Gibson v. Saul ( 2022 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
INDIA PATRICIA GIBSON,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 1:21-cv-660-ZMF
KILOLO KIJAKAZI,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, India Patricia Gibson, moves for reversal of Defendant Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration’s decision adopting the findings of an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) and denying Gibson’s application for Supplemental Security Income and Disability
Insurance Benefits. See Pl.’s Mot. J. Reversal (“Pl.’s Mot.”) 1, ECF No. 18.
On September 29, 2021, by consent of the parties, U.S. District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan
referred this matter to a Magistrate Judge for all purposes. See Min. Order (Sept. 29, 2021).
Pending before this Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment of Reversal and Defendant’s Motion
for Judgment of Affirmance. See Pl.’s Mot.; Def.’s Mot. J. Affirmance (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No.
20. After considering the parties’ submissions and the Administrative Record, 1 the undersigned
DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment of Reversal and GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for
Judgment of Affirmance in an accompanying order.
1
The Administrative Record consists of thirty exhibits. See Administrative R., ECF No. 13. For
ease of reference, citations to the Administrative Record will refer to the “AR” and cite to the
consecutive page numbers provided in the lower right-hand corner of each page.
1
I. BACKGROUND
Statutory Framework
The Social Security Act entitles an individual to disability benefits if she is unable to
engage in “any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); see
20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a) (2022).
The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) uses a five-step process to determine whether
a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4) (2022). The claimant bears the burden of
proof for the first four steps. See Butler v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 992, 997 (D.C. Cir. 2004). First, a
claimant must show that she is not presently engaged in “substantial gainful activity.”
§ 416.920(a)(4)(i). Second, she must demonstrate that she has a “severe impairment” that
“significantly limits [her] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.”
§§ 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c). Third, the claimant must show that her impairment or combination of
impairments “meets or equals” one of the listings at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1.
§ 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If it does, then the claimant is deemed disabled and the inquiry ends. See
§§ 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (d). If not, the ALJ must proceed to step four, which requires the ALJ to
determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and consider whether, in light of
the RFC, the claimant can still perform any past work. See § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). At step five, if the
RFC indicates that the claimant cannot engage in past work, then “the burden shifts to the
Commissioner” to prove that the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and past work experience
indicate that she is “able to perform ‘other work’” that exists in the national economy. Butler, 353
F.3d at 997 (citing §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f)).
2
Factual Background
1. Gibson’s Testimony
Gibson’s alleged disability began on January 31, 2017, at which time she stopped working.
See AR 180. The alleged disability followed an injury to her back, neck, and shoulder while
working as a bus driver. See AR 296, 483. She testified at the hearing and in her adult function
reports that she cared for her personal needs—including dressing, bathing, laundry, caring for hair,
feeding herself, using the toilet, and cleaning—but sometimes needed help getting dressed or
caring for her hair. See AR 65–66, 237. She reported that she generally prepared her meals twice
per week. See AR 65, 238. She sometimes shopped for food and completed light household chores,
but other times needed help from her children, her mother, or a friend. See AR 66, 238–39. She
testified that she generally attended church once a week and reported going to doctor’s
appointments. See AR 67, 240. She typically drove herself when leaving the house, but
occasionally needed assistance. See AR 239–40.
2. Medical Evidence
On February 1, 2017, Dr. Polo-Zisa examined Gibson at Concentra Medical Center
(“Concentra”). See AR 970. Dr. Polo-Zisa concluded that Gibson’s lumbosacral spine had no
tenderness and a full range of motion; her thoracic spine was tender with painful, but full, range
of motion; and she ambulated with a normal gait. See AR 970. Gibson’s straight-leg raise test was
negative bilaterally. See AR 970.
On February 16, 2017, Dr. Pickett examined Gibson at Concentra. See AR 916. Gibson
had a negative straight-leg raise test and ambulated with a normal gait. See AR 916–17. On March
7, 2017, Dr. Shah examined Gibson at Concentra. See AR 910. Her cervical and thoracic spine
showed no tenderness with a full range of motion. See AR 911. On May 4, 2017, Dr. Raizman
3
concluded that an April 2017 MRI of Gibson’s cervical spine showed a malformation and
multilevel herniated disks. See AR 39, 1052. On July 18, 2017, Nurse Practitioner Hockman and
Dr. Silverio evaluated Gibson’s back pain. See AR 702. They observed lumbar spine tenderness,
but a normal range of motion and ambulation with a normal gait. See AR 702.
