberson, 2019 WL 5892219 (No. 18-1593), ECF No. 25.
Several months after the dismissal, Roberson submitted a second FOIA request by letter to
the FBI. The letter, dated June 15, 2020, was received by the FBI on July 2, 2020. 1 Pl.’s Opp.
¶ 8, ECF No. 13; Pl.’s Ex. 1, ECF No. 13-1. The FBI determined that this request sought the same
records that were previously processed and released to Roberson following his first request. Def.’s
Ex. 1 (“Seidel Decl.”) ¶ 5, ECF No. 11-1. In a letter dated August 6, 2020, the FBI acknowledged
receipt of Roberson’s second request and informed him that the records were previously released,
that another search located no additional records, that his request was being administratively
closed, and that Roberson could appeal the FBI’s determination to the Office of Information
Policy. Id. ¶ 6; Pl.’s Ex. 3, ECF No. 13-1. The Office of Information Policy later advised the FBI
that it had no record of an administrative appeal regarding this second FOIA request. Seidel Decl.
¶ 8.
1
Although the FBI contended in its motion that it received the request “on or about June 15, 2020,”
Def.’s Mot. at 2, ECF No. 11, Roberson responded that the correct date of receipt was July 2, 2020,
which the FBI did not dispute in its reply. Pl.’s Opp. ¶ 10, ECF No. 13; see Def.’s Reply, ECF
No. 16.
2
Roberson alleges here, in a complaint docketed on August 18, 2020, that the FBI violated
FOIA by failing to produce responsive records. Compl., ECF No. 1. The FBI seeks dismissal or
summary judgment, arguing that Roberson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by filing
the complaint without first pursuing an administrative appeal. In addition, the FBI argues that the
district court’s previous dismissal in Roberson v. FBI precludes Roberson from bringing this
action.
Legal Standard
Because the parties have submitted materials outside the pleadings that bear on the issues
presented, the Court analyzes the FBI’s motion as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); Thompson v. DEA, 492 F.3d 428, 437–38 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Summary
judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “In making
that determination, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing
party.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014) (quotation omitted).
Analysis
I. The FBI Has Not Shown that Roberson Failed to Exhaust Administrative
Remedies.
The FBI first contends that Roberson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because
he did not administratively appeal the FBI’s denial of his request for records. Def.’s Mot. at 10,
ECF No. 11. FOIA requires exhaustion of the administrative appeal process before an individual
may seek judicial review of an agency’s denial of a request for documents. Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t
of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 61–62 (D.C. Cir. 1990). An individual who does not actually exhaust
his administrative remedies may constructively exhaust them if the agency fails to respond to the
request by the statutory deadline. Id. at 62; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i). The statute requires
3
agencies to “determine within 20 days (excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays)
after the receipt of any such request whether to comply with such request” and to “immediately
notify the person making such request” of the determination. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i).
Constructive exhaustion generally occurs if the agency fails to answer the request within 20
business days, but “[i]f the agency responds to the request after the twenty-day statutory window,
but before the requester files suit, the administrative exhaustion requirement still applies.” Jud.
Watch, Inc. v. Rossotti, 326 F.3d 1309, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The question here, then, is whether
the FBI responded to Roberson’s FOIA request before he filed this suit.
Generally, a pleading or other paper that is not filed electronically is filed when it is
delivered to the clerk or to a judge who accepts it for filing. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d)(2). But under the
“mailbox rule” for pro se prisoner pleadings, the filing date is when the prisoner “gave his motion
to prison officials for delivery to the district court.” Anyanwutaku v. Moore, 151 F.3d 1053, 1057
(D.C. Cir. 1998); see Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270–71 (1988). Courts regularly apply this
mailbox rule to determine the filing date of FOIA complaints. See, e.g., Earle v. Holder, 815 F.
Supp. 2d 176, 179 n.3 (D.D.C. 2011) (accepting the date that a prisoner mailed his complaint from
the prison as the filing date when measuring a statutory limitations period); Hart v. DOJ, 648 F.