On November 15, 2017 and January 11, 2018, Dr. Onyewu examined Gibson and observed
spine tenderness, but a normal range of motion. See AR 488, 767, 769. Gibson ambulated with an
antalgic gait. 2 See AR 488, 767, 769. Gibson’s straight-leg raise test was negative bilaterally during
both examinations. See AR 488, 769. On April 5, 2018, Dr. Onyewu examined Gibson again and
reviewed an MRI of her cervical spine. See AR 751, 753. The MRI showed disc herniations;
however, motor strength was normal. See AR 752–54. Gibson’s straight-leg raise test was positive
at thirty degrees and she ambulated with an antalgic gait. See AR 754–55.
On May 29, 2018, Dr. Nolte examined Gibson. See AR 786. Dr. Nolte observed that she
ambulated with a slow gait, but had a normal stance and could “walk on [her] heels and toes
without difficulty,” get up and out of a chair without difficulty, and needed no help getting on and
off the exam table. AR 788. Gibson had moderate limitations in bending and squatting, and a mild
limitation in walking. See AR 790. On June 21, 2018, Dr. Raizman examined Gibson again and
observed that she had decreased cervical spine range of motion and that her straight-leg raise test
was positive bilaterally. See AR 1116.
From August 2018 to November 2019, Gibson continued to visit several doctors regarding
her back pain. These doctors concluded that her back exams and range of motion were normal, see
AR 421–22, and that she ambulated with a normal gait, see AR 1355. Dr. Venkataram, a state
2
An antalgic gait occurs when a person walks with a limp because of pain. See Cheryl Whitten,
What Is an Antalgic Gait?, WEBMD, https://www.webmd.com/pain-management/what-is-
antalgic-gait (last visited Nov. 21, 2022).
4
agency consulting physician, opined that Gibson could perform work at a light exertion level,
consistent with objective evidence of her back pain, and found her not disabled. See AR 92–94,
97–98.
However, in September 2018 and March 2019, Dr. Onyewu examined Gibson and made
some contrary findings. See AR 822, 1475. Dr. Onyewu observed that Gibson ambulated with an
antalgic gait, but his examination of her spine showed a normal range of motion, with pain. See
AR 826, 1475–77. Dr. Onyewu also noted that there was evidence of spinal tenderness, see AR
826, and that Gibson’s straight-leg raise test was positive at thirty degrees, see AR 826, 1477. On
May 22, 2020, Dr. Onyewu examined her again. See AR 16. Dr. Onyewu concluded that Gibson
suffered from chronic lower back pain. See AR 21. Dr. Onyewu advised her to avoid activities
such as “lifting, prolonged standing, walking,” and climbing. AR 21.
Procedural Background
On December 20, 2017, Gibson applied for disability benefits. See AR 31, 180. On July
27, 2018, the SSA denied her claim. See AR 118. On November 5, 2018, the SSA denied her
request for reconsideration. See AR 31, 127. On November 26, 2019, ALJ Raghav Kotval held a
hearing on Gibson’s claim. See AR 31, 53.
On January 16, 2020, the ALJ ruled Gibson was not disabled. See AR 47. At step one, the
ALJ determined that Gibson had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since the disability
onset date. See AR 33. At step two, the ALJ found that Gibson had severe impairments of “spine
disorders (cervical and lumbar)” among others. AR 33. At step three, the ALJ determined that
Gibson did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled
the criteria of Listing 1.04 (disorders of the spine). See AR 34–35. At step four, the ALJ found that
Gibson had the RFC to perform light work with some limitations. See AR 37. Specifically, she
5
could “lift, carry, push, and pull 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. She [could] sit
for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. She [could] stand and walk for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday.”
AR 37. Gibson could “only occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and
crawl.” AR 37. Thus, the ALJ limited Gibson to “simple, routine tasks, not at a production pace,
performed in two-hour increments” before needing a break. AR 37. The ALJ concluded that
Gibson’s severe impairments did not lead to debilitating effects on her functional abilities. See AR
38. At step five, the ALJ determined that there were jobs in significant numbers in the national
economy that Gibson could perform. See AR 46. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ relied on
the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”). See AR 46–47, 78–80. The ALJ asked the VE to
assume a hypothetical individual of Gibson’s age and education who could perform a full range of
light work with the above-referenced limitations. See AR 76. The VE responded that such an
individual could make a successful adjustment to a significant number of jobs in the national
economy, such as a greeter/usher, hostess, or information clerk. See AR 46, 79.
Gibson appealed the ALJ’s decision, which the Appeals Council declined to review. See
AR 4–6. Gibson now seeks review of the ALJ’s decision. See Pl.’s Mot. She argues that the ALJ
committed reversible error at step three because her impairments satisfied Listing 1.04A. 3 See id.
at 2, 5–12.
3
The Court pauses briefly to note that on April 2, 2021, the SSA updated the musculoskeletal
listings. Revised Medical Criteria for Evaluating Musculoskeletal Disorders Final Rules
Questions and Answers, SSA, https://www.ssa.gov/thirdparty/materials/pdfs/21-
489_Musculoskeletal_FAQs.pdf (last visiting Nov. 22, 2022). Listing 1.04 became Listing 1.15,
with additional requirements. See 1.00 Musculoskeletal Disorders – Adult, SSA,
https://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/bluebook/1.00-Musculoskeletal-Adult.htm#1_15
(last visited Nov. 22, 2022). For consistency, the Court will continue to refer to Listing 1.04 in
accordance with the parties’ briefing refers to Listing 1.04. See Pl.’s Mot.; Def.’s Mot.
3
Gibson only claims to meet the criteria of Paragraph A. See Pl.’s Mot. at 2.
6
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Upon review, “[t]he court must uphold the [ALJ’s] determination if it is supported by
substantial evidence and is not tainted by an error of law.” Smith v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 1120, 1121
(D.C. Cir. 1987). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Butler, 353 F.3d at 999 (quoting Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). This standard “requires more than a scintilla, but can be
satisfied by something less than a preponderance of the evidence.” Fla. Mun. Power Agency v.
Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 315 F.3d 362, 365–66 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). “Substantial-
evidence review is highly deferential to the agency fact-finder.” Rossello ex rel. Rossello v. Astrue,
529 F.3d 1181, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 2008). On review, the “plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating
that the Commissioner’s decision [was] not based on substantial evidence or that incorrect legal
standards were applied.” Settles v. Colvin, 121 F. Supp. 3d 163, 169 (D.D.C. 2015) (cleaned up).
The reviewing court may not replace the ALJ’s judgment “concerning the credibility of the
evidence with its own.” Goodman v. Colvin, 233 F. Supp. 3d 88, 104 (D.D.C. 2017) (cleaned up).
Rather, “[t]he credibility determination is solely within the realm of the ALJ.” Grant v. Astrue,
857 F. Supp. 2d 146, 156 (D.D.C. 2012).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Evaluation of Spinal Disorder Under Listing 1.04 at Step Three
1. Legal Standard
The criteria of the listings in step three “are more restrictive than the statutory disability
standard” because they describe impairments that are “severe enough to prevent a person from
doing any gainful activity,” not just substantial gainful activity. Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521,
532 (1990) (quoting § 416.925(a)). “For a claimant to show that h[er] impairment matches a
7
listing, it must meet all of the specified medical criteria. An impairment that manifests only some
of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify.” Id. at 530 (emphasis in original). The
claimant bears the burden of proving a presumptively disabling impairment. See id. at 525.
Listing 1.04 requires Gibson to show that she had a disorder of the spine and that she met
an additional criterion contained in paragraphs A, B, or C. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App.
1, 1.04. Paragraph A requires “nerve root compression characterized by neuro-anatomic
distribution of pain, limitation of motion of the spine, motor loss (atrophy with associated muscle
weakness or muscle weakness) accompanied by sensory loss or reflex loss and, if there is
involvement of the lower back, positive straight-leg raise test (sitting and supine).” 4 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart P, App. 1, 1.04.