Supp. 2d 113, 115 n.3 (D.D.C. 2009) (concluding that a prisoner’s opposition was filed when he
gave it to prison staff for mailing); see also Order at 2, Roberson, 2019 WL 5892219 (No. 18-
1593), ECF No. 30 (recognizing the correct filing date of Roberson’s complaint in the previous
FOIA action as June 1, 2018, not the date it was received by the court, under the mailbox rule).
Here, the parties agree that the FBI responded to Roberson’s FOIA request on August 6,
2020, which was more than 20 business days after it received the FOIA request on July 2. Def.’s
Mot. at 2; Pl.’s Opp. ¶ 10. The record supports (and the FBI does not dispute) that Roberson
4
submitted his complaint to prison officials for mailing on August 4, 2020, which the Court treats
as the relevant filing date under the mailbox rule. Pl.’s Exs. 4–5, ECF No. 13-1. Because the
FBI’s August 6 response was neither within the 20-day statutory period nor before Roberson filed
suit on August 4, the FBI has not shown that Roberson failed to constructively exhaust his
administrative remedies.
II. Res Judicata Does Not Bar Roberson’s Claim.
The FBI also argues that res judicata bars this action because Roberson “asserted the same
FOIA challenge to the Office’s actions” in his prior lawsuit and a final judgment was entered on
the merits. Def.’s Mot. at 12. The doctrine of res judicata “bars successive lawsuits if a prior
litigation (1) involving the same claims or causes of action, (2) between the same parties or their
privies, (3) ended in a final, valid judgment on the merits, (4) entered by a court of competent
jurisdiction.” Ashbourne v. Hansberry, 894 F.3d 298, 302 (D.C. Cir. 2018). The Court disagrees
that res judicata applies here.
First, Roberson’s lawsuits do not involve the same claims. Lawsuits involve the same
claims if they “share the same nucleus of facts.” Apotex, Inc. v. FDA, 393 F.3d 210, 217 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted). Courts consider “whether the facts are related in time, space,
origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a
unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding or usage.” Id. (quotations
omitted). Res judicata “does not bar parties from bringing claims based on material facts that were
not in existence when they brought the original suit.” Id. at 218.
Although the two complaints at issue here raise similar causes of action based on the FBI’s
responses to similar FOIA requests, the FOIA requests were submitted—and denied—separately
and years apart from each other. The lawsuits therefore challenge different agency determinations,
5
and the current lawsuit challenges a determination that had not yet been made at the time of the
first lawsuit. See Drake v. FAA, 291 F.3d 59, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that res judicata did
not bar a successive lawsuit against an agency’s “subsequent determination” and noting that key
events “had not even taken place at the time” when the plaintiff instigated the initial lawsuit). And
as noted above, the circumstances surrounding the submission of the second FOIA request are
materially different, such that Roberson has now constructively exhausted his administrative
remedies. The Court concludes that the facts underlying the lawsuits are not “closely related in
time, space, origin, and motivation” and would not have formed a convenient trial unit as required
for res judicata to apply. Apotex, 393 F.3d at 217.
Second, even if the lawsuits did raise the same claim, the previous case was dismissed
without prejudice and therefore “does not operate as an adjudication upon the merits” or “have a
res judicata effect.” Cactus Canyon Quarries, Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n,
820 F.3d 12, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quotations omitted). A dismissal of a complaint for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies does not preclude a plaintiff from bringing another suit after he
has exhausted his administrative remedies. See Murthy v. Vilsack, 609 F.3d 460, 466 (D.C. Cir.
2010); Bland v. Connally, 293 F.2d 852, 855 (D.C. Cir. 1961). The previous dismissal therefore
would not have barred Roberson from filing suit after exhausting his administrative remedies even
as to his first FOIA request, and it likewise does not bar his suit here. See Bowden v. United States,
106 F.3d 433, 436–37, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (concluding that a district court erred in dismissing a
claim as barred by an earlier dismissal order based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies
because “the earlier dismissal was without prejudice”).
6
Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court denies the FBI’s motion. An order will issue
contemporaneously with this opinion.
DATE: October 10, 2022
CARL J. NICHOLS
United States District Judge
7