In evaluating the ALJ’s decision at step three, “th[is] Court is not confined to the ALJ’s
analysis at step three and instead must consider the reasoning provided by the ALJ in the decision
in its entirety.” Al Hulais v. Comm’r. of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 18-cv-118, 2018 WL 6704756, at
*6 (D. Md. Dec. 20, 2018); see also Colter v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-632, 2022 WL 715218, at *11
(D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2022) (the ALJ “provid[ed] a sufficient basis for this Court to understand his
reasoning when viewing the decision as a whole”). For example, an ALJ’s reasons why a claimant
was not disabled at step four may “provide [a] rationale that is sufficient for [a court] to determine
the basis for the finding about [no] medical equivalence at step 3.” SSR 17-2p, 2017 WL 3928306,
at *4 (Mar. 27. 2017). 5
4
Gibson only claims to meet the criteria of Paragraph A. See Pl.’s Mot. at 2.
5
“Although Social Security Rulings . . . do not have the force of law, they are entitled to deference
so long as they are consistent with the [SSA] and regulations.” Nelson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., No. 19-cv-788, 2021 WL 1207753, at *4 (citing Fair v. Shalala, 37 F.3d 1466, 1469 (11th
Cir. 1994)).
8
2. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Determination that Plaintiff’s Impairment
Did Not Meet Listing 1.04A
The ALJ “specifically identifie[d] Listing [1.04], describe[d his] reasons for concluding
that Plaintiff’s condition d[id] not meet or medically equal that Listing, and [went] on to discuss
the evidence in the record in significant detail.” Conway ex rel. Tolen v. Astrue, 554 F. Supp. 2d
26, 35 (D.D.C. 2008); see AR 34, 38–45. There was no requirement “that the ALJ provide an
exhaustive point-by-point breakdown of every listed impairment. Rather, the ALJ [satisfied his
obligation] to provide a coherent basis for his step-three determination” by discussing the medical
evidence, disability report, and consultative examiner reports. Keene v. Berryhill, 732 F. App’x
174, 177 (4th Cir. 2018); see AR 34–35.
First, “[d]uring h[is] step three analysis, the ALJ explained why Gibson failed to meet the
requirements of Listing 1.04A” based on the medical evidence. Al Hulais, 2018 WL 6704756, at
*7; see AR 35. Specifically, the ALJ explained:
The record contains evidence of cervical and lumbar spine degeneration,
which led to reduced range of motion and back pain (Ex. 26F). The
claimant’s lower extremity strength was slightly decreased. However, on
examination by Dr. Nolte, the straight-leg raising test was negative
bilaterally. The claimant’s gait was slow, but she could walk on her heels
and toes without difficulty. Her stance was normal. She used no assistive
devices. She needed no help changing for the exam or getting on and off the
exam table. She was able to rise from a chair without difficulty. This
evidence is inconsistent with an inability to ambulate effectively.
AR 35. The ALJ thus identified Listing 1.04A and described his “reasons for concluding that
Plaintiff’s condition d[id] not meet . . . that Listing” before going “on to discuss the evidence . . . in
significant detail” at step four. Conway, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 35; see AR 34, 38–45.
In his step four “discussion of [Gibson’s] relevant medical evidence, the ALJ cited
substantial evidence in the record demonstrating that Plaintiff did not meet all of the requirements
for Listing 1.04A.” Al Hulais, 2018 WL 6704756, at *8; see AR 38–45. Treatment reports,
9
including those of Dr. Onyewu, indicated some spinal tenderness; however, those reports also
showed that Gibson retained a range of motion within normal limits—if not a full range of motion.
See AR 39, 437, 767–69, 970, 1475–77. Treatment records from this period indicated there was
no sciatic tenderness, see AR 38, 916–17, 752–54, despite Gibson’s diagnosis of a malformation
and claims of significant pain.,” AR 39, 1051. The medical evidence also indicated that Gibson
did not exhibit significant lumbosacral spine tenderness and her lumbar range of motion was within
normal limits. See AR 38, 702, 970. Gibson’s motor strength was normal on several occasions.
See AR 38–43, 488, 752–54, 911, 970. Her neurovascular function was also intact. See AR 39,
916–17. Additionally, during the May 2018 consultative examination, Gibson had a normal stance
and could “walk on her heels and toes, get up and out of a chair without difficulty, and needed no
help getting on and off the exam table.” AR 24; see AR 35, 41, 788. These “repeated findings . . . of
full strength . . . preclude a finding of ‘motor loss . . . accompanied by sensory or reflex loss.”
Knight v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-2734, 2022 WL 1746963, at *7 (D.S.C. Mar. 28, 2022) (cleaned up).
Thus, “there [was] elsewhere in the ALJ’s opinion an equivalent discussion of the medical
evidence relevant to the [s]tep [t]hree analysis which allows this Court readily to determine
whether there was substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s [s]tep [t]hree conclusion.” Schoofield
v. Barnhart, 220 F. Supp. 2d 512, 522 (D. Md. 2002).
Additionally, “the regulation’s text is clear that where, as here, ‘there is involvement of the
lower back,’ the claimant must produce evidence of positive [straight-leg raise] testing[.]”
Watlington v. Berryhill, No. 16-cv-46, 2017 WL 7053988, at *9 (W.D. Va. Dec. 20, 2017) (cleaned
up); see 20 C.F.R Part 404 Subpart P, App. 1, 1.04. “The absence of positive findings
from . . . straight-leg raising tests is enough to prevent [a plaintiff] from meeting Listing
1.04(A)[.]” Watlington, 2017 WL 7053988, at *9. Gibson provided some evidence of positive
10
straight-leg raise tests and antalgic gait. See AR 488, 752–54, 767, 769, 1116, 1475–77. However,
multiple examinations contradicted that evidence. See AR 38–44. In two examinations in February
2017, Gibson ambulated with a normal gait, and her straight-leg raise test was negative bilaterally.
See AR 38, 916–17, 970. In July 2017, Gibson again ambulated with a normal gait. See AR 39,
702. In both November 2017 and January 2018, the straight-leg raise test was negative bilaterally.
See AR 40, 488, 769. Finally, in November 2019, Gibson again ambulated with a normal gait. See
AR 43, 1355. The lack of uncontradicted evidence of positive straight-leg raise tests and
substantial defects in Gibson’s gait indicates that “the Listing 1.04A requirement of motor
loss . . . was [] not met.” Peters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 17-cv-2371, 2018 WL
4223155, at *6 (D. Md. Sept. 5, 2018); see Al Hulais, 2018 WL 6704756, at *8; AR 35–45.
“Therefore, in light of the evidence in the medical record . . . , the Court concludes that substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that [Gibson’s] impairments do not meet or equal Listing
1.04A.” Al Hulais, 2018 WL 6704756, at *8; see AR 35–45.
Second, “[although] the ALJ need not articulate his reasons for rejecting every piece of
evidence, he must at least minimally discuss a claimant’s evidence that contradicts the
Commissioner’s position.” Lane-Rauth v. Barnhart, 437 F. Supp. 2d 63, 67 (D.D.C. 2006)
(quoting Godbey v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2000)). The amount of contradictory
evidence the ALJ must consider depends on the case and strength of evidence. See Demetria R. v.
Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-3227, 2022 WL 3142376, at *21 (D.D.C. June 30, 2022). Ultimately, the ALJ
should consider whether the opinion is supported by “objective medical evidence” and whether it
is consistent with “the evidence from other medical . . . and nonmedical sources.” Id. (finding
ALJ’s consideration of two contrary medical reports sufficient since substantial evidence
supported his evaluation of the “supportability” and “consistency” of the reports); see Abigail R.
11
v. Kijakazi, No. 21-cv-13, 2022 WL 19676, at *8 (D. Neb. Jan. 3, 2022) (same); O’Brien v. Saul,
No. 18-cv-12634, 2020 WL 1169459, at *7 (D. Mass. March 11, 2020) (finding ALJ’s
consideration of one contrary medical report sufficient since it was “inconsistent with the overall
weight of the evidence” and supported by “substantial evidence”).
Here, the ALJ indicated not only “what evidence was credited, but also whether other
evidence was rejected,” rather than simply ignored. Brown v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 703,708 (D.C. Cir.
1986); see AR 44–45. The ALJ explained that Gibson’s positive back findings contradicted other
medical evidence that did not indicate motor loss or an inability to ambulate effectively, see AR
35, and his explanation was supported by substantial evidence, see AR 437, 970, 788; Broyles v.
Astrue, 910 F. Supp. 2d 55, 62 (D.D.C. 2012). Specifically, the ALJ noted treatment records
wherein Gibson’s straight-leg raise tests were negative, see AR 35, and she ambulated with a
normal gait, see AR 44, 437, 970, 1355. Indeed, Dr. Nolte’s examination revealed that Gibson had
a normal stance and could “walk on her heels and toes, get up and out of a chair without difficulty,
and needed no help getting on and off the exam table.” AR 34, 788. This contradicted examinations
by Dr. Onyewu and Dr. Raizman, wherein Gibson ambulated with an antalgic gait, and had
positive straight-leg raise tests and slightly decreased motor strength. See AR 752–54, 767–769,
1116, 1475–77.
“[E]ven if [Dr. Onyewu and Dr. Raizman’s] opinion[s] [were] persuasive in some respects,
the Court must defer to the contrary finding of the ALJ so long as it is supported by substantial
evidence[.]” Demetria R., 2022 WL 3142376, at *22. The ALJ considered at least four other
medical reports inconsistent with those of Dr. Onyewu and Dr. Raizman. See AR 39–45. “That is
substantial evidence[.]” Demetria R., 2022 WL 3142376, at *22 (ALJ’s consideration of two
medical reports showing Plaintiff did not meet a listing constituted substantial evidence to support
12
ALJ’s conclusion that reports which supported Plaintiff’s position were properly discounted as
contrary evidence); see also Broyles, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 62 (ALJ’s consideration of contradictory
evidence sufficient because the ALJ explained why such evidence conflicted with other medical
evidence). The Court cannot “reweigh the evidence” in [Gibson’s favor. Id. at 60 (internal citations
omitted). Thus, the ALJ “provided an adequate basis, supported by substantial evidence, for
finding the reports of [Dr. Onyewu and Dr. Raizman] less-than-totally-persuasive.” Demetria R.,
2022 WL 3142376, at *21; see AR 39–44.
Third, an ALJ need not “spell out every aspect of what a listing includes . . . as long as his
discussion of the evidence is not perfunctory.” Mangan v. Colvin, No. 12-cv-7203,
2014 WL 1908937, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 2014). For example, an ALJ’s analysis totaling “three
sentences” to dismiss “the possibility that [a claimant met] or medically equal[ed] Listing 1.04’s
criteria” was inadequate. Watson, Jr., v. Berryhill, No. 16-cv-089, 2018 WL 3434711, at *4 (N.D.
Ind. July 17, 2018). Unlike in Watson, the ALJ here “discuss[ed] the listing by name” and spent
three pages detailing why Listing 1.04 did not apply. Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F. 3d 664, 668 (7th
Cir. 2004); see AR 34–36. This “reasoning was not perfunctory or inadequate.” Keys v. Colvin,
No. 14-cv-250, 2016 WL 447519, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 5, 2016).
3. Medical Equivalence
a. Steps Four and Five Analysis Rebutted Medical Equivalence
If an ALJ “believes that the evidence already received in the record does not reasonably
support a finding that the individual’s impairment(s) medically equals a listed impairment, the
[ALJ] is not required to articulate specific evidence supporting his or her finding that the
individual’s impairment(s) does not medically equal a listed impairment.” SSR 17-2p, 2017 WL
3928306, at *4 (Mar. 27. 2017). Instead, “a statement that the individual’s impairment(s) does not
13
medically equal a listed impairment constitutes sufficient articulation for this finding” because the
ALJ’s “articulation of the reason(s) why the individual is or is not disabled at a later step in the
sequential evaluation process will provide rationale that is sufficient for a subsequent reviewer or
court to determine the basis for the finding about medical equivalence at step [three].” Id.The ALJ’s analysis at steps four and five demonstrated no medical equivalence. See AR
37. “The ALJ was aware of the medical records showing the existence of Plaintiff’s [impairments],
as he found those impairments to be severe . . . . But a reasonable reading of his decision shows
that he found that the records did not support a finding of functional limitations from Gibson’s
impairments], much less severe limitations.” Coscarelli v. Saul, No. 19-cv-1219,
2021 WL 8053621, at *9 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2021); see AR 33, 37. Indeed, the ALJ found that
Gibson had the RFC to perform light work. See AR 37. She could “lift, carry, push, and pull 20
pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. She [could] sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday.
She [could] stand and walk for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday.” AR 37. The ALJ also “noted
that . . . the consultative examination indicated a lack of functional limitations.” Coscarelli, 2021
WL 8053621, at *9; AR 41, 44–45. Additionally, the ALJ determined at step five that there were
jobs that Gibson could perform. See AR 46. He concluded that Gibson could make a successful
adjustment to a significant number of light, unskilled jobs in the national economy, such as a
greeter/usher, hostess, or information clerk. See AR 46, 79. “[The ALJ’s] discussion at step[s] four
[and five] provide[] a sufficient rationale and substantial evidence supports a finding that Plaintiff
does not meet [or medically equal] Listing [1.04A].” Coscarelli, 2021 WL 8053621, at *9; AR
37–47.
b. Evidence of Daily Living Rebutted Medical Evidence
14
The ALJ also considered substantial evidence that Gibson did “not have marked difficulties
in daily living.” Meador v. Colvin, No. 13-cv-214, 2015 WL 1477894, at *4 (W.D. Va. Mar. 27,
2015); see AR 37, 237. Gibson’s “ability to perform daily activities, such as taking personal care,
preparing simple meals, and shopping in stores . . . provide substantial evidence for the ALJ[’s]”
finding that Gibson was not disabled. Magee v. Berryhill, No. 17-cv-1922, 2019 WL 329571, at
*4 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2019); see AR 37–38, 65–67. That is, Gibson’s “activities of daily living
confirmed that she was not as functionally limited as she contended.” Goodman, 233 F Supp. 3d
at 112. This independently supports the ALJ’s finding that Gibson did medically equal a Listing
1.04A impairment.
c. Physician Reports Rebutted Medical Equivalence
“[Although] the ALJ . . . makes the ultimate decision on medical equivalence . . . ‘the
judgment of a physician designated by the Commissioner on the issue of equivalence . . . must be
received into the record as expert opinion evidence and given appropriate weight.”’ Mitchell v.
Colvin, No. 12-cv-1573, 2016 WL 509281, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2016) (quoting SSR 96-6p, 61
Fed. Reg. 34466, 34468 (July 2, 1996)). The signed opinions of several state agency physicians
finding that Gibson “was not disabled constitute[d] probative evidence of a lack of equivalence.”
Phelps v. Astrue, No. 10-cv-240, 2011 WL 2669637, at *5 (D. N.H. July 7, 2011); AR 82–124.
The ALJ not only discussed the state agency physicians’ opinions on the record, but also found
them “highly persuasive.” AR 44. In so doing, the ALJ fulfilled his obligation “to adequately
explain his reasoning, including which evidence is credited and which is rejected.” Mitchell,
2016 WL 509281, at *3.
Contrary to Gibson’s argument, the ALJ was not compelled to seek additional expert
evidence. See Pl.’s Mot. at 11–12. ALJs “may ask for and consider evidence from medical
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experts.” SSR 17-2p, 2017 WL 3928306, at *3 (Mar. 27. 2017). However, because the ALJ
believed that the “evidence [did] not reasonably support a finding that [Gibson’s] impairment(s)
medically equal[ed]” Listing 1.04A, the ALJ was not required “to obtain ME (Medical Expert)
evidence . . . prior to making a step [three] finding that [Gibson’s impairment(s) [did] not
medically equal [Listing 1.04A].” SSR 17-2p, 2017 WL 3928306, at *4 (Mar. 27. 2017).; see AR
34.
IV. CONCLUSION
There was substantial evidence that the ALJ did not err in concluding that Gibson did not
meet or medically equal the listing criteria for a 1.04A. Therefore, as set out in an accompanying
order, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment of Reversal will be denied, and Defendant’s Motion for
Judgment of Affirmance will be granted.
2022.11.23
12:34:21 -05'00'
Date: November 23, 2022 ___________________________________
ZIA M. FARUQUI
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